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Abstract 
 
By means of a close reading of early 19th century economic works, and by 
reconstructing aspects of Thomas Hodgskin‘s political economy, this thesis 
presents an exposition of those parts of his work that contributed to his position 
on growth.  Rather than concentrating on his ideas on capital, we have centred 
on his concept of political economy as a science concerned with labour as the 
sole creator of wealth. 
We present his political economy as having labour as its focal point within a 
hypothetical pure market economy.  From here he sought a foundation to 
economic growth derived from human action rather than capital or other 
material circumstances.  Hodgskin saw human knowledge and the use of 
technology as the starting point that would, from his perspective, lead inevitably 
to those economic conditions that produce improvements in economic welfare 
and by doing so allow for an increase in population. 
In order to demonstrate his ideas on growth, we reconstruct his concepts of 
what was natural and artificial to equate to the modern notions of endogenous 
and exogenous.  Improvements to knowledge and technology that stemmed 
from the very temper of humanity and its tendency to multiply, were the 
endogenous fount of growth. In this way as Hodgskin stressed ―necessity was 
the mother of invention‖. 
We also illustrate how, from Hodgskin‘s perspective, exogenous issues were 
the non-economic influences such as governments, legal (rather than natural) 
laws and tithes that tended to act counter-productively to human progress. 
Our reconstruction also resolves some of the dissonance that has long been 
associated with Hodgskin‘s economics, by addressing some of the apparent 
contradictions that otherwise persist.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Agenda 
This thesis is a reconstructive exposition of Thomas Hodgskin‘s economic 
theory of endogenous growth. We aim to show that, contrary to the orthodoxy of 
mainstream economic thought adhered to by most of his contemporaries, 
Hodgskin presented an early portrayal of endogenous economic growth.1  For 
Hodgskin this growth would occur spontaneously, and thereby endogenously, 
as a result of what he saw as the natural conditions of man‘s social situation.  
The medium that enabled this economic growth was the human ingenuity 
evident in mankind‘s ever increasing knowledge and improving technology.  
From this perspective economic growth arose from man‘s ideas and mental 
abilities rather than the purely material circumstances of his existence. Hence 
we find in Hodgskin a concentration on human abilities and actions as the prime 
impetus to growth rather than the material characteristics of land or capital.  
Thus this thesis concentrates on this humanistic temper of Hodgskin‘s 
economics, rather than upon his capital theory that has generally received most 
academic attention.   
To this end we have dealt with his views on the character of the science of 
political economy, which were in advance of what was to become the more 
accepted concept of economics as a science rather than an art or guide to the 
                                            
1
 By endogenous we mean that growth, in Hodgskinřs scheme, arose from causes 
within, rather than outside, of a considered economy.  We do not propose that Hodgskin 
held a strictly technical notion of endogeny as portrayed in modern theories of 
endogenous growth. Hodgskinřs ideas should rather be seen as dissonant to his 
contemporaries and as such conceptually preparatory to modern notions particularly as 
they relate to such issues as the importance of knowledge, technology, and human 
capital.   
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management of the economy.  Where Hodgskin differed from later economists 
was that for him economics was a humanistic rather than materialistic science. 2 
This separation of the humanistic from the material required a clear conception 
of the field of endeavours upon which such distinctions are to be drawn. This 
was made abundantly clear by the various demarcations applied to the term 
Nature and the associated concepts of what was natural, un-natural and 
artificial.3   
What Hodgskin conceived of as artificial was not just a simply clear-cut 
opposition to the natural.  As J.S. Mill pointed out, if we take the artificial to 
mean that which resulted from man‘s actions, we either have to say that man is 
not part of nature, if that nature and the artificial are in opposition; or we 
encompass the artificial as natural. This then left the issue as to what was un-
natural if the artificial was not envisaged as just the converse of the natural.  To 
a certain extent this conundrum, at least for Hodgskin‘s economics, can 
become clearer if we clarify his notion of growth.  Such a reconstructive 
clarification, of Hodgskin‘s economic theory, leads to the conclusion that therein 
by natural Hodgskin meant that which was economically endogenous and the 
term artificial equated to that which was exogenous to a specific abstract 
economic condition.  
Hodgskin‘s humanistic approach was crucial to his analysis that saw labour as 
the sole cause of wealth. Although he recognised land and capital as necessary 
components to the production of wealth, it was only labour that had agency; 
only people acted. 
This concentration on labour thus required a portrayal of labour in its broadest 
sense as human action directed to the production of subsistence, and wealth.4   
Hodgskin claimed that labour should be rewarded with all that it produced.  The 
comprehensive nature of Hodgskin‘s labour was such that as only labour acted, 
all the results of that action should be attributable to that labour.  This became 
emotively expressed in the notion that labour should be rewarded with the 
                                            
2
 See chapter 2 Ŕ Political Economy. 
3 See chapter 3 Ŕ Nature. 
4 See chapter 4 Ŕ  Labour.  
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whole product of labour.  However, when we unpack what this claim amounted 
to it is less revolutionary than might first appear and was initially received as.  
Hodgskin‘s actual claim was that as what was produced was created by human 
activity those humans with responsibility for that activity had a property claim on 
that output.5 
Thus rather than a Labour Theory of Value in the traditional sense of that 
expression, we shall illustrate that Hodgskin held to what might be better 
expressed as a Labour Theory of Property.   Indeed we will show that to a large 
extent Hodgskin and some of his less naïve contemporaries (such as J.S. Mill 
and de Quincey) were well aware of the limits of a purely objective concept of 
value; particularly one that determined value simply by the labour embodied 
within a commodity. Several economists understood that a commodity‘s value 
was determined by what might be characterised as people‘s subjective 
concepts of worth, rather than absolute value existing objectively or having a 
concrete being independent of the good‘s consumer.6  
A correct understanding of Hodgskin‘s concept of value is important to an 
appreciation of his ideas on price. Hodgskin‘s position on price was quite 
distinct from a notion of value. When Hodgskin claimed that prices tended to fall 
over time, he was not claiming that the value of goods decreased. 
The issue of nomenclature often comes to the fore in this thesis, and this is 
particularly so when we try and clarify what Hodgskin meant by natural and 
market prices, especially when compared to his contemporaries.7  We conclude 
that Hodgskin‘s natural price was in fact the inverse of productivity, as the ratio 
of labour to output (when contrasted to productivity as the ratio of output per 
unit of labour).  Hodgskin also held that money (or market) prices provided 
invaluable information for buyers and sellers regarding production, consumption 
and economic activity in general.  Indeed price was the ―finger of Heaven‖ that 
presumably aided or was a part of the invisible hand that ensured market 
clearing. 
                                            
5 See chapter 5 Ŕ The Produce of Labour.  
6
 See chapter 6 Ŕ Value.  
7
 See chapter 7 Ŕ Price. 
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Hodgskin acknowledged the distinctiveness of his concept of the behaviour of 
prices when he asserted that in the long term both market and natural prices 
would decrease. 
Once we have clarified both the character and behaviour of prices we are able 
to form a more complete picture of what Hodgskin envisaged as economic 
growth.8    
From his humanistic perspective economic growth and human technological 
progress in general, flowed from the needs of an increasing population.  With 
―necessity as the mother of invention‖ an increasing population demanded and 
obtained increased social output.  Given the recognition of material constraints, 
an increasing population necessitates increased productivity or that increased 
population would not survive.  The very fact that populations increased required 
that either more physical resources were made available or that those limited 
resources were more productively applied.  Thus if physical resources are 
limited, knowledge and technology must improve so as to support an increasing 
population.   
A further facet to Hodgskin‘s economic growth stems from this inevitable 
improving productivity.  If all cost was attributable or reducible to labour, or if 
labour was the only contributing action in production then improving productivity 
must reduce natural price (in Hodgskin‘s sense of natural price as the inverse of 
productivity). 
Hodgskin believed that long term competitive pressures would ensure a 
narrowing of the gap between market and natural prices and that they would 
both follow descending trends.9  Whilst editor of The Economist Hodgskin was 
instrumental to the establishment of a series of weekly price data series now 
continued as The Economist Commodity Price Index, which after 160 years 
concluded that market prices had indeed fallen over that extensive period.10 
It is here with prices that the distinction between natural and un-natural comes 
to the fore again as the natural was conceived of as that which leads towards 
                                            
8 See chapter 8 Ŕ Growth. 
9
 He was not as naïve as to assume a direct correlation between natural and market 
prices. 
10 The Economist 12th February 2005, p.76. 
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growth and the un-natural as that which hindered such natural growth. 
Alternatively expressed what was natural diminished both natural and market 
prices whilst that which was un-natural tended to act in such a way as to either 
slow or stop the otherwise inevitable fall of natural prices. 
Thus progress was portrayed as the natural condition that humanity was 
presented with, unless hindered by un-natural circumstances. The view of 
Hodgskin was that from the very constitution of man and his social existence, 
economic progress (in the terms that he saw it - i.e. as an increasing population 
with improving living standards) was inevitable.  Thereby growth occurred from 
within the economic circumstances that man existed in – growth was 
endogenously stimulated by man‘s situation, condition and traits.  In this there 
was a certain commonality between Hodgskin‘s use of the term natural and the 
more modern term endogenous (that was not within an early 19th century 
economist‘s lexicon).11 
That which was un-natural can thus be portrayed as being what we nowadays 
envisaged as exogenous.  From this perspective that which would not normally 
occur in the abstract unfettered economic affairs of man was un-natural or 
exogenous.  In the sense that Hodgskin used the term artificial in the title of his 
The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted (1832) we might have a 
better understanding of his stance if we reconstructed the title as The 
Endogenous and Exogenous Rights of Property Contrasted.  
Indeed this interpretation can also enlighten our understanding of his terms 
Natural and Social price, which had presented the anomaly of the social being 
placed in apparent opposition to the natural. It is plain from Hodgskin‘s work in 
general that this was not his intention as he explicitly saw man‘s social (rather 
than legal) condition as natural.  A clarification that contrasted endogenously 
and exogenously fashioned prices should illustrate Hodgskin‘s economics with 
less ambiguity than the actual terms he left us. 
                                            
11 An early example of the use of the term endogenous in a non botanical sense can be 
seen in Herbert Spencerřs article Over Legislation for the Westminster Review of July 
1853, with regards to the origins of various social and governmental institutions: 
Were there space, much more might be said upon the superiority of what 
naturalists would call the exogenous order of institutions over the 
endogenous one. (Spencer, 1853, p.256)   
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A further issue is thereby a consideration of what would be encompassed by 
the un-natural or those exogenous influences that were so economically 
damaging.  This concern is quite evident throughout Hodgskin‘s writings, 
particularly in his opposition to legal laws, as well as governmental and legal 
interference in the market or economy as a whole.  His active opposition 
against the Corn Laws and support for free-trade and laissez faire economics 
as encapsulated in his latter writings for The Economist also illustrate this point. 
A simplified expression of Hodgskin‘s attitude towards interference in the 
market might posit that anything that required the force of law to maintain its 
existence was not fit to survive and would only bring harm upon that which, 
perhaps with the best of intentions, it was meant to improve.  To a large extent 
this attitude can be seen as being aligned to what was to become the Darwinian 
evolutionary stance of later Victorian Britain.  
Focus 
Our intention has been to present Hodgskin‘s ideas with as full an 
understanding as is possible nearly 140 years after his death rather than 
concentrate on the validity of his prognosis.12 
Other issues that do not aid our focus upon Hodgskin‘s concept of growth, 
although they may have attracted much attention elsewhere, receive less 
attention within this thesis. 
His endogenous growth theory was largely independent of his ideas on capital. 
Indeed as his ideas on capital arose from his humanistic economic view of 
political economy, it would be fair to conceive that his view of political economy 
spawned two distinct concepts.  The first can be seen in Labour Defended 
(1825) which focused upon his notions regarding capital.  The second was 
presented in his next work Popular Political Economy (1827) where the focus 
was upon growth.  
                                            
12
 With regards to the increase in population, the improvements in technology and the 
fall of prices over the subsequent years Hodgskin appears to have been more on the 
right lines than the Ricardianism he opposed. 
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Labour Defended and Hodgskin‘s concept of capital have attracted much 
attention elsewhere, whereas this thesis targets his other line of thought, i.e. 
economic progress and endogenous growth.   
Following the first stream concerned with capital, much has already been 
written regarding the connection between Karl Marx and Hodgskin‘s 
economics.13  Hence, our focus herein has been intentionally directed towards 
Hodgskin‘s ideas on growth rather than his capital theory.  As Marx‘s main 
concern with Hodgskin was with his capital concepts, our intention to 
concentrate on Hodgskin‘s growth economics would not have been aided by 
giving extensive consideration to Marx and his connection with Hodgskin‘s 
work, within this thesis. 
Methodological Preamble 
The use of the expression Radical in our title is intended to emphasise two 
particular methodological aspects within this work, rather than present an initial 
claim that Hodgskin‘s economic thought was itself radical with the usual 
revolutionary connotations associated with that term. 
The first emphasis that the term Radical provides is with regards to the manner 
in which the research for this thesis has been directed.  In this sense we mean 
Radical as an expression of returning to first principles, or as a historian might 
articulate, primary sources.  Hence the term radical is used in its original sense 
derived from the Latin radix – i.e. root.  This thesis deliberately concentrates on 
original (root) sources as its prime research material.  Whilst secondary sources 
are not without their place, and have provided useful perspectives and 
information, their interpretations of the history of economic thought, especially 
as that relates directly to Thomas Hodgskin, have been purposely downplayed 
when compared to our exposition of available primary sources.  Thereby this 
thesis attempts to deal with Hodgskin, as a specific niche within the history of 
economic thought, through the root expression of that and similar thought, 
rather than as subsequent expressions have represented it, encumbered by 
succeeding history. 
                                            
13
 Élie Halévyřs Thomas Hodgskin (1903; 1956) and G.D.H. Coleřs Introduction (1922) 
to Labour Defended provide excellent examples of these efforts and illustrate the 
topicality that originally gave rise to such works. 
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One result of this particular stress is that the more usual nuance of the term 
radical became manifest within this composition.  In this notion of the term 
radical, the concentration on primary sources has itself produced a secondary 
source that in a number of important ways is contrary or indeed radical or 
dissonant to many of those secondary sources already pertaining to that 
primary material.  In this context the result can be regarded at odds with much 
of the existing secondary material.  As such this thesis might be justified as not 
only a specialized work dealing with Hodgskin‘s particular ideas on growth from 
an economic perspective, but also a complement to the existing secondary 
material (without being a compliment). 
One consequence from such a radical review of Hodgskin‘s economic thought 
is that the reputation of some economists tends to be less evident than one 
might otherwise expect, if the conceptions portrayed in many secondary 
sources had been allowed to prevail.14  Although some, most notably J.S. Mill, 
have remained pertinent and thereby maintained a place in this thesis.15 
With this impassiveness towards repute in mind, attention has been 
intentionally focused on those of lesser notoriety and those whose fame may 
not have lingered in economists‘ minds over the subsequent century and a half.  
                                            
14 For example David Ricardo: whose subsequent reputation did not reflect his place in 
the literature of political economy of early 19
th
 century Britain.  He was relatively 
unknown and little read during his lifetime and by 1830 what influence he had upon the 
elite of political economy had waned significantly, as recognised in some of the 
secondary sources; for example, D.P. OřBrienřs The Classical Economists Revisited 
(2004) pointed out that: 
By the 1830s there was agreement amongst his fellow economists 
assembled at the Political Economy Club that Ricardořs system was no 
longer at all generally accepted. (OřBrien, 2004, p51) 
15 As an undoubtedly important and respected writer of the period during which 
Hodgskin wrote we have used John Stuart Millřs works throughout this thesis as an 
exemplifier of an important standpoint of this period.  We do not claim that Mill had 
any particular priority or authority. We refer to Mill as representative of one specific 
perspective relevant to Hodgskinřs position. 
In this vein we will not only use such work as his Nature (1874) but also his 
debating speeches of the 1820.s, his articles from the Edinburgh and Westminster 
Reviews, numerous other publications (such as Fraser’s Magazine and the Monthly 
Repository), as well as his more famous books such as his System of Logic (1843) and 
Essays On Some Unsettled Questions Of Political Economy (1844) and Principles of 
Political Economy (1848).  The sheer volume of available material by Mill also justifies 
reference back to such a reasonably renowned figure, which is given further validity 
from the commonality in much that the two writers considered their field of expertise 
and subject matters. 
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This has been done, in part, to dim the light from the ―Great Men‖ so that 
illumination from a more varied range of sources might emerge to illustrate 
perspectives that may hitherto have been obscured.  
Whilst the role of the ―Great Men‖ identified by subsequent literature has been 
deliberately reduced in importance, the ―smaller players‖ have been given 
greater exposure than may have been granted in many works on the general 
(broader) history of economic thought. 
If this change of emphasis were done of its own accord then there could be an 
issue regarding the validity of such a move.  However, we contend, that if we 
are concerned, as we are herein, with the economic thought of one man, rather 
than a grander swathe of history, there can be some justification in this.  
Thomas Hodgskin would have been influenced by other writers and economists 
of his day not on the basis of their subsequent fame, but primarily by the 
relevancy and influence of their ideas, as well as the intellectual environment 
that gave birth to such ideas.  Thus, in the first instance, it is the pertinence of 
contemporary influences and positions that should guide the inclusion or 
otherwise, of other writers, economists and viewpoints. 
One might justifiably be interested in the influence that the famed names, such 
as Ricardo, McCulloch, Senior and the Mills, had on Hodgskin.  However if this 
was less significant, or little compared to other sources, or if succeeding fame 
has disproportionately enlarged their roles, then it must of necessity be those 
other, perhaps even justifiably, lesser known writers who come more to the fore, 
in a work concentrated on one specific subject (i.e. Hodgskin) rather than in 
those works concerned with particular historic events, issues or swathes of 
time. 
Thus whilst the influence of Ricardo might be of importance in the history of 19th 
century economic thought as a whole, especially given his influence upon J.S. 
Mill and Marx, his role may be far less crucial to an understanding of Hodgskin‘s 
thought.  Additionally, lesser known writers, although not necessarily impacting 
significantly on the course of history of economic thought still provide 
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illumination on particular points or positions pertinent to Hodgskin‘s work, and 
can be justly referred to for the illustration they thereby provide. 16 
This attitude is not adopted as the result of random methodological whim or 
solely a desire for historical purity and precision.  It is specifically adopted to 
address a particular difficulty one faces with regards to Hodgskin‘s apparent 
contrariness on certain issues.  In much of that secondary material he is either 
portrayed as simply eclectic, peculiar, confused, inconsistent or at worse 
absurd, with regards to the principles he adopted. 
One glaring example of this misrepresentation is the oft-repeated 
characterization of Hodgskin as a Ricardian Socialist, which is particularly odd 
given his forthright opposition to both Ricardo and socialism. 
We are reminded by Thomas Webb in his work The Intellectualism of Locke 
that ―Whenever an author appears peculiarly absurd, the first suggestion should 
be that he has been misunderstood‖ (Webb, 1857, p.13). 
Thus we would reiterate that primary sources have been selected, with a view 
to the illumination they afford on an issue, rather than on the reputation, 
authority or direct relation to Hodgskin‘s writings that they might otherwise bring 
to bear in a broader, more comprehensive work.     
Our concentration and emphasis on root (i.e. contemporary) material is a 
premeditated endeavour to achieve an understanding of Hodgskin within his 
original contextual setting.  A deliberate attempt to avoid the clouding of vision, 
which, to some extent, is unavoidable when our standpoint is so distanced in 
time (not least with the subsequent development of language and changing 
terminology) and somewhat obscured by the later writings of scholars, mostly 
with other objects in mind, then ours – that of comprehending Hodgskin‘s 
economics of growth as a coherent and consistent whole.   
Notwithstanding all this emphasis upon historical method, as the subject matter 
of this thesis is the growth theory of the nineteenth century economist Thomas 
Hodgskin, it is our intention to present an exposition of his thought on this issue 
                                            
16 Although Alfred Marshall wrote that ŖEconomics has then as its purpose firstly to 
acquire knowledge for its own sakeŗ (Marshall, 1920, p.39), it is not intended herein to 
reproduce knowledge unless it has some relevance to the subject being dealt with. 
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from a distinctively economic perspective, rather than a predominately historical 
view.17   
A Radical Reconstruction 
Hence we have adopted the term Radical Reconstruction to explain our 
methodology.  Apart from its reliance on primary sources our radical 
reconstruction depends on a close reading of Hodgskin‘s material and our 
immersion in the literature and culture of the period in which he worked and 
wrote.18   
We would not claim to have undertaken a close reading in the strictest technical 
literary critical sense of the term but an intense approximation of this 
methodology applied to economic texts and concepts, concentrating on the 
linguistic and semantic as well as cultural aspects of economic arguments.   
This form of reconstruction has been applied to various aspects within this 
thesis, which we briefly introduce here: 
 We demonstrate the distinction between labour as the cause and the 
source of wealth; such that labour was the efficient cause of wealth but 
not necessarily its sole source.  
 The term natural is reconstructed to equate to the more modern 
expression endogenous.  
 The term artificial is reconstructed to equate to the more modern 
expression exogenous.  
 Hodgskin‘s Natural Price is presented as simply the inverse of 
productivity. 
 Hodgskin‘s notions on value are interpreted such that he is distanced 
from the usual concept of a labour theory of value.  Hodgskin fully 
recognized the role of subjective valuation by a good‘s purchaser in 
                                            
17
 The two monographs published in English to date on Thomas Hodgskin were both 
written by historians rather than academic economists: Ŕ Élie Halévyřs Thomas 
Hodgskin (1903) [first published in English in 1956] and David Stackřs Nature and 
Artifice The Life and Thought of Thomas Hodgskin (1998). 
18 The research has focused on a close analysis of British, Irish, and American primary 
sources from the late 18
th
 to mid 19
th
 centuries. French material available in English at 
this period is also encompassed.  
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relation to that good‘s value. We conclude that he held a labour theory of 
property as well as a labour theory of the notion of value.19  
 We also present Hodgskin‘s growth theory as one based on the 
endogenous factors of population and knowledge that necessarily 
increase as a result of man‘s social existence. 
The Mechanics of a Life 
Thomas Hodgskin was born on 12 December 1787 at Chatham 
where his father was a store-keeper in the naval dockyard. … 
when he was barely twelve, his father cut short his education and 
.. [sent] the boy to sea as a cadet on a warship. For twelve years 
Thomas Hodgskin was a sailor (Halévy, 1956, p.29-30) 
So begins Halévy‘s account of the mechanics of Hodgskin‘s life. Hodgskin‘s 
time in the navy was obviously pivotal in his formative development. It was here 
that his antipathy towards authority first surfaced such that in 1812 he was 
retired on half-pay following his disciplinary clashes with superior officers (ibid, 
p.31, Stack, 1998, p.36-42). 
These experiences lead to him writing his first book, An Essay on Naval 
Discipline (1813).20  Soon after its publication Hodgskin went to Edinburgh to 
study at Edinburgh University (Autumn 1813 to April 1815), but never 
graduated. On his return to London he introduced himself to Francis Place and 
other London radicals. 21 
About this time Hodgskin made the acquaintance of the Charing 
Cross Road tailor, Francis Place – Place, the Westminster political 
reformer, the friend of Bentham and of James Mill (Halévy, 1956, 
p.34) 
                                            
19
 As we shall explain in the appropriate section by a Ŗlabour theory of the notion of 
labourŗ we mean the acceptance that consumersř subjective valuations often aligned 
with their estimation of the labour embodied in or commanded by a commodity, rather 
then the idea that a good held intrinsic value in relation to the labour necessary to its 
production. 
20 Hodgskin also had published his only article for the Edinburgh Review Ŕ The 
Abolition of Impressments (Oct. 1824).  This was on the same subject as his first book 
but presented with far more economic arguments. 
21 Such an association was apparently not unexceptional: 
Every naval or military hero who diverges from the path of routine and 
discipline, and talks and writes of politics and reform, seeks 
encouragement from him [Bentham]. (Hodgskin/Parry, 1825, p.236) 
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The influence of this group of acquaintances had important ramifications for 
Hodgskin. They were instrumental in arranging for his European trips (Oct. 
1815 – Nov. 1818), followed by a second spell in Edinburgh and the publication 
of a second work, his travelogue Travels in the North of Germany (1820).22  He 
stayed under the influence and patronage of Place, Mill and Bentham until 
James Mill arranged for a post on the Morning Chronicle in 1823 that meant a 
return to London and an independent income. 
This financial self-sufficiency coincided with a period of intellectual 
independence that was to distance him from those he had previously viewed as 
friends.  It was also during this time that he was involved in the setting up of the 
London Mechanics‘ Institution.  
In the late 1820.s and early 1830.s he published his main works of economic 
interest – Labour Defended (1825). Popular Political Economy (1827) and The 
Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted (1832). During this period, 
and later, he was also writing for many journal and daily newspapers.23 
Hodgskin, now the father of seven children and compelled to work 
to provide for his entire family, disappeared after 1832 into the 
obscurity of anonymous Journalism (Halévy, 1956, p.130) 
He gave lecturers to the Chartists in the 1840.s and had these published as 
Peace, Law and Order (1842) and A Lecture on Free Trade in Connexion with 
the Corn Laws (1843). Then in 1846 he joined the newly established magazine 
The Economist for whom he wrote until 1857.  Two further lectures where 
published What Shall We do with Our Criminals? Don‟t Create Them (20th May 
1857) and Our Chief Crime: Cause and Cure (3rd June 1857). 
                                            
22 Although generally acknowledged as being published in 1820 it would appear that 
this relates only to the Edinburgh edition:- a notice in the Caledonian Mercury of 10
th
 
Jan. 1820 advise of ŖThis day were publishedŗ for Hodgskinřs Travels. However 
notices in the Morning Chronicle (13
th
 Nov. 1819) and The Times (10
th
 Nov. 1819) 
would seem to indicate that a London edition was actually first published in November 
1819. The Morning Chronicle referred to Hodgskinřs work in positive terms Ŕ Ŗof 
whose recent work on Germany we cannot speak too highlyŗ (MC, 3rd Aug. 1820). 
23 Hodgskin also had published his The Word Belief Defined and Explained in October 
1827.  A second edition of Labour Defended was published in 1831.  In 1837 a short 
pamphlet entitled  A Letter to Mr George Steven, was also issued 
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After his retirement from The Economist he moved to the suburbs of London, 
but still continued to write a weekly article for the Brighton Guardian until his 
death on 21st August 1869. 
In his Introduction to the English translation of Halévy‘s monograph on 
Hodgskin,  A.J. Taylor noted the sparseness of biographical detail: 
Much of the detail of Hodgskin‘s life story remains obscure, not 
because Halévy wished it so, but because the evidence for a fuller 
reconstruction is lacking. This subordination of contemporary life 
and of action to thought could, in the study of many thinkers, 
prove disastrous. … Of Hodgskin, however, this is far less true. 
Taylor, 1956, p.19) 
Much more detail was subsequently provided in David Stack‘s excellent 
biography Nature and Artifice: The Life and Thought of Thomas Hodgskin 
(1998). Although there still seems to be more that can be collated when 
recounting specific aspects of Hodgskin‘s life. 
Early Writings 
It seems that Hodgskin was far more prolific and broader in his writings 
particularly early in his career.  William St. Clair reported a court case of June 
1827 that is important in this regard, but otherwise has not been referred to 
when discussing Hodgskin (St. Clair, 1970, p.4-7).  This libel action resulted in 
the acknowledgement of Hodgskin as the co-writer of William Parry‘s The Last 
Days of Lord Byron (1825); is itself a quite interesting fact.   
However perhaps more important was the emphasis placed on Hodgskin as an 
established writer of some renown as early as 1825.  Mr. Lacey, of Knight and 
Lacey who published both Labour Defended and The Last Days of Lord Byron 
in 1825, referred to Hodgskin as someone ―in the habit of writing for publication‖ 
(ibid, p.5).  The Lord Chief Justice‘s summing up made reference to Hodgskin 
as ―a person familiar with the tones and excellencies of the English language‖ 
(ibid). 
Further esteem of Hodgskin‘s writing can be seen in the favourable review 
made of Popular Political Economy in The Times (15th June 1827).   
Thus it appears that Hodgskin was producing works we have hitherto been 
unaware of, with a more respected reputation than was credited to him by those 
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antagonistic to his views.  Given he had no direct followers or disciplines it was 
in the main his detractors‘ efforts that have come down to us over time. 
Stack has Hodgskin‘s vocation as a newspaper writer starting with his return to 
London from Edinburgh in 1823 – ―Hodgskin‘s forty-six year career as a 
journalist was about to begin‖ (Stack, 1998, p.78).24 
Notwithstanding this comment Stack did acknowledge that Hodgskin did write 
articles in some Edinburgh publications prior to his return to London.  Stack 
asserted that Hodgskin was reduced to ―producing anodyne articles for Tory 
journals‖ and had ―adapted himself to the life of a literary prostitute‖ (ibid, p.75). 
Thereby little of what he produced during this period was of real worth and we 
might thus be surprised at his meteoric rise that saw him able, within two years 
of embarking on his journalistic career of being able to produce Labour 
Defended followed by Popular Political Economy in less than another two years.  
It would seem that Stack and many writers considering Hodgskin may have 
underestimated the scope of his literary output in the 1820.s. 
One is thus left with the prospect that there might well be further material written 
by Hodgskin that can be found if one only knew where to look.  David Stack did 
provide some clues: 
The only way to earn money [for Hodgskin during his second stay 
in Edinburgh] was to write non-political articles usually on 
Germany or the German language for such ―Church and King‖ 
journals such as the Edinburgh Monthly Review and the 
Edinburgh Magazine and Literary Miscellany. (Stack, 1998, p.75) 
If one looks through the Edinburgh Monthly Reviews‟ contents list one might be 
struck by how few articles relevant to Germany or its language there actually 
was.25  However, there are several articles that are not only concerned with 
subjects that Hodgskin would have been interested in, but on reading them 
closely might be identified as being in his style.  The Edinburgh Monthly Review 
                                            
24 Stack remarked on Halévyřs characterisation of Hodgkinřs journalistic career in a 
footnote thus: 
Halévy said very little about Hodgskinřs journalism beyond providing an 
incomplete list of the papers he worked for, without dates, and the 
comment that he Ŗdisappeared after 1832 into the obscurity of 
anonymous journalism (Stack, 1998, p.147). 
25
 For example - Political State of Germany Ŕ Jan 1821; Modern History of Prussia - 
March 182. 
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only published for an eighteen month period between 1819 and 1821 and thus 
coincides with Hodgskin‘s second residency in the Scottish capital. We might 
thereby have an additional source of early Hodgskin material that was formative 
to his later books. 
Of particular interest is an article, in part a review of William Godwin‘s Of 
Population (1820), in the May 1821 edition - Godwin on Population – (p.535-
557).26  This is essentially Hodgskin‘s work that appears almost as an early 
précis of Popular Political Economy.  This thereby counters the assumption that 
Hodgskin never published anything directly relating to William Godwin (Halévy, 
1956, p.31)  
Introducing Mr. Hodgskin 
When his economic writings first appeared in the 1820.s, Thomas Hodgskin 
caused quite a stir.  This can be seen in the extensive consternation he excited 
amongst his contemporaries.  
Mr Hodgskin entertains the strangest notions possible (Place, 
1825).27 
Although Place‘s comment pre-dates the publication of Hodgskin‘s first 
economic work – Labour Defended – in late July 1825, the passion of his 
notions on capital had become known to Francis Place. Much of the 
antagonism towards Hodgskin‘s position was due to the implications of his 
capital economics. It also resulted from his uncompromising, almost brutal, 
attitude to both the dissemination of political economy and to equitable 
distribution.   
His approach towards education and the communication of ideas and 
knowledge has had two lasting consequences.  Firstly he was one of the co-
                                            
26 Also of interest as likely efforts by Hodgskin are Brown on the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind – June 1820 (p.693-735); The State of the Press Ŕ March 1821 (p.363-
376); Owen on the Regeneration of Society Ŕ May 1821 (p.581-599). Obviously more 
work would be needed to confirm the authorship of these articles. 
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 Letter from Francis Place to George Birkbeck (11
th
 June 1825); in which Place tried 
to discourage The London Mechanicsř Institution from allowing Hodgskin to deliver a 
course of lectures on political economy. 
Ronald Meek, in his Studies in the Labour Theory of Value noted that: 
Thomas Hodgskin was a name to frighten children with (Meek, 1956, 
p.124) 
 27 
founders of the London Mechanics‘ Institute, which subsequently became 
Birkbeck College. Secondly he was the first economics editor of The Economist, 
and was thus crucial to the establishment and success of that journal.28 
With regards to his initial public and subsequent intellectual influence, David 
Stack concluded that this was quite narrow and ―centred exclusively upon 
Labour Defended‖ (Stack, 1998, p.204).29 
Despite this, Hodgskin‘s impact in terms of economic theory was also significant 
for its bearing on Marxism. A point emphasised by Élie Halévy: 
But if the ideas of Hodgskin have their starting point in the 
philosophy of Bentham, it is in the philosophy of Karl Marx, as one 
knows, that they have their resting place; and it is under their 
Marxist form that they have gained universal popularisation. 
(Halévy, 1956, p.169)   
In Capital, Marx quoted from three of Hodgskin‘s publications and referred to 
him as ―one of the most important modern English economists‖ (Marx, 1976, 
p.1000).  Marx also noted Hodgskin‘s Labour Defended (1825) and Popular 
Political Economy (1827) as being ―still regarded as belonging to the most 
important works of English political economy‖ (Marx, 1972, p.263). 
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 In The Pursuit of Reason; The Economist 1843-1993 Ruth Dudley Edwards 
commented on Hodgskinřs impact on The Economist: 
Hodgskin certainly added depth, scope and erudition to the literary pages 
along with a sharpness and combativeness that suited the paperřs style: 
(Edwards, 1993, p.128) 
Initially Hodgskin seems to have radicalised [James] Wilson on laissez-
faire and concentrated his mind on the issue of punishment … There 
were other minds being brought to bear on the paper, but in the first few 
years Hodgskinřs role was crucial. (ibid, p.137) 
29 A contrast to this assertion can be seen with commentators from the early 20th 
century.  For example, Max Beer, in his A History of British Socialism (1919), noted the 
influence that Hodgskin had upon the Chartists, particularly James OřBrien.  
Having settled in London and learned the ideas of the National Union of 
the Working Classes, he [OřBrien] became one of the champions of the 
class struggle theory also.  He quotes Hodgskin, especially his Natural 
and Artificial Right of Property, which corresponded most of all to 
OřBrienřs own way of thinking.  Hodgskin himself wrote to OřBrien and 
congratulated him on his efforts. (Beer, 1919, p.19) 
Indeed we can see Hodgskinřs relationship with the Chartists illustrated in his 1840.s 
lectures: - Peace, Law and Order (published by Hetherington in 1842) and A Lecture on 
Free Trade (1843).  These were both delivered to Chartist audiences (Stack, 1998, 
p.158, p.160) 
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By the later half of the 19th century Hodgskin appeared to have become a fairly 
anonymous figure although his work, when considered at all, was seen as far 
less scurrilous then it had been viewed in the 1820.s and 1830.s: 
This remarkable tract [Labour Defended] is attributed to Mr. 
Thomas Hodgskin, well known as an able and accomplished 
journalist; (Lalor, 1852, p.xxiv) 
All Hodgskin‘s writing shows him to have been a man of liberal 
education, and some philosophical training. … there was 
something in Hodgskin‘s writing well calculated to attract the 
attention of those who had any real insight into the signs of the 
times. No member of the English socialist group seems to have 
been more widely read on both sides of the Atlantic, and the 
significance of his position was instantly recognised. (Foxwell, 
1899, p.lv-lvi)   
In more modern terms, Hodgskin‘s work has influenced, to some extent, in the 
work of David Ellerman, the World Bank‘s development policy in the 1990.s, 
especially following the breakdown of former communist regimes in eastern 
Europe.30 
Background and Context 
This thesis was inspired by earlier research that reviewed the issue of property 
rights in British political economy of the early 19th century. Within this context 
the work of Thomas Hodgskin became evident.  However, this current research 
far exceeds that earlier effort in both its depth and its concentration upon the 
more economic aspects of Hodgskin‘s political economy, specifically his ideas 
on growth. 
For Hodgskin to be considered solely as an economist, in the sense we use that 
term today, would be to restrict him from the many interests and concerns he 
wrote upon. This would be akin to referring to Karl Marx as just an economist; it 
would be missing the point to a great degree.  Hodgskin, whilst undoubtedly not 
                                            
30 David Ellerman is an American academic economist and mathematician who worked 
at the World Bank from 1992 until 2003. From 1997 until 2003 he was Senior 
Economist and Advisor to the Chief Economist (1997-9 Joseph Stiglitz; 2000-3 
Nicholas Stern). He has authored several books and articles which explicitly drew 
directly from Hodgskinřs economics; most notably - Intellectual Trespassing as a Way 
of Life: Essays in Philosophy, Economics, and Mathematics (1995), Property and 
Contract in Economics (1992) and The Democratic Worker-Owned Firm (1990). 
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comparable to Marx in terms of volume or scope, used his economics towards 
an end rather than as his end.  
In fact the Yale Law School, which maintains a Hodgskin Archive, refers to him 
as a ―British educator, journalist, political activist, and polemicist‖ rather than an 
economist.31 Élie Halévy, his first biographer, saw Hodgskin as ―a philosopher 
at the same time as he is an economist‖ (Halévy, 1956, p.181).   
The third and forth of Hodgskin‘s publications were concerned with 
predominately economic issues evoked as political economy.  The sixth was 
concerned with property ownership rights and legal laws, but should not be 
detached from his political economy, as this issue was central to his views.  
Hodgskin‘s political philosophy was based on an almost nihilistic anarchism, 
which contributed to his originality.32  He was not a socialist despite many such 
assertions.  It was not until Lowenthal (1911) that Hodgskin became typecast as 
a Ricardian Socialist; a curious claim given his opposition to both Ricardo and 
socialism.33  His economics were to some extent a reaction against Ricardo that 
occurred when the bulk of apparently anti-capitalist or anti-establishment writers 
were socialist (for example William Thompson).  To a large extent it was this 
anti-establishment stance that resulted in his being grouped with those 
socialists.   
The fact that some of his notions were approved and taken up by many 
socialists (most notably Marx) has furthered this misconception.  It is also worth 
noting that some of Hodgskin‘s political economy would fit within a Misean 
                                            
31 (www.library.yale.edu/mssa/about_microfilm_mssa.html) 
32 Nihilistic in the sense that knowledge of the future is unknowable in the present, as it 
is not possible to know or predict what new technologies or knowledge would emerge.  
As such knowledge largely determined the conditions of man. Comprehension or 
acquaintance of the future condition of man was thus largely unfathomable. 
If the future was unknowable Hodgskin conceived that there was little point in 
trying to stipulate rules that could be applied to such impenetrable conditions. 
33
 For Noel Thompson ŖMarx was the only Ricardian Socialist. Hodgskin, Gray, 
Thompson and Bray may be more appropriately designated ŘSmithianř ŗ (Thompson, 
1984, p.105). However, he also acknowledged that Hodgskin could be removed from 
the socialist camp as Ŗa proponent and defender of anarchic individualism against legal, 
institutional, political and other constraintsŗ (ibid, p107).  
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conception of the Austrian School of economics, as can be seen by the regard 
he is held in by many libertarian and Austrian authors.34 
Contemporaries and their Concerns 
Samuel Bailey‘s emphasis on the importance of understanding different 
doctrines has been adopted as a relevant and valid position within this thesis.    
In the present state of political economy, however, a critical 
reference to the doctrines of preceding and contemporary 
economists cannot be avoided, and ought not to be avoided if it 
could.  A mere direct expository treatise would be of far inferior 
utility.  However true a doctrine may be, it is of little service until its 
relation to other doctrines, and its connection with knowledge 
already extant, has been shown. (Bailey, 1825, p.xi)35 
Given this, it is worth noting that we have adopted a similar attitude as that 
expressed by J.B. Say and Edward Rogers;36 
A man of genius is indebted to everything around him; to the 
scattered lights which he has concentrated, to the errors which he 
has overthrown, and even to the enemies by whom he has been 
assailed; inasmuch as they all contribute to the formation of his 
opinion. (Say, 1821, p.xl)  
In matters of science, the progress of discovery and the 
establishment of truth are most effectually promoted when 
veneration for the authority of great names is not allowed to 
restrain the freedom of discussion: (Rogers, 1822, p.3).  
This thesis will, as we have previously acknowledged, delve into the work of 
                                            
34
 A notable example being Murray Rothbard, who recognised that Hodgskin was not a 
socialist.  
Thomas Hodgskin was a fascinating personality and a brilliant political 
philosopher and writer of early and mid-nineteenth century England. A 
radical Lockean and individualist anarchist, Hodgskin has unfortunately 
been enshrined in the histories of economic thought as a ŖRicardian 
socialistŗ. (Rothbard, 1978, p.5) 
Fred Dayřs paper How Austrian was Thomas Hodgskin? (2006) also emphasised 
this point. 
35
 This passage was later cited and embraced within Samuel Readřs Preface to his 
Political Economy (Read, 1829, p.ix). 
36 Edward Rogers (1794-1824): An Essay on some General Principles of Political 
Economy (1822).  Although hindsight does not view him as a particularly prominent 
economist, his contributions have not gone wholly un-noted: ŖIt is worthy of note that 
he [Rogers]  here gives a mathematical treatment of the incidence of taxation on land Ŕ 
with one exception the earliest attempt made in England to apply mathematics to 
economicsŗ (Seligman, 1903, p.82-3).  Seligman notes the earliest as An Essay on the 
Theory of Money (1771) by Henry Lloyd. 
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many of those ―preceding and contemporary economists‖ and some of those 
who followed.   
In many matters, the differences between economists (of this period in question 
– the early 19th century) were down to the application of diverse definitions. To 
understand where any writer was at odds with his peers or adopted a unique 
position requires an insight into those economists‘ work with regards to their 
use of terms and the perspective they adopted.   
Significant deliberations upon definitions may appear tedious, but is essential if 
we are to arrive at an understanding of the relevant issues.37  It might appear 
peculiar that terms were used so diversely, but a reason for this may be found 
in Senior‘s observation that: 
When we read the most eminent of recent writers on the subject 
[of political economy], we find them chiefly engaged in 
controversy.  Instead of being able to use the works of his fellow 
labourers, every economist begins by demolition, and erects an 
edifice, resting perhaps, in a great measure, on the same 
foundations, but differing from all that has preceded it in form and 
arrangement. (Senior, 1852, p.12)  
A broad coverage of contemporary economics of the early 19th century might 
include certain subjects that might seem retrospectively superfluous, but we 
would argue that these concerns are best comprehended in the full context and 
relevance of their time.  
Utilitarianism 
The Utilitarianism of Bentham and the Mills was a concept for determining 
morality; 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or 
the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend 
to produce the reverse of happiness. (Mill, X, p.210) 
                                            
37
 As Charles Knight: 
If we sometimes appear obscure, it must be borne in mind that we cannot 
forbear to employ a technical terms, which are indispensable to the exact 
knowledge of every science; and if we sometimes seem tedious, it must 
also be considered that the truths which we endeavour to expound must 
be arrived at step by step by a methodical progress (Knight, 1831, p.8). 
Charles Knight was not associated with Hodgskinřs publisher Knight and Lacey, as 
illustrated by St. Clair (1970, p.5). 
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In contrast to this Hodgskin‘s utilitarianism was of a personal private variety that 
had more to do with a modern economist‘s concept of individuals as profit or 
utility maximisers than that more usually associated with philosophers of the 
19th century.  In Hodgskin individuals act so as to give themselves the 
maximum utility. This was most stridently expressed in his Peace, Law, and 
Order (1842); 
The great and immediate object of all man‘s exertions is man‘s 
own happiness. Self-preservation is not the first nor the chief law 
of nature. The chief law, the law of laws, is – BE HAPPY. This 
command, this call, this craving we all necessarily feel, and 
numerous are the instances in which individuals, despising pain 
and death, or rushing on self-destruction, endeavour to obey the 
command, ―Be happy,‖ even in self annihilation. (Hodgskin, 1842, 
p.9) 
Thus in Hodgskin utility was a descriptive concept of human behaviour rather 
than a morality code or prescriptive model – ―the directive rule of human 
conduct‖ (Mill, X, p.213).38  
Property 
Hodgskin‘s concept of property was not a value based system that allotted or 
conceived property in relation to morality or what was best for society. As we 
shall discuss more fully when we explore Hodgskin‘s Labour Theory of 
Property, Hodgskin‘s notions of property were borne of its active creation and 
production rather than the utilitarian view that focused on its the use and the 
benefits that it brought. For example, in Godwin his ―idea of property entails the 
concept of use‖ (Clark, 1977, p.248). 
As can be seen throughout Hodgskin‘s writings the issue of property played an 
essential role in his economics; as both production and distribution furthered 
growth. In Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted (1832) the right of 
property was portrayed as the crucial problem for society and economic 
considerations as a whole: 
As the contests between individuals, between classes, and 
between subjects and their rulers, all relate to wealth, you may be 
                                            
38 If we try and seek a moral code in Hodgskinřs work it would relate to the expediency 
of following the laws of nature with its resultant benefice (see chapter 3 Ŕ Nature and 
the Natural) rather than an active ability to determine what would be beneficent. 
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sure, that no topic can in practise, be pregnant with more 
important results – The right of property, which is now arming the 
land-owner and the capitalist against the peasant and the artisan, 
will, in truth, be the one great subject of contention for this and the 
next generation; before which, it needs no prophetic vision to 
foretel, the squabbles of party politicians, and the ravings of 
intolerant fanatics will die away unnoticed and unheard. 
(Hodgskin, 1832, p.15)39 
By the beginning of the 19th century, utilitarian ideas had become a dominant 
political idea that, particularly as regards property rights, influenced economic 
thought.  By illustrating utilitarian notions of property we will be able to distance 
Hodgskin from this utilitarianism and show that he owed little intellectual debt to 
the various threads of utilitarianism, particularly that of William Godwin.  
William Godwin 
There has long been an association made between Hodgskin and Godwin.  
Despite Stack‘s claim that ―this relationship was first posited by Halévy‖ (Stack, 
1998, p.66) it can be seen made contemporarily, for example in the Quarterly 
Review: 
It [the claim to the whole produce of industry] forms the substance 
of a work entitled ―Labourer defended against the claims of 
Capital, or the productiveness of Capital proved by a Labourer,‖ 
published in London in 1825.  It is the staple of Mr. Godwin‘s 
theory on ―Political Justice;‖ (QR, July 1832, p.412-3) 40  
                                            
39 In his The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin (1977) John P. Clark had 
noted the importance of property as an issue for Godwin: 
The subject of property is central to Godwinřs social and political 
thought. (Clark, 1977, p.248) 
A further consideration of this understanding can be seen in Robert Lamb’s For and 
Against Ownership: William Godwin’s Theory of Property in the Review of Politics 
(2009): 
A proper appreciation of Godwinřs writing on property is thus important 
for understandings of late eighteenth-century theories of ownership and 
distributive justice. All of the major British Ŗradicalŗ thinkers of the 
1790s ŕ including Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Thelwall, 
and Thomas Spence ŕ each inspired to some degree by the French 
Revolution, discussed the issue of distributive justice largely through 
discussions of property rights. (Lamb, 2009b, p.276) 
40 David Stack recognised that the assumed relationship between Godwin and Hodgskin 
stemmed from the apparent closeness of their anarchist positions; 
The basis of their posited relationship lay in the congruity of their 
conclusions on government and laws.  So close were these that it was 
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It will become evident during this thesis that this claim of the labourer to the 
whole produce of industry was not one made in this naïve sense by Hodgskin, 
and that Godwin‘s theories were more complicated then here expressed.  The 
Quarterly Review‟s position should be seen as part of the general anti-Hodgskin 
furore and panic caused in certain quarters by his writings.  By association with 
Godwin, it was probably hoped to cast addition aspersions upon Hodgskin‘s 
ideas. 
Nevertheless Godwin exemplifies the utilitarianism that saw property justified as 
individually created, delineated and acknowledged.41  He believed that property 
should be distributed accorded to what was best for the individuals of society.   
Every man has a right to that; the exclusive possession of which 
being awarded to him, a greater benefit or pleasure will result, 
than could have arisen from its being otherwise appropriated. 
(Godwin, 1793II, p.423) 
Godwin conceived that the equality he saw inherent in man would inevitably 
lead to the expediency of parity in distribution of the materials of wealth. 
                                                                                                                                
assumed that Hodgskin must have derived his views from a reading of 
Political Justice. (Stack, 1998, p.66) 
Hence Stack argued extensively against any intellectual debt being owed by 
Hodgskin to Godwin (ibid, p.66-69);   
Hodgskin drew on Locke and Smith, rather than Godwin, and accepted 
the doctrines of self-love and unintended consequences which Godwin, 
himself a critic of natural rights on utilitarian grounds, revolted against. 
(ibid, p.69) 
41
 Indeed a review of Godwinřs novel Cloudesley: a Tale (1830) in the Edinburgh 
Review acknowledged as the initial concerted source of contemporary utilitarianism as a 
code for morality, despite debates that still range as to whether Godwin actually was a 
utilitarian (e.g. see Robert Lambřs article Was William Godwin a Utilitarian? in the 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Jan. 2009). 
Mr. Godwin was the first whole-length broacher of the doctrine of 
Utility.  He took the whole duty of man Ŕ all other passions, affections, 
rules, weaknesses, oaths, gratitude, promises, friendship, natural piety, 
patriotism, Ŕ infused them in the glowing cauldron of universal 
benevolence, and ground them into powder under the unsparing weight 
of the convictions of individual understanding.  … It was as if an angel 
had descended from another sphere to promulgate a new code of 
morality; (ER, April 1830, P.155)  
He has, however, the merit of having been the first to show up the 
abstract, or Utilitarian, system of morality in its fullest extent, whatever 
may have been pretended to the contrary; and those who wish to study 
the question, and not to take it for granted, cannot do belter than refer to 
the first edition of The Enquiry concerning Political Justice; (ibid, p.157)    
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Human beings are partakers of a common nature; what conduces 
to the benefit or pleasure of one man, will conduce to the benefit 
or pleasure another.  Hence it follows, upon the principles of equal 
and impartial justice, that the good things of the world are a 
common stock, upon which one man has as valid a title as 
another to draw for his wants.  It appears in this respect … that 
each man has a sphere, the limit and termination of which is 
marked out, by the equal sphere of his neighbour.  I have a right 
to the means of subsistence; he has an equal right. (ibid) 
As expressed in Political Justice, Godwin assumed that a rationally educated 
man could only act rationally.42  Hence distributive equality would be seen as 
the most logical expedient outcome, and although not productively equal, man 
would spontaneous distribute according to needs and equality rather than 
ability; 
Hence it follows that the distribution of wealth in every community, 
must be left to depend upon the sentiments of the individuals of 
that community.  If, in any society, wealth is estimated at its true 
value, and accumulation and monopoly be regarded as the deals 
of mischief, injustice and dishonour, instead of being treated as 
titles to attention and deference, in that society the 
accommodation of human life will tend to their level, and the 
inequality of conditions will be destroyed. (ibid, p.440-1) 
In his Enquirer Godwin countenanced the active repression of inequalities, that 
has seen him included in histories of socialism as well as anarchism, but would 
have distanced him from Hodgskin‘s anti-authoritarian stance.43 
Inequality therefore being to a certain extent unavoidable, it is the 
province of justice and virtue to counteract the practical evils 
which inequality has a tendency to produce. It is certain that men 
will differ from each other in their degrees of industry and 
economy. But it is not less certain, that the wants of one man are 
similar to the wants of another, and that the same things will 
conduce to the improvement and happiness of each, except so far 
as either is corrupted by the oppressive and tyrannical condition of 
the society in which he is born. The nature of man requires, that 
                                            
42
 Thus in Godwin individual anarchism arose from the recognition of logical necessity 
whereas in Hodgskin, as we shall see later, it was borne of his identification of Natural 
Laws or tendencies.  Natural laws were downplayed in Godwin Ŕ  
ŖNatureŗ is not an important concept in Political Justice; nature is to be 
overcome by rational control rather than followed. (Stafford, 1987, 
p.272) 
43
 Hence Anton Menger referred to Godwin as Ŗthe first scientific socialist of modern 
timesŗ (Menger, 1886, p.40). 
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each man should be trusted with a discretionary power. The 
principles of virtue require, that the advantages existing in any 
community should be equally administered; or that the inequalities 
which inevitably arise, should be repressed, and kept down within 
as narrow limits as possible. (Godwin, 1797, p.169)44 
That Hodgskin owed anything to this thread of utilitarianism, or the anarchism 
(or even the economics) of Godwin will become evident as we discuss the 
various issues of concern within this thesis.  Godwin‘s notions on property and 
an enforced equality of distribution are, as we shall see, alien to Hodgskin‘s 
position that favoured the equality of opportunity rather than Godwin‘s equality 
of outcomes. 
 
                                            
44 Despite his reputation as an anarchist, in Political Justice Godwin made a case for the 
use of coercion; 
But, if reason prove insufficient for this fundamental purpose, other 
means must doubtless be employed. It is better that one man should 
suffer, than that the community should be destroyed.  General security is 
one of those indispensable preliminaries, without which nothing good or 
excellent can be accomplished.  It is therefore right that property, with all 
its inequalities, such as it is sanctioned by the general sense of the 
members of any state, and so long as that sanction continues unvaried 
should be defended, if need be, by means of coercion. (Godwin, 1793II, 
p.442) 
He conceived that coercion would only be necessary because of the Ŗinjudicious 
magnitude and complication of political societiesŗ (ibid, p.443) and would rarely be 
resorted to. 
In a general and absolute sense therefore, it cannot be vindicated. But 
there are duties incumbent upon us, of a temporary and local nature; and 
we may occasionally be required, by the pressure of circumstances, to 
suspend and contravene principles, the most sound in their general 
nature. … It is never to be regarded but as a temporary expedient, the 
necessity of having recourse to which is deeply to be regretted. (ibid) 
However, in the way of utilitarianism, coercion was an evil that could be justified on 
it relative merits when compared to a worse evil; 
It is an expedient, protecting one injustice, the accumulation of property, 
for the sake of keeping out another evil, still more formidable and 
destructive. (ibid) 
In contrast to this, coercion was unacceptable to Hodgskin, and was viewed as itself 
a cause of the inequality that Godwin hoped it would remove: 
I may not at present enter further into the subject of political order, 
which I have merely alluded to in order to contrast it with natural social 
order.  …  One is perfect freedom, the other coercion. In the one there is 
perfect equality, in the other dominion and degradation, lordship and 
serfship.  (Hodgskin, 1842, p.17) 
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Property Rights 
The early nineteenth century debate on rights and property rights in general, 
centred on the issue of their origin, either as natural or exclusively legally 
created concepts.   
we are entitled to say, that nearly all the questions which now 
agitate our people, all the evils that Reform is expect to relieve, 
relate to the right and distribution of property. We throw no doubt 
ourselves on a right of property which is natural and 
indispensable, but the right which is established by our laws may 
and does want to be inquired into. (BL, 17th June 1832)   
The Benthamite position was that there were no rights except those rights 
created by laws.  Thus the right of property was not borne of some intrinsic or 
―natural‖ condition, but created and maintained by man‘s legal measures 
because it was expedient, in terms of utility, so to do. 
Right, therefore, is factitious, and the creature of will.  It exists, 
only because the society, or those who wield the powers of the 
society, will that it should exist; and before it was so willed, it had 
no existence. (Mill, 1825b, p.5)45 
Hodgskin saw ―Messrs. Bentham and [James] Mill, and their arrogant disciples‖ 
in opposition to Locke, Smith and others, for their abandonment of natural rights 
in favour of law as the sole source of rights (Hodgskin, 1832, p.22).46 
Thus there were two distinct perceptions of law, rights and property; and those 
who adopted a Benthamite view generally expressed opposition to Hodgskin in 
all matters.47   
                                            
45
 Hodgskin was specifically critical of this passage from James Millřs article 
Jurisprudence written for The Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica; - ŖFilmerřs 
doctrine of the divine right of kings was rational benevolence, compared to [this] 
monstrous assertionŗ (Hodgskin, 1832, p.21).  It was against Filmer that Locke had 
written his Two Treatises of Government that Hodgskin extensively cited 
46
 Cicero, Seneca, Bacon, Locke, Burke and Smith were listed by Hodgskin as those 
who held to notions favourable to natural rights (Hodgskin, 1832, p.22).  
47 For example Thomas Cooperřs opening remarks to his chapter On Property Ŕ ŖAll 
rights are the creatures of society, founded on their real or supposed utility; and 
requiring the force of society to protect themŗ (Cooper, 1826, p.52: 1830, p.63). 
Whereas others, whose position was nearer to Hodgskinřs, took a contrary view Ŕ 
ŖPrivate property, as an institution, did not owe its origin to any of those considerations 
of utility, which plead for the maintenance of it when establishedŗ (Mill, II, p.201).  A 
further example can be seen in John Stuart Millřs most Hodgskinite comment Ŕ ŖThe 
laws of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the justification 
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These two perspectives can be somewhat aligned to the economics of growth, 
that is the central theme of this thesis.  Hodgskin‘s concept of growth as 
endogenous can be seen associated with his views on property as 
endogenously arising from the very natural of mankind and his social being.  
Whereas the opposing position maintained that property, and thus eventually 
growth, was exogenous to human existence; unless imposed by legislative 
decree. 
Hodgskin adopted a strictly Lockean position, of rights being valid prior to the 
instigation of legal systems.   
Although central to Hodgskin‘s anarchism, hostility to laws, with regards to 
rights, was not uncommon in the early part of the 19th century.  The MP George 
Poulett Scrope provided a rationale as to why the ideas of Bentham and respect 
for the law had come to override, or at least compete with, the notion of natural 
rights (and appeared to have been as contemptuous of legal process as 
Hodgskin was).48 
Unhappily wisdom has had but little to do with the proceedings of 
most law-makers; nor, had they all been Solons in capacity, was 
their real object always that which they professed to have in view.  
While the pubic welfare has been on their lips, their own private 
advantage, or the indulgence of their selfish passions, was but too 
frequently uppermost in their minds.  In this way the discrepancies 
between legal and natural rights have been widened, until at times 
all trace of the latter has disappeared from the institutions of a 
society, and been utterly lost sight of by those who enforce or 
expound them; until, in the maze of precedent and prescription, 
the means have been mistaken and worshipped for the end, and 
the law has been  looked upon as an abstract something to be 
venerated and pursued for its own sake, independent of its 
bearing on the welfare of man; until it has been stoutly denied that 
                                                                                                                                
of private property rests.  They have made property of things which never ought to be 
property, and absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist.ŗ (ibid, 
p.207). 
48
 Scrope was apparently comfortable using Hodgskinřs Labour Defended, Popular 
Political Economy and Natural and Artificial Right of Property as an authority, in his 
Principles of Political Economy (Scrope, 1833, p.s.8, 150, 249, 250).  Although by his 
second edition, Political Economy for Plain People (1873), Scrope had removed the 
preliminary philosophical content regarding rights and Ŗnatural Lawŗ; thus only Labour 
Defended and Popular Political Economy where referred to (Scrope, 1873, p.s.103,  
202,  203). 
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there is, or can be, any other right than that which is established 
by law.  (Scrope, 1833, p.3-4) 
William Paley 
David Stack commented that ―Hodgskin‘s utilitarianism was not derived from 
Bentham, but from Paley‖ (Stack, 1998, p.73). In The Pillars of Economic 
Understanding: Ideas and Traditions (1998), Hodgskin‘s estrangement from 
Bentham‘s utilitarianism was also noted. 
Hodgskin‘s direct connection to Utilitarianism is through his 
relationship with Francis Place (1771-1854), a disciple of 
Bentham.  But Hodgskin early on rejected the hedonistic basis of 
Benthamism – the consequentialism of the ―greatest happiness‖ 
formula – and chose instead to focus on the importance of Natural 
Law and natural rights as the foundation for social rules and order. 
(Perlman & McCann, 1998, p.293) 
Paley‘s utilitarianism was explicitly linked to the issue of population in the most 
direct manner. 
I think, with certainty, that the quantity of happiness produced in 
any given district so far depends upon the numbers of inhabitants 
… the collective happiness will be nearly in exact proportion of the 
numbers; that is, twice the number of inhabitants will produce 
twice the quantity of happiness: (Paley, 1824, p.419)49 
Thus, like Hodgskin, Paley saw ruin in a population‘s demise and advantage to 
its growth; 
the decay of population is the greatest evil that a state can suffer; 
and the improvement of it the object which ought, in all countries, 
to be aimed at, in preference to every other political purpose 
whatsoever. (ibid) 
                                            
49
 For our purposes herein we use the 1824 London (Thomas Tegg) edition of Paleyřs 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, from the originally published in 1785; 
(not the New York, S. King 1824 edition that is available through Google Books.) 
By later editions book VI Elements of Political Knowledge of his Principles had 
been dropped. Hence the 1852 edition edited and annotated by Alexander Bain 
concluded that  
Paleyřs chapters on Politics, which are omitted here, have nearly become 
obsolete, (Bain, 1852, p.v) 
Thus the work became The Moral Philosophy of Paley and Paleyřs lengthy chapter 
of most interest to an economist Ŕ Of Population and Provision; and of Agriculture and 
Commerce, as Subservient Thereto Ŕ was absent. This also applied to the Richard 
Whately edition; Paley’s Moral Philosophy with Annotations (1859). 
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Although Hodgskin‘s concerns with population can be seen broached in Paley, 
the latter‘s views on property were distinctly un-Hodgskin-like. Paley conceived 
of property as a convenience that stemmed from God‘s will enacted in legal 
instruments; 
The real foundation of our right is THE LAW OF THE LAND. 
It is the intention of God that the produce of the earth be 
applied to the use of man: this intention cannot be fulfilled without 
establishing property: it is consistent therefore with his will that 
property be established. The land cannot be divided into separate 
property without leaving it to the law of the country to regulate that 
division: it is consistent therefore with the same will, that the law 
should regulate the division; and, consequently, ―consistent with 
the will of God,‖ or ―right,‖ that I should possess that share which 
these regulations assign me. (Paley, 1824, p.69) 
This was in harmony with Paley‘s view that rights simply related to God‘s will: 
Now, because moral obligation depends, as we have seen, upon 
the will of God; right, which is correlative to it, must depend upon 
the same.  Right therefore signifies consistency with the will of 
God. (ibid, p.49) 
Paley was dismissive of the Lockean concept of natural rights (i.e. not derived 
from God‘s will) and specifically attacked Locke‘s ideas, which when he 
summarised them, he partially accepted; 
Another says, that each man's limbs and labour are his own  
exclusively; that, by occupying a piece of ground, a man 
inseparably mixes his labour with it; by which means the piece of  
ground becomes thenceforward his own, as you cannot take it  
from him without depriving him at the same time of something  
which is indisputably his.  
This is Mr Locke's solution; and seems, indeed, a fair reason, 
where the value of the labour bears a considerable proportion to 
the value of the thing; or where the thing derives its chief use and 
value from the labour. Thus game and fish, though they be 
common, whilst at large in the woods or water, instantly become 
the property of the person that catches them; because an animal, 
when caught, is much more valuable than when at liberty; and this 
increase of value, which is inseparable from, and makes a great 
part of the whole value, is strictly the property of the fowler, or 
fisherman, being the produce of his personal labour. For the same 
reason, wood or iron, manufactured into utensils, becomes the 
property of the manufacturer; because the value of the 
workmanship far exceeds that of the materials. And upon a similar 
principle, a parcel of unappropriated ground, which a man should 
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pare, burn, plough, harrow, and sow, for the production of corn, 
would justly enough be thereby made his own. (ibid, p.67) 
To this degree, Paley accepted Locke‘s proposition as regards most material 
wealth but thought this insufficient to explain ownership of lands by explorers 
and the staking of a claim. 
But this will hardly hold, in the manner it has been applied, of 
taking a ceremonious possession of a tract of land, as navigators 
do of new-discovered islands, by erecting a standard, engraving 
an inscription, or publishing a proclamation to the birds and 
beasts; or of turning your cattle into a piece of ground, setting up a 
landmark, digging a ditch, or planting a hedge round it. (ibid, p.68) 
Hence this flaw as regards property by possession rather than by labour 
enabled Paley to seek a more comprehensive explanation in his affiliation of 
legal instruments with God‘s will.  
Lockean Foundations 
The political-philosophical foundations of Hodgskin‘s political economy were 
centred on his interpretation of the Lockean theory of property, human 
understanding and knowledge.50   
Locke started with a dismissal of the concept of innate or instinctive ideas, 
whereby experience was conceived as the initial and primary provider of 
concepts and ideas.51  Thus, for Locke, the mind could be likened to ―white 
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas‖.  When he asked where all ―the 
busy and boundless fancy of man‖ had originated – he answered – from 
experience: 
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?  To this 
I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge 
is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.  (Locke, 1689, 
2.I.2) 
                                            
50 Lockeřs property theory being laid out in Two Treatise of Government (1690); 
whereas An Essay on Human Understanding (1689), expressed his concepts of 
knowledge and understanding in general. References to Lockeřs works are by book. 
chapter. section. 
51
 When William Godwin had also attacked the concept of innate principles in his 
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Godwin, 1793I, p.25), he acknowledged he was 
following Locke.   
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Locke recognised two methods by which ideas could be generated within the 
human conscious – ―This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending 
wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call 
SENSATION.‖ (Locke, 1689, 2.I.3).  The other source being internal reflection, 
which was itself dependent upon the understanding gained by external 
sensation via human experience (ibid, 2.I.4). 
That Hodgskin started from a similar position can be seen stated in his Essay 
on Naval Discipline – 
As a strenuous believer in the theory, that there are no such 
things as innate ideas; that, consequently, there is no such thing 
as an intuitive moral sense in man; that we know right from wrong 
only through our acquired knowledge acting upon our sensation; 
(Hodgskin, 1813, p.74) 
In his Two Treatises on Government (1690) Locke had expounded his famous 
notion that saw property as the result of labour, which, as we discuss later in 
this thesis, was so crucial to Hodgskin‘s economics. 
Thus the principle Mr Locke lays down is, that nature gives to 
each individual his body and his labour; (Hodgskin, 1842, p.26)    
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all 
men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no 
body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the 
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then 
he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it 
in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is 
his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It being by him 
removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath 
by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common 
right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable 
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what 
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good, left in common for others. (Locke, 1690, 1.V.27) 
Social Perception 
From the Lockean perception, knowledge of self and other beings (as well as 
events or external circumstances) could only be gained via the senses and 
experience. 
As we learn of our own bodies from seeing and feeling them, and 
as we see and feel the bodies of others, we have precisely similar 
grounds for believing in the individuality or identity of other 
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persons, as for believing in our own identity. (Hodgskin, 1832, 
p.28-9) 
In this manner the human senses perceived objects by the actions of those 
objects upon them.  External inactive objects could not generate a sensory 
response.  Thus, in society, all that could be known of its members resulted 
from the experience of human actions, translated into sensations and presented 
as properties unto the minds of the members of that society.   
Thereby the individual could only be known by their agency that impacted upon 
other individuals‘ sensation and reflection. These actions lead to the conception 
of individuality, which became bound-up with the concept of self and the 
perception of others, and thereby formed not only the basis of mutual social 
recognition, but also property.   
The words expressed by the words mine and thine, as applied to 
the produce of labour, are simply then an extended form or the 
ideas of personal identity and individuality.  We readily spread 
them from our hands and other limbs, to the things the hand 
seize, or fashion, or create, or the legs hunt down and overtake.  
Nor is this extension limited to material objects. (Ibid, p.29)  
This identification of the self through personal action revealed in property is 
absent from Godwin‘s work. Thus in their formulations of individual anarchism 
Hodgskin and Godwin held markedly different attitudes to society.  Godwin saw 
society as a necessary evil –  
But though the chief purpose of society is to defend us from want 
and inconvenience, it effects this purpose in a very imperfect 
degrees. (Godwin, 1793I, p.7) 
In contrast to this Hodgskin saw man as an essentially social creature.  
Out of this fundamental principle of every individual‘s existence, 
and from which the actions it dictates, there grows a great SYSTEM 
OF SOCIAL ORDER, IN WHICH NO ONE IS GREATER THAN ANOTHER, 
though he may be wiser and richer, and which is, I think, or ought 
to be the order contemplated by the motto [Peace, Law and 
Order]. (Hodgskin, 1842, p.11) 
Godwin challenged co-habitation and saw marriage as a forced arrangement of 
individuals into joint communion (Godwin, 1793II, p.506-8).52 For Hodgskin 
                                            
52
 Alexander Gray highlighted Godwinřs objection to marriage as a surrender of the 
individualřs own control over their own rationality Ŕ 
 44 
marriage was an inevitable state of the adult human condition.  Indeed for 
Hodgskin it was this natural or inevitable tendency of men and women to 
cohabit that was the initial stimulus to the division of labour: 
The primary division of labour springs from the sexual difference 
of organisation, it has its foundation in the difference of our 
physical constitution, in the different parental duties required of 
the sexes, and is co-extensive with the existence of our race. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.112) 
The foundation or beginning of society is the union of the sexes.  
(Hodgskin, 1842, p.11) 
Having biological needs human must direct some of their actions towards 
meeting those physical needs, such as food, drink and shelter.  For political 
economic purposes those actions which are directed to meeting these material 
needs may be called labour. Thus the properties of individuals are presented by 
their actions, of which labour is not an inconsiderable portion. 
As we shall show it was this Lockean principle of the relationship between 
nature and labour that was so crucial to Hodgskin‘s economics especially his 
concept of endogenous growth. 
Historical Works 
There have been two biographies of Thomas Hodgskin, which have dealt with 
his ideas to differing degrees.53  In the Introduction to Élie Halévy‘s biography 
A.J. Taylor noted that it was a ―study of the development of a man‘s ideas: it is 
not the history of his life and times‖ (Taylor, 1956, p.19).  David Stack (Nature 
and Artifice, 1998) had a far more historical perspective and dealt with those 
more personal details and events in his life, as well as the theoretical interests. 
This thesis is not meant to be biographical or simple history.  It will centre on 
Hodgskin‘s ideas on economic progress and endogenous growth, primarily as 
expressed in his writings, and secondarily within direct and indirect reactions to 
his writings, and other contemporary sources. This renders it not exclusively 
                                                                                                                                
marriage involves co-operation, and co-operation must mean some 
degree of dependence of one on the other, which must again entail some 
disobedience to the dictates of oneřs own conscience in the matter of 
justice. (Gray, 1946, p.123) 
53 Yaleřs Hodgskin Papers also include a draft of Cecil Driverřs notes (1935) that were 
apparently intended for another biographical work. 
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concentrated upon Hodgskin‘s notions.  Where additional work supplements, 
compliments or supports that of Hodgskin, and are also valid to the thesis‘ 
position, these will be explored. 
The two biographies have been used as sources of references and material not 
normally available.  The British Museum and Cambridge University libraries 
have also been used to access rarer material, but these biographies together 
with Graham Wallas‘ The life of Francis Place (1898) are useful initial sources 
and identify such material as his correspondence (e.g. with Francis Place).54  
They also refer to contemporary correspondence that was written concerning 
Hodgskin; such as between Place, Bentham, Brougham, Birkbeck and James 
Mill. The availability of Yale University Library‘s Hodgskin Papers on microfilm 
has also been an important source of relevant correspondence and information.  
Outline of Chapters 
Thus in Chapter Two – Political Economy – we look at Hodgskin as, contrary to 
much opinion, a defender of scientific political economy.  We explore the 
stimulus to his defence and how he limited what was encompassed by the 
discipline.  The major contentions here are that political economy was a 
humanistic science in that it dealt with human action and interaction rather than 
materialistic aspects, and that in this he pre-empted both John Stuart Mill and 
Nassau Senior, with whom he had much in common. 
Chapter Three – Nature and the Natural – we will introduce the contemporary 
debates concerning nature and what was seen as natural.  This will expound 
Hodgskin‘s concept of nature in terms akin to those expressed by J.S. Mill, but 
also highlight where Hodgskin was distinct from many of his contemporaries.  
We will also emphasise the differences between the term natural with nature 
and with the artificial. 
Chapter Four – Labour – continues Hodgskin‘s emphasis on the human aspects 
of production.  This involves much discussion of what was meant by the term 
                                            
54
 Although it is important to ensure that one does not fall foul of the accusation that 
William Henry Chamberlain made of Marx, who, he claimed, Ŗstarted with a set of 
dogmatic a priori assumptions and then scratched around in the British Museum for 
facts that would seem to bear out these assumptionsŗ.  (Chamberlain, 1956 [Some 
Mistakes of Marx,  Freeman magazine, May 1956]) 
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Labour by Hodgskin and his contemporaries – especially his one time friend 
McCulloch, and others such as Mill, Senior, and Malthus. 
Chapter Five – The Product of Labour – clarifies Hodgskin‘s most notorious 
claim, that the labourer should receive the whole product of labour. It also 
illustrates how this basic concept has been misunderstood.   
Chapter Six – Value – will briefly refute the notion that Hodgskin held 
exclusively to a labour theory of value.   
Chapter Seven –  Price – will investigate the three types of prices that Hodgskin 
delineated: Natural, Social and Market prices.  His strict demarcation of Natural 
Prices to equate solely to labour with the exclusion of profits and rents will be 
compared to his specific classification of Social Price. Hodgskin‘s views on 
Market Price as an information providing mechanism – as ―the index to the 
wants of society‖ (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.235) – will be pursued and related to 
modern Austrian economics. 
Chapter Eight – Growth – will look at Hodgskin‘s conceptions of social and 
economic growth, which can not be separated from his work on knowledge and 
technological progress.  We will also deal with the relationship between falling 
prices, caused by technology requiring less labour in production, and growth. 
Hodgskin had an endogenous growth theory which stipulated that it was the 
inescapable growth of human knowledge and competition in the market that 
stimulated an economy via improved technology. For Hodgskin economic 
growth had an inevitability that was inexorably linked to his vision of progress.  
Chapter Nine – Concluding Remarks – will attempt to pull these various aspects 
of Hodgskin‘s economics into a coherent whole and draw appropriate 
conclusions with regards to the various apparent contradictions in his work. 
Typographical Note 
We have reproduced quotations using the spellings and wordage in as near to 
the original material as possible. The use of antiquated lettering such as 18th 
century f.s has been amended to the more modern alphabet. Original italics and 
use of capitals (particularly favoured by Hodgskin himself) have been retained 
and no additional emphases added to quoted passages.  
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Abbreviations used 
BEM. Blackwood‘s Edinburgh Magazine 
BL. Bell‘s Life in London and Sporting Chronicle 
BN. Brighton Guardian 
C. The Chemist 
E. The Economist 
EMR The Edinburgh Monthly Review 
ER. The Edinburgh Review 
LP. Letters to Francis Place 
LWR The London and Westminster Review 
MM.  The Mechanics Magazine 
MR. The Monthly Review 
NR.  The New Englander 
QR. The Quarterly Review  
RAS Register of Arts and Sciences 
SM The Scotsman 
TN. The Trades Newspaper 
WN. Wealth of Nations (Adam Smith) 
WR. The Westminster Review 
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Chapter 2 
Political Economy 
 
Agenda 
Our agenda in this chapter is to present not only an overview of Thomas 
Hodgskin‘s conception of political economy but also the views held on the 
discipline by his contemporaries during the period at which he was writing (i.e. 
the first half of the nineteenth century).  Given that the focus of this thesis is 
Hodgskin‘s view of economic growth we need to set out the field within which 
his enquiry was undertaken so that we are clear on what he considered were 
the vital factors.  
Firstly, we investigate Hodgskin‘s methodology with regards to political 
economy, and how this related to what has become known as the Classical 
school of political economy.  If we take J.S. Mill as an archetypal classical 
economist then there was much in Hodgskin‘s economics that could be 
considered akin to that school‘s position.  Although if J.S. Mill is seen as 
atypical we can still highlight the similarity of Hodgskin‘s economics with those 
of Mill, as well as placing Hodgskin in the context of the period in question. 
In our second section we illustrate how Hodgskin appeared in advance of his 
contemporaries as to what the science of political economy should aim to 
achieve.  He held a very distinct view, expressed as early as 1825, that political 
economy was a non-judgemental science that should be disassociated from the 
art of government and business, or ethical questions as to what was the right or 
wrong ways to manage an economy.  We will show that although he was very 
much alone in this view in the 1820.s, by the 1840.s his view had become far 
more widely accepted as can be seen by the changing attitudes, for example, of 
McCulloch, Torrens, Senior, and J.S. Mill. 
Our third section demonstrates that Hodgskin defended political economy as an 
academic science against the negative view popular at that time which was 
often highly antagonistic to both political economy and economists.  
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The fourth section of this chapter presents Hodgskin‘s conception that the 
subject matter of political economy was human action in the form of labour. 
Thus despite Hodgskin‘s most famous work, Labour Defended (1825), being an 
attack on the customary view taken of capital, capital was not of itself, except as 
the result of labour, a prime consideration within that strand of his political 
economy concerned with economic growth.  In this way his political economy 
was humanistic in its method and subject matter.  We will show that he was not 
alone in such a view and that there was much, particularly in the writings of J.S. 
Mill, which can be aligned with Hodgskin‘s position. 
In our final section, given that political economy was for Hodgskin concerned 
with the production of wealth, we lay out the distinction between the cause and 
the source of wealth. Such a demarcation is important within Hodgskin‘s 
economics as it emphasises the humanistic focus of his work.  
Introduction 
Although Hodgskin‘s work coincided with what might be conceived of as the 
heyday of classical political economy, it should be recognised that during this 
period the discipline was still subject to many disputes and much conflict, from 
both its practitioners and the public at large. 
But such is the existing state of feeling on the subject – so 
numerous are the misapprehensions that prevail respecting it – 
and so strong is the prejudice in many minds against the study, – 
a prejudice, partly the effect, and partly the cause, of these 
misapprehensions, that I am compelled, however reluctantly, to 
occupy some of your time in removing objections and mistakes 
which stand in the very threshold of our inquiries. (Whately, 1831, 
p.11-12) 
Many of the misapprehensions that prevailed centred on the consideration of 
what political economy, as a subject, was concerned with, as well as the 
definitions of terms within the science. 
The differences of opinion among political economists have been 
a frequent subject of complaint; and it must be allowed, that one 
of the principle causes of them may be traced to the different 
meanings in which the same terms have been used by different 
writers. The object of the present publication is, to draw attention 
to an obstacle in the study of political economy, which has now 
increased to no inconsiderable magnitude. (Malthus, 1827, p.vii)   
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Political Economy has remained destitute of a definition framed on 
strictly logical principles, or even of, what is more easily to be had, 
a definition exactly co-extensive with the thing defined. (Mill, 1844, 
p.123) 
Whilst it may be true, that clarifying definitions may not be as interesting as 
―doing the science‖ itself, without sufficiently defined terms a science will 
inevitably be internally contradictory and imprecise.  In his The Word Belief 
Defined and Explained (1827) Hodgskin had recognised the importance of 
ensuring that terms were sufficiently explained. 
To define the meanings of words is generally supposed to be the 
business of a Dictionary maker rather than of a philosopher; but of 
late so much light has been thrown on several dark periods of 
history, and on several dark parts of the science of metaphysics, 
by examining and explaining the meaning of words, that many 
philosophers might congratulate themselves were their labours to 
be followed by similar splendid results. (Hodgskin, 1827b, p.1)55 
Thus in line with Hodgskin‘s acceptance of this mode of research, and aware of 
the differences that exist between the meanings of words in the early 19th 
century with those of today, especially within the field of economics, we will not 
shy away from spending significant space within this thesis on the definitions of 
various terms.  
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 Hodgskin further noticed that one of his main influences, Thomas Brown, had 
concentrated on definitions to attain useful results: 
The investigations of Dr. Thomas Brown, in his Essay on Cause and 
Effect, … are confined to an examination of the meaning of certain 
words, such as cause, power, will, effect, &c.; and by specifying 
distinctly the facts which these words represent, thus explaining what 
they mean, he has done more to improve this abstruse part of the 
philosophy of mind than any other metaphysician of our time. 
(Hodgskin, 1827b, p.1-2) 
Not only was Brown held in high regard by Hodgskin but also by John Stuart Mill.  
Much of Millřs An Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1865) was an attack 
on Hamiltonřs criticism of Brown.   
Of all persons, in modern times, entitled to the name of philosophers, the 
two, probably, whose reading on their own subjects was the scantiest, in 
proportion to their intellectual capacity, were Dr. Thomas Brown and 
Archbishop Whately: … It cannot be denied that both Dr. Brown and 
Archbishop Whately would have thought and written better than they 
did, if they had been better read in the writings of previous thinkers: but I 
am not afraid that posterity will contradict me when I say, that either of 
them has done far greater service to the world, in the origination and 
diffusion of important thought, than Sir W. Hamilton with all his 
learning: because, though indolent readers, they were, both of them, 
active and fertile thinkers. (Mill, IX, p.497) 
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Notwithstanding this, our immediate task in this chapter, is to show, accepting 
―the heyday of Classical economics was during the years 1800-1850‖ (O‘Brien, 
2004, p1), that even during this period economics was often under attack, 
particularly being charged with inconsistency as to what it purported to study. 56   
As we shall show, Hodgskin had addressed such criticisms when he initially 
wrote on economic issues in the 1820.s. However, before looking at Hodgskin‘s 
defence of political economy, it is worth understanding his position within the 
school of classical political economy, as a prelude to an appreciation of his 
methodological approach. 
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 OřBrienřs The Classical Economists Revisited (2004) has been cited as an exemplar 
of the current understanding of historians of political economic thought upon the subject 
of classical economics, to which we can compare Thomas Hodgskin.  OřBrien is an 
especially useful reference point not only for his work on classical political economy as 
a whole, but also his specialisation upon Hodgskinřs erstwhile friend and notable 
contemporary, John Ramsey McCulloch.  Not only did OřBrien oversee, introduce and 
annotate the Collected Works of J.R. McCulloch, but his J. R. McCulloch, A Study in 
Classical Economics (1970) also illustrates his expertise of political economy in the 
first half of the 19
th
 century.  
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Section One 
Hodgskin’s Methodology 
 
Hodgskin as a Classical Economist 
Rather than being a Classical economist in the sense that O‘Brien categorised 
Hodgskin can be seen as ―one of the offshoots of Classical economics rather 
than a part of it‖ (O‘Brien, 2004, p.xvi).57  The distance between Hodgskin and 
his contemporaries is of interest here with regards to whether this was a 
theoretical or cultural separation, or resulted from something more concrete. 
O‘Brien concluded that although ―the Classical economists formed something of 
a cross-section of society‖, they ―still managed to form what was … a 
surprisingly close-knit group‖ (O‘Brien, 2004, p.12).  This, in part, he put down 
to institutional links, the most important of which was the Political Economy 
Club (ibid, p.13).  Although Hodgskin was personally known to several 
members of this Club, such as James Mill, McCulloch and The Economist‘s 
founder (and Hodgskin‘s employer) James Wilson, Hodgskin never became a 
member of this or of the other institutions that O‘Brien mentioned with regard to 
this group - ―the (Royal) Statistical Society, the British Association, and the 
Royal Society‖ (ibid). 
O‘Brien also noticed the journalistic connections between the Classical 
economists as ―Probably equal in importance to the institutional links between 
the Classical economists were those afforded by periodical literature‖ (ibid, 
p.15). Again it should be noted that despite his career as a journalist, apart from 
                                            
57 OřBrien did not refer to Hodgskin in The Classical Economists Revisited, although he 
did refer to two other later ŖoffshootsŗŔ Marx and Henry George (OřBrien, 2004, 
p.xvi). Also left unmentioned were that group of economists misleadingly associated 
with Hodgskin, the Ricardian Socialists. 
On several occasions OřBrien referred to James Wilson, the founder of The 
Economist, and his opposition to the 1844 Bank Act (often in conjunction with J.S. 
Mill), but without reference to Hodgskin, who would have been writing many of the 
appropriate articles in The Economist.  
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his one article on naval disciple in the Edinburgh Review (Oct. 1824), Hodgskin 
failed to get accepted as a writer for any of the monthly and quarterly 
periodicals.  Despite his eventual success on The Economist, Hodgskin had to 
be content with journalism on the less weighty weekly and daily newspapers.   
Never having attained an academic position, Hodgskin‘s career did not 
encompass any significant period of teaching.58  In contrast, Hodgskin‘s 
acquaintance from his student days in Edinburgh, John Ramsey McCulloch, 
who was accepted by the ―establishment‖ and the Classical school, became 
―the first holder of the professorship of political economy at University College, 
of the University of London‖ (Dorfman, 1966, p.6).59 
This lack of academic experience would not of itself have been sufficient to 
exclude him from the mainstream of Classical economics as the academic 
credentials of these economists were quite varied.60 
There were ―On the other hand, many of the Classical economists [who] had 
neither university education nor employment‖ (O‘Brien, 2004, p.10). However 
these self-educated economists tended to be privileged by resources or careers 
that permitted the pursuit of their interest in economics.61 
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 Especially when compared to others such as John Craig, Samuel Read and 
McCulloch in Edinburgh; Whately, Senior and William Foster Lloyd at Oxford; 
Malthus, Richard Jones and George Ramsay at Cambridge; as well as John McVickar, 
Thomas Cooper, and Francis Wayland, the earliest economics lecturers and Professors 
in the USA.  
59 When David Stack referred to McCulloch as Ŗthe first professional economistŗ 
(Stack, 1998, p.27) he presumably meant outside of a solely academic environment as 
his academic lecturing was not his only source of income.  McCulloch eventually 
established a more profitable and less anonymous journalist career than Hodgskin was 
able to do. 
He was a successful journalist and a good popular lecturer, and his 
audiences were composed largely of businessmen, statesmen, and would-
be statesmen.  In fact McCulloch made his living Ŕ and a good living Ŕ 
primarily by his lectures and writings until in 1838, the Whig 
government gave this ŖWhig of Whigsŗ the post of Comptroller of His 
Majestyřs Stationery Office (Dorfman, 1966, p.6). 
60 As OřBrien pointed out, these credentials were far more diverse than the latter neo-
classical economists Ŕ ŖIt was a characteristic of neo-Classical economics that its 
practitioners, from the 1870s onwards, were largely academic, both by employment and 
(to some extent at least) by cast of mindŗ (OřBrien, 2004, p.9). 
61
 Such as David Ricardo, James Mill, Robert Torrens (retired Royal Marine, MP and 
owner/editor of The Globe newspaper), Thomas Joplin (retired Royal Marine, Banker 
 54 
Hodgskin’s Lecturing 
Hodgskin‘s only known formal public lectures on political economy were the four 
he gave at the London Mechanics‘ Institute in September and October 1826.62   
It this context it is interesting to note that Thomas Hodgskin‘s 
offer, 1825, to lecture at the newly founded London Mechanics 
Institute was declined in consequence of a warning given by 
Francis Place to George Birkbeck about the heterodox nature of 
Hodgskin‘s economic opinions, while William Ellis was invited to 
lecture in Hodgskin‘s stead. (Thompson, 1984, p.60)  
These initial lectures on political economy at the Mechanics‘ Institute by  both 
Hodgskin (in 1826) and William Ellis (in 1825) were not acknowledged in the 
book published to officially commemorate the 30th anniversary of the 
establishment of the London Mechanics‘ Institute – James Hole‘s An Essay on 
                                                                                                                                
and sometime newspaper proprietor), George Poullet Scrope (MP and geologist), Lord 
Henry Brougham (MP and later Lord Chancellor), Samuel Bailey (Sheffield merchant 
and later Banker), Charles Knight (publisher and writer), John Rooke (farmer and 
geologist) and Charles Hall (Sheffield doctor).  For the co-operative and early socialist 
movements Robert Owen (industrialist) and William Thompson (Irish landlord) can 
also be seen as independently privileged.  
Thomas de Quincey seemed to have been in a position comparable to Hodgskin in 
terms of using his economic writings as a basis for his working career.  There were also 
others, such as Charles Forester Cotterill, of whom very little is known and who may 
well have been in a position akin to Hodgskin.  
The identity of Piercy Ravenstone (along with Hodgskin the least socialist of the so-
called Ricardian Socialists) has been the subject of some discussion. For example, 
Dorfman claimed that this pseudonym may have been used by Edward Edwards, the 
Quarterly Review’s main contributor on economics between 1823 and 1830 (Dorfman, 
1966, p.17).  However this would seem at odds with the Quarterly Reviewřs less than 
complimentary review of Ravenstoneřs second work, Thoughts on the Funding System 
(1824), which might seem to debar Ravenstone from consideration as one of its 
reviewers;  
Mr Ravenstone, indeed, is exceedingly unfortunate in having, almost in 
the very outset of his work, fallen into a mistake, which at once shows 
that he has read the books of other men without understanding them, and 
makes it no matter of surprise that he should produce one which no other 
man but himself (we make the exception in courtesy) can possibly 
understand. (QR, March 1825, p.312) 
In the Works and Correspondence of Ricardo Ravenstone was identified as Richard 
Puller, of whom Ŗlittle else is knownŗ other than who were his father and brother, and 
some other family details.   (Ricardo, XI, p.xxviii) 
62 A report from the Register of the Arts and Sciences recorded the Mechanics 
Institutionřs Quarterly Managersř Report of 6th Sept. 1826, thus: 
The Report, in allusion to the subject of Lectures, stated that, on 
Wednesday, the 13
th
 instant, Mr. Thomas Hodgskin will commence a 
course of Lectures on the Productive Powers of Human Labour, which 
will occupy four successive Wednesdays. (RAS, 16
th
 Sept., 1826, p.183)  
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the History and Management of Literary, Scientific and Mechanics‟ Institutes 
(1853). Hole‘s work also provided an example of the continuing negative 
attitude towards political economy at that period.  
This subject [political economy], both from its own importance and 
the peculiar view we take of it, requires more than a passing 
remark.  Dr. Chalmers, many years ago, recommended its 
introduction into Mechanic‘s Institutions. If we differ from so great 
an authority, it is not because we underrate the importance of the 
subject, but because practical experience has shown that as yet 
opinion is too much divided, and party feeling too strong, to permit 
them to be discussed with calmness. … However valuable 
lectures on political economy would be, therefore, the time has not 
yet arrived whey they can be offered with advantage; … This 
course has not been, and cannot be, adopted in Mechanics‘ 
Institutes (Hole, 1853, p.65-6). 63 
These comments might go some way to explain E.P. Thompson‘s comments, in 
The Making of the Working Class (1963), regarding the early relationships 
between the London Mechanics‘ Institute, political economy and Hodgskin :- 
The crucial conflicts took place on the questions of control, of 
financial independence, and on whether or not the Institutes 
should debate political economy (and, if so, whose political 
economy).  Thomas Hodgskin was defeated in the latter conflict 
by [Francis] Place and [Henry, later Lord] Brougham.  (Thompson, 
1963, p.818) 
Nevertheless in those first few years after the establishment of the Mechanics‘ 
Institute Hodgskin did lecture on various subjects.  He delivered a lecture series 
                                            
63 James Hole (1819-1895) was a socialist activist with particular interest in working 
class education. His Lectures on Social Science and the Organisation of Labour (1851) 
received a short review by Hodgskin in The Economist, which left little doubt of the 
difference of political opinion between the two of them and perhaps shows that Hole 
would not have approved of the political economy that Hodgskin had lectured upon. 
Mr Hole infers that it is the duty of authority to regulate more, and 
regulate better.  He is an opponent of laissez faire, or of natural 
organisation and natural order; and because in old times politicians have 
superinduced on them a political organisation and a political order, 
pregnant with mischief, he would now have the Socialists try their hands 
at a pet scheme of political government.  All his fine, eloquent 
observations and apt quotations are pervaded and vitiated by the 
fundamental error of aiming to regulate society because politicians have 
aimed to regulate it and have most signally failed. (Hodgskin, E., 1
st
 
March 1851, p.235) 
This passage is also worthy of note for its alignment of the term natural with lassez 
faire, and by implication the un-natural or artificial with political organisation of market 
or economical activity. 
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On Mind, as well as lectures on General Grammar and The Progress of Society 
(Hodgskin, 1827, p.xvii: Halévy, 1956, p.91: Stack, 1998, p.138).64 
The Progress of Society 
Given that Hodgskin‘s attitude towards progress is pivotal to this thesis, it is of 
great regret that his lectures on The Progress of Society were only ever 
mentioned in passing and that only one short commentary appears available as 
to their content.65 As will become evident Hodgskin‘s concept of human 
progress was of an inevitable advancement of the human condition.  
                                            
64 Other lectures by Hodgskin were given and well received: 
Mechanics Institution:- A course of lectures on the subject of ŖMental 
Physiologyŗ or ŖMetaphysicsŗ has been lately commenced by Mr. 
Thomas Hodgskin. This gentleman has, our readers will probably know, 
already favoured the Members of the Society with a course of lectures on 
ŖPolitical Economyŗ and their substance has appeared in a very 
successful work, entitled, ŖPopular Political Economy.ŗ He is also the 
author of (very generally and justly admired) ŖTravels in the North of 
Germanyŗ and a very recent work called ŖThe Word Belief Defined and 
Explained.ŗ  The best praise that we can bestow on the two lectures 
already delivered by this gentleman, and the best proof that they are 
deserving of it is, that they have obtained equal success to those on 
Political Economy.  The theatre was crowded on both evenings, and the 
attention paid by all present.  His next lecture will be Ŗon the Senses of 
Smell and Taste.ŗ (BL, 20th January, 1828, p.1) 
Commenting on the first of this series of lectures, the Morning Chronicle had noted 
that:    
By means of various illustrations, he [Hodgskin] kept his numerous 
audience alive till the close of the lecture, when the general satisfaction 
was manifested by very considerable applause. (MC, 14
th
 Jan. 1828)     
65
 The Morning Chronicle of 4
th
 August 1829 contained a short article entitled The Past 
and the Present with sub-heading of Ŗ(from Mr. Hodgskinřs Lectures on the Progress of 
Society at the Mechanics Institution)ŗ. This piece contains two themes; firstly using the 
example of fire it is noted that in ancient times fire was given an almost holy standing 
compared to our almost dismissive modern attitude: 
We procure it so easily that we are rather careful to extinguish than to 
preserve it; but, in Ancient Rome, some of the choicest of its maidens, 
under [the] name of Vestals, were appointed to cherish and keep alive 
[the] sacred flame. (MC, 4
th
 Aug. 1829) 
Secondly, it was noted that although ancient monuments might seem more 
magnificent then modern efforts, those of the far past were Ŗexecuted by the hands of 
slavesŗ for; 
the tasked and force labour of a whole nation directed to gratify the 
vanity of one man, or build up some proud memorial of slavery or 
superstition. (ibid) 
These ancient monuments were contrasted with modern technology such as the 
Eddystone lighthouse that were produced for the benefit of all, under far greater levels 
of freedom and better living standards for the whole of society. Thus those that 
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the progress of society is one continual stream of improvement, 
however much at variance with it temporary aberrations may 
appear to our short-sighted view. (Hodgskin, BG., 12th March 
1862);   
When we refer to progress in this thesis, unless it is specifically indicated 
otherwise, it is expressly in the sense for example stipulated by J.B. Bury in The 
Idea of Progress, an Inquiry into its Origin and Growth (1920):  
You may conceive civilisation as having gradually advanced in the 
past, but you have not got the idea of Progress until you go on to 
conceive that it is destined to advance indefinitely in the future. 
(Bury, 1920. p.7) 
It is in this sense that Hodgskin used the term progress.   
Political Economy as a Tool 
From 1823 until his death Hodgskin was primarily a journalist who wrote most 
notably upon political economy. Although his career culminated with his writings 
for the Brighton Guardian (1861-1868), it reached its zenith with his 
appointment, as the economics editor on The Economist (1844-1857).66   
Hodgskin was a working journalist and activist for whom economics was 
essentially a tool within his agenda for social and political progress.  Hodgskin‘s 
interest with political economy was not the result of his journalistic career – as 
his letters to Francis Place between 1816 and 1823 show.  His travelogue 
Travels in the North of Germany (1820) also contained many early expressions 
                                                                                                                                
lamented the passing of the times of magnificent ancient monuments were just living in 
the past and missing the real advances society had made.  
66 In this way Hodgskinřs career was similar to his successor at The Economist Ŕ Walter 
Bagehot Ŕ who like Hodgskin wrote and published on social and political topics as well 
as practical and scientific economics. 
It is also worth noting that although Hodgskin worked for the publishers Knight and 
Lacey in the 1820.s on various publications (such as The Mechanics’ Magazine and The 
Chemist), and that they published Labour Defended in 1825, we do not know whether 
he was involved with their short-lived The Economist (1824-1825).  Knight and Laceyřs 
The Economist had no relationship to the more famous Economist which Hodgskin 
eventually did work upon. Nor is there any reason to believe Hodgskin had any 
involvement with Thomas Joplinřs Economist Ŕ ŖIn 1837, Thomas Joplin had founded a 
short-lived publication by that nameŗ (OřBrien, 2004, p.17) 
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of his economic concerns. The other key topic for Hodgskin was legislation as it 
concerned human welfare and progress. 67 
When Hodgskin defended political economy it was as a method for working 
class liberation, as much as an academic or intellectual pursuit in itself.  
I admit that the subject is somewhat abstruse, but there is a 
necessity for the labourers to comprehend and be able to refute 
the received notions of the nature and utility of capital. … The 
theory on which profits are claimed, and which holds up capital, 
and accumulation of capital to our admiration as the mainspring of 
human improvement, is that which I say the labourers must, in 
their own interest, examine, and must, before they can have any 
hope of a permanent improvement in their own conditions, be able 
to refute. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.5) 68 
In his early writings, Hodgskin addressed two fields of enquiry, which we might 
identify as the internal and external debates regarding political economy.69 
The internal debate centred on questions upon the subject matter within the 
discipline of political economy.  However, what might be seen as external 
enquiries challenged the relatively new discipline in the early part of the 
nineteenth century.70  In these outward looking deliberations political economy 
was the subject matter of discussion within a larger debate that we would 
nowadays call Social Sciences, but was then more generally seen as 
encompassed by Moral Philosophy. 
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 As Senior noted: 
The writer who pursues such investigations is in fact engaged on the 
great Science of legislation: a Science which requires a knowledge of the 
general principles supplied by Political Economy, but differs from it 
essentially in its subject, its premises, and its conclusions.  The subject of 
legislation is not Wealth, but human Welfare. (Senior, 1836, p.2) 
Whilst this thesis is concerned with Hodgskinřs economics, it would be impossible 
to avoid the influence that Hodgskinřs position on legislation had upon the narrower 
concern of political economy.    
68 The word "admiration" in the 1825 and 1831 editions was reproduced as 
"administration" in the 1922 (Cole) re-typeset edition of Labour Defended (1922, p.28): 
this changed the emphasis of the sentence in this later version. 
69 George Opdyke, in his A Treatise on Political Economy (1851), having discussed the 
subject matter of political economy then referred to Ŗwhat may be termed the external 
relations of Political Economyŗ (Opdyke, 1851, p.13). 
70 It is our intention to limit, in general, our enquiries (in this chapter) to the period up 
to the early 1850.s, to include John Stuart Millřs Principles of Political Economy 
(1848), and an article entitled Free Trade in the Quarterly Review for December 1849.  
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These external enquiries covered such concerns as the legitimacy of the study 
of political economy as a defensible or worthwhile intellectual pursuit.71   
Also at issue was the consideration of which subject matters should be 
encompassed or excluded from political economy; along with questions as to 
what end and method the discipline should be applied. Together these matters 
were more then a simple attempt to define the term ―political economy‖; they 
were fundamental to the whole project of political economy and as such their 
consideration is essential to a contextual appreciation of Hodgskin‘s writing and 
ideas. 
David Stack claimed that ―Malthusianism and political economy were 
synonymous‖ and that it was ―imperative for radicalism to reject not just 
Malthusianism, but the whole of the new science of political economy‖ (Stack, 
1998, p.28).72 
                                            
71 Within the context of this questioning of political economy, physiocratic notions still 
persisted in some contemporary criticisms.  Some argued that political economy, as it 
had evolved since Adam Smith, not being centred upon land as the source of all wealth, 
was not only misguided and erroneous, but thereby potentially a dangerous application 
of intellect and effort.  Hodgskin noted the persistence of these notions of land being the 
source of wealth; 
Familiar and correct as the principle, that all wealth is the produce of 
labour, may appear, the opinion just referred to, that land is the source of 
wealth Ŕ which is the fountain of much injustice towards individuals, and 
much national animosity, it having been the occasion of several wars, 
and the excuse for much usurpation Ŕ shows that this principle is not 
universally recognized. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.20) 
There were two main works in the 1820.s that continued the argument that land was 
the source of wealth Ŕ Williams Spenceřs Tracts on Political Economy (1822), which 
reproduced his Britain Independent of Commerce (originally published in 1807 and 
replied to in 1808 by James Millřs Commerce Defended and Torrensř The Economists 
Refuted), as well as Agriculture the Source of Wealth and The Objections against the 
Corn Bill Refuted (both originally published in 1815); and Outlines of a System of 
Political Economy (1823) by Thomas Joplin (1790-1847): 
The produce of the soil, on the contrary, possess an inherent value Ŕ a 
value derived from itself.  It produces men, and men produce gold.  It 
creates its own demand, which gold does not. (Joplin, 1823, p.101) 
Joplinřs comments might seem a singular oddity if it were not for his later 
credibility founded on his banking and currency tracts, which lead him to become a 
leading light and theorist of the Bullion/Currency School, which eventual won the day, 
in banking policy terms.  Joplin became a successful banker and founded the National 
Provincial Bank. 
72 J.S. Mill also seems to have associated the two forms together: 
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Hence when Stack later referred to Hodgskin‘s ―rebuttal of political economy‖ 
(ibid, p.147) he underplayed Hodgskin‘s commitment to political economy, and 
lost the distinction between those who, like Hodgskin, were critical of doctrines 
internal to political economy and others such as Piercy Ravenstone and The 
Quarterly Review that were critical of the whole concept of a science of political 
economy.  
The attitude towards political economy represented one of the most marked 
distinctions between Ravenstone and Hodgskin.  Both were anti-Malthusian and 
shared similar concepts of capital (as social relations rather than simplistic 
material wealth), but their attitudes to both political economy and property 
differed.  For Ravenstone political economy was a ―vile illiberal study‖ 
(Ravenstone, 1824, p.72); as such ―political economy has accordingly become 
the study of all those who felt themselves unequal to other pursuits.‖ (ibid, p.5) 
In The People‟s Science Noel Thompson recognised the ―great emphasis‖ 
placed by William Thompson, John Gray and Hodgskin ―on the need for the 
working classes to confront and defeat the political economists with the 
constructs, concepts and analytical tools of political economy‖ (Thompson, 
1984, p.12).   
                                                                                                                                
we need not wonder that the epithets of ŖMalthusiansŗ and ŖPolitical 
Economistsŗ are so often considered equivalent to hard-hearted, 
unfeeling, and enemies of the poor; Ŕ accusations so far from the being 
true, that no thinkers of any pretensions to sobriety, cherish such hopeful 
views of the future social position of labour, or have so long made the 
permanent increase of its remuneration the turning-point of their 
speculations, as those who most broadly acknowledge the doctrine of 
Malthus. (Mill, ER, April 1845, p.502: also IV, p.368) 
J.S. Millřs wholehearted acceptance of Malthusian population theory can be seen in 
his comments at the Utilitarian debates with the Owenites in 1825: 
That principle [of population] appeared to rest upon evidence so clear 
and so incontrovertible, that to understand it, is to assent to it, and to 
assent to it once is to assent to it for ever.  I flatter myself, that I 
understand it completely; I assented to it without any reservation; and I 
could not have believed that any discussion could have rendered my 
comprehension of it more clear, or my assent to it more confident and 
undoubting.  Sir, that which I did not conceive to be possible has actually 
come to pass: I have been strengthened in my opinions by the discussion 
which they have undergone.  (Mill, XXVI, p.288) 
This is one important issue (that related to political economy) where we find J.S. 
Mill and Hodgskin expressing opposed opinions.  Although, as we shall discuss later, 
Millřs opinion (expressed at about the same time as those above) on the subject of 
progress could be seen as contradictory to Malthusian population theory. 
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We cannot acknowledge, therefore, that we are incapable of 
ascertaining and understanding the natural laws which regulate 
the progress of society, without giving into the hands of one class 
of men the power of interpreting them according to their own 
views and interests.  If we will not inquire into these laws, 
preferring a blind submission to some of our fellow-creatures, we 
surrender unto them the disposal of all that is valuable in 
existence: and we know from all experience, that such a power 
has never been possessed but to be abused. (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.263) 
Thompson reiterated this passage and hence summed up Hodgskin‘s attitude 
towards political economy:- 
Thus Hodgskin saw political economy as a powerful instrument 
which, by establishing and interpreting the ―natural laws‖ of 
economic life, could, in effect, define the economically possible 
and the economically efficacious. That the efficacious and the 
possible should be defined by ―one class of men‖ according to 
―their views and interests‖ was not acceptable.  Such competence 
should not be the exclusive possession of one class.  For 
Hodgskin, political economy was too important to be left to the 
classical political economists. (Thompson, 1984, p.12) 
J.S. Mill and Hodgskin 
When commenting on the Classical economists that followed Ricardo, O‘Brien  
categorised J.S. Mill as ―the most important of these [later Classical] 
economists‖ (O‘Brien, 2004, p.52).  There can be little doubt that of all the 
contemporary prominent economists who might be deemed as Classical it was 
J.S. Mill that Hodgskin seemed to have favoured most.  His review of Mill‘s 
Principles of Political Economy for The Economist whilst acknowledging various 
areas of dispute, was nonetheless complimentary:  
a work which is undoubtedly the most complete exposition of the 
whole subject which has yet issued from the press (Hodgskin, E., 
27th May 1848, p.604)73 
                                            
73 These comments may be seen as very positive, especially if compared with 
Hodgskinřs remarks upon Ricardořs Principles Ŕ ŖMr Ricardo was more acute than 
learned; his observation was far superior to his knowledgeŗ (Hodgskin, E., 28th Nov. 
1846, p.1557). This almost aggressive style was more typical of Hodgskinřs Economist 
writings; 
Hodgskin certainly added depth, scope and erudition to the literary pages 
along with a sharpness and combativeness that suited the paperřs style 
(Dudley, 1993, p.128) 
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Thus from Hodgskin‘s comments upon Mill‘s Principles we can assume that 
there must have been some alignment between the two.  Accordingly we should 
also be aware of several threads of connection between Mill and Hodgskin. 
It is evident that J.S. Mill knew of Hodgskin, although following the deliberate 
attempts by James Mill and Lord Brougham to suppress any mention of 
Hodgskin or his ideas, Hodgskin is conspicuous by his absence from J.S. Mill‘s 
works. Hodgskin‘s Labour Defended is mentioned only in passing without 
naming its author in Mill‘s Reorganization of the Reform Party originally 
published in the April 1839 edition of the London and Westminster Review (Mill, 
VI, p.485).74  
Whilst Hodgskin never seems to have admitted to his anarchism which we, and 
others, have subsequently gathered from his writings, J.S. Mill was, at least in 
his youth, not so reticent; 
I am content however that they should call me radical, 
revolutionist, anarchist, Jacobin, if they please.  I am content to be 
                                                                                                                                
Hodgskinřs successor at The Economist, Walter Bagehot had written a review of 
Millřs Principles for The Prospective Review that was akin to Hodgskinřs in its 
favourable view of Millřs worth and talents 
He [Mill] is the first among great English Economists who has ventured 
to maintain, that the present division of the industrial community into 
labourers and capitalists is neither destined nor adapted for a long-
continued existence: that a large production of wealth is much less 
important than a good distribution of it: that a state of industry in which 
both capital and population are stationary is as favourable to national 
well-being as one in which they are advancing: that fixed customs are 
perpetually modifying the effects which unrestrained competition would 
of itself inevitably produce: that a large body of peasant proprietors is 
usually a source of great national advantage: and that a system of 
Emigration on a great scale would be productive of much benefit to the 
English peasantry by raising their habitual standard of comfort, and 
therefore putting a check on the reckless increase of a miserable 
population. These propositions (which are not all that might be set down) 
will be enough to prove that the subject we have selected for discussion 
with Mr. Mill contains a sufficient number of his peculiar opinions, and 
therefore asking our readers to acquiesce in our selection of a special 
topic, we shall pass on to the general and introductory portion of our 
article. (Bagehot, 1848, p.460) 
74 Millřs The Claims of Labour for the Edinburgh Review (April 1845) also referred to 
Charles Knights Rights of Industry (1831) which named Hodgskin in its direct attacks 
upon him.  It would be impossible to read Knightřs Rights of Industry without knowing 
it was a criticism of Labour Defended and Popular Political Economy.  
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treated as an enemy to establishments, to institutions, and to 
order. (Mill, XXVI, p.262)75 
We can also see from an early stage Mill expressed views very similar to 
Hodgskin in terms of human perfectibility; 
I mean no disrespect to some highly estimable persons, who are 
of a different opinion from myself on this question [of perfectibility], 
but I am persuaded that a vast majority of those who laugh at the 
hopes of those who think that man can be raised to any higher 
rank as a moral intellectual being, do so from a principle very 
different from wisdom or knowledge of the world. (Mill, XXVI, 
p.429)76   
Whilst in this speech Mill praised Condorcet‘s notion of perfectibility, he still 
subscribed to Malthus‘s population principle, which was initially written as a 
direct rebuttal of Condorcet and Godwin‘s concepts of perfectibility.77  
Mill, although maintaining diminishing returns for agriculture, was able to accept 
that in industry increasing technology would ensure long run increasing returns. 
[Mill] tried to incorporate Ricardo‘s work into his own, though in so 
doing he emasculated the former more or less completely.  Thus 
he [Mill] still had the concept of diminishing returns in agriculture, 
but modified it so much by the possibilities of technical progress 
that it ceased to be a fundamental proposition.   It was, he 
believed, only a valid proposition in a given state of technical 
knowledge; and he gave many reasons why it should be offset by 
changes in technical knowledge. (O‘Brien, 2004, p.52-3)78 
                                            
75 Taken from a speech on Parliamentary Reform Ŕ August 1824. 
76 Taken from a speech on Perfectibility Ŕ 2nd May 1828. 
77 In his later review of The Claims of Labour Mill recognised the paradox of Malthusřs 
population theory as it related to progress and claimed that, in the early editions of the 
Essay on Population Malthus had drawn the incorrect conclusion Ŕ ŖThe first 
promulgator of a truth is not always the best judge of its tendencies and consequences;ŗ 
(Mill, ER, April, 1845, p.500: also IV, p.367).  Thus Mill claimed that contrary to 
Malthusř early claims, the population theory inevitably lead to the concept of 
Ŗindefinite social improvementŗ (ibid). 
Mill did not mention Godwin who was still at that time a social outcast due to his 
views and practise regarding marriage. Given Millřs later entanglement with Mrs 
Taylor, it is perhaps fortunate that he avoided any association with Godwin. 
78 Although, as OřBrien noted, there are passages in Millřs Principles that admit 
improved returns even in agriculture, e.g. 
During the twenty or thirty year last elapsed [till 1857], so rapid has been 
the extension of improved processes of agriculture, that even the land 
yields a greater produce in proportion to the labour employed. (Mill, II, 
p.193) 
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This is an issue that we will return to later in this thesis. 
The Education of Hodgskin and Mill 
Hodgskin might be seen to have had an advantage over J.S. Mill in having 
attended university, whereas Mill did not receive any formal institutional 
education. It seems that James Mill was reluctant to expose his son (John) to a 
university education (Burston, 1973, p.90), although ―there is plenty of strong 
evidence that James Mill strongly favoured a period of living abroad as part of 
an education‖ (ibid, p.88). 
Hence in one particular regard the education that Hodgskin and Mill received 
coincided quite notably.  Jeremy Bentham and James Mill played significant 
roles in Hodgskin‘s post-naval education, as they did in J.S. Mill‘s late-teen 
instruction. In James Mill on Philosophy and Education (1973) the guidelines 
given to Hodgskin by James Mill and Bentham are reproduced in full as 
illustrative of the instructions that would have been given to J.S. Mill (Burston, 
1973, p.93-6).  
Despite the instructions received by Hodgskin being for his German expedition, 
whilst J.S. Mill‘s travels were mainly in France, there were similarities with 
Hodgskin‘s earlier travels to France (as the companion to Francis Place‘s son). 
Both Mill and Hodgskin stayed at the French homes of Jeremy Bentham‘s 
brother (Sir Samuel Bentham) and J.B. Say (in Paris).  Both Hodgskin and Mill 
attended (separately) Say‘s lectures on economics in Paris. 
When Hodgskin finally returned to London (from his second period in 
Edinburgh) in 1823, James Mill arranged for him to be given a job for the 
Morning Chronicle.  This was the same year that John Stuart Mill had also 
begun his career writing for that journal.  
                                                                                                                                
In a society which is advancing in wealth, population generally increases 
faster than agricultural skill, and food consequently tends to become 
more costly; but there are times when a strong impulse sets in towards 
agricultural improvements. Such an impulse has shown itself in Great 
Britain during the last twenty or thirty years.  In England and Scotland 
agricultural skill has of late increased considerably faster than 
population, insomuch that food and other agricultural produce, 
notwithstanding the increase of people, can be grown at less cost than 
they were thirty years ago [from 1848]: (Mill, III, p.713)    
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Mill and Socialism 
There is much in J.S. Mill‘s writings that can be positively associated with 
socialism or ―to a qualified Socialism‖ as Mill referred to it in his Autobiography 
(Mill, 1873, p.161). These include Mill‘s 1845 Edinburgh Review article The 
Claims of Labour, various portions of his Principles, as well as the 
posthumously published Chapters on Socialism (1879).  The first of these 
expressed the need to treat labourers using terms similar to Hodgskin; 
if we might point to the principle on which, at some distant date, 
we place our chief hope of healing the widening breach between 
those who toil and those who live on the produce of former toil; it 
would be that of raising the labourer from a receiver of hire – a 
mere bought instrument in the work of production having no 
residual interest in the work itself – to the position of being, in 
some sense, a partner in it. (Mill, ER, April 1845, p.516: also IV, 
p.382) 
As Mary Agnes Hamilton remarked, Mill‘s socialism was an individualistic rather 
than a state socialism (Hamilton, 1933, p.66-67), again this is comparable to 
Hodgskin‘s position (at least with regard to the individualism), which was, like 
Mill‘s, critical of the ―socialism‖ of Owenites, St. Simonians, and Fourier‗s 
followers.  Again like Hodgskin, Mill expressed views in support of private 
property and competition.79  The same methodological individualism seems to 
have been of the utmost import to Hodgskin and Mill. In some regards Mill 
(especially in his later writings)  was more ―socialist‖ than Hodgskin as indicated 
by this passage from Mill‘s Principles: 
I agree, then, with the Socialist writers in their conception of the 
form which industrial operations tend to assume in the advance of 
improvement; and I entirely share their opinion that the time is ripe 
for commencing this transformation, and that it should by all just 
and effectual means be aided and encouraged.  But while I agree 
                                            
79
 The advantages of private property had also been extolled by William Godwin.  In his 
essay which spawned Malthusřs Principle of Population, Of Avarice and Profusion, 
Godwin was critical of the state directed allocation of productive resources and rewards 
that tended towards equality. Thus when men Ŗhave their portion of labour assigned to 
them by the society at large, and the produce collected into a common stockŗ :- 
It reduces the exertions of a human being to the level of a piece of 
mechanism, prompted by no personal motives, compensated and 
alleviated by no genuine passions.  It puts an end to that independence 
and individuality, which are the genuine characteristics of an intellectual 
existence, and without which nothing eminently honourable, generous or 
delightful can in any degree subsist. (Godwin, 1797, p.168-9) 
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and sympathize with Socialists in this practical portion of their 
aims, I utterly dissent from the most conspicuous and vehement 
part of their teaching, their declamations against competition. (Mill, 
1909, p.792: also III, p.794)  
There were areas such as Mill‘s support for Malthus‘ population principle, the 
death penalty and for representative government that Hodgskin would never 
have assented to.  The Wage Fund theory, which for so long held Mill‘s 
commitment, was always attacked by Hodgskin, (although Mill did eventually 
recant following works by Longe and Thornton, but not until the year that 
Hodgskin died – 1869).80    
Thus not only was J.S. Mill the most prominent economist of the 1840.s and 
1850.s but he was not too far from Hodgskin with some of his notions, and they 
also shared some aspects of their backgrounds.81   
Subsequent Subjects 
With Hodgskin‘s approach to political economy in mind the remainder of this 
chapter will aim to address four issues pertinent to Hodgskin‘s political 
economy, especially as presented in his earlier writings. 
 Whether political economy was an art or a science or both. 
 Hodgskin‘s defence of political economy. 
 What was encompassed as the subject matter within political economy. 
 Why labour was so crucial to Hodgskin‘s political economy. 
These issues will be considered with regard to Hodgskin‘s writings and those of 
contemporary political economists of that period.  
                                            
80 Indeed Francis Longeřs A Refutation of the Wage-Fund Theory (1866) contains 
numerous arguments reminiscent, to some degree, of those in Hodgskinřs Labour 
Defended, especially with regards to the advance of capital. Hodgskinřs Economist 
review of McCullochřs A Treatise on the Rate of Wages (27th Dec. 1851) contains a 
concerted criticisms of the Wage Fund theory (this will be dealt with in more detail in 
our consideration of Hodgskinřs concept of labour). 
81 Even down to the fact that J.S. Mill was born in Pentonville, the same area that 
Hodgskin resided in during the time he lived in London.  When Hodgskin moved to 
London in 1813 and made acquaintance with Bentham and James Mill he would have 
been close to the Mills and would presumably have known of the infant John Stuart 
Mill. 
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Section Two 
Political Economy as a Science 
 
Agenda 
This section illustrates how, before it was the commonly held position, Hodgskin 
viewed political economy as an objective or at least non-judgemental science 
distinct from the prevalent view that in the 1820.s encompassed the art or 
practical management of economic affairs within the discipline.  We also show 
how during the period up to the 1840.s this previously commonly held view was 
replaced by a stance more akin to Hodgskin‘s. 
Art or Science 
If the teacher of Political Economy have not decided whether he is 
engaged on a science or an art, whether it is his duty to explain 
phenomena or to deliver precepts, whether his principal business 
is to observe facts or deduce inferences, whether his premises 
are all physical truths or depend on partly or arbitrary 
assumptions, – his work, though it may contain partial views of the 
highest value, cannot possibly form a clear or consistent whole. 
(Senior, 1852, p.16)  
By 1844 John Stuart Mill held that political economy was ―a science not an art‖ 
(Mill, 1844, p.125: also IV, p.313), however, two decades earlier, such an 
opinion was rarely propagated so confidently. 82  
                                            
82 Hodgskin, in his early writings did not provide a specifically direct demarcation 
between art and science, although towards the end of his life he agreed with Millřs 
earlier distinction (Hodgskin, BG., 15
th
 Feb. 1865).  Mill had attempted to distinguish 
between art and science thus:  
The one deals in facts, the other in precepts.  Science is a collection of 
truths; art a body of rules, or directions for conduct.  The language of 
science is, This is, or, This is not; This does, or does not, happen.  The 
language of art is, Do this; Avoid that.  Science takes cognizance of a 
phenomenon, and endeavours to discover its law; art proposes to itself an 
end, and looks out for the means to effect it. (Mill, 1844, p.125: also IV, 
p.312) 
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Political economy had been called a science before The Wealth of Nations, but 
a distinct demarcation between art and science had not been made. Hodgskin 
expressed the fundamentally scientific nature of political economy that, 
although he did not specifically differentiate science from art, seemed to 
emphasis the separation that others were to make and was to become the 
usual distinction of science from art.   
In a lengthy passage in Popular Political Economy Hodgskin attempted to 
―relieve political economy from some of the odium cast on it of late‖: 
It [political economy] is not, as is generally supposed, a meddling, 
factious, ambitious science, – not a political science, prescribing 
regulations for society, or dictating duties to men; … It does not 
pretend to say what men will do, but it says the consequences of 
their actions, some of which it endeavours to trace, are inevitable.  
It aims at ascertaining the natural circumstances which regulate 
the production of wealth, and it records some of those instincts 
                                                                                                                                
Nassau Senior had also laid out his distinction couched in terms of artřs 
purposiveness, but added a temporal dimension: 
Shortly, it may be said that, as a history is a statement of past facts, so a 
science is a statement of existing facts, and an art statement of the means 
by which the future facts may be caused or influenced, or, in other 
words, future events brought about.  The first two aim only at supplying 
materials for the memory and the judgment; they do not presuppose any 
purpose beyond the acquisition of knowledge.  The third is intended to 
influence the will.  It presupposes that some object is to be attained, and 
points out the easiest, the safest, or the most effective conduct for that 
purpose.  It is for this reason that the collection of related facts which 
constitute a science is generally a less complex thing than the collection 
of related precepts which constitutes an art. (Senior, 1852, p.18-9) 
The opening lines of Sir James Steuartřs An Inquiry into the Principles of Political 
Œconomy (1767) were ŖI present to the public this attempt towards reducing to 
principles, and forming into a regular science, the complicated interests of domestic 
policy.ŗ (Steuart, 1767, p.i)  Steuart assumed the relationship between political 
economy and domestic economy that was still being repeated over fifty years later by, 
amongst others, James Mill and McCulloch, that Ŕ ŖWhat œconomy is in a family, 
political œconomy is in a stateŗ (ibid). 
Robert Torrens not only referred to political economy as a science, but also 
highlighted the disputed state of the discipline. 
The controversies which at present exist amongst the most celebrated 
masters of Political Economy have been brought forward by a lively and 
ingenious author as an object against the study of the science. (Torrens, 
1821, p.xiii) 
In 1821 the Ŗmastersŗ would presumably have been Robert Malthus, David Ricardo, 
and James Mill; McCulloch could not be considered in this class in 1821.  The 
Ŗingenious authorŗ was probably a reference to Piercy Ravenstone and his A Few 
Doubts on the Subjects of Population and Political Economy (1821).    
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which lead man … to seek happiness by means appropriate and 
peculiar to his condition. It presumes not to direct these instincts, 
but expressly declares that this is a matter for private judgment, 
and must be left to private men.  It takes no notice of the arts of 
life; it does not pretend to explain the principles of mechanics, 
agriculture, or chemistry; it does not therefore point out, as is said 
by some authors, the means by which the industry of men may be 
rendered most productive.  … No man can say how industry may 
be rendered most productive; for this is the continually varying 
result of the practical knowledge of all mankind.  Rejecting all 
notice of the arts, political economy can never inform us how the 
hand may be made skilful.  The science observes the close 
connexion between individual gain and the general welfare; but it 
does not pretend to direct the operations of the merchant, the 
trader, or the farmer, any more than those of the engineer; … The 
utmost extent of its utility in promoting opulence is, that statesmen 
may learn from it, … how they may cease to check that 
production, which they, like the science itself, cannot possibly 
promote. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.38-40) 
A common conclusion in the 1820.s was that political economy should include 
those practical and policy recommending aspects that, in Hodgskin‘s opinion, 
should not be considered within a science of political economy.   
For example, Nassau Senior, in his Introductory Lecture on Political Economy, 
published the same year as Hodgskin‘s Popular Political Economy (1827), still 
included the practical within political economy.83 
the science of Political Economy may be divided into two great 
branches – the theoretical, and the practical. (Senior, 1827, p.7) 
The discussions over whether a subject was a science or an art were not limited 
to political economy.  In the first edition of The Chemist, there was an article 
                                            
83 So contemporary where these two works that they both received their notice of 
publication on the same day in The Times Ŕ May 17th 1827. Popular Political Economy 
was favoured with one of its few complimentary  reviews, which aligned Hodgskin with 
Smith but opposed him to Malthus: 
The subject is not a very inviting one to the general reader, but we think 
that the manner in which Mr. Hodgskin has treated it deserves to be 
mentioned. In general, he subscribes to the doctrines of Adam Smith Ŕ 
whose principles he develops and applies with great precision and 
clearness. … [He is] therefore decidedly opposed to the doctrine of Mr. 
Malthus.  He is of the opinion that a dense population carries with it an 
ample compensation in an increased productive power, arising out of the 
number of labourers, the division of labour, and the increase of 
knowledge. (The Times, 15
th
 June 1827, p.8) 
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entitled Chemistry as a Science in which Hodgskin commented on chemistry‘s 
transition from being an art, towards becoming a science: 84 
As long as Chemistry was a mere art, confined to producing a few 
results, of use only to a few practical Chemists, it was of no more 
general interest, however useful, than the art of house-building or 
shoe-making; but now, in addition to its utility as an art, it 
endeavours to explain most of the alterations, unaccompanied by 
perceptible motion, which take place in all the substances of the 
globe. (Hodgskin, C., 13th March 1824, p.11) 
Changing Attitudes 
An illustration of political economists‘ changing attitudes to their science can be 
seen reflected in McCulloch‘s commentary on the practical implications of 
Ricardo‘s economics.  In his article Works and Character of Mr Ricardo 
published in The Scotsman (6th Dec. 1823), McCulloch claimed of ―the leading 
doctrines of Mr Ricardo‘s system of Political Economy‖ that: 
They are not, as has been sometimes stated, merely speculative.  
On the contrary, they enter deeply into almost all the practical 
investigations of the science, and especially into those most 
difficult ones which relate to the distribution of Wealth.  
(McCulloch, SM., 6th Dec. 1823, p.778) 
However, by 1846 it was evident that McCulloch‘s emphasis ―upon the abstract 
character of the principles established by Ricardo … contrasts with McCulloch‘s 
denial in 1824-25 of the allegation that those doctrines were ‗merely 
speculative‘‖ (Ricardo, X, p.370).85 
The establishment of general principles being Mr Ricardo‘s great 
object, he has paid comparatively little attention to their practical 
application, … But his is not a practical work: and it did not enter 
into his plan to exhibit the circumstance that give rise to the 
discrepancies in question [between principle and practical 
circumstances]. (McCulloch, 1846, p.xxv) 
Robert Torrens‘ views between the 1820.s and 1840.s also changed, as he 
admitted in The Budget (1844). Once Torrens came to recognise Ricardo‘s 
                                            
84
 That this article was Hodgskinřs was noted by David Stack: ŖHodgskin wrote a series 
on the history of ŘChemistry as a Scienceř,ŗ (Stack 1998, p.81).  
85 It might be argued, from a reading of volume V of The Works and Correspondence of 
David Ricardo, that in his parliamentary debates Ricardo apparently believed that his 
principles were directly applicable to practical issues and problems.  This was certainly 
one of the complaints made against Ricardo and political economy in general at this 
time, and until at least the 1850.s.  
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political economy as an abstract and hypothetical science, he was able to 
accept Ricardo‘s reasoning. This was in contrast to his criticisms in the third 
edition of his Essay on the External Corn Trade (1826).86   
With the publication of Outlines of the Science of Political Economy (1836), 
Senior expressly excluded the ―practical branch‖ from his description of the 
science of political economy. 
We propose in the following Treatise to give an outline of the 
Science which treats of the Nature, the Production, and the 
Distribution of Wealth.  To this Science we give the name of 
Political Economy. (Senior, 1836, p.1) 
By 1836 practical questions were ―of great interest and difficulty, but no more 
form part of the Science of Political Economy, in the sense in which we use the 
term‖ (Senior, 1836, p.2).87 Indeed Hodgskin‘s concept of political economy as 
dealing with the laws of the production of wealth separated from the practical art 
of government, had not only been taken up by Senior, but was by some 
continental economists seen as the defining distinction of what was often seen 
as the English school of political economy.  
                                            
86 Torrens recognised Ricardořs apparent confusion of the hypothetical and the 
practical: 
In the works of that profound and original writer [Ricardo], more than 
those in any other writer of our times, Political Economy is presented as 
an abstract science.  All his reasonings are hypothetical.  His conclusions 
are necessary truths, irresistibly commanding assent under the premises 
assumed, and enabling us, if we will make the necessary correction for 
the difference between the hypothetical circumstances and the 
circumstances which actually exist, to arrive at conclusions practically 
true under all the varying conditions of society.  It must be confessed, 
however, that this necessary correction Mr. Ricardo himself, not 
unfrequently failed to make.  He enunciates, Ŗwith as little qualification 
as if they were universal and absolute truths,ŗ propositions which are 
strictly applicable to no circumstances save those involved in his 
hypothesis.  This gives to his writings the appearance of paradox, and 
leads to the impression that his conclusions are at variance with facts. … 
he occasionally fell into the fallacy of reasoning from his abstract 
principles as if they were absolutely true, and no modifying 
circumstances could exist (Torrens, 1844, p.xii-xiv).         
87 Senior gave examples of these practical questions as: 
To what extent and under what circumstances the possession of Wealth 
is, on the whole, beneficial or injurious to its possessor, or the society of 
which he is a member?  What distribution of Wealth is most desirable in 
each different state of society? And What are the means by which any 
given Country can facilitate such a distribution?  (Senior, 1836, p.2) 
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The Edinburgh Review‘s article on Senior‘s Outlines noted the use of ―the word 
chrematistics, so frequently employed in this controversy,‖ (ER, Oct. 1837, 
p.74).88  By way of example, the Review item reproduced some passages from 
an entry by ―Professor Cherbuliez of Geneva‖ in the Bibliothèque Universelle de 
Génève (Dec. 1836) regarding Senior and his work.89  Cherbuliez apparently 
perceived that - 
the chrematistic tendency has become predominant, and even 
exclusive, with English economists; while those of the Continent 
have continued to treat economical questions under their double 
point of view.  We may therefore consider modern economists as 
divided into two schools, (ibid, p.75). 
A latter passage in the article laid out the distinction between the English and 
continental economists; that for the latter political economy included both the art 
and the science.90 The article also claimed, as did Hodgskin, that the policy 
inference that laissez-faire was unavoidable:  
                                            
88 This article provides a good contrast between the attitudes of The Edinburgh Review 
when compared with The Quarterly Review with regards to the issues of protectionism, 
free-trade (especially exemplified in the 1851 Quarterly Review article entitled Free-
Trade), and laissez-faire policies in general.  This Edinburgh Review article was 
apparently not written by McCulloch, as his last known article was in the previous 
edition, published in July 1837 (OřBrien, 1995h, p.415). 
Seniorřs own articles (31 in all) appeared in the Edinburgh Review from July 1841 
till April 1855 (Levy, 1970, p.313-4n) 
89 Presumably Antoine-Elisée Cherbuliez (1797-1869) - professor of public law and 
polical economy.  Cherbuliez received his own chapter (XXIII) in Marxřs Theories of 
Surplus Value (1861-3) where he was equated, in part, to the Scottish economist George 
Ramsey (1800-1871). 
90
 This passage bears similarities to Hodgskinřs discussion of economics as a science, 
and also noted the difference between the political economy of Adam Smith and that of 
subsequent economists: 
The English writers, or Chrysologists, as M. Cherbuliez would call them, 
or followers of Dr Smith (though his own definition of Political 
Economy differs widely from that of his successors), define their science 
as that of the laws which regulate the production and distribution of 
wealth.  Their opponents say that it both investigates those laws, and, 
moreover, directs the legislator how to regulate distribution, so as to 
secure that proportion in the enjoyment of it which is most conducive to 
the general welfare.  The foreign school (we term them so for 
convenience, although there are many English authors whose views 
assimilate to theirs) hold, that it is the office of the political economist to 
point out in what way social happiness may be best be attained through 
the medium of national wealth.  Our own writers reply, that this is the 
province, not of the economist, but of the politician.  … We contend that 
the study is purely a science: our opponents, that it includes the practical 
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there can be no doubt of the one great practical conclusion to 
which the theories of English writers of the school in question, 
however conflicting in many points, tend with absolute unanimity.  
It is, That the ―Laws which regulate the distribution of wealth 
between the different classes of society,‖ are principles with which 
it cannot be economically profitable for the legislative to 
intermediate. (ER, Oct. 1837, p.78)91 
Despite the similarities that existed in the introductory chapters of Senior‘s 
Outlines of Political Economy (1836) and Hodgskin‘s Popular Political Economy 
(1827), it would be unrealistic to claim that Senior was directly following 
Hodgskin.  Senior would have been exposed to utilitarian radical ideas and to 
J.S. Mill‘s articles on political economy that were later reprinted in Mill‘s Essays 
on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy.92 By the second half of the 
1830.s, Hodgskin‘s writings were limited to anonymous journalism and working 
class circles.  Indeed it is far more likely that Hodgskin, Mill and Senior were all 
reacting to the changing consciousness of political economists to their still 
                                                                                                                                
adaptations of the science to existing circumstance.  In other words, that 
it is at once a science and an art.   According to them, it is a deontology: 
according to us, an ontology only. (ER, Oct. 1837, p.77) 
(The change to first person plural within the latter part of this passage is that of the 
original text which was all within a single paragraph.)      
91 This passage continued in a vein similar to Hodgskinřs policy assertions, especially 
his early position regarding The Spitalfields Acts, The Combination Laws and the Corn 
Laws, and might almost be said to be essentially Hodgskinite (particularly his 
Economist writings) in its exposition: 
That in so far as the immediate productiveness of industry is concerned, 
every such attempt, however insidiously or plausibly framed, cannot but 
pro tanto diminish it.  That whether the Legislature interfere with the free 
use of capital, by protecting duties, or with the contracts between 
capitalist and labourer, by combination laws Ŕ or with the contract 
between landlord and tenant, by restraints on alienation, &c. Ŕ in 
whatever shape, in short, the multiform spirit of restrictions may show 
itself, it cannot but produce precisely the same results as if the fertility of 
the earth, or the productiveness of labour, has been to a certain extent 
diminished. (ER, Oct. 1837, p.78-9)  
92 On the Definition of Political Economy: and on the Method of Investigation proper to 
it: was the fifth essay in Millřs Essays on Some Unsettled Questions.  The Preface noted 
that these Ŗwere written in 1829 and 1830, the fifth alone has been previously printedŗ 
(Mill, 1844, p.v). The editorřs notes in the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill detail 
this essay as having been first written in the autumn of 1831, and first published in the 
London and Westminster Review in October 1836 (Mill, IV, p.309). 
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relatively pioneering discipline, but Hodgskin‘s freedom from intellectual 
constraints perhaps enabled him to express this changing attitude earlier. 93 
However prevalent this concept was to become, Hodgskin‘s early expression of 
political economy as a science, should be seen in the context of his political 
agenda.   
The Need for Scientific Political Economy 
In Labour Defended (1825) Hodgskin expressed his support for the labourers‘ 
claims to a greater share of society‘s productive output, but recognised that this 
could not be achieved by violence. Indeed he had felt the need to defend 
Labour Defended against the charge made in the Trades‟ Newspaper that his 
pamphlet was supportive of the use of violence to attain better conditions for 
labourers. 
                                            
93 Senior wrote (in apparent agreement with Hodgskin) that ŖThe earlier writers who 
assumed the name of Political Economists avowedly treated not of Wealth, but of 
Governmentŗ (Senior, 1836, p.1). Senior then noted James Steuartřs remark that the 
object of political economy was the art of maximising the subsistence for a nationřs 
population, rather than a scientific enquiry into the laws which affect wealth. 
Both Hodgskin and Senior used the same passage from Henri Storch to support their 
own positions. 
ŖPolitical Economyŗ is defined by Mr Storch to be Ŗthe science of the 
NATURAL laws which determine the prosperity of nations, their wealth 
and civilization.ŗ (Hodgskin, TN., 29th Jan. 1826) 
ŖPolitical Economy,ŗ says M. Storch, Ŗis the science of the natural laws 
which determine the prosperity of nations, that is to say, their wealth and 
their civilizationŗ (Senior, 1836, p.1)  
The difference between the wording of Heinrich Friedrich Storch (Cours 
d’Économie Politique) is due to the fact that Storchřs work was never translated into 
English. So both authors were providing their own translations from the French of either 
the original 1815 publication or of J.B. Saysř notated edition of 1823.  
It is interesting that Storch was so freely quoted by Hodgskin in The Trades 
Newspaper, which was a working class medium, presumably with the expectation that 
Storchřs authority would be recognised. Hodgskin also used Storch as a source in 
Popular Political Economy, as well as some of his Economist articles in the 1850.s. 
Storch was also cited in many other political economy books and journals.  It seems that 
Storchřs renown was more widespread at that time than it might be considered to be 
nowadays. 
Hodgskin and Senior also used similar passages from Say and McCulloch to show 
that the demarcation of political economy had not been consistently held to.  They both 
used McCullochřs definition of political economy Ŕ Ŗthe Science of the laws which 
regulate the production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption of those articles or 
products that are necessarily useful or agreeable to man …ŗ (McCulloch, 1825, p1). 
Senior additionally pointed out the contradiction of this with McCullochřs later 
statement that Ŗits object is to point out the means by which the industry of man may be 
rendered most productive of wealthŗ (ibid, p.8).  
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So far from looking to violence of any kind as a means to obtain 
any end, however laudable, I look only to knowledge. … I at least 
have no wish to excite either the labourers or their opponents to 
acts of violence.  I at least do not forget, that every act of violence, 
by whoever committed, tends to retard that continued melioration 
in the condition of society, (Hodgskin, TN., 30th Oct. 1825)94 
Being adverse to violence Hodgskin claimed that resort had to be made to 
reason, but that this reasoning had to avoid certain arguments.  This was 
especially prudent given the economic boom of late 1825, when it would have 
been ineffectual to rely on arguments that permitted comparisons of workers‘ 
existing circumstances with previous eras or foreign workers‘ conditions. 
To obtain better treatment the labourers must appeal from 
practice to principle.  We must put out of view how labour has 
been paid in times past, and how it is now paid in other countries, 
and we must show how it ought to be paid. This I admit is a 
difficult task, but the former condition of the labourer in this 
country, and his condition at present in other countries, leaving us 
no criterion to which we can or ought to appeal, we must 
endeavour to perform it. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.5) 
Thus reasons had to be presented that abstracted from reality or existing 
conditions. This led Hodgskin to believe, that workers could only obtain better 
distributive conditions as the result of hypothetical arguments and reasoning. 
Hodgskin may well have become aware of such a possibility as a result of his 
work for the Morning Chronicle reporting on proceedings in the House of 
Commons, where ―Ricardian‖ hypothetical arguments had been applied with 
apparent success. 
                                            
94 Despite Hodgskinřs protests there were passages in Labour Defended that might have 
caused alarm, such as  
till the right of property shall be founded on principles of justice, and not 
on those of slavery; till man shall be held more in honour than the clod 
be treads on, or the machine he guides -- there cannot, and there ought 
not to be either peace on earth or good-will amongst men. (Hodgskin, 
1825, p.32) 
Hodgskinřs work also elicited responses that carried undertones of violence, even if 
they illustrated a misunderstanding of Hodgskinřs position as regards property, for 
example in Thomas Cooperřs Elements of Political Economy: 
Would Mr. Hodgskin and his followers, take the land and machinery of 
the capitalist by force?  For if not by bargain and contract, there is no 
alternative.  If Mr Hodgskin and his followers say yes, then if I were a 
capitalist, I should say, we will fight for it if you please. (Cooper, 1830, 
p.352) 
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Section Three 
In Defence of Political Economy 
 
Agenda 
In this section we present an exposition of Hodgskin‘s defence of political 
economy as a useful and beneficial science.  We do this against the backdrop 
of contemporary attacks against political economy.  This background of 
antagonism can be seen in articles published by The Trades Newspaper 
around the time of its serialised reporting of Labour Defended.  We also draw 
upon Hodgskin‘s direct response to its concerns, which were later restated in 
Popular Political Economy (1827).  
Polarised Opinions   
Two very different opinions prevail in society regarding political 
economy.  On the one hand it is described as the most important 
of all the sciences, and indispensable to the welfare of society. … 
On the other hand, there is a large class of persons who never 
mention political economy without a sneer.  They deny that any 
such science does or can exist; and deride those who undertake 
to teach it. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.1-2) 
Hodgskin‘s Popular Political Economy (1827) began with a defence of political 
economy.  In his Preface Hodgskin commented that what he perceived as the 
―repugnance now felt to some of the doctrines of Political Economy‖ stemmed 
from Malthus‘s Essay on Population (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.xix).   
It was probably Hodgskin‘s exposure to working class interests and his post 
writing Parliamentary reports that made the polarization of opinion on political 
economy obvious to him.  Consequently Hodgskin was able to note the 
widespread prevalence of this polarity; 
repeatedly met with in the public journals, and continually 
reproduced in Parliament, as well as among all the classes of the 
people, (ibid, p.3).  
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We can thus explore what Hodgskin conceived of as the widespread diversity of 
opinion on political economy, by investigating the negative attacks on the 
subject in the early 1820.s. 
Attacks on Political Economy 
A readily available illustration of the parliamentarian attacks on political 
economy can be found in the reports of Ricardo‘s speeches in his collected 
Works and Correspondence (Volume v).95  For example, in a debate regarding 
the new Chancellor of the Exchequer‘s budget statement on 21st Feb. 1823, 
Ricardo is reported to have commented that he ―had frequently‖ needed ―to 
repel the attacks which were made upon the science of political economy‖ 
(Ricardo, V, p.248). 
Perhaps Ricardo‘s most telling remark was reported during a debate on the Silk 
Manufacture Bill, on 9th June 1823, where he apparently conceded that:- 
the words ―political economy‖ had, of late, become terms of 
ridicule and reproach (ibid, p.307) 
When James Mill wrote to McCulloch regarding the arrangements for the 
Ricardo memorial lecture series he echoed Ricardo‘s concerns; 
You can have little notion of the dread of publicity which hangs 
over many of us: of the aversion to Political Economy which yet 
here is almost universal. (Mill, 10th Jan. 1824)96  
                                            
95 Hodgskin started writing parliamentary reports in late 1822, but there is no way of 
knowing whether any of the reports in volume V of the Works of Ricardo actually 
related to reporting by Hodgskin.   
96 So disheartened were Ricardořs followers during the period just after Ricardořs 
death, that James Mill had wrote to McCulloch (19
th
 Sept. 1823) and concluded that 
Ŗyou and I are his two only genuine disciples,ŗ (Bain, 1882, p.211). 
There were however, marked differences between McCullochřs and James Millřs 
economics, which were perhaps best illustrated by their opposition to each other on 
banking and currency issues.  McCulloch sided with the Bullionists, whilst James and 
John Stuart Mill were anti-Bullionists.  
Ricardo seems to have accepted that his position did not attract many followers Ŕ ŖI 
have not yet succeeded in making many converts in my own country, but I do not 
despair of seeing the number increase Ŕ the few I have are of the proper description, and 
do not want zeal for the propagation of the true faithŗ (Ricardo, VIII, p.227 Ŕ 4th Sept. 
1820).  The diarist John Lewis Mallet (14
th
 Jan. 1820) recalled that Ricardořs Principles 
had, despite there having 750 copies printed of the first edition and 1000 each of the 
second and third editions (ibid, X, p.262-264), Ŗnot been read by 200 persons in the 
country,ŗ (ibid, VIII, p.152n).  
 78 
It seems that Ricardianism started from relatively modest beginnings, although 
by 1825 Ricardo‘s reputation had posthumously flourished. Samuel Bailey 
remarked that Ricardo was considered by some ―as the ablest economist of his 
day‖ (Bailey, 1825, p.xii). However, Bailey was concerned as to how such an 
exalted position had been attained: 
It has been unfortunate, perhaps, for Mr. Ricardo‘s ultimate 
reputation, and certainly for the science which he cultivated, that 
his admirers have extolled him beyond the sobriety of truth. … It is 
probable, however, that the excess of their admiration has blinded 
them to his defects; that they have been too much occupied with 
the excellence of his speculations to note the errors by which they 
are disfigured.  It would be difficult, on any other supposition to 
account for the extravagant praises which have been heaped on 
his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. (Bailey, 1825, 
p.xii-xiii) 
In a later paper (A Letter to a Political Economist) Bailey expressed his 
concerns regarding the way that political economy shielded itself by defending 
particular political economists: 
The science has suffered, and still suffers infinitely more from 
arrogance, which looks upon certain names and doctrines as 
sacred from attack, that intolerance which would repress every 
symptom of free examination, that confidence which rejects with 
scorn any suspicion of the possibility of error, that pertinacity 
which clings to opinions once expressed because the credit of 
individuals appears to be involved in maintaining them. (Bailey, 
1826, p.95) 
The established periodicals (e.g. The Edinburgh Review and The Quarterly 
Review) generally refrained from directly referring to the dissent regarding 
political economy, but rather stressed its importance and thereby contributed to 
                                                                                                                                
When the foundation of a lectureship of political economy was established,  it was 
not met with overwhelming support: 
if Mr. John Smith had not exerted himself as much as he did, at the last, 
it would have been dropped.  Mr Lefevre, Mr. Mill, George Grote, and 
Mr. J. Smith, were the only strenuous supporters. (Bain, 1882, p.214) 
Nevertheless subscriptions were established to raise £1200 over ten years for the 
Memorial Lectures that were given by McCulloch (Bain, 1882, p.214).  This was about 
the same sum that was raised as an immediate result of Hodgskinřs appeal in the 
Mechanics’ Magazine, around this time (11th Oct. 1823), to establish a mechanics 
institute (Hole, 1853, p.8).     
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an indirect defence of political economy.97 The reason for this, James Mill saw 
related to these journals being ―addressed to the aristocratical classes‖ (Mill, 
WR., Jan. 1824, p.210).  
Explanations Provided 
The newly established Benthamite radical publication, The Westminster 
Review, was more forthcoming in its acknowledgement of the attacks on 
political economy. In its review of James Mill‘s Elements of Political Economy 
J.S. Mill saw in the unscientific presentation of Ricardo‘s work, an excuse for 
political economy‘s detractors:98 
As Mr. Ricardo‘s work, however, partakes somewhat of the nature 
of a running comment upon the writings of preceding authors, and 
does not afford a clear and well-arranged view of the science, his 
differences with Adam Smith and others have been eagerly 
caught at by the small wits of the day, as certain signs that 
political economy admits of no indubitable conclusions, that they 
who study it may with justice be classed with the alchymists and 
astrologers of old, and that their visionary and ill-digested projects 
are undeserving of public attention. (J.S. Mill, WR., Oct. 1824, 
p.291) 
It was often conceived that attacks upon political economy resulted from the 
divergence and rapid development of ideas and opinions articulated by political 
economists. This was expressed by McCulloch in his Discourse on Political 
Economy (1824) thus; 
                                            
97 By way of example, the Edinburgh Review, in a review of McCullochřs Discourse on 
the Rise, Progress, Peculiar Objects and Importance of Political Economy (1825) paid 
the following compliment to political economy: 
Though directly conversant only about wealth and industry Ŕ though 
having for its immediate object but the bodily comforts and worldly 
enjoyments of men, it is certain that it is at the same time the best nurse 
of all elegance and refinement, the surest guarantee for justice, order, and 
freedom, and the only safe basis for every species of moral and 
intellectual improvement. (ER., Nov. 1825, p.2) 
98 The Memoir of Ricardo, originally published in The Annual Biography and Obituary 
(1824), written (apparently) by Moses Ricardo with James Millřs influence Ŗparticularly 
in the paragraph on the Principlesŗ (Ricardo, X, p.15), made the following assertion in 
defence of Ricardořs Principles: - 
The train of arguments is derived from a few luminous principles, and 
one is so consequent upon another, that the work cannot be examined in 
detail: it must be taken as a whole, and as such, its conclusions are 
demonstrated with almost mathematical precision. (Ricardo, X, p.10) 
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the differences which have subsisted among the most eminent of 
its professors, have proved exceedingly unfavourable to its 
progress, and have generated a disposition to distrust its best 
established conclusions. (McCulloch, 1824, p.8)99 
McCulloch concluded that this was necessarily the case with any relatively new 
science – ―Political Economy has not been exempted from the common fate of 
the other sciences‖ (ibid, p.9).100 However McCulloch was prepared to claim 
that political economy had reached a degree of perfection that would alleviate 
the fears of its detractors. 
But the errors with which Political Economy was formerly infected 
have now disappeared, and a very few observations will suffice to 
show that it really admits of as much certainty in its conclusions as 
any science founded on fact and experiment can possibly do. 
(McCulloch, 1824, p.9) 
Hodgskin plainly disagreed with McCulloch‘s assertion:101  
                                            
99
 McCulloch had been prepared to be censorious to Ricardo in their direct 
correspondence (5
th
 June 1821), for publicly exposing political economy to possible 
criticism. 
Your object never has been and never can be any other than to endeavour 
to promote the real interests of the science; but I apprehend you will 
agree with me in thinking that nothing can be  more injurious to these 
interests than to see an Economist of the highest reputation strenuously 
defending one set of opinions one day, and unconditionally surrendering 
them the next Ŕ The fundamental differences that formerly existed (for I 
am sorry to think they have now nearly disappeared) between you and 
Messrs. Malthus and Sismondi induced many to believe that Political 
Economy was a thing of fudge, a fabric without a foundation Ŕ And I 
certainly think that those who were formerly of that opinion have a good 
deal better ground for entertaining it now (Ricardo, VIII, p.382). 
100 A point also recognised by Torrens, when discussing the objections against political 
economy, which were based on the changing beliefs, as well as the differences and 
internal wrangling between authors and practitioners.  Torrens was also rather 
optimistic about the prospect of widespread consensus  in the science : 
A similar objection might have been urged, in a certain stage of progress, 
against every branch of human knowledge. …  In the progress of the 
human mind a period of controversy amongst the cultivators of any 
branch of science must necessarily precede the period of their unanimity. 
… With respect to Political Economy the period of controversy is 
passing away and that of unanimity rapidly approaching.  Twenty years 
hence there will scarcely exist a doubt respecting any of its fundamental 
principles. (Torrens, 1821, p.xii) 
101
 Nassau Senior, Samuel Read and Richard Whately also recognised the difficulties 
caused by the incompleteness and contradictions between political economists at this 
time (and two decades later), as well as the need to defend political : 
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That the science is incomplete, and yet in its infancy – those who 
profess it differing among themselves as to its first principles – is 
generally admitted; (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.xxiii). 
The Trades’ Newspaper 102 
In working class circles and publications the distrust of political economy was 
not only based on the contradictions and impermanence of its doctrines, but 
also in the implications of what Hodgskin saw as dogma – ―Men turn away 
disgusted, not from truth, but from errors dogmatically enforced.‖ (Hodgskin, 
                                                                                                                                
It is, at present, in that state of imperfect development, which … throws 
the greatest difficultly in the way of the beginner, and consequently, of a 
teacher, and offers the fairest scope to the objections of an idle or an 
interested adversary. (Senior, 1827, p.2) 
Every one is aware that Political Economy is in a state of imperfect 
development, (Senior, 1852, p.11) 
By all who are acquainted with the most recent and most noted works on 
Political Economy, it will be readily admitted that the science is at 
present in a very unsettled and unsatisfactory state.  There is scarcely a 
single doctrine … upon which there is a perfect and uniform, or even a 
general agreement, among the numerous sects and schools into which 
this science is now divided. (Read, 1829, p.v) 
It has been my first object, to combat the prevailing prejudices against 
the study [of political economy]; (Whately, 1831, p.vi) 
Sir John Bylesř Sophisms of Free-Trade and Popular Political Economy (1849) was 
not an attack on Hodgskinřs Popular Political Economy but rather the more generally 
accepted orthodoxy of mid 19
th
 century political economy as typified by J.S. Mill and 
McCulloch.  The first fallacy he attacked was that ŖPolitical Economy is a scienceŗ Ŕ 
If by a science be meant a collection of truths ascertained by experiment, 
and on which all well informed men are agreed. Then political economy 
is manifestly not yet a science. (Byles, 1849, p.1) 
Notwithstanding this Byles was willing to accept political economyřs scientific 
credentials if a less rigorous notion of science was applied; 
If by a science be meant a subject on which some little has gradually 
become known, but the great body of solid knowledge yet remains to be 
discovered by experience and observation, then, indeed, in this lower 
sense, political economy is a science. (ibid) 
Nevertheless, McCullochřs confidence in political economy was accepted in the 
USA.  Indeed Cooper adopted McCullochřs confidence in political economy and thus 
portrayed an upbeat prognosis:  
The recent applications of the principles of Political Economy, by the 
enlightened Ministry of Great Britain, … have been received with nearly 
unanimous approbation throughout the Kingdom, as well as in 
Parliament: and we seem to gain a glimpse of the dawn of a new day; 
and of peace on earth, and good will toward men. (Cooper, 1826, p.ii; 
1830, p.iv) 
102 The Trades’ Newspaper which was, as Noel Thompson described Ŕ Ŗthe only 
authentically working-class newspaper outside the co-operative press in the late 1820sŗ 
(Thompson, 1984, p.12). 
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1827a, p.xxii).  For Hodgskin this disgust became noticeably evident in The 
Trades‟ Newspaper.  
The Trades‟ Newspaper was concerned with the immediate implications of the 
policy of Free Trade.  It perceived that workers were becoming increasingly 
disadvantaged by the removal of protective measures, as a result of policies 
apparently endorsed by political economists, as voiced in parliament and the 
establishment periodicals. 
In Narrative of the Conditions of the Manufacturing Population (1824) Alexander 
Richmond had claimed that the antagonism of the working classes towards 
political economy was due to its emphasis on free-trade.  This was also to form 
the basis of the complaints endorsed within the Trades‟ Newspaper with regard 
to the Spitalfields Acts and the Corn Laws. 
For the last forty years, the ablest writers on political science have 
been advocates for a general freedom of trade, and have 
condemn the whole system of bounties, prohibitory duties, 
monopolies and restrictions of all kinds: leaving every thing open 
to fair competition.  The greater part of their reasoning, however, 
more immediately refers to the external trade of one country 
compared with that of another; and few of them have been aware 
of the effect produced by the application of the principle on the 
different classes of the same community, or the positive injustice 
done, by its operating in one case and not in another.  It is indeed 
a delicate point to interfere with, being the keystone of the whole 
political machine; for, were the principle generally applied, it would 
change the whole order of society and annihilate all the 
incorporated and chartered rights of the country.  Thus we have a 
number of small communities, enjoying particular privileges, 
forming the component parts of a larger; and the benefits of the 
boasted freedom of trade are confined to those with no special 
privileges to defend, or have no means of doing so. (Richmond, 
1824, p.2-3) 
Hodgskin linked the free-traders and Corn Law abolitionists as using the same 
reasoning and usually ―of the same party in the ministry‖ – ―The same class of 
reasoners who advocate the repeal of corn laws are also advocates of the 
abolition of the restrictions on trade.  They have used similar arguments on both 
subjects;‖ (Hodgskin, TN., 12th Feb 1826).  
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The Spitalfields Acts 
The Spitalfields Acts played a significant part in Hodgskin‘s early journalist 
career, as his views on them, being in line with his notions on economic free 
trade, confronted other working class concerns of the time. 
by the sixth number of the [Mechanics‟] Magazine he [Hodgskin] 
demanded the outright repeal of the acts, which, he admitted, 
were ―cherished by a great many of our readers‖ … The more 
immediate importance of the articles [by Hodgskin], however, was 
the hostile response of the magazine‘s readership.  Keen to 
preserve their loyalty to his fledgling publication, Robertson did 
not publish the further articles on Spitalfields that Hodgskin had 
promised.  Hodgskin left the Mechanics Magazine soon after this 
to become editor of a more specialist sister publication, The 
Chemist.  (Stack, 1998, p.80) 
Hodgskin‘s view was always that ―Free trade laissez faire, is incompatible with 
any species of restriction on industry,‖ (Hodgskin, E., 19th April 1848, p.479).  
This was not only in line with his political economic position, but his general 
anarchistic view that the ―Legislature is not competent even to redress the 
wrong it enacts without causing some misery‖ (Hodgskin, E., 26th May 1849, 
p.573). 
Stack provided an explanation of why the Spitalfields Acts were of such 
importance:  
Although they applied to comparatively few men, and contained 
provisions forbidding the formation of trade unions, they were 
regarded with some affection by the weavers, and other groups of 
workers, all over the country (Stack, 1998, p.80). 
The reform of the Spitalfields acts gave rise to numerous pamphlets during 
1822 and 1823, with some as late as 1828 still trying to make their point. For 
example, A Defence of the Spitalfields Acts (1823) by Andrew Larcher was 
typical of working class pamphlets of the time, and provides a contemporary 
account of why they were apparently valued by working class interests:103  
                                            
103
 By working class pamphlets we refer to pamphlets aimed at working class concerns 
rather than necessarily written by working labourers. The Spitalfields Acts, Seven 
Pamphlets 1818-1828 edited by Kenneth Carpenter as part of the series Ŕ British 
Labour Struggles: Contemporary Pamphlets 1717-1850 Ŕ provides examples of these 
mostly anonymous works. Larcher is otherwise unknown, except that we know at the 
time of publication he lived in Bethnal Green.  
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Thus to me it is evident, that the Spitalfields Act is not only a 
protection to the London Weavers, but also to tradesmen, to 
shopkeepers, and to every other class or people in London: and, 
in a measure, to the peace of the whole British empire.  It keeps 
up a regulating standard, by which the London and Country 
weavers are protected from the extreme distress to which 
rapacious employers would reduce them; it enables the weavers 
to buy and consume commodities, which gives employ to 
thousands of other families, and thereby secures trade and profit 
to wholesale and retailing venders. … Such a national distress 
must be dangerous to the constitution, or such a failure of trade 
will surely bring a fatal failure upon the revenue, which must 
inevitably cause a revolution with all its direful consequences.  
Hence it is evident that the Spitalfields Act is of some importance 
to the kingdom. (Larcher, 1823, p.3) 
It seems that Malthus‘s emphasis on effectual demand and under consumption 
were the economic notions adopted by those propagating working class 
opposition to the removal of the protection afforded by laws such as the 
Spitalfields Acts.  Hodgskin seems to have accepted that the removal of 
protectionist legislation affected effective demand, but that this under-
consumption resulted from over-trading. The capitalists, in Hodgskin‘s opinion, 
were stimulated by Government encouragement on the prospect of creating 
extended markets. 
For this general delusion there must have been a general cause; 
and I attribute the unfounded hopes of the capitalist, and 
consequently all this over-trading, first in one branch of 
commerce, then in another, to the speeches and writings of the 
ministerial part of the Government, and to the system on which 
the Ministers have acted for these last six years, of removing 
restrictions and prohibitions from our commerce.  Whenever they 
have proposed the removal of such restrictions, they have 
flattered the cupidite and stimulated the enterprise of our 
manufacturers and merchants, by talking of the increased market 
they were to find for their commodities.  The latter eagerly 
hastened to supply the imaginary market.  They first over-worked 
and over-employed their men, and then undersold each other.  
These speculations turned out not profitable; – they became 
bankrupts, and distress among the workmen, wide-spread and 
alarming distress, has been the consequence. (Hodgskin, TN., 
12th Feb. 1826) 
These legal instruments were seen, in many working class circles, as best 
serving the workers‘ immediate interests, whereas Hodgskin and other Free-
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Traders were only able to offer more long-term benefits by their removal.  
Thereby, in the 1820.s, the concerns of the working class were with nominal 
wages and prices rather than issues that more directly affected real wages, 
such as the Corn Laws. Hodgskin, in his Lecture on Free Trade in Connection 
with the Corn Laws (1843) seemed to have recognised the disparity of interests 
as only being eroded by the 1840.s. : 
As the labouring class have unfortunately stood aloof from our 
agitation, though they are now I believe coming forward and 
making common cause with us, as it has been asserted that to 
abolish the Corn Laws would injure them, (Hodgskin, 1843, p.4) 
It seems that there was acceptance of the notion that if prices were raised, then 
wages, being at a subsistence level, would necessarily rise too. This was not 
due to a theoretical principle, as in Ricardo‘s Principles, but from experience of 
how workers were actually paid and supported by the Poor Laws.104 The view 
held and propagated by Hodgskin and many others was that free trade would 
benefit workers in the long term, and that the Corn Laws, in practise, affected 
the workers less than the more affluent capitalist and land owning classes. 
Of this, however, I am quite certain, that the Corn Laws, execrable 
as they are in principle, and mischievous as they are to the whole 
community, do not impose anything like so heavy a tax on the 
labourer as capital.  Indeed, however injurious they may be to the 
capitalist, it may be doubted whether they are so to the labourer.  
They diminish the rate of profit, but they do not in the end lower 
the wages of labour.  Whether there are Corn Laws or not, the 
capitalist must allow the labourer to subsist, and as long as his 
claims are granted, and acted on, he will never allow him to do 
more. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.22) 
Senior‘s 1828 lecture On the Corn Laws and Poor Laws shows that at this 
period, the Poor Laws were used to maintain workers‘ wages up to the price of 
                                            
104 In Hodgskinřs writing there were quite often poetic asides included for reasons he 
explained thus: 
To me it is always pleasant to find the language of science confirmed by 
the authority of the poets, who, obtaining popularity only by describing 
or appealing to general feelings and sentiments of mankind, may be 
supposed to be their most accurate representatives. (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.22-3) 
In this vein we can use lines from Shelleyřs The Mask of Anarchy (1819) as 
representative of contemporary sentiment:  
Tis to work and have such pay,  
As just keeps life from day to day. 
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subsistence, in conjunction with the Corn Laws.  As such Hodgskin‘s claim that 
there were ―institutions which limit the reward of labour, whatever may be its 
produce, to a bare subsistence,‖ (Hodgskin, 1825, p.31) can be seen justified – 
The Poor Laws as at present administered … secure to every 
individual a definite amount of wheat, to be made up if not earned 
by labour, by the occupiers of land and houses in the parish in 
which each individual is settled. And while the corn laws continue, 
an alteration of the poor laws would be an injustice which no 
government could venture, no legislation sanction, and no people 
endure. To prohibit the poor man from purchasing his food at the 
cheapest market, and at the same time to take from him the 
subsistence to which he is by law entitled would excite, and would 
deserve to excite, an insurrection. (Senior, 1828, p.232) 
Hodgskin’s Response to The Trades’ Newspaper 
The Trades‟ Newspaper was an important journal and outlet that was generally 
sympathetic towards Hodgskin‘s ideas. Its extensive reviews, commentary and 
near serialisation of Labour Defended, had brought Hodgskin and his work to 
the notice of the working classes.105  It was edited by Joseph Clinton 
Robertson, who had been the ―proprietor, editor, and driving force‖ of The 
Mechanics‟ Magazine that Hodgskin had worked for in 1823 (Stack, 1998, 
p.79).106  
The January 22nd 1826 issue of The Trades‟ Newspaper contained an editorial 
that concluded with the following condemnation of political economy, and of the 
―repeal of the prohibition of foreign silks‖ by ―Mr. [William] Huskisson and his 
colleagues‖:107 
                                            
105
 Shortly after the publication of Hodgskin's Labour Defended, a series of detailed 
reviews commenced in the Trades’ Newspaper on 21st August 1825.  These were 
continued on 28
th
 August, 4
th
 September, 25
th
 September, and 16
th
 October.  Although 
these reviews reproduced large sections of Labour Defended they were not simple 
serialisations of the work. These articles always covered the entire front pages of the 
newspaper, and extended onto the second pages 
106 Robertson and Hodgskin had gone their separate ways after the Mechanicsř Institute 
had evolved out of their control; during the later part of the 1820.s their relationship was 
still relatively amicable. Although by 1835 there was a complete falling out between the 
two over Hodgskinřs acclaim of Birkbeckřs role in the Mechanicsř Institute and his 
remarks published in The Courier (24
th
 March 1835) to the effect that Robertson had 
tried to detrimentally affect the instituteřs progress (Stack, 1998, p.151).   
107 William Huskisson MP (then for Liverpool) was the President of the Board of 
Trade; he had acknowledged Ricardo as Ŗa gentleman, whom he had also the pleasure 
of reckoning among his friendsŗ (Ricardo, V, p.332).   
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The poor operatives [silk weavers] have, as usual been left wholly 
out of sight in the adjustment of the compensation attendant on 
the new order of things: but can this lessen their claims to 
consideration in the eye of justice and humanity?  We hold it to be 
clearly a matter of national duty and concern to rescue them from 
the ruin which has them in its grasp; nor do we hesitate to say, 
that rather than so many thousands of industrious and 
unoffending people should be left to the fate that has overtaken 
them, it were better far that things should exist as they were till the 
end of time.  PERISH POLITICAL ECONOMY, BUT LET THE PEOPLE LIVE.  
(Trades‟ Newspaper, Jan, 22nd 1826, p.441) 
This passage presents an important distinction between Robertson and 
Hodgskin, particularly their attitudes towards growth and progress.  The Trades‟ 
Newspaper adopted a conservative stance in that if the workers suffered by the 
adoption of progressive measures then it would be better not to change or 
progress, but to maintain the current situation ―till the end of time‖.   
This sharply contrasted with Hodgskin‘s commitment to progressive change, not 
so much as a policy but as the inevitable conclusion of economic activity and 
human existence.    
Despite these differences Hodgskin‘s reply was published in the following issue 
and entitled Political Economy. It contained much that was to become included 
in his Introduction chapter of Popular Political Economy (1827).   
Hodgskin‘s Political Economy began with an attack on the notion given by both 
James Mill and McCulloch that political economy was in some way equivalent to 
domestic economy.108 Hodgskin stressed that political economy was a science 
rather than the practical art of national or domestic government.   
I was not surprised at observing in your Paper of yesterday, the 
following sentence, "Perish political economy, but let the people 
live," because you and most of your readers probably understand 
by these terms, some prevalent theories influencing the decisions 
                                                                                                                                
Huskisson was later to gain notoriety as the first railway fatality resulting from an 
incident with Stephensonřs Rocket in 1830. 
108 ŖPolitical Economy is to the state, what domestic economy is to the family.ŗ (Mill, 
1821, p.1; 1826, p.1) - ŖPolitical Economy may be said to be to the state what domestic 
economy is to a single family.ŗ (McCulloch, 1825, p.9n; 1849, p.1n)  As Whately 
pointed out, the etymology of the term ŖPolitical-Economyŗ was unfortunate for it did 
indeed imply the art Ŗtreating of the affairs and regulation of a Commonwealthŗ 
(Whately, 1832, p.4).        
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of statesmen, to the production of great present evil.  Nor am I 
surprised that you should conceive of the science, because its 
professors have said of it, that it is to the "state what domestic 
economy is to a family:" and the domestic economy of a family 
being always regulated by its head, it follows that political 
economy consists only of regulations established by the head or 
government of the state. (Hodgskin, TN., 29th Jan. 1826) 109 
Hodgskin accepted that if political economy was simply the art of domestic 
economy extended to administer and control the state, under some family or 
state leadership, then that political economy, given the prevalent condition of 
society, was not worthy of defence. 
we are obliged to conclude that the existing distress and the 
existing misery are occasioned by some social regulations; and 
looking at political economy as another name for some such 
regulations, I join with you in saying "let it perish, but let the 
people live." (ibid) 110 
However Hodgskin‘s point was that this was not a valid conception of what 
political economy should be. 
This idea, however, of political economy, is not a correct one, and 
I should hope, for the sake of the people themselves, that they will 
not transfer the hatred such mischievous regulations so justly 
                                            
109 Hodgskinřs reference to the Ŗheadŗ in relation to the economy seems reminiscent to 
remarks in Steuartřs Principles regarding the headship of the economy, although Steuart 
emphasised the distinction between government and economy ; 
The whole œconomy must be directed by the head, who is both lord and 
steward of the family.  It is however necessary. That these two offices be 
not confounded with one another.  As lord he establishes the laws of his 
œconomy; as steward, he puts them in execution. … Œconomy and 
government, even in a private family, present therefore two different 
ideas, and have also two different objects. (Steuart, 1767, p.v) 
This analogy of the head determining the laws is pertinent if we relate it to the 
notion of political economy as the laws of economic activity as determined by what 
James Mill referred to as the aristocracy (as those with political power), and to 
Hodgskinřs attack on McCullochřs attempts to enter this aristocracy (Hodgskin, BG, 
30
th
 Nov. 1864) 
110 The attack on the perceived relationship between domestic and Ŗthe current loose 
notion of Political Economyŗ was reiterated in John Stuart Millřs Essays on Some 
Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, in his attempt to specify political economy 
as a science as counter-distinguished from an art.  
domestic economy, so far as it is capable of being reduced to principles, 
is an art.  It consists of rules, or maxims of prudence, for keeping the 
family regularly supplied with what its wants require, and securing, with 
any given amount of means, the greatest possible quantity of physical 
comfort and enjoyment. (Mill, 1844, p.125: also IV, p.313) 
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deserve, to one of the noblest studies which can engage their 
attention. (Hodgskin, TN., 29th Jan. 1826) 
For Hodgskin, political economy was necessarily a science, but he traced the 
confusion between art and science to The Wealth of Nations where (for 
Hodgskin and also for Senior) Smith distinguished between political economy 
(in Book IV – Of Systems of Political Œconomy) and the science of wealth (in 
Book III – Of the different Progress of Opulence in different Nations).111  
In one part of it he contrasts this natural science with political 
economy, as we understand it, and as he describes it to be, "a 
part of the business of a statesman."  He most philosophically 
endeavoured to trace national wealth and national prosperity, to 
some natural laws; and he examined several systems of political 
economy or legislative measures intended to promote national 
wealth; almost all of which he found reason to condemn.  By a 
strange change in the meaning of terms, the natural science of 
wealth, which he cultivated, has been called political economy; 
and in consequence it has been confounded by almost all 
persons, even by those who have written on the subject, with the 
regulations of legislators. (Hodgskin, TN., 29th Jan. 1826)112 
It was for this reason, presumably, that Hodgskin referred to ―the erroneous 
name of Political Economy‖ (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.3).113   Hodgskin was not alone 
                                            
111 Hodgskin conceived that subsequent economists had also departed from Smithřs 
doctrines as far as distribution is concerned.  
That great man carefully distinguished the natural distribution of wealth 
from the distribution which is derived from our artificial right of 
property.  His successors, on the contrary, make no such distinction, and 
in their writings the consequences of this right are stated to be the laws 
of Nature. (Hodgskin, 1827, p.xxii) 
112 It seems that Hodgskinřs use of the phrase "a part of the business of a statesmanŗ is 
not directly from Adam Smith, who referred rather to political economy as Ŗa branch of 
the science of a statesmanŗ (Smith, WN, IV,,1).  This may have been a honest mistake 
of memory (given the speed at which Hodgskinřs letter was written) or a polemic devise 
to avoid drawing attention to Smithřs use of the word Ŗscienceŗ to what would have 
been considered an art by Hodgskin and others by the 1840.s (e.g. J.S. Mill and Senior).   
The phrase Ŗthe business of a statesmanŗ was used several times by Smithřs 
predecessor Sir James Steuart in An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Œconomy 
(1767). Thus for Steuart political economy was a concern or tool of the statesman, 
rather than being, as Smith seems to imply, the actual science of statesmanship.     
113 In his Economist review of William Ellisř Outlines of Social Economy, Hodgskin 
had continued his critique of the use of the term political economy; 
Those who gave the name of political economy to the science of the 
Wealth of Nations, did Adam Smith a dishonour and the public an injury.  
It has no connection with politics, except to repudiate them. (Hodgskin, 
E., 12
th
 Dec. 1846, p.1621) 
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in his perception of a changing context of the term political economy as it 
related to Smith‘s original use.   
The review of Senior‘s An Outline of the Science of Political Economy 
(Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1837) also accepted that Smith's "own definition of 
Political Economy differs widely from that of his successors" (ER., Oct. 1837, 
p.77).    
The Edinburgh Review also accepted that "which the English authors have 
given the name of Political Economy" may have been incorrectly named - "They 
have adopted an inconvenient title.  We are quite ready to change it, provided 
the world can agree on a new one" (ibid, p.83).114  Nevertheless, the term 
―political economy‖ has persisted, as Hodgskin recognised, and became the 
name of the discipline that was still aspiring to become a science. 
Thus Hodgskin seems to have defended political economy on the grounds that 
as a science it was separable from the art.   
                                                                                                                                
Hodgskin persisted with this concept into his later writings in The Brighton 
Guardian, for example Ŕ Ŗthat science erroneously called Political Economyŗ 
(Hodgskin, BG., 30
th
 Nov. 1864, p.2).   
114 One of the words suggested was Catallactics.  This had been suggested previously 
by Whately, who had also recognised the confusion resulting from Smithřs usage. 
The name I should have preferred as the most descriptive, and on the 
whole least objectionable, is that of CATALLACTICS, or the ŖScience of 
Exchanges.ŗ (Whately, 1832, p.6) 
However if we bring a wider understanding to the term exchange, then Catallactics 
becomes less of a restrictive expression. 
Exchange is choice, and choice is the action of a particular person.  What 
he chooses may be such that he needs another personřs agreement, 
another personřs choice.  But we can look at the action of exchange 
through the eyes on one person at a time.  It involves preference and 
sacrifice. It is deliberate.  It gives advantage. (Shackle, 1973, p.1) 
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Section Four 
The Subject Matter of  
Political Economy 
 
Agenda 
The agenda for this section is to present a brief exposition of what Hodgskin 
considered as the subject matter of political economy.  This requires a 
discussion of political economy as a humanistic science in the sense that it was 
perceived as concerned with man and his actions rather than other physical 
conditions.  To this end we will draw upon writings by J.S. Mill, and to a lesser 
degree Nassau Senior, which also expressed political economy in humanistic 
terms, as illustrative of the position that Hodgskin held.115  
Humanistic Economics 
It must always be remembered, though it seems hardly necessary 
to state it, that all wealth is created by labour, and there is no 
wealth which is not the produce of labour. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.19) 
Hodgskin‘s assertion that labour created all wealth can be conceived of as a 
humanistic methodological claim.  He did not deny that non-human agency was 
necessary for the creation of wealth. His position was that political economy 
was a humanistic science in which, those non-human aspects did not pertain, 
but should be left to the domain of mechanics, chemistry, business studies and 
other physical concerns. If political economy was to be distinguished from these 
other sciences, then it should exclude all activities apart from human agency. 
                                            
115 J.S. Mill presented more direct philosophical detailing on why political economy 
was a humanistic science rather than Hodgskin who often presented his position as 
statements rather than arguments.  To this end Millřs work can be used to provide 
methodological explanations of Hodgskinřs position. 
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A similar position can be seen with J.S. Mill, in his essay On the Definition of 
Political Economy and on the Method of Investigation proper to it (1844). We 
intend to use Mill‘s account of the philosophy behind the concept of economics 
as a humanistic science as it is far more complete and coherent than can be 
gathered from Hodgskin‘s scattered writings on this issue.  We will then make a 
comparison of Hodgskin‘s works back to Mill‘s exposition.  
As we shall see the view of both Hodgskin and Mill on political economy was 
one that was theoretically unconcerned with the practicalities of the physical 
constraints, technology and relationships of any particular historical period, but 
was essentially a humanistic or anthropocentric science.  
The Scope of Political Economy 
Hodgskin‘s most specific statement of the scope of political economy can be 
found in his letter to the Trades‟ Newspaper entitled Political Economy:- 
As the subject is limited and studied in this country, it is the 
science of the natural laws which regulate the production and 
distribution of wealth. … All wealth is produced by labour; the 
science, therefore, as far as production is concerned, is limited by 
ALL the circumstances, but only by them which influence the 
productive powers of labour. … The second great branch of 
political economy consists therefore in ascertaining all the natural 
circumstances - and it is only limited by ALL these circumstances, 
which at any and all times determine the distribution of wealth 
among men through the medium of exchange. … Considered as 
the science of all the natural circumstances which determine the 
production and distribution of wealth, though we have not yet 
ascertained all these circumstances, there is surely no other 
subject which is of more importance, or more interesting to all 
mankind. (Hodgskin, TN., 29th Jan. 1826)  
This expression of the scope of political economy was more limited then that 
given in Popular Political Economy that might seem to extend to the mechanical 
and chemical disciplines, despite his focus on labour and his almost dismissive 
attitude to the impact of land and capital: 
It [political economy] is the science of ALL the circumstances or 
laws which influence the production power of labour, and which 
regulate and determine the distribution of all the products of 
labour. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.5-6) 
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The earlier use of the term natural, when compared to the similar expression in 
Popular Political Economy, was probably a better articulation of his position   
than in the later work. What we intend to emphasise here is that when Hodgskin 
wrote about political economy including ―all circumstances‖, he did not intend it 
to include physical circumstances.116 
Separation from the Physical  
When Hodgskin proclaimed that ―Political economy is a natural, not a political 
science‖ (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.263), he was not claiming it as a physical science, 
but as a science of man‘s actions. J.S. Mill, like Hodgskin, conceived political 
economy as a science distinct from the physical sciences:  
The real distinction between Political Economy and physical 
science must be sought in something deeper than the nature of 
the subject-matter; which indeed, is for the most part common to 
both. (Mill, 1844, p.129)117 
For although there were some disciplines that dealt solely with subject matters 
that could be distinguished along the lines of their relationship ―with the human 
mind‖ or ―with all things whatever except the mind‖, there were others, such as 
music, politics and law, which were not so distinct.  Thus Mill gave his ―rationale 
of the distinction between physical and moral science‖. 
In all the intercourse of man with nature, whether we consider him 
as acting upon it, or as receiving impressions from it, the effect or 
phenomenon depends upon causes of two kinds: the properties of 
the object acting, and those of the object acted upon.  Everything 
                                            
116 A justification of Hodgskinřs perhaps over-extensive definition of the science can 
found in Mill: 
When a definition so manifestly surpasses in extent what it professes to 
define, we must suppose that it is not meant to be interpreted literally, 
though the limitations with which it is meant to be understood are not 
stated. (Mill, 1844, p.127) 
117 Mill further distinguished political economy as a psychological science rather than a 
physical science.   It was thus concerned with human activities in relation to the mind 
rather than being concerned with the physical world. 
If we contemplate the whole field of human knowledge, attained or 
attainable, we find, that it separates itself obviously, and as it were 
spontaneously into two divisions, which stand so strikingly in opposition 
and contradistinction to one another, that in all classifications of our 
knowledge they have been kept apart.  These are, physical science, and 
moral or psychological science.  The difference between these two 
departments of our knowledge does not reside in the subject-matter with 
which they are conversant: (Mill, 1844, p.129) 
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which can possibly happen in which man and external things, are 
jointly concerned, results from the joint operation of a law or laws 
of matter, and a law or laws of the human mind.  Thus the 
production of corn by human labour is the result of a law of the 
mind, and many laws of matter.  The laws of matter are those 
properties of the soil and of vegetable life which cause the seed to 
germinate in the ground, and those properties of the human body 
which render food necessary to its support.  The law of the mind 
is, that man desires to possess subsistence, and consequently 
wills the necessary means of procuring it. (Mill, 1844, p.130) 
This last sentence of Mill‘s can be related to Hodgskin‘s axioms regarding the 
need to labour and to necessity as the stimulus to create the ―means of 
procuring it‖. 
Man is doomed to eat bread by the sweat of his brow, and 
naturally those who do not work have nothing to eat.  If we do not 
labour, we can have no food, (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.27) 
we may be certain that the cause of that progress in knowledge, 
which is in its turn the cause of that perpetual increase in our 
productive power, is the natural law which dooms us to labour, 
and which is perpetually in operation, at its greatest extent by the 
active principle of population.  Necessity is the mother of 
invention. (ibid, p.86)118 
Moral Science119 
Mill emphasised that the demarcation between physical and mental sciences 
should be readily understood: 
The physical sciences are those which treat of the laws of matter, 
and all complex phenomena in so far as dependent upon the laws 
of matter.  The mental or moral sciences are those which treat of 
                                            
118
 In comparison to Hodgskinřs view that necessity was the stimulus to improvement, 
for Malthus necessity was the factor that restricted improvement and held back progress 
Ŕ ŖNecessity, that imperious all prevailing law of nature, restrains them within the 
prescribed boundsŗ (Malthus, 1798, p.15; 1817, p.4).  
119 It would be as well to illustrate how the term moral was used at this period. 
As it is highly desirable to keep scientific language precise, and always 
to use the same terms in the same sense, we shall now further observe 
upon the word Ŗmoralŗ in relation to science or faculties.  It is sometimes 
used to denote the whole of our mental faculties, and in opposition to 
natural or physical, as when we speak of Ŗmoral science,ŗ or Ŗmoral 
truths,ŗ or Ŗmoral philosophyŗ.  But it is also used in contradistinction to 
Ŗintellectualŗ or Ŗmental,ŗ in connexion with or in reference to 
obligation; and then it relates to rights and duties, and is synonymous 
with ethical. (Brougham, 1835, p.7)   
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the laws of the mind, and of all complex phenomena in so far as 
dependent upon the laws of mind. (Mill, 1844, p.131)120 
Thus economics as a social science would presumably be a mental or moral 
science concerned with the mind.  This, we construe, would also have been 
Hodgskin‘s view.  It may well be that we no longer adhere to this distinction 
between physical science and mental science; in which case social sciences 
may well be understood as straddling both physical and mental disciplines.  
That political economy was a moral or mental science was undoubtedly the 
concept held by J.S. Mill in the first half of the 19th century, and evidently was 
also adhered to by Hodgskin and many others.121 
Political economy was a moral science that had to presuppose the physical 
disciplines and events: this lead Mill to his ―precise statement of the relation in 
which Political Economy stands to the various sciences which are tributary to 
the arts of production‖ and highlighted the area of most difficulty in separating 
the physical and moral:  
Most of the moral sciences presuppose physical science: but few 
of the physical sciences presuppose moral science.  The reason 
is obvious.  There are many phenomena (an earthquake, for 
example, or the motions of the planets) which depend upon the 
laws of matter exclusively: and have nothing whatever to do with 
the laws of mind. Many, therefore, of the physical sciences may 
be treated of without any reference to mind, and as if the mind 
existed as only as a recipient of knowledge only, not as a cause 
producing effects.  But there are no phenomena which depend 
exclusively upon the law of the mind: even the phenomena of the 
mind itself being partially dependent upon the physiological laws 
of the body.  All the mental sciences, therefore, not excepting the 
                                            
120 A similar demarcation can be found in Senior: 
Sciences are divided into two great classes, differing both as to the 
matters which they treat, and the sources from which they draw their 
premises.  These are the physical and the mental, or, as they are 
sometimes called, the moral sciences (Senior, 1854, p.22) 
121 For example, the notion of political economy as a moral or mental science was also 
adhered to by Nassau Senior as he plainly stated in the second of his Four Introductory 
Lectures on Political Economy (1854) Ŕ Political Economy a Mental Science.  
All the technical terms, therefore, of Political Economy, represent either 
purely mental ideas, such as demand, utility, value, and abstinence, or 
objects, which, though some of them may be material, are considered by 
the political economist so far only as they are the results or causes of 
certain affections of the human mind, such as wealth, capital, rent, 
wages, and profits. (Senior, 1854, p.35) 
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pure science of mind, must take account of a great variety of 
physical truths: and (as physical science is commonly and very 
properly studied first) may be said to presuppose them, taking up 
the complex phenomena where physical science leaves them. 
(Mill, 1844, p.131) 
Mill’s Concluding Definition of Political Economy 
In the following paragraphs Mill clarified what the science of political economy 
was concerned with; 
The laws of production of the objects which constitute wealth, are 
the subject-matter both of Political Economy and of almost all the 
physical sciences.  Such, however, of those laws as are purely 
laws of matter, belong to the physical science, and to that 
exclusively.  Such of them as are laws of the human mind, and no 
others, belong to Political Economy, which finally sums up the 
result of both combined. 
Political Economy, … takes for granted all such of the truths of 
those sciences as are concerned in the production of the objects 
demanded by the wants of mankind; or at least takes for granted 
that the physical part of the process takes place somehow.  It then 
inquires what are the phenomena of mind which are concerned in 
the production and distribution (Mill, 1844, p.132)    
By emphasising political economy‘s concern with man in the social context of 
wealth creation, Mill concluded that political economy was unconcerned with 
man acting individually.122 Nor did it relate to man acting socially other than with 
regards to the issue of wealth (fulfilling his wants)123.   
From the above considerations the following seems to come out 
as the correct and complete definition of Political Economy: – ―The 
science which treats of the production and distribution of wealth, 
so far as they depend upon the laws of human nature.‖ Or thus – 
―The science relating to the moral or psychological laws of the 
production and distribution of wealth.‖ (Mill, 1844, p.133) 
Despite this claim to completeness, Mill provided further emphasis in terms of 
man‘s social pursuit of wealth. 
                                            
122 ŖThose laws or properties of human nature which appertain to man as a mere 
individual, and do not presuppose, as a necessary condition, the existence of other 
individuals … form a part of the subject of pure mental philosophy.ŗ (Mill, 1844, p.134) 
123 ŖThese laws, or general truths, form the subject of a branch of science which may be 
aptly designated from the title of social economy; … This science stands in the social, 
as anatomy and physiology to the physical body.  It shows by what principles of his 
nature man is induced to enter into a state of society:ŗ (Mill, 1844, p.135) 
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It does not treat of the whole of man‘s nature as modified by the 
social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society.  It is 
concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess 
wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of 
means for obtaining that end.  It predicts only such of the 
phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of 
the pursuit of wealth.  It makes entire abstractions of every other 
human passion or motive except those which may be regarded as 
perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth … 
Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely in 
acquiring and consuming wealth; (Mill, 1844, p.137-8) 
Mill also recognised the hypothetical nature of this science –  
Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose 
that mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the 
mode in which science must necessarily proceed. … With respect 
to those parts of human conduct of which wealth is not even the 
principle object, to these Political Economy does not pretend that 
its conclusions are applicable. But there are certain departments 
of human affairs, in which the acquisition of wealth is the main and 
acknowledged end.  It is only these that Political Economy takes 
notice. (Mill, 1844, p.139) 
Thus Mill came to his concluding definition: 
Political Economy, then, may be defined as follows; and the 
definition seems to be complete: – 
―The science which traces the laws of such of the phenomena 
of society as arise from the combined operations of mankind for 
the production of wealth, in so far as those phenomena are not 
modified by the pursuit of any other object.‖  (ibid, p.140)  
Hodgskin’s Definition of Political Economy 
The purpose of this section is to investigate how Hodgskin‘s perception of the 
science of political economy was consistent with that professed by Mill.  
Hodgskin felt obliged to justify political economy as being concerned only with 
human action, because of the lack of impact that physical circumstances 
appeared to have on productivity.  He did not, like Mill, state that this was 
necessarily so from a philosophical position regarding the way sciences should 
be categorised; this was one of the great values of Mill‘s essay. 
The difference between Mill and Hodgskin on this matter could be seen in their 
different concepts of progress.  Mill with his post-Malthusian attitude to progress 
perhaps needed a philosophical distinction.  Whereas Hodgskin with a pre-
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Malthusian concept of progress would not necessarily feel that a philosophical 
justification was needed. Hodgskin‘s notion of progress, to some degree, 
presupposed the superiority of humanistic influences over the merely physical 
and, in a progressive view, static effects.  It can also be related to his concept of 
nature, as that from which all else followed (as we will discuss in a later 
chapter). 
Hodgskin stressed that the material aspects should be excluded from political 
economy because of their transitory character.  He saw that material 
circumstances appeared to influence production only in a relatively minor 
capacity. 
It is, however, not a little remarkable that we may at once reject 
from our inquiries all the physical circumstances, and material 
things not inherent in man himself, and not created by labour, 
which are supposed in general to influence most strongly the 
prosperity of our race. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.15) 
It [political economy] takes no notice of the arts of life; it does not 
pretend to explain the principles of mechanics, agriculture, or 
chemistry (ibid, p.39) 
Hodgskin recognised that physical conditions did play a part but that that part 
itself was significantly influenced by the historical condition and progress of man 
at any time: 
I beg the reader to recollect that I do not assert, that what we call 
the fertility in soils, which is in all cases, however, a quality relative 
to our knowledge at the moment we speak, has no influence 
whatever on the quantity of labour necessary to procure 
subsistence; but that influence is so unimportant, compared to the 
effect of knowledge-guided labour, that it may be neglected.  
Thus, rejecting situation, land, and fertility, the most important 
physical circumstances which are supposed influence the 
prosperity or our race, we may reject from the science all other 
physical circumstances, except the powers and faculties of man, 
and what he creates. (ibid, p.19) 
In Popular Political Economy it was these ―powers and faculties‖ that were the 
concern of political economy, and these were the mental facilities of the human 
mind. 
It is with these natural interests, passions, instincts and affections, 
and with their consequences, – they not being suspended at any 
moment, and continuing to operate powerfully when society is in 
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its most advanced state as at its commencement, – that political 
economy principally deals. (Hodgskin, 1827, p.25) 
Social Economy 
There were attempts to refer to the science as Social Economy rather than 
apply the political nomenclature.124 One such attempt was William Ellis‘ Outline 
of Social Economy (1846), in the review of which Hodgskin gave his approval of 
such terminology: 
The subjects treated are – civilization and barbarism; self-
government; wealth and capital; rent; wages; profit; division of 
labour; interchange; value in exchange; money-coin; money-paper 
and credit; bills of exchange; price; abundance and scarcity; 
freedom of trade; restriction; machinery; colonies; taxation; taxes 
direct; taxes general and local; income; expenditure; conclusion. 
These are the substance of political economy; but, looking to the 
partial disfavour which has unfortunately fallen on the science, the 
author has done right, we think, to call his work not political but 
social economy. (Hodgskin, E., 12th Dec. 1846, p.1621) 
Despite this passage including an apparent rendering of Ellis‘ contents list, it 
illustrated the range of subjects that Hodgskin envisaged as encompassed 
within political economy.  As well as demonstrating his acceptance of the term 
social economy as equivalent to political economy, it also showed his 
awareness of the issue we discussed earlier in this chapter regarding the 
unfavourable regard that political economy was held in by many people. 
Hodgskin and Mill understood what has remained known as political economy 
as a social science concerned with those mental conditions and aspects that 
influenced the production and distribution of wealth, within a social context. 
Consumption 
The list of contents for political economy given in Hodgskin‘s review of Ellis, did 
not include consumption. It is interesting to note that J.S. Mill, like Hodgskin, did 
not consider consumption as an issue within the remit of political economy. 
                                            
124
 There are many examples in Hodgskinřs writings of his commenting on the 
inappropriateness of the term political economy to the science generally known by that 
name. For example, in his review of George Opdykeřs Treatise on Political Economy 
Hodgskin remarked that Ŗthe author has no clear conception of the science that has been 
miscalled political economy;ŗ (Hodgskin, E., 22nd Nov. 1851, p.1299). 
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For we contend that Political Economy … has nothing to do with 
the consumption of wealth, further than as the consideration of it 
is inseparable from that of production.  We know not of any laws 
of the consumption of wealth as the subject of a distinct science: 
they can be no other than the laws of human enjoyment. (Mill, 
1844, p.132.n) 
In this he had adopted a position akin to Hodgskin‘s: 
In consuming wealth, the object is to support life, or give zest to 
existence; and the most agreeable methods of consumption must 
be settled by the taste of the individual … they do not fall in the 
department of the economist, but in that of the cook, the 
physician, or the moral philosopher.  Consumption may, therefore, 
be discarded from political economy. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.5) 
Nassau Senior also excluded consumption from his definition of political 
economy, but dealt with it in those sections of his works covering production.  
This was due to his conception of consumption as the opposite of production – 
the destruction (un-production) of wealth rather than its production. 
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Section Five 
The Source and the Cause of Wealth 
Agenda 
The oft made claim ―that all wealth is created by labour‖ (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.19), was extended particularly in the early 19th century, to embrace the more 
comprehensive claim that only labour created wealth.  We have already seen in 
this chapter that Hodgskin qualified his claim that only labour created wealth, 
with an acknowledgement that land and tools were influential but relatively 
unimportant. 
The significance of labour and what exactly was meant by labour will form part 
of a later chapter. However in the last section of this chapter we will broach the 
issue of the cause of wealth, as an expression of Aristotelian causal notions, as 
opposed to the more modern credence placed on Humean causation and Mill‘s 
induction method of causality.125  This section is also intended to further 
illustrate the importance of labour within political economy, in addition to the 
methodological humanism of the previous section. 
We will use the work of both Daniel Raymond and Richard Jones to provide a 
framework around which we can reconstruct Hodgskin, given that his writings 
that did not adhere to the strict demarcation made by these two economists.  
This reconstruction will alleviate some of the confusion that might otherwise 
distract from our comprehension of Hodgskin‘s economics as a thorough whole. 
To this end we will first look at the example of Daniel Raymond‘s expression of 
the separation of the terms cause and source of wealth as presented within his 
                                            
125 It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to debate the worth or otherwise of the 
various notions of causality to be found in the fields of philosophy and logic.  Thus we 
will not be entering into a philospohial discussion on causation and causality.  It is 
solely the intention herein to comprehend Hodgskinřs economics by viewing his 
writings from a perspective that may have been far more prevalent in his day.  
 102 
chapter The Source and Cause of Wealth in the first volume of the 2nd edition of 
his The Elements of Political Economy (1823).126 
Daniel Raymond 
Daniel Raymond introduced his topic thus: 
A distinction has not hitherto been made between the source and 
the cause of wealth, but, if I mistake not, the distinction will be 
found to exist in the nature of things, and be of singular utility in 
the further prosecution of this obstruse science.  No branch of the 
subject, at present, lies hidden in deeper obscurity, than the 
sources of wealth – none, respecting which, there is a greater 
diversity of opinion. (Raymond, 1823, I, p.89) 
For Raymond the source and the cause of wealth were two distinct issues that 
had tended to be confused.  
Not to have distinguished between the source and cause, and to 
have traced wealth to such inadequate and equivocal sources, 
has rendered the means by which wealth is to be augmented alike 
equivocal.  It was an error in the first concoction, and has cast 
doubt and uncertainty over the whole science. (ibid, p.90) 
As the phrase ―a source of wealth‖ was ―to a certain extent, an inaccurate mode 
of expression, in the literal sense of the words‖ Raymond had to resort to 
clarifying the definition of terms, particularly the words source and cause, 
especially as they were often used synonymously. 
The word source is sometimes used as synonymous with fountain 
and sometimes as synonymous with cause.  But the words 
fountain and cause are not themselves synonymous.  To use the 
word source, therefore, in such different senses, cannot fail to 
cause ambiguity, to avoid which, I shall always use it as 
synonymous with fountain.  This is its appropriate meaning in 
political economy, where it is used to express the origin of the 
                                            
126 The work of Daniel Raymond (1786-1849) is cited purely as an extended example 
of the view which separated wealthřs cause and source, rather than for its influence on 
contemporary political economy. The fact that Raymond might be seen, in some 
aspects, as similar in character to Hodgskin, is more to do with a reflection of a 
particular tone in many writers of that period, rather than suggesting Raymond was even 
known by Hodgskin. 
We shall subsequently cite the Malthusian academic Richard Jones and the highly 
influential Jeremy Bentham with regard to their Aristotelian expressions in connection 
to the causes of wealth.  However Raymondřs is one of the most explicit articulations of 
the cause Ŕsource demarcation, which, given that this distinction may be far less marked 
in modern English, is felt to be well worth reproducing. 
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necessities and comforts of life, as contradistinguished from the 
cause which produces them. (ibid, p.91-2)127 
Fountain of Wealth 
Thus Raymond accepted that the earth was the source or fountain of all wealth.   
In this sense of the word, no argument is necessary to prove that 
the earth is the only source of private as well as public wealth – 
the great fountain from which we derive all the necessaries and 
comforts of life. The earth includes the ocean as well as the land.  
(ibid) 
That the earth is the sole fountain or source of wealth is so self-
evident a proposition, to a mind untrammelled and 
unsophisticated by the ingenious subtleties of philosophers, that a 
man would be thought to be engaged in a very idle employment, 
who should attempt to prove it: (ibid, p.93) 
Nonetheless as the earth was the source, some other entity must be the cause. 
Thus Raymond advanced to discuss the cause in quite Hodgskinite terms and 
expressions: 
But the earth does not yield her fruit spontaneously the law is, that 
―man shall eat bread in the sweat of his face.‖  It is the labour of 
man, and that alone, which causes the earth to yield her increase. 
LABOUR, therefore, is the cause, and the only cause, of wealth – 
which draws forth from the great fountain the necessities and 
comforts of life.  The power which produces national wealth 
resides in the bones and sinew of man, and it is in vain to seek for 
it any where else. Labour is the main spring, the fundamental 
principle of every true system of political economy. (ibid, p.92) 
From this demarcation of source and cause Raymond was led into many of the 
ideas that Hodgskin was later to promulgate.  The most marked of these, apart 
from the idea that only labour is the cause of wealth, was the proposition that 
capital was not an active agency in wealth creation but only an instrument akin 
to land that labour acted upon. 
It seems scarcely credible, that a writer who presumes to instruct 
mankind in the science of political economy, should really 
suppose that capital, whether land, money, or goods, was an 
                                            
127 Walker’s Dictionary defined Cause as ŖThat which produces or effects any thing, 
the efficient; the reason, motive to any thing; subject of litigation; partyŗ: whereas 
Source was ŖSpring, fountain-head; original, first producerŗ (Walker, 1831, p.76 & 
p.488).  We know from Hodgskinřs The Word Belief Defined (1827) that Walker’s was 
a dictionary used by him.  
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active agent, capable of either supplanting or of performing 
labour, which is beyond the reach or power of man to perform. It is 
not possible for any man to suppose that capital can really 
perform labour, and he who talks about labour performed by 
capital, must, therefore, use the language in a figurative or 
metaphorical sense; and when writers so far forget themselves as 
to suppose, that a science is to be elucidated by the flourishes of 
rhetoric, it is not surprising that so little progress has been made 
in the study of political economy. (ibid, p.107)128 
Naïve Productivity Theory of Production  
It might be said that as Raymond‘s comments only amounted to an attack on 
what became recognised as the naïve productivity theory of production, they 
are of little real interest.129  Our point, however, is that Raymond‘s commentary 
can be seen aligned to Aristotle‘s ideas on causes.  Analysed with Aristotle‘s 
causality structure in mind, rather than claiming Raymond consciously or 
directly adopted Aristotelian causality, it is possible to liken Raymond‘s Source 
to Aristotle‘s material cause; whereas his Cause equated to an Efficient Cause. 
                                            
128 It is evident that Raymond was referring to the notion which was typically displayed 
in Lauderdaleřs An Inquiry into The Nature and Origin of Public Wealth and into the 
Means and Causes of its Increase (1804 & 1819) 
Now, it is apprehended, that in every instance where capital is so 
employed as to produce a profit, it uniformly arises, either Ŕ from 
supplanting a portion of labour, which would otherwise be performed by 
the hand of man; or Ŕ from its performing a portion of labour, which is 
beyond the reach of the personal exertion of man to accomplish. 
(Lauderdale, 1804, p.161) 
Hodgskinřs attack on the naïve productivity theory was the main subject matter of 
Labour Defended (1825), but rather than Lauderdale his target had been James Mill: 
He [James Mill] speaks of capital as an instrument of production co-
operating with labour, as an active agent combining with labour to 
produce commodities, and thus he satisfies himself, and endeavours to 
prove to the reader that capital is entitled to all that large share of the 
produce it actually receives. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.34) 
129 Rather than an attack on productivity theory that was justified, for example, by the 
Method of Concomitant Variations.  
Böhm-Bawerk discussed the notion of ŖNaïve Productivity theoryŗ in his Capital 
and Interest (1890); 
Those productivity theories which claim for capital a direct value-
producing power (first type), as well as those which start from the 
physical productivity of capital, but believe that the phenomenon of 
surplus value is self-evidently and necessarily bound up with it (second 
type), … I shall group these together under name of Naïve Productivity 
theories. (Böhm-Bawerk, 1890, p.118-9) 
The founder of the Naïve Productivity theories is J.B. Say. (ibid, p.120) 
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Aristotle‘s notion of art or production being a function of innate or applied 
motion also appears to have been adapted by Hodgskin and other political 
economists such as McCulloch. 
The question might be raised, why some things are produced 
spontaneously as well as by art, e.g. health, while others are not, 
e.g. a house. The reason is that in some cases the matter which 
governs the production in the making and producing of any work 
of art, and in which a part of the product is present, — some 
matter is such as to be set in motion by itself and some is not of 
this nature, and of the former kind some can move itself in the 
particular way required, while other matter is incapable of this; for 
many things can be set in motion by themselves but not in some 
particular way, e.g. that of dancing. The things, then, whose 
matter is of this sort, e.g. stones, cannot be moved in the 
particular way required, except by something else, but in another 
way they can move themselves — and so it is with fire. Therefore 
some things will not exist apart from some one who has the art of 
making them, while others will; for motion will be started by these 
things which have not the art but can themselves be moved by 
other things which have not the art or with a motion starting from a 
part of the product.  (Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk.7, part 9) 
After Isaac Newton the concept of ―some matter is such as to be set in motion 
by itself‖ was discounted, hence production had to be via the matter being 
moved by an outside agency, i.e. man via his labour; 
All action is motion; we perform only motion, and all the 
phenomena of the universe … are manifested to us only as 
motion. … The one term, motion, – motion imparted to all things, 
and all things existing in motion, – signifies all that man knows 
and all that man can ever learn.  (Hodgskin, BG., 6th July 1864) 
Labour, therefore, and nothing but labour, is that peculiar part of 
motion – (Mr McCulloch calls it transmutation) – which is the sole 
object of that science erroneously called Political Economy.  It is 
the science or methodised knowledge of labour, of what labour 
effects, and of all the natural laws which labour follows. 
(Hodgskin, BG., 30th Nov. 1864) 
This notion of production being equivalent to motion can be found not only in 
McCulloch but earlier in Destrutt de Tracy and later in John Stuart Mill.  It can 
also be seen linked with Aristotelian causality in Jeremy Bentham‘s Manual of 
Political Economy (1843). 
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The causes of wealth, or say rather the matter of wealth, are –  
1. Final – well-being. 
2. Material – matter considered in respect to its possessing, or 
being capable of possessing value – viz. subservency to well-
being, the final cause. 
3. Efficient – viz. motion. (Bentham, 1843, III, p.36)130 
Richard Jones 
Not many writers made this explicit demarcation between source and cause in 
Aristotelian terms.  One who did was the Haileybury Professor Richard Jones in 
his Lectures on Labor and Capital which were posthumously reproduced in his 
Literary Remains, consisting of Lectures and Tracts on Political Economy 
(1859), where he claimed to be following his ―illustrious predecessor, Malthus‖ 
and identified an error in Adam Smith‘s nomenclature. 
In examining into the laws which determine the amount of wealth 
produced, we turn, first, to observe its original sources.  These, no 
doubt, are the earth and elements.  From them all material wealth 
which man can appropriate or fashion is originally produced.  
Labor was inadvertently described by Adam Smith as the source 
of all wealth.  This mistake, for reasons we shall presently give, 
very slightly affected the correctness of his reasonings; but still it 
was a mistake.  Labor is the universal instrument, without which 
none of the productions of nature could be appropriated by man, 
or made useful to him; but his labor is no more the original source 
of his wealth, than the mouth is the original source of his food, 
which it masticates and prepares for the nutriment of his frame. 
(Jones, 1859, p.6) 
Jones, like Hodgskin had, also dismissed the issue of land‘s fertility as a major 
issue of consideration when compared to labour; 
We may conclude, then, that though the earth and elements are 
sources of wealth, the efficient cause and instrument by which 
their natural powers are developed and made fruitful is the labor 
of man; and that the efficiency of that cause or instrument 
contributes more, on the whole, to determine the positive and 
                                            
130 This is the Manual of Political Economy in the  The Works of Jeremy Bentham 
Volume III (1843) edited by John Bowring rather than the Manual of Political Economy 
edited by Werner Stark in Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings (1952) volume 1.  
Stark asserted that the Bowring edition of the Manual was written about 1804 and was 
intended to be entitled Institute, whereas the Manual in his edition was written 
originally between 1793 and 1795. (Stark, 1952, p.49). 
In a footnote Bentham commented that the term Ŗmatter of wealthŗ is Ŗemployed to 
prevent ambiguityŗ presumable the ambiguity of having a hierarchy of causal 
explanations. 
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comparative wealth of nations than any difference in the original 
sources of their wealth.  These conclusions are a sufficient 
justification of the course taken by Smith when he made an inquiry 
into the causes of the varying efficiency of human labor the 
foundation of his essay on the Wealth of Nations, and in this 
respect we shall follow in the footsteps of the great master. (ibid, 
p.9) 
These points were repeated in Jones‘ Text-Book of Lectures on the Political 
Economy of Nations delivered at the East India College, Haileybury, where 
Jones commented that Senior had already corrected Smith‘s error; 
The source of wealth is the earth; or, if we speak of them 
separately, the sources of wealth are the earth and the waters.  
These produce all the objects appropriated or fashioned by the 
labors of man.  Human labor itself is not, strictly speaking, an 
original source of wealth, although, without such labor, no wealth 
comes into man‘s possession.  The habit of treating labor as the 
source of wealth was probably founded on some expressions of 
Adam Smith, on whose authority it has been propagated. (Jones, 
1859, p.343) 
Hodgskin often failed to attend to the distinction made by Jones and Raymond, 
and like many others, frequently referred to labour as the source, but more 
often as the creator of wealth.131 Within the overall context of his work and with 
regard to this stricter discrimination we would argue that he effectively meant 
that labour was the cause of wealth.  It thus appears that when Hodgskin stated 
that labour was the source of wealth this should be construed to mean that 
labour was the efficient cause of wealth. 
This confusion of source and cause in Hodgskin can, for example, be seen in 
his review of H.C. Carey‘s book The Past, The Present, and the Future for The 
Economist; 
since his [Ricardo‘s] time it has continually and generally been 
admitted that labour is the sole source of value, the sole source of 
production, the payment of all cost, and the ultimate regulator of 
price. (Hodgskin, E. 28th Oct. 1848, p.1228) 
When Hodgskin wrote that ―labour is the sole source of value‖ he should be 
construed to have meant that value resulted or existed because labour had 
                                            
131 For example: ŖIt has been shown in the Introduction, that labour creates all wealth.ŗ 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.45) 
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been performed. He did not mean (as we shall illustrate in more depth later in 
this thesis) that labour was the measure or the sole source of value. 
However, when Hodgskin wrote that labour was ―the sole source of production‖ 
he meant that labour was the sole cause, or active agent, of or within 
production.132 He wrote in The Brighton Guardian that ―Production being, 
however, the end, and labour the means,‖ (Hodgskin, BG. 29th August 1862) 
indicating that labour was production‘s efficient cause.  Production was ―the 
end‖ which had for its source, or final cause man‘s natural predisposition or 
need to eat, clothe, and generally sustain himself.133 
Thus Capital and Labour where elements of wealth, with labour as the cause 
and capital and land (to a lesser degree) were the source.  
The reason for such a lapse of phraseology may have been that such terms 
were used as journalistic or polemic expedients; or reflected the current 
linguistic expressions of the time. Hopefully, with the explanation our 
reconstruction provides here, we can overcome such imperfections of 
terminology to better understand his writings. 
Efficient Cause 
We should not be distracted from looking at early notions of political economy 
with Aristotle‘s schema in mind, simply due to the similarity between an efficient 
cause and the modern use of the term cause. 
Thus when physiocrats stated that the earth was the sole cause of wealth, from 
the prospective of material cause it was not denied that the earth was indeed 
                                            
132 For example, in his review of George Rickardsř Population and Capital (1854): 
Man is the sole productive agent. Labour, enlightened more or less by 
knowledge and skill, is the sole productive instrument. The whole 
science of political economy concerns man and his industry, not his 
products; and Mr Rickards, like his predecessors, has fallen into a 
mistake when he when he left the productive power of man and wrote 
about the productive power of capital. (Hodgskin, E., 18
th
 Nov. 1954, 
p.1270) 
133 Labour as the Ŗpayment of all costŗ was Smithřs notion, whereas labour as the 
Ŗultimate regulator of priceŗ refers to the limited view of the relationships between 
price, cost, and value (as voiced by Hodgskin, De Quincey, and J.S. Mill), that we will 
discuss later in this thesis. 
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the material cause of all wealth, especially when the earth is conceive in the 
widest general sense. 134 
Likewise neo-classical economics with its themes of subjectivism and 
marginalism could be seen as concerned with Final Causes.  
When Hodgskin, Thompson and many others stated that labour was the cause 
or source of all wealth, our reconstruction should enable us to understand their 
argument for labour being the sole efficient cause of wealth.135 This is, 
especially the case if, as we shall discuss in our next chapter, labour is seen as 
human action and all wealth is the result of that activity.136  
Hence a reconstruction of Hodgskin‘s political economy could define it as the 
science of the efficient cause of the production of wealth.  This would be in line 
with his contention that labour was the subject matter political economy. 
Production being, however, the end, and labour the means, the 
true scientific method will be to treat of labour.  In fact the science 
of production is the science of labour, or our knowledge of the 
means of which labour can be and is made most productive. 
(Hodgskin, BN., 20th Aug. 1862) 
                                            
134 In a similar manner it might be postulated that Mercantilists viewed the economy 
from the standpoint concerned with Formal Causes.  
Although such considerations are, however, far beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
might be useful to view such paradigm shifts as Adam Smithřs rebuttal of the 
physiocrats and the Marginalist revolution of the 1870.s, as changes in causal emphasis. 
135 Although, if we dig deep enough, there was also the view, held by those who saw 
value solely determined by supply and demand, rather than being related to labour, that 
put forward supply and demand as the efficient cause.  The most explicit case of this 
can be found in Essays On The Progress Of Nations, in Productive Industry, 
Civilization, Population, and Wealth: Illustrated by Statistics of Mining, Agriculture, 
Manufactures, Commerce, Banking, Revenues, Internal Improvements, Emigration, 
Mortality, and Population (1853) by Ezra C. Seaman: 
The proportion between supply and demand is the principal and efficient 
cause, which determines and regulates the price of an article, and the 
amount of labor required to produce it, is on prices, but an incidental 
cause, which affects the price indirectly, by increasing or diminishing the 
supply of the article. The free trade economists have elevated the 
incident to the rank of the principal, and degraded the principal to the 
station properly belonging to the incident. (Seaman, 1853, p.316-7) 
136 I.e. accidental wealth is only wealth after having been acted upon in some manner. 
ŖSince anything which is produced is produced by something … and from somethingŗ 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk.7, part 8). 
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In summary we can suggest that Hodgskin‘s concentration on labour as the 
central subject matter of political economy was based on what was effectively 
an Aristotelian perspective that saw labour as the efficient cause of wealth.  
This perspective also goes someway to explain his antipathy to land and capital 
being considered as actively dynamic agents of the production of wealth.137 
It is perhaps from this standpoint we will be better equipped to begin to 
understand exactly what Hodgskin meant when he claimed for labour that its 
reward should be the whole produce of labour; a claim that is the subject matter 
of a later chapter. 
                                            
137 Such a notion, on labour as the sole creative agent for wealth, was not unique to 
Hodgskin.  Indeed, according to the Austrian economist Frank Fetter is his essay 
Clark's Reformulation of the Capital Concept, such a notion was recognised in Frank 
William Taussigřs economics: 
Third, he [Taussig], much more explicitly than Marshall, reaffirms a 
pretty bald labor-theory of value to account for the origin and 
distinctiveness of capital (concrete), conceived of as "artificial" in 
contrast with land as "natural." In accord with this thought, he (probably 
unique in this regard) denies "productivity" alike to capital and to land, 
and thinks labor alone can properly be said to be productive, more so to 
be sure if applied "through the use of tools" than without them, more 
applied "on some land.., than on other land," but in any case it is always 
labor alone that has "productivity." (Fetter, 1927, p.129) 
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Chapter 3 
Nature and the Natural 
 
 
It will be asked, ―What is meant by the words, natural principles, 
natural rules, or natural laws … to be here inquired into?‖ 
(Thompson, 1824, p.2) 
Agenda 
One of the main contentions of this thesis is that Hodgskin‘s use of the term 
natural, especially as applied to prices and growth, can be reconstructed to be 
equivalent to the modern term endogenous.   From this standpoint we also 
stress that by artificial he can be understood to have been referring to what we 
would nowadays class as exogenous. 
In this chapter we shall demonstrate that by nature Hodgskin was referring to a 
particular abstract economical state that was isolated from external 
disturbances. For him such external issues should not have been encompassed 
by political economy; i.e. governmental influences and interferences, and those 
factors that resulted from legal administration.138  Thus by natural, at least in his 
economical writings, Hodgskin was denoting that which pertained to an abstract 
economic condition. 
To arrive at this understanding we first need to illustrate the difficulties 
incumbent upon the general use of the term nature as it was employed in the 
19th century.  To this end the conclusion that we shall eventually reach is initially 
left aside whilst we explore the convolutions and inconsistencies that arise if our 
reconstruction is not borne in mind. 
The position is complicated by Hodgskin own inconsistent use of terms, a 
position we seek to clarify by our subsequent substitution of the terms 
endogenous and exogenous for natural and artificial.  When Hodgskin wrote 
                                            
138 The need for a separation of the political from political economy is why Hodgskin 
and others had claimed that the science had been erroneously labelled political 
economy. 
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about nature in an extensive or general sense it was usually of the physical 
world or environment around him.  Thus this chapter deals initially with this 
notion of nature before we consider his concept of what was natural. Such a 
distinction is not only important within this thesis, but also to an understanding 
of the political economy of the first half of the 19th century and the later Victorian 
period.   
Another important illustration within this chapter is the connection of Hodgskin 
concept of nature with his ideas on progress and economic growth. 
J.S. Mill’s Nature 
Although the J.S. Mill‘s essay Nature was not published until four years after 
Hodgskin‘s death, it was however written between 1850 & 1858 and is thus 
indicative of contemporary thought at the period when Hodgskin was editor at 
the Economist. 
The argument of this chapter is that Hodgskin‘s use of the term Nature was not 
unusual during the earlier part of the 19th century.  As such he did not feel the 
need to make a specific effort to explain his usage.  However this use is 
perhaps not that by which we would nowadays expect the term to be, or to have 
been, used.  Therefore we draw on Mill‘s essay Nature so as to illustrate this 
particular usage that was not unexceptional at that time.  Thus the initial part of 
this chapter includes an exposition of Mill‘s use of the term ―nature‖. This is 
compared with Hodgskin‘s position, to articulate our attitude on the way that 
Hodgskin had used the term. 
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Section One 
Nature 
Introduction 
An appreciation of Hodgskin‘s concept of nature is necessary to a 
comprehensive understanding of his work.  Much of his economics, particularly 
his perception of economic growth, as well as his method and basic 
assumptions, were inextricably linked to his notion of nature.  His argument with 
both Malthusian population and Benthamite law theories can be resolved into 
distinctions on the character of nature. 
Hence, in this section, we will initially look at the problems associated with the 
term nature and arrive at a designation of the term within the context of 
Hodgskin‘s work.  From this we will be able to illustrate that natural laws were 
conceived of as akin to what we might otherwise refer to as the laws of physics.  
We also demonstrate that although Hodgskin placed nature and some of man‘s 
actions (the artificial) in unavoidable opposition; he nevertheless recognised 
that much of man‘s actions and their consequences were necessarily natural. 
The latter part of this chapter will concentrate on how, with this appreciation of 
Hodgskin‘s nature in mind, we can better understand some of those notions that 
arise from its use that are relevant to his economics particularly those related to 
his concept of economic growth.  These include his confidence in Nature‘s 
beneficence, which we will contrast with the positions of Malthus and Bentham.  
This then leads into his concept of progress, and above all economic growth.  
Defining Nature 
From an etymological perspective, nature can be conceived as that from which 
everything else proceeds.  The words nature and natal have the same Latin 
stem nãscĩ – be born. Hence we intend to illustrate herein how our 
understanding of Hodgskin‘s work is enhanced by recognising that linkage 
between these two words.    
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If we were to conceptually understand nature as that from which everything 
subsequent necessarily follows, then much analysis would tend to incorporate 
some impression or consideration of what could be envisaged as nature.  Thus 
most biographies start with their subject‘s birth or the circumstances leading up 
to that birth. Even a non-biographical work usually begins with some 
contextualisation that places what follows in perspective. 
In his book on Hodgskin, David Stack recognised that Nature was central not 
only to Hodgskin but also much of contemporary intellectual arguments. 
The unifying theme in Hodgskin‘s thought was the contrast 
between Nature and Artifice.  His attempts to delineate the natural 
from the artificial, to alert man to ‗the infinite importance‘ of 
listening ‗to the voice of nature‘, was not unique.  It was a current 
in radicalism from the time of the London Corresponding Society 
through to Chartism, and beyond.  Nature was widely deployed in 
the arguments of radicals as a standard by which the laws, 
institutions and practices of government could be judged.  (Stack, 
1998, p.8) 139   
The contrast between nature and artifice crucially resolved around what was 
natural and whether what was artificial, in the sense of man-made, was 
necessarily always opposed to nature. 
John Stuart Mill‘s essay Nature (1874) acknowledged the importance of the 
term and recognised its ill-disciplined application, and the need for the use of a 
stricter definition.       
Nature, natural, and the groups of words derived from them, or 
allied to them in etymology, have at all times filled a great place in 
the thoughts and taken a strong hold on the feelings of mankind.  
That they should have done so is not surprising, when we 
consider what the words, in their primitive and most obvious 
significations represent; but it is unfortunate that a set of terms 
which play so great a part in moral and metaphysical speculation, 
should have acquired many meanings different from the primary 
one, yet sufficiently allied to it to admit of confusion. The words 
have thus become entangled in so many foreign associations, 
mostly of a very powerful and tenacious character, that they have 
                                            
139 Stack cited these quote marked phrases from Hodgskinřs Natural and Artificial 
Right of Property Contrasted (1832, p.i).  However, it should be noted that Hodgskin 
commented that his aim in this work was to establish a distinction Ŗbetween the natural 
and the legal right of propertyŗ (Hodgskin, 1832, p.i).  Hodgskin was not claiming here 
a universal distinction between nature and the artificial. 
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come to excite, and to be symbols of feelings which their original 
meaning will by no means justify; and which have made them one 
of the most copious sources of false taste, false philosophy, false 
morality, and even bad law. (Mill, 1874, p.3)  
Hodgskin‘s contemporary, William Thompson had also accepted that Nature 
was an expression sometimes used to justify arguments, but in his view, mostly 
on dubious grounds associated with unwarranted positive connotations. 
No word has been more misapplied than the word Natural; nor is it 
necessary here to enter here into an analysis of its origin, 
derivative, or present significations.  So pleasing are the 
associations connected with it, that it is arbitrarily allied to almost 
anything which it is sought to recommend. (Thompson, 1824, p.3) 
Utilitarian Nature 
Despite his own cautioning William Thompson nevertheless proceeded to use 
the term in a way that although contrary to Hodgskin‘s usage, was in line with 
Bentham‘s politico-legal philosophy. He thereby used nature to signify that 
which was best for society. 
No natural laws of distribution, or of any thing else, in the sense 
here given them, any where exist. By natural laws of distribution 
enlightened political economists do mean, or ought to mean, 
those general rules or first principles, on which all distribution of 
wealth ought to be founded, in order to produce the greatest 
aggregate mass of happiness to the society, great or small, 
producing it. (Thompson, 1824, p.3) 
Thus Thompson gave a clear example of the Utilitarian conception that that 
which brings the most benefits, must be natural. Samuel Read‘s Political 
Economy: An Inquiry into the Natural Grounds of Right to Vendible Property or 
Wealth (1829) is also worthy of note for its adoption of this Utilitarian normative 
viewpoint as regards natural laws (as well as for his criticism of Hodgskin). In 
his Preface Read addressed the use of the term Natural in his title. 
To obviate an objection that may be taken to our Title and to the 
way in which the word Natural is used in it, I adduce the following 
explanation of the meaning of the word, whence the sense will 
appear in which it is here employed:- 
―Natural may be opposed either to what is unusual, miraculous, or 
artificial.  In the two former senses, justice and property are 
undoubtedly natural.‖ – Hume; Inquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals, Appendix 3, - note. (Read, 1829, p.x)  
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Read saw Natural therefore as that which was normal or best. Thus the science 
of politics was ―the science of all that is right and wrong‖ (ibid, p.xvii).  Political 
economy was for him the branch of this science of politics that dealt with 
property or wealth (rather than the person or the state). 
The second branch of political science is that which comprises the 
investigation and demonstration of all that is right and wrong, and 
that should or should not, be established as compulsatory or 
institutional law, in regards to those rights and duties of men in 
society which relate chiefly or exclusively to property, i.e. 
transferable property or wealth, - and which has lately grown up 
into an extensive and important separate science, under the name 
of ―Political Economy‖. (ibid, p.xviii) 
There is in Read the coincidence of the terms natural and real with regards to 
rights, as being that which was best rather than that, as in Hodgskin and J.S. 
Mill, which it was in the nature of prevailing circumstances likely to occur 
whether right or wrong, good or bad. 
by natural or real right being understood, such modes of conduct 
and relations to persons and property as can be demonstrated to 
be consistent with the general good of mankind, and the best form 
of civil society, or with ―those general principles which,‖ as has 
been observed by a writer of the highest class and authority, 
―ought to run through and be the foundation of the laws of all 
nations.‖ (ibid, p.xix) 
Read noted that the author he referred to was Adam Smith in his Theory of 
Modern Sentiments (1759).  The section to which Read alluded was that where 
Smith, after having dismissed casuistry, noted that ―it might be expected that 
these reasonings should have led them [lawyers] to aim at establishing a 
system of what might properly be called natural jurisprudence‖ (Smith, 1759, 
p.341). Smith commented on the lamentable progress that had been made in 
that regard and acknowledged that he would not deal with this issue in that 
work. 
Adam Smith‘s most pertinent comments on natural laws can rather be found in 
Lectures on Jurisprudence (1978 [1762-3]), when discussing whether polygamy 
was natural, and the proportionately equality of the numbers of men and women 
in different societies –  
It is not probable or to be believed without good foundation that 
the laws of nature vary so much in other countries.  We see that 
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the laws of nature with respect to gravity, impulse, etc. are the 
same in all parts of the globe: the laws of generation in other 
animals are also the same in all countries, and it is not at all 
probable with regard to that of men there should be so wide a 
difference in the eastern and northern parts. (Smith, 1978, p.155) 
This presented natural laws as universal constants rather than the pragmatically 
flexible allowance within Read‘s scheme. 
An Object’s Nature 
In contrast to Thompson our intention is to ―enter here into an analysis of its 
origin, derivative, or present significations‖; albeit in a relatively narrow fashion, 
in order to arrive at an understanding of how Hodgskin used the term nature. 
J.S. Mill saw an object‘s nature as ―the ensemble or aggregate of its powers or 
properties‖ … ―its entire capacity of exhibiting phenomena‖ (Mill, 1874, p.5).  
Hence physical laws could be expressed as the laws of an object‘s nature.140 
And since the phenomena which a thing exhibits, however much 
they vary in different circumstances, are always the same in the 
same circumstances, they admit of being described in general 
forms of words, which are called the laws of the thing‘s nature.  
Thus it is a law of nature of water that under the mean pressure of 
the atmosphere at the level of the sea, it boils at 212° Fahrenheit. 
(Mill, 1874, p.5)141 
Evidently individual objects conform to a multitude of individual laws pertaining 
to their nature.  The collective sum of all these laws can be conceived as Nature 
in the whole or general sense: 
As the nature of any given thing is the aggregate of its powers and 
properties, so Nature in the abstract is the aggregate of the 
powers and properties of all things.  Nature means the sum of all 
phenomena, together with the causes which produce them; 
including not all that happens, but all that is capable of happening; 
                                            
140
 The etymology of the stem nãscĩ form (nature) equates as the Latin form or 
translation of the Greek physis (φύσις), or physics. The distinction between the terms 
nature and physics (or indeed between natural law and law of physics could be seen to 
boil down to whether we use the Latin or Greek root derivation.  
141
 This notion of consistency pertaining to the laws of nature can also be found in 
Malthusřs Essay on Population: 
The constancy of the laws of nature, or the certainty, with which we may 
expect the same effect, from the same causes, is the foundation of the 
faculty of reason. (Malthus, 1798, p.362)  
 118 
the unused capabilities of causes being as much a part of the idea 
of Nature, as those which take place. (ibid)142 
Nature as the “About-to-be” 
In Nature and the Supernatural (1860), Horace Bushnell defined nature in a 
sense closer to the birthing connotations of its etymology. He also detached 
causes from objects‘ properties in the sense that wood floated on water not so 
much because of the inherent disposition of wood but because of universal 
causes (or as we might say - laws of physics).143 
The Latin etymology of the word nature, presents the true force of 
the term clear of all ambiguity.  The nature (natura) of a thing is 
the future participle of its being or becoming – its about-to-be, or 
its about-to-come-to-pass, – and the radical idea is, that there is, 
in the thing whose nature we speak of, or in the wholes of things, 
an about-to-be, a definite fruition, a fixed law of coming to pass, 
such that, given the thing, or whole of things, all the rest will follow 
by an inherent necessity.  In this view, nature, sometimes called 
―universal nature,‖ and sometimes ―the system of nature,‖ is that 
created realm of being or substance which has an acting, a going 
on process from within itself, under and by its own laws.  Or, if we 
                                            
142
 Millřs 1874 posthumous essay Nature was not his first expression of his frustration 
in the casual use of the term Nature as his debating speech (between Utilitarians and 
Owenites) in 1825, Population illustrates: 
A gentleman affirmed on the former evening that the principle of 
population is unnatural: that it is contrary to nature and therefore cannot 
be true.  What he meant by nature, and by unnatural, he did not tell us: 
indeed he did not seem to know: nor did he offer any proof that the 
principle of population is unnatural.  What he meant by nature I cannot 
tell: I will tell him what I mean by nature;  I mean all the things which 
we see and feel: the sun, moon and stars; men and animals, trees, plants 
and shrubs; the earth with all its productions and various phenomena.  If 
all this be not nature, I should like to know what is.  Now then, to what 
part of all this does the gentleman consider the principle of population to 
be contrary?  Is it contrary to the sun and moon?  contrary to the stars?  
contrary to the trees and shrubs?  to the sea? to an earthquake or a 
volcano?  If, Sir, as is abundantly manifest, a man would make himself 
ridiculous by saying that the principle of population is contrary to any of 
these, I should like to know how that which is not contrary to any part, 
can be said to be contrary to the whole. 
But the gentleman may reply that it is contrary to some supposed law 
of nature.  If he can prove this I have done.  But to what law of nature is 
it contrary?  (Mill, XXVI, p.295) 
143 Although Horace Bushnell (1802-1876) was an influential, Yale educated, American 
theologian we do not claim that he influenced Hodgskin, only that by way of example, 
he postulated an attitude that could, albeit within general terms, be seen as similar to 
Hodgskin. 
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say, with some, that the laws are but another name for the 
immediate actuating power of God, still it makes no difference, in 
any other respect, with our conception of the system.  It is yet as if 
the laws, the powers, the acting, were inherent in the substances, 
and were by them determines.  It is still to our scientific separated 
from our religious contemplation, a chain of causes and effects, or 
a scheme of orderly succession, determined from within the 
scheme itself. (Bushnell, 1860, p.36-7)144 
In Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted Hodgskin can be seen 
both in his association of Nature and God, and his reference to a first cause, to 
be somewhat aligned with Bushnell‘s position. 
Nature or God, whichever the reader pleases, for the two words 
signify the same everlasting First Cause, (Hodgskin, 1832, p.57) 
Thus if we conceive Hodgskin‘s notion of nature as being close to Bushnell‘s 
there are still two areas that need to be addressed in relation to nature.  Firstly 
there was the possible conflict between nature and man; or between the natural 
and the artificial.  Secondly, there was the normative association in the use of 
the term nature that carried the connotation that what was natural was 
necessarily good. 
Nature and the Artificial 
Despite Mill‘s first definition, of scientific nature, nature and man or man‘s 
creations were often portrayed in opposition.  Although, as Mill noted, what was 
artificial must of necessity conform to nature in the sense of nature as the 
universal laws of physics. Thus a concept of nature that opposed artifice would 
be distinct from what Mill called ―the true scientific sense‖ of the term nature. 
For example, it [Mill‘s scientific sense] entirely conflicts with the 
common form of speech by which nature is opposed to Art, and 
natural to artificial.  For in the sense of the word Nature which has 
just been defined, and which is the true scientific sense, Art is as 
much Nature as anything else; and everything which is artificial is 
natural – Art has no independent powers of its own: Art is but the 
employment of the powers of Nature for an end. (Mill, 1874, p.7)   
                                            
144 This progressive aspect of nature could also be seen in the writings of many radicals 
of the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries. David Stack cites Wordsworth, Godwin and 
Paine as particularly prominent in their association of nature with progress, and linked 
this with Hodgskinřs writings (Stack, 1998, p.13-15). 
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Thus Mill began to make the point that if Nature and artifice are set up in 
opposition then the term Nature is not being used in the scientific sense, but in 
a secondary sense.145 
In another sense it [Nature] means, not everything that happens, 
but only what takes place without the agency, or without the 
voluntary or intentional agency, of man. (Mill, 1874, p.8)146 
Nature could also be seen to have become a normative concept that conveyed 
the connotation of nature as being necessarily good. The artificial was thus 
burdened with all the negative implications associated with its opposition to 
nature – what was artificial must be unnatural and thereby bad.  If nature was 
imbued with goodness then the unnatural by antithesis must essentially be 
corrupt. 
This normative concept of nature, Mill saw leading to a third notion of nature as 
an ethical justification.147 
                                            
145 According to Bushnellřs definitions if manřs actions, when conceived of as artificial, 
are separate from, or different to the Natural, then manřs impact must be seen rather as 
Supernatural: 
That is supernatural, whatever it may be, that is either not in the chain of 
natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect, 
in nature, from without the chain.  Thus if any event transpires in the 
bosom, or upon the platform of what is called nature, which is not from 
nature itself, or is varied from the process nature would execute by her 
own laws, that is supernatural, by whatever power it is wrought. 
(Bushnell, 1860, p.37) 
Thus Bushnellřs Supernatural included the preternatural as it seems to avoid the 
miraculous, spiritual or religious connotations perhaps normally associated with the 
term supernatural. Nevertheless Bushnell did recognize that the term was often used in a 
sense that differed from his own definition. 
Instead of regarding the supernatural as that which acts on the chain of 
cause and effect in nature from without the chain, and adhering to that 
sense of the term, we use it, very commonly, in a kind of ghostly, 
marveling sense, as if relating to some apparition, or visional wonder, or 
it may be to some desultory, unsystematizable action, whether of angels 
or of God. (ibid, p.41) 
146 A similar recognition of the notion that separated nature and artifice can be found in 
Hodgskinřs fellow member of staff at The Economist, Herbert Spencerřs The Study of 
Sociology originally published in 1873:- 
Those who have been brought up in the belief that there is one law for 
the rest of the Universe and another law for mankind, will doubtless be 
astonished by the proposal to include aggregates of men in this 
generalization. (Spencer, 1897, p.50-1)  
147 There was a further notion regarding Nature that involved its personification.  This 
can be seen illustrated and (in part) justified in Darwinřs Origin of Species (originally 
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But the employment of the word Nature as a term of ethics seems 
to disclose a third meaning, in which Nature does not stand for 
what is, but for what ought to be; or for the rule or standard of 
what ought to be.  A little consideration, however, will show that 
this is not a case of ambiguity; there is not a here a third sense of 
the word.  Those who set up Nature as a standard of action do not 
intend a merely verbal proposition; they do not mean that the 
standard, whatever it be, should be called Nature; they think they 
are giving some information as to what the standard of action 
really is.  Those who say that we ought to act according to Nature 
do not mean the mere identical proposition that we ought to do 
what we ought to do.  They think that the word Nature affords 
some external criterion of what we should do; and if they lay down 
as a rule for what ought to be, a word which in its proper 
signification denotes what is, they do so because they have a 
notion, either clearly or confusedly, that what is, constitutes the 
rule and standard of what ought to be. (Mill, 1874, p.12-3)148 
Hodgskin undoubtedly contrasted Nature and the artificial but what concerns us 
is whether he adhered to the scientific concept of Nature? Or did he hold the 
somewhat confused second concept that excluded man from Nature? Or was 
his nature a purely normative verbal device used to justify his own claims? 
When we can answer these questions we are better placed to understand 
Hodgskin on the issue of nature.  
                                                                                                                                
published in 1859). Where it was noted that ŖSeveral writers have misapprehended or 
objected to the term Natural Selectionŗ (Darwin, 1872, p.81).  Darwin went on to 
explain his use of the term Natural in much the same sense as we argue it was used by 
Hodgskin. 
In the literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a false term; 
but who ever objected to chemists speaking of the elective affinities of 
the various elements? Ŕ and yet an acid cannot strictly be said to elect the 
base with which it in preference combines.  It has been said that I speak 
of natural selection as an active power or Deity; but who objects to an 
author speaking of the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of 
the planets?  Every one knows what is meant and is implied by such 
metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity.  So 
again it is difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by 
Nature, only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and 
by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us.  With a little 
familiarity such superficial objections will be forgotten. (ibid, p.82) 
148 There were also those who used Millřs second definition of the term Nature that 
encompassed Ŗnot everything that happens, but only what takes place without the 
agency, or without the voluntary or intentional agency, of manŗ (Mill, 1874, p.8). These 
saw what Ŗisŗ as unnatural due to manřs so-called artificial interference.  Thus what is, 
was divergent from what ought to be, and would remain so until man altered his actions 
to ensure that what ought to be became that which is.  Thus nature was used as a 
standard with which to bring manřs conduct back in line. 
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Hodgskin’s Artifice 
A useful step in coming to terms with Hodgskin‘s idea of Nature is to know what 
he meant by artificial.  For if by artificial he meant everything that was man 
made or the result of man‘s actions and that all this was unnatural, then he was 
adhering to Mill‘s second definition.  However, if much of what resulted from 
man‘s deeds was plainly conceived as natural then he would be tending 
towards the first universal or scientific meaning. 
Hodgskin undoubtedly used the term artificial as carrying certain negative 
undertones, but when he only encompassed certain aspects of human 
endeavour as artificial, he was using the term for particular technical or verbal 
elucidation. 
The most obvious occurrence of the natural – artificial distinction was in his 
book The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted.  Thus we should 
establish exactly what the Artificial of this work‘s title specifically related to and 
look for examples where the artificial (in the sense of man-made) was 
conceived as natural. 
In its very first paragraph Hodgskin related this work expressly to the issue of 
the right of property. 
In his [Hodgskin‘s] opinion, the contest now going on in society, 
the preternatural throes and heavings which frightfully convulse it 
from one end to another, arise exclusively and altogether from the 
right of property, and can neither be understood nor relieved, but 
by attending to the great distinction he has endeavoured to 
establish between the natural and the legal right of property. 
(Hodgskin, 1832, p.i) 
Thus Hodgskin coupled the words legal and artificial as synonymous unless his 
title was not intended to associate his text and its objective. This was not the 
only example of the use of the word legal in this work in equivalence to artificial, 
such as ―the opposition between the legal and the natural right of property‖ 
(ibid, p.170) and: 
by assuming the present legal right of property to be the natural 
right, the whole of those doctrines are founded on a false basis, 
and give a false notion of the natural laws which regulate society. 
(ibid, p.171) 
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Natural Society 
This last example also presents the notion that society, as an aggregate of 
human activity, was necessarily a natural entity following natural laws, i.e. not 
an artificial (separate from nature) association.  Indeed this assertion that 
society was a natural development rather than solely a legal creation was 
crucial to Hodgskin‘s writings and pivotal to his disagreement with Benthamite 
economics and philosophy.149 
Nearing the end of Natural and Artificial Right of Property Hodgskin made his 
most strident expression that contradicts the assumption that he held nature 
and artifice in opposition.   
I have not, perhaps, entered as fully as I ought, and certainly not 
as fully as I might, into the advantages which would arise from the 
legislator recognizing and acting on the natural right of property, 
and into all the disadvantages which do actually flow from his 
continual struggles to uphold an unjust right of property.  I have 
                                            
149
 Hodgskinřs claims that political economy was a natural science and that the 
production of wealth related to natural facts, also supports the contention that he 
understood manřs actions and the artificial as both encompassed within nature.  As 
illustrated in the following passages; 
You will, I trust, my dear Sir, remember, that in my lectures I only 
explained the phenomena of social production, as far as they form part of 
a natural science; (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.viii) 
It [political economy] looks on man as a part of the great system of the 
universe, and supposes that his conduct is influenced, regulated, and 
controlled or punished, in every minute particular, by permanent and 
invariable laws, in the same manner as the growth of plants, the chemical 
combinations of matter, and the motions of the heavenly bodies.  …  I 
hope, therefore, he will feel no reluctance to follow me in my future 
endeavours to develope the natural laws regulating production and 
distribution; some of which are universally known, others are 
acknowledged and acted on, and of all, the existence is implied in every 
attempt to show, that the regulations of government, the granting of 
monopolies and bounties, the imposing heavy duties and prohibitions, 
interfere with and disturb the natural course of national prosperity. (ibid, 
p.42-3) 
That I have, by the foregoing remarks, exhausted the vast subject of the 
natural science of the production of wealth, or even glanced at 
numberless natural circumstances which influence production, I cannot 
suppose; yet I have set before the reader all those usually noticed in 
treatises of Political Economy. Moreover, I have included the influence 
of knowledge, and have endeavoured to ascertain the natural source of its 
progressive increase. (ibid, p.258) 
the principles of the science of the production of wealth are expressions 
of natural facts. (Hodgskin, E., 27
th
 Nov. , 1852, p.1327) 
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not contrasted, as I might have done, the works of nature and 
man,  Not that I am one of those ascetics, who think man can 
effect nothing good within his proper sphere, his works are noble, 
and no person admires them more than I do, his manifold and 
wondrous achievements in every branch of art. (Hodgskin, 1832, 
p.186) 
Thereby Hodgskin admitted that his work was not intended to contrast nature 
and artificial in the sense of the ―works of nature and man‖.  In this case we 
might ask why the term Artificial appeared in his book‘s title when it seems 
evident that he could have used Legal.  It may have been that a legal right must 
be a man-made or artificial right and so the use of the more general term did 
not preclude the more specific.  It could have been a decision made to make 
the book more palatable for general publication, or to alleviate the possibility of 
legal repercussions.150    
It may have been that Hodgskin‘s journalist instincts led him to take advantage 
of the common prejudice of the time that placed nature and the artificial in 
opposition to get his work to a wider audience.  
Another alternative is that Hodgskin recognised that it was not solely legal laws 
that determined the right of property but also, (though not wholly un-associated) 
social conventions and relations allied with rule by government, a theme he had 
previously broached. 
                                            
150
 In his Dedication (to George Birkbeck) which opened his earlier Popular Political 
Economy (1827) Hodgskin had appealed for security from persecution because of his 
beliefs: 
I trust our countrymen are now much too liberal and enlightened to be 
offended with the honest expression of such an opinion: I do not court 
either persecution or martyrdom for my political faith, if there are now 
any man so attached to existing systems, as to think that he who does not 
believe in their efficacy ought to be hanged or burned; and it is only 
under the confident assurance that no man by our liberal countrymen, 
and under a soi-disant liberal government, will be persecuted on account 
of opinions, that I venture to place your respected and honoured name at 
the head of some that are at variance, I am afraid, with the political creed 
of the great majority of men. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.xv)  
It may have been that by 1832 he could no longer rely on the protective patronage 
that he had previously been able to, knowing that his links to James Mill, Bentham and 
earlier associates had been acrimoniously severed.  The title may have just reflected an 
expedient avoidance of conflict.    
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The possibility is also left open for our contention that by artificial Hodgskin 
encompassed what might nowadays be seen as the exogenous and that these 
other factors, such as conventions as well as social and political relations 
outside an abstract economical ―proper sphere‖, could be envisaged as 
exogenous.  
The Social 
In Popular Political Economy (1827) rather than contrast nature and artifice 
Hodgskin contrasted the natural with the social.  
The whole of these circumstances [which influence the productive 
power of labour] may be divided into two classes; firstly, NATURAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES, or laws not dependent on, or derived from 
government, – such as the passions and faculties of man, the 
laws of his animal existence, – and the relations between him and 
the external world; and, secondly, SOCIAL REGULATIONS, depending 
on, or originating with governments, – such as those permanent 
laws which appropriate the soil of the country, or which bestow on 
it a constitution, establishing a diversity of ranks among its 
inhabitants; as well as the laws for the regulation of trade and the 
acts of Administration, many of which are expressly intended to 
add to the wealth of society, or determine its distribution. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.23-4) 
So here Hodgskin verbally opposed the natural and social but the social was 
again, as we have already seen with Artificial, apparently restricted to 
government and its legal enactments.  The first six chapters of Popular Political 
Economy dealt with what could be seen as the natural progression of society 
and particularly knowledge as influences upon labour‘s productiveness.  Indeed 
chapter three is entitled – Natural Laws which regulate the Progress of Society 
and Knowledge.  In this and other chapters Hodgskin made his point that the 
progress or development of societies tended to certain regularities which could 
be construed to be universal, scientific or natural laws. 
Thus when we call to mind the uniformity of the progress of 
civilization in its early stages – man having everywhere, as far as 
history reaches, gradually passed successively through the stage 
of naked savage living on wild fruits, of a hunter feeding on flesh, 
almost as wild and ferocious as the wild beasts with which he 
contended for prey, of a shepherd domesticating and rearing the 
animals he found it difficult to catch by hunting, and ultimately of 
an agriculturist, raising vegetable food for himself, and for the 
animals he destines for his own use, – acquiring therefore 
 126 
successfully, in all places, the knowledge which enables him first 
to hunt and ensnare wild animals, next to domesticate them, and 
finally to cultivate the ground; when we recollect this uniformity in 
the progress of our race, we can hardly fail to suppose that it must 
be regulated by some general law. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.83-4)151 
Thus we should have little doubt that Hodgskin conceived human action and 
what might be seen as the artificial as part of nature and subject to Natural 
laws.     
Hodgskin’s Natural Laws 
When Hodgskin discussed natural laws it was to the same immutable powers 
that Mill was to refer to: 
The words, laws of nature, decrees of nature, which I so freely 
use, are certainly imposing phrases, and when we speak of such 
decrees in the material world, we mean an irresistible power 
which man can neither change nor influence. (Hodgskin, 1832, 
p.58)  
There are definite undertones of Hodgskin‘s faith in the existence of benevolent 
intentionality in nature (which we discuss later), which enabled him to write of 
decrees rather than simple statement of facts or circumstances, in J.S. Mill‘s 
sense.  A discussion of the meaning of the word Law found in James Mill‘s Law 
of Nations (1825), throws some light on the issue. 
In the meaning of the word Law, three principles are involved; that 
of Command, that of a Sanction, and that of the Authority from 
which the command proceeds.  Every law imports, that something 
is to be done; or to be left undone. (Mill, 1825, p.3)  
This illustrates a possible difference with J.S. Mill‘s natural laws which are 
exclusively presented as positive descriptive explanations of reality. With James 
                                            
151 This notion of the production of natural or general laws was consistent with Millřs 
as expressed in Nature (1874); 
Since all phenomena which have been sufficiently examined are found to 
take place with regularity, each having certain fixed conditions, positive 
and negative, on the occurrence of which it invariably happens; mankind 
have been able to ascertain by direct observation or by reasoning 
processes grounded on it, the occurrence of many phenomena; and the 
progress of science mainly consists in ascertaining those conditions.  
When discovered they can be expressed in general propositions, which 
are called laws of the particular phenomenon, and also, more generally, 
Laws of Nature. (Mill, 1874, p.6) 
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Mill and Hodgskin the expression of natural laws carried undertones of apparent 
normative statements with the mention of ―Authority‖ and ―decrees‖.152   
Scientific understanding was conceived as beginning with the recognition of 
how objects react in given situations, before changing those situations, 
observing how reactions change and then coming to an understanding of why 
those reactions differ.153   
His [mankind‘s] highest wisdom then, at all times, consists in 
ascertaining the facts of the material world, and regulating his 
conduct by them.  From them he deduces rules, or he generalizes 
them, and calls them laws of nature, (Hodgskin, E., 8th Sept. 1855, 
p.980) 
Since all phenomena which have been sufficiently examined are 
found to take place with regularity, each having certain fixed 
conditions, positive and negative, on the occurrence of which it 
invariably happens, mankind have been able to ascertain, either 
                                            
152
 A reconciliation of this seeming contradiction can be found in Karl Popperřs Logic 
of Scientific Discovery (1959) which used the term Nature Law in the same sense as J.S. 
Mill and argued that normative statements can be seen rather as negations of existential 
statements. Thus J.S. Millřs positive position can be aligned with Hodgskinřs more 
emotive language that talked of necessities and imperatives. 
The theories of natural science, and especially what we call natural laws, 
have the logical form of strictly universal statements; thus they can be 
expressed in the form of negations of strictly existential statements or, 
we may say, in the form of non-existence statements … In this 
formulation we see that natural laws might be compared to 
Ŗproscriptionsŗ or Ŗprohibitionsŗ.  They do not assert that something 
exists or is the case they deny it. They insist on the non-existence of 
certain things or states of affairs, proscribing or prohibiting, as it were, 
these things or states of affairs: they rule them out. And it is precisely 
because they do this that they are falsifiable. (Popper, 1959, p.48) 
Hodgskinřs use of natural laws can sometimes be seen to have combined the use of 
the descriptive and, by turn of phrase, the proscriptive: 
Man is doomed to eat bread by the sweat of his brow; and naturally those 
who do not work can have nothing to eat.  If we do not labour, we can 
have no food, and must inevitably perish.  This is as certain as any axiom 
of mathematics; … the necessity for man to labour … is a law of the 
universe, like the principle of gravity. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.27-8) 
153 Hodgskinřs successor at The Economist Walter Bagehot made a similar point 
regarding the discovery of natural laws as a scientific process: 
The discovery of a law of nature is very like the discovery of a murder.  
In one case you arrest a suspected person, and in the other you isolate the 
cause. (Bagehot, 1885, p.19) 
[Alfred Marshallřs Preface to Bagehotřs Postulates of English Political Economy 
(1885) noted that the material in that work had been previously published in the 
Fortnightly Review of 1876, shortly before Bagehotřs death in 1877.] 
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by direct observation or by reasoning processes grounded on it, 
the conditions of the occurrence of many phenomena; and the 
progress of science mainly consists in ascertaining those 
conditions. When discovered they [the regularities] can be 
expressed in general propositions, which are called laws of the 
particular phenomenon, and also, more generally, Laws of Nature. 
(Mill, 1874, p.5-6) 
The use of the term nature might be conceived as tautological, such that the 
word Law would be sufficient.  However, within economics, particularly within 
Hodgskin‘s writing, the distinction between these natural or scientific laws and 
legal laws was important, and so the clarification the use of natural brought was 
appropriate.154 
Nature’s Beneficence 
The fundamental idea from which Thomas Hodgskin starts is 
essentially the same as the one from which François Quesnay 
and Adam Smith had started: the conviction that there is a great 
and beneficial order of the universe which comprises the human 
and physical worlds alike. (Stark, 1943, p.52)  
That this was so can be seen in his early writings, but as Stark noted this was 
the usual attitude of the period in which Hodgskin wrote.155 Such an attitude can 
be seen within the debate that Malthus instigated regarding population. Given 
that the world inevitably contained suffering the issue was whether it as a 
necessary evil arising from the laws of nature (God‘s will) or was it due to 
human interference with nature‘s (God‘s) grand design? 
By one party of reasoners, general poverty is attributed to natural 
and unalterable laws; by another it is said to be altogether the 
result of social institutions. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.265)156  
                                            
154 The fact that many writers wrote both on Political Economy and Jurisprudence 
(Smith, Hodgskin, the Mills, Senior, Scrope and numerous others) made this distinction 
particularly necessary at this period of the 19
th
 century.  OřBrien also noted the Ŗlegal 
trainingŗ and Ŗprofessional interestŗ of many Classical economists: Senior, Cairnes, 
Fawcett, Francis Horner, Longfield, West, Wheatley and Lord Lauderdale (OřBrien, 
2004, p.11). 
155
 Hodgskin made the point that a belief in the persistence of universal order (and laws) 
was apparently innate to human understanding: 
there is a principle in our nature Ŕ a law of our mind, by which we at all 
times believe in the invariability of the order of the universe. (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.31)  
156 Such was Hodgskinřs belief that natural laws were the basis of political economy, 
the claim that natural laws could end in negative results seemed to have perturbed him: 
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Hodgskin adopted the latter position, that suffering was not a necessary (or 
natural) evil but the result of man‘s interference in the benevolence of God or 
nature.157  
Men attribute to nature the evil which is caused by social 
institutions, and are led by their reverence, or rather their idolatry 
of the wisdom of their ancestors, to doubt the wisdom of the Deity. 
(ibid, p.37) 
The whole system of social production must be considered, like 
the solar system, as a part of the universe, which man may 
observe and know, but cannot regulate.  He may thwart for a time 
the benevolent views of his Creator, but he is invariably 
admonished, by the misery which ensues, of his having done 
wrong. … As it will undoubtedly be regulated and controlled in 
every minute part, and at all times, by the same hand that placed 
man on the earth, and gave to the embryo of the forest tree a 
living power to shoot upward, overcoming the ruling principle of 
matter, there is reason to believe that it will be perfect, like the 
Master Power from which it emanates.  (ibid, p.261-2) 
This faith in a benevolent intentionality, exemplified here in Hodgskin, was 
attacked by Mill in the final paragraph of his Nature: 
                                                                                                                                
We are all subjects of Nature, and we can only be either happy or great 
by obeying her laws.  And if Rent, such as it at present exists, be 
according to Mr. Ricardo the natural result of Society, then every attempt 
to rid us of the control of a wealthy aristocracy must be ultimately 
unsuccessful and in its progress mischievous.  I am a democrat.  Mr. 
Ricardořs doctrines are the strongest support I know, as far as reasoning 
goes, to aristocracy, and therefore I dislike them.  This is the source of 
one of my prejudices against them which I thus honestly and openly 
confess. 
Mr. Rřs opinions set bounds to our hopes for the future progress of 
mankind in a more definite manner even than the opinions of Mr. 
Malthus. (Hodgskin, LP., 28
th
 May 1820) 
157
 Hodgskin seemed to have been of the view that Nature and God could be conceived 
of as the same entity. 
for Matter, God and Nature appear to me to be three words nearly 
synonymous, the first and the last expressing our continued perceptions 
while the middle one expresses the signs of power benevolent and 
uniform with which we are accompanied (Hodgskin, LP., 18
th
 Feb. 1816) 
It is interesting to note that Isaac Newton, in his Principia, had also associated God 
and Nature.  In contrast to Hodgskin, Newton distinguished the two in terms of 
beneficence and final cause.  
a god without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing else but 
Fate and Nature. (Newton, 1687, p.442) 
A discussion of this theological distinction between reality with or without Godřs 
determining dominance could be linked to a contention on the association or identity of 
Aristotelian First and Final Causes, which is belong the scope of this thesis. 
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The scheme of Nature, regarded in its whole extent, cannot have 
had, for its sole or even principal object, the good of human or 
other sentient beings. What good it brings to them is mostly the 
result of their own exertions. Whatsoever, in nature, gives 
indication of beneficent design proves this beneficence to be 
armed only with limited power; and the duty of man is to 
cooperate with the beneficent powers, not by imitating, but by 
perpetually striving to amend, the course of nature - and bringing 
that part of it over which we can exercise control more nearly into 
conformity with a high standard of justice and goodness. (Mill, 
1873, p.65)158 
However there is an inconsistency in this passage; namely that, if, as Mill had 
earlier shown, nature ―is a collective name for all facts, actual and possible‖ 
(ibid, p.6), then amending ―the course of nature‖ would be impossible if 
amendments could only facilitate what was already possible.  
The issue of the benevolence or otherwise of Nature, whilst undoubtedly 
colouring the views of some economists, is not itself a subject resolvable within 
economics. What is important is to observe whether an economist‘s faith or 
theology materially interfered with the validity of their economic analysis. 159 
Whether running contrary to the laws of reality was disadvantageous or not, is a 
subjective assessment.  Whether actions to improve upon Nature are an 
unnecessary (or waste of) effort with detrimentally effects, particularly in the 
case of economic growth, could be seen as a more objective question.  Harking 
back to the oft used analogy of a fountain; understanding the appropriate 
natural laws (i.e. gravity) enables us to stipulate what actions are necessary if 
we require a result apparently at odds with that natural law (i.e. getting water to 
raise up in the air); i.e. that actually utilizes a natural law rather than breaks it.160 
                                            
158 A similar expression of artificial means as the improver of Nature can be seen in 
Millřs System of Logic (1843). 
we may hereafter succeed not only in looking forward into the future 
history of the human race, but in determining what means may be used 
and to what extent, to accelerate the natural progress in so far as it is 
beneficial; (Mill, VIII, p.929) 
159 Just as we might note that an economist was a Christian but not delve into the rights 
and wrongs, or validity of Christianity. 
160 The gravitational analogy was often use by Hodgskin, particularly in Popular 
Political Economy (e.g. Hodgskin, 1827a, p.28-29), and also by John Rooke (1819, 
p.5). Even the fountain parallel can be found: 
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As this applies to Hodgskin‘s economics we can investigate what conditions 
would be necessary to achieve economic growth (in terms we will discuss 
subsequently) given the difficulties of an increasing population and diminishing 
returns in production. 
Mill‘s point regarding nature‘s ambivalence to human welfare can be 
decomposed to several issues, which we can address; 
 Was change possible? 
 If so, was change inevitable? 
                                                                                                                                
Admitting that men have, to a certain degree, the power of throwing the 
necessity to labour off their own shoulders; as they may alter the 
direction of the influence of gravity, in making a fountain rise from the 
earth into the atmosphere; the question occurs, will throwing off this 
necessity, by the appropriation of other men's produce, not be followed 
by certain and inevitable consequences? (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.30) 
J.B. Say also employed the fountain and gravity analogy. 
But facts that take place may be considered in two points of view; either 
as general or constant, or as particular or variable.  General facts are the 
results of the nature of things in all analogous cases; particular facts as 
truly result from the nature of things, but they are the result of several 
operations modified by each other in a particular case.  The former are 
not less incontrovertible than the latter, even when apparently they 
contradict each other.  In natural philosophy, it is a general fact, that 
heavy bodies fall to the earth; water in a fountain, nevertheless, rises 
above it.  The particular fact of the fountain is a result wherein the laws 
of equilibrium are combined with those of gravity, but without 
destroying them. (Say, 1821, p.xviii) 
A very similar expression can also be found in George Prymeřs An Introductory 
Lecture and Syllabus to a Course delivered in the University of Cambridge on the 
Principles of Political Economy (1823) would indicate: 
But it has not perhaps been sufficiently remarked, that there are two 
kinds of facts, general or constant facts: and particular or variable facts.  
General facts are results from the nature of things in all similar cases; as 
in Physics it is a general fact, that a heavy body falls to the earth.  
Particular facts are the results of several actions or causes modified by 
one another in a peculiar case; it is a particular fact, that the water of a 
fountain rises from the earth.  The one kind of facts is as incontestable as 
the other, even when they seem contradictory.  The particular fact of the 
fountain is the result of a case where the laws of equilibrium in fluids 
combine with those of gravity, and counteract them; but without in the 
least disproving the truth of either.  But the mere matter of  fact man 
might argue thence, that it is a property of heavy fluids to rise from the 
earth: and indeed inferences as decidedly, though not as obviously 
absurd, are perpetually advanced on legislative subjects, by this ill and 
opinionative class of men.  The maxim that the more ignorant a man is of 
the science he affects to talk about, the more dogmatical he becomes, is 
particularly true in Political Economy. (Pryme, 1823, p.7-8)  
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 If change did occur, was change in physical and moral (or non-human 
and human) spheres identical? 
 How could one determine whether change was actually progress?  
Indeed there was extensive deliberation over these issues, particularly as they 
affected human society, in the early 19th century.  The two main British 
expressions, around which that debate focussed were Godwin‘s Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice (1793) and other works, together with Malthus‘s 
response to Godwin, his An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798, 1803, 
1817).161 
The Perfectibility Debate 
This debate was seen to resolve around the perfectibility of man. Malthus wrote 
that the main issue that his Essay on Population addressed related to whether 
change was possible. 
It has been said, that the great question is now at issue, whether 
man shall hence-forth start forwards with accelerated velocity 
towards illimitable, and hitherto unconceived improvement; or be 
condemned to a perpetual oscillation between happiness and 
misery, and after every effort remain still an immeasurable 
distance from the wished-for goal. (Malthus, 1798, p.2)162 
Malthus admitted his own view ―of human life has a melancholy hue‖ (ibid, p.iv) 
since ―the argument is conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of 
                                            
161 Malthus wrote that his Essay was in fact, directly stimulated by Godwinřs 1797 
collection of essays The Enquirer: 
The following Essay owes its origin to a conversation with a friend, on 
the subject of  Mr. Godwinřs Essay,  on avarice and profusion,  in his 
Enquirer.  (Malthus, 1798, p.i) 
162
 Malthusřs opinion, especially as expressed in the first edition (1798) of his Essay, 
seems to have been that man could not gain perfection Ŗon earthŗ because of the Ŗevilsŗ 
resultant from his principle of population.  These earthly evils were however viewed as 
Godřs preparation of the soul to attain its reward in the afterlife. 
The view of human life, which results from the contemplation of the 
constant pressure of distress on man from the difficulty of subsistence, 
by shewing the little expectation that be can reasonably entertain of 
perfectibility on earth, seems strongly to point his hopes to the future. 
(Malthus, 1798, p.348) 
Earthly pain and evil were, for Malthus, obviously Godřs intentional mechanism for 
preparing mankind for the hereafter.  Thus human perfectibility would run contrary to 
Godřs intentions and would be debarred by a perfect God.  
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mankind‖ (ibid, p.v).163  It appears that this melancholy was not only common 
but almost conceived of as a mark of astuteness. In his speech Perfectibility 
(2nd May 1828), John Stuart Mill made this point. 
I know that among all that class of persons who consider 
themselves to be par excellence, the wise and the practical, it is 
esteemed a proof of consummate judgement, to despair of doing 
good.  I know that it is thought essential to a man who has 
knowledge of the world, to have an extremely bad opinion of it: 
and that whenever there are two ways of explaining any fact, wise 
and practical people always takes that way which attributes most 
folly, or most immorality, to the mass of mankind. (Mill, XXVI, 
p.428) 
Despite Mill‘s view of society‘s generally pessimistic attitude, Malthus‘s second 
edition of his Essay was both less theological and, Malthus apparently thought, 
less melancholic than the first.  It did, however, not hold out much hope of 
structural change within society.164  
                                            
163 The Malthusian case was that it Ŗis the constant tendency in all animated life to 
increase beyond the nourishment prepared for itŗ (Malthus, 1803, p.2).  The 
inevitability of diminishing returns to food production due to the inevitability of falling 
soil fertility, excluded any possible general improvement in conditions for humanity. 
Man is necessarily confined in room.  When acre has been added to acre 
till all fertile land is occupied, the yearly increase in food must depend 
on the amelioration of the land already in possession.  This is a stream, 
which, from the nature of the soils, instead of increasing, must be 
gradually diminishing. (ibid, p.5) 
It was against this assumption of the inability of productivity to improve that was, as 
we will discuss latter in this thesis, Hodgskinřs main argument against Malthus, and the 
mainspring of his notion of economic growth. 
164 The notion that the term Ŗdismal scienceŗ was penned by Thomas Carlyle in 
reference to political economy as a whole but not to Malthus or Ricardo in particular, is 
concisely shown in Robert Dixonřs paper The Origin of the Term "Dismal Science" to 
Describe Economics (1999). Dixon illustrates that the term was used by Carlyle with 
reference to his pro-slavery position. 
He [Carlyle] writes of those who argued that the forces of supply and 
demand rather than physical coercion should regulate the labour market 
that: "the Social Science ... which finds the secret of this Universe in 
supply and demand and reduces the duty of human governors to that of 
letting men alone ... is a dreary, desolate, and indeed quite abject and 
distressing one; what we might call ... the dismal science" ([Collected 
Works of Thomas Carlyle] Volume 11, p 177). He also uses the term 
"dismal science" in a derogatory way a number of times later in the 
work, where it is lumped together with other unwelcome (to Carlyle) 
features of the political scene as "ballot boxes", "universal suffrage" and 
"Exeter-Hall Philanthropy". (Dixon, 1999) 
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A strict inquiry into the principle of population leads us strongly to 
the conclusion, that we shall never be able to throw down the 
ladder by which we have risen to this eminence; but it by no 
means proves that we may not rise higher by the same means.  
The structure of society, in its great features, will probably always 
remain unchanged.  We have every reason to believe, that it will 
always consist of a class of proprietors, and a class of labourers; 
but the condition of each, and the proportion which they bear to 
each other, may be so altered as greatly to improve the harmony 
and beauty of the whole.  It would, indeed, be a melancholy 
reflection, that, while the views of physical science are daily 
enlarging, so as scarcely to be bounded by the most distant 
horizons, the science of moral and political philosophy should be 
confined within such narrow limits, or at best be so feeble in its 
influence, as to be unable to counteract the increasing obstacles 
to human happiness arising from the progress of population. 
(Malthus, 1803, p.604)   
In his article The Claims of Labour for the Edinburgh Review (April 1845) Mill 
saw definite positives for society‘s subsequent understanding of perfectibility 
stemming from Malthus‘s work. 
For several reasons, it will be useful to trace back this 
philanthropic movement to its small and unobvious beginnings – 
to note its fountain-head, and show what mingled streams have 
from time to time swelled its course. 
                                                                                                                                
Dixon also noted that it was J.S. Mill who initially responded to Carlyleřs original 
article Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question published in Fraser's Magazine in 
December 1849. 
It was the economist John Stuart Mill who responded to Carlyle in the 
next issue of Fraser's Magazine. Mill argues that the "law" which 
propels Carlyle is "the law of the strongest", "a law against which the 
great teachers of mankind have in all ages protested" (Mill, 1850, p 87) 
and says that history teaches us that human improvement comes not from 
the tyranny of the strongest but instead from the struggle against such 
tyranny. Mill remarks that if people are to be compelled to work because 
'work' is so good for them then surely "we would not hold from the 
whites, any more than from the blacks, the 'divine right' of being 
compelled to labour" (p 92). Mill especially objects to Carlyle's notion 
"that one kind of human beings are born servants to another kind" (p 92) 
and says that if, as Carlyle asserts, "the gods will this, it is the first duty 
of human beings to resist such gods" (p 87). Mill ends his piece by 
expressing regret that Carlyle had offered substantive support for the 
institution of American slavery "at a time when the decisive conflict 
between right and iniquity seems about to commence" (p 95). By 
providing such support, Mill concludes, Carlyle has done "much 
mischief" (ibid). (Dixon, 1999) 
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We are inclined to date its origin from an event which would in 
vulgar apprehension seem to have a less title to that than any 
other honourable distinction – the appearance of Mr. Malthus's 
Essay on Population. Though the assertion may be looked upon 
as a paradox, it is historically true, that only from that time has the 
economical condition of the labouring classes been regarded by 
thoughtful men as susceptible of permanent improvement. We 
know that this was not the inference originally drawn from the truth 
propounded by Mr. Malthus. Even by himself, that truth was at first 
announced as an inexorable law, which, by perpetuating the 
poverty and degradation of the mass of mankind, gave a quietus 
to the visions of indefinite social improvement which had agitated 
so fiercely a neighbouring nation. To these supposed corollaries 
from Mr. Malthus's principle, it was, we believe, indebted for its 
early success with the more opulent classes, and for much of its 
lasting unpopularity with the poorer. But this view of its tendencies 
only continued to prevail while the theory itself was but imperfectly 
understood; and now lingers nowhere but in those dark comers 
into which no subsequent lights have penetrated. The first 
promulgator of a truth is not always the best judge of its 
tendencies and consequences; but Mr. Malthus early abandoned 
the mistaken inferences he had at first drawn from his celebrated 
principle, and adopted the very different views now almost 
unanimously professed by those who recognise his doctrine. (Mill, 
IV, p.366-7) 
Not only did Mill claim that the effective improvement of society only became a 
concern following Malthus‘s Essay, but that only those who acknowledged 
Malthus‘s principle of population were making any serious contribution to its 
intellectual debate. 
And, the doctrine being brought thus into conflict with those plans 
of easy beneficence which accord so well with the inclinations of 
man, but so ill with the arrangements of nature, we need not 
wonder that the epithets of "Malthusians" and "Political 
Economists" are so often considered equivalent to hard-hearted, 
unfeeling, and enemies of the poor; accusations so far from being 
true, that no thinkers, of any pretensions to sobriety, cherish such 
hopeful views of the future social position of labour, or have so 
long made the permanent increase of its remuneration the turning-
point of their political speculations, as those who most broadly 
acknowledge the doctrine of Malthus. (ibid, p.368) 
Despite this claim, Thomas Hodgskin was one of those who were anti-
Malthusian yet conceived that social progress was possible.  
 136 
Our feelings are hostile to his theory; and without pretending to 
controvert it, the Author has endeavoured to show, that the true 
principles of production justify the prejudices of mankind, and 
strengthen that confidence the most enlightened of our species 
were most disposed, prior to the unhappy celebrity obtained by 
The Essay On The Principle Of Population, to place in the wisdom 
and goodness of that Power, which sustains, informs, and 
regulates the moral as well as the material world (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.xix)165 
As Halévy noted, so anti-Malthusian was Hodgskin that he wrote a now lost 
article on Population that he sent to Francis Place to forward to William Godwin, 
in May 1820.  It was not forwarded by Place who was very much pro-
Malthusian, nor was it published :–  
Twice the article was refused.  Malthusianism had become one of 
the dogmas of the Liberal party, not to be refuted in a Whig 
publication. (Halévy, 1956, p.60) 
All that remains of Hodgskin‘s essay on population is a summary he sent to 
Place, the conclusion of which forms a précis of Hodgskin‘s notions on 
population that we will return to later in our discussion of growth. 
Nature as Prime Cause 
Hodgskin seems to have believed that Nature was the prime cause from which 
all else followed. 
It is a law of our being, that we must eat bread by the sweat of our 
brow … When nature stamped this law on us, and on the external 
world, she undoubtedly regulated and determined, through the 
endless succession of time, all its possible consequences. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.28) 
However, like any other natural or physical law, man could choose to follow or 
utilise that law, or he could choose to operate in opposition to it. 
She left us to choose between starvation and labour; between 
holding the plough ourselves, and carrying a whip to make 
another hold it for us; between subsisting ourselves by our honest 
exertions, or basely or violently plundering some other persons; 
but she fixed beyond our control the consequences of our choice. 
There is ample reason to suppose, therefore, that all the minute 
                                            
165
 The more detailed account of Hodgskinřs anti-Malthusian principle of population 
will from part of our chapter Price, where the productive benefits of additional 
population evident with the long term fall in natural prices, will be discussed. 
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branches of the production and distribution of wealth, are 
regulated and controlled by circumstances flowing from the 
necessity to labour; just as every part of the material world is 
regulated and controlled by natural laws. As gravity determines 
the stability of bodies on the globe, their motion towards the 
centre of the earth, and even the motion of those which seem to 
resist its power - they being forced upwards by the superior 
gravity of some other bodies - and regulates also the motion of the 
globe itself, as well as the motions of all the heavenly orbs; so the 
necessity to labour makes its influence felt, even in those cases, 
such as the steam-engine, in which man seems almost to have 
subdued Nature, making her perform the task she imposed on 
him. In such cases, the powerful instruments are made by labour; 
they require continual repair, which is done by labour; and they 
must always be directed and set in motion, which is also labour, 
by the hand of man. (Ibid, p.29) 
Thus Hodgskin accepted that man‘s actions could conflict with natural laws, but 
if he did so act there would eventually be negative consequences to bear.  Not 
only would these penalties have to be borne but eventually the ascendancy of 
the natural laws would be restored; in much the same way that despite man‘s 
ingenuity in fountain construction gravity would eventually return all the water to 
ground level. 
It was this conviction in the supremacy of natural laws that was the foundation 
of Hodgskin‘s imperative against practical political action. Much of Natural and 
Artificial Right of Property Contrasted argued that laws attempted to preserve 
social relations and legal rights of property that were contrary to natural laws 
and social progress, but that as natural laws are the dominant factor they would 
tend to supersede legal enactments. 
My argument is, that those great changes which the law did not 
ordain, were effected in spite of the law. The law-maker, instead 
of facilitating the emancipation of villeins, did what he could to 
prevent it, but his ambition and his greed were overpowered by 
the beneficent operation of natural laws. Improvements in art and 
science, the introduction of commerce and manufactures, 
consequent upon multiplication of the species,—to all of which, 
except perhaps the last, which he has opposed indirectly by mis-
appropriating the produce of industry, the law-maker has in 
general been excessively hostile, brought about the abolition of 
personal slavery. (Hodgskin, 1832, p.94)166 
                                            
166
 A point Hodgskin reiterated in Peace, Law, and Order (1843): 
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This assurance in the dominance of natural laws over legal laws was such that 
Hodgskin did not conceive that legal laws could even reverse the ―damage‖ 
done by previous laws. The best policy was to let natural laws take their course 
to supplant the effects of legal laws: 
The inefficacy of laws applies to reforming the laws … Bad laws 
therefore should not be swept away by new laws, but be suffered 
to fall into desuetude, which is for all parties a gradual and safe 
extinction of evil. (ibid, p.123) 
Legislature is not competent even to redress the wrong it enacts 
without causing some misery. (Hodgskin, E., May 26th 1849, 
p.573)167 
Thus nature would necessarily cause society to progress, albeit with temporary 
delays resulting from human attempts to circumvent or avert such progress.    
the progress of society is one continual stream of improvement, 
however much at variance with it temporary aberrations may 
appear to our short-sighted view. (Hodgskin, BN., March 12th 
1862) 
Hodgskin’s Notion of Progress 
In what we have presented so far it should be evident that Hodgskin had an 
unfaltering assurance in progress as a natural inevitability.  Reasonably we 
might ask how such progress could be recognised and qualified.  Werner Stark 
                                                                                                                                
The relations between landlord and tenant, capitalist and labourer, which 
is a relationship growing out of slavery, and between master and servant, 
are not created by nature, and they form no part of the natural order of 
society.  They are the off-spring of conquest, the result of almost 
forgotten usurpations, which the extension of the natural order of society 
has a continual tendency to overrule and destroy.  Gradually, the lord 
enforcing his will with the battle axe and sword, and the trembling thrall 
working with a fetter round his arm on which was branded the name of 
his master, have disappeared from amongst us; and a numerous middle 
class, of which all the members are equal to one another, the offspring of 
division of labour and mutual exchange, has supplied their place.  The 
effects of the original wrong, however, still fester in the constitution of 
society.  We suffer now from the consequences of ancient usurpations 
which must be outgrown, and can only be outgrown by the extension of 
the system of division of labour, of mutual buying and selling and 
mutual service Ŕ or free trade, before the natural social order I have 
described can reign supreme and bestow on man the happiness it is 
destined to confer on him. (Hodgskin, 1842, p.16) 
167
 Such statements, especially when linked back to his notion of the prime causation 
for society, show where Hodgskinřs anarchism can be seen originating in his concept of 
nature.  
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in his The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought (1843) illustrated how this 
was founded in Hodgskin‘s theory of population. 
While both the physical and the moral world are governed by 
beneficent laws divine, Hodgskin taught, the laws of the physical 
world are static in their beneficence, while the laws of the moral 
world are dynamic: The vital principle of society‖, he says, the 
principle ―which distinguishes it from every other part of creation 
[is] that of steady progression in improvement‖ (Right of Property, 
p.3). And he indicates the moving force which drives society 
forward on its way of ever-increasing welfare: ―The laws of 
population‖, he boldly states, defying the authority of Robert 
Malthus, are the ―clue to the whole‖ (Ec[onomist], 1848, p.604). 
―The increase of population … carries with it all the necessities for 
increasing subsistence, increasing knowledge, and increasing art, 
which are at all times observed168 … It is the germ and essence of 
all civilisation‖  (Ec[onomist], 1849, p.1060). (Stark, 1943, p.86-7) 
Hodgskin saw that a nation‘s wealth was related to the size of its population – 
―The foundation of all national greatness is the increase of the people‖ 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.26).  However this statement related to dynamic increases 
rather than the simple static size of the populace.  The initial response to such a 
claim might be that if the population increased but there was no increasing 
supply of commodities for that increased number, their average condition could 
fairly be said not to have improved.  
If we are to have an ideal of social progress it would probably not include a 
situation where, as a whole, less material wealth was available.  Some of 
Hodgskin‘s contemporaries referred to happiness rather than wealth as the 
social aim or measure of wellbeing, but Hodgskin recognised there were 
problems with a concept of happiness.169  
                                            
168 Werner Stark own footnote here commented that:- 
The conviction that the increase of population is, not the source of all 
evil, but the source of all good, was, in Hodgskin, the result of a definite 
scientific theory and not of a blind preconceived belief. Yet, he never 
and nowhere explicitly stated and developed his doctrine, which would 
have been a complete refutation of Malthusřs Principle of Population.  
The reason is simply this, that Hodgskin, in his 82 years of his life, never 
was in a position to devote the necessary time to his higher pursuits. 
(Stark, 1943, p.87n) 
169
 For example, in William Thompsonřs An Inquiry into the Principles of the 
Distribution of Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness, (1824) and John Grayřs 
Lecture on Human Happiness, (1825) 
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Happiness being a very indefinite term, let us substitute for 
prosperity, or wealth; (Hodgskin, 1832, p.80) 
Hence our proposal would be to conceive Hodgskin‘s notion of progress as 
linking together the ideas of an increasing population with increased prosperity 
for that population.   From a economical stance, especially with reference to 
Hodgskin‘s Popular Political Economy, Hodgskin‘s concept of economic growth 
was one that combined a situation of an increasing population with a fall in 
prices of commodities, or rise in real wages. 
In Popular Political Economy Hodgskin demonstrated that prices, in his sense 
of natural prices, tended to fall in the long term.  This propensity was effectively 
a natural law, and thus, as we have seen would have had the tendency to 
overcome whatever manmade obstacles were put in its place.   
Whether Hodgskin was correct in his faith in a benevolent providence or not, 
can be seen as secondary, especially in a value free science that he, Mill and 
others came to envisage.  Once the principle is assumed that the economy is 
subject to laws of nature, then establishing and understanding those laws 
becomes the prime object of inquiry.  
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Section two 
The Natural 
Introduction 
We need to be clear as to the distinction between nature and what is meant by 
natural.  By nature Hodgskin meant that which existed as a result of the laws of 
physics.  Thus all that existed, by virtue of this all encompassing definition, must 
be part of that nature.  Hence, as J.S. Mill had pointed out, everything must be 
natural as nothing could exist outside of those laws of physics.  Thereby any 
distinction between the natural and the artificial was meaningless, given that 
nothing artificial, thanks to the laws of physics could exist. 
Nevertheless Hodgskin did make a distinction that, unless we choose to ignore 
it, must be explained or understood, if we are to reconstruct his ideas on price 
and growth that were so important to his economics.  To this end this section 
will concentrate on his use of the term natural as he specifically applied it within 
his economics.   
A Qualified Nature 
If the term nature is used unqualified then indeed nature would be a 
comprehensive all-embracing concept, from which there could be little (if 
anything) considered outside its realm.  However if we use the term nature as 
signifying all those conditions resultant from the laws applicable to a specific 
situation being considered, then within such an abstractly limited state of affairs, 
nature becomes those conditions that result from that specific set of 
circumstances we are considering.  Such an abstractly qualified nature is thus 
not only limited to that isolated situation, but by the laws uniquely pertinent to 
those circumstances.  Thus, bearing in mind that the terms endogenous and 
exogenous were expressions unavailable to Hodgskin in the early nineteenth 
century, within such hypothetical isolations what is artificial simply becomes 
what is exogenous to the limited field of consideration.  In a similar manner 
what is natural is that which is endogenous or within the particular sphere or 
discipline under our consideration. 
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Hence our contention is that when Hodgskin, in his economic considerations, 
was writing about the natural it was applicable to such an abstract economical 
nature or what might be regarded as endogenous to an abstract isolated 
economy or economic situation.  
The Scope of Popular Political Economy 
If we focus on his economic writings, specifically as expressed in Popular 
Political Economy, we can find this effectively articulated in his Introduction. 
Firstly he limited the scope of his deliberations: 
And thus the whole science of political economy is comprised, as 
already stated, within the circumstances which influence the 
productive power of labour, and determine the distribution of its 
products. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.23) 
As we have previously seen political economy for Hodgskin was essentially a 
consideration of labour; it was ―the passions and faculties of man, the laws of 
his animal existence, and the relations between him and the external world‖ 
(ibid) that were the crucial and permanent issues for economics; 
It is with these natural interests, passions, instincts, and 
affections, and with their consequences, they not being 
suspended at any moment, and continuing to operate as 
powerfully when society is in its most advanced state as at its 
commencement, that political economy principally deals.  To them 
this book will be almost exclusively confined; on them, and on 
their permanency, together with the permanency of those laws by 
which the material world excites sensations in us, at all times and 
places, is founded the natural science of national wealth. In every 
subsequent page they will find a prominent place. (ibid, p.25) 
It becomes clear as his Introduction progresses that, despite his somewhat less 
than focused examples, Hodgskin was laying out his method as one that 
abstracted the purely economical out from the whole field of human 
endeavours.  Popular Political Economy was concerned with the purely 
economical or as he labelled it natural circumstances:-   
We have first, therefore, to discover all the natural circumstances 
which influence production and distribution at all times and places; 
and by them, as a test, we examine the effects of social 
regulations. Before we can possibly tell what influence is 
exercised by the latter, we must ascertain all the former. (ibid, 
p.35) 
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Deductive or Inductive Reasoning 
It must be remembered that the words inductive and deductive when applied to 
logical reasoning were not, when Hodgskin wrote Popular Political Economy, 
always used with the same meaning and distinction that they are today.  This 
can be seen exemplified in Richard Whately‘s Elements of Logic (1826), which 
before Mill‘s System of Logic (1843) was considered a leading authority on the 
subject.  When discussing whether induction was a form of syllogism Whately 
noted that the term induction was often applied inconsistently: 170 
The inaccuracy seems chiefly to have arisen from a vagueness in 
the use of the word Induction; which is sometimes employed to 
designate the process of investigation and of collecting facts: 
sometimes, the deducing of an inference from those facts. 
(Whately, 1826, p.151) 
Although Hodgskin applied italics to the words discover and examine, he did not 
clarify exactly what he meant by these words or the emphasis he intended to 
imply.  It would seem that by examine he meant look at particular incidences 
and arrive at general answers or understanding in an inductive manner. 
The word discover might initially also seem to carry inductive connotations 
however dictionaries of the time stress examine as a testing of evidence and 
observing what is known, whereas discovery implies making known what would 
otherwise be unknown or unseen; 
To Discover … To disclose, to bring to light; to make known; to 
find out, to espy. (Walker‘s, 1831, p.151) 
Therefore it would seem that he was contrasting the two distinct sets of 
circumstances, his natural and social, in terms of how they could be 
investigated, in what we would nowadays see as akin to the inductive or 
deductive distinction.  That it was his intention to draw a definite distinction on 
                                            
170 It is also worth observing that a clear distinction between inductive and deductive 
reasoning had not yet fully been established. This can be seen in the dictionaries of the 
time where deduction related to sequencing and induction to persuasion, although there 
was some coincidence of meaning:  
 To Deduce … To draw in a regular connected series; to form a regular 
chain of consequential propositions; to lay down in regular order. 
(Walker, 1831, p.135) 
To Induce … To persuade, to influence to any thing; to produce by 
persuasion or influence; to offer by way of induction or consequential 
reasoning; to produce; to introduce, to bring into view. (ibid, p.274) 
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the method of their study can be seen in his subsequent summing up of this 
section when he commented that he had ―pointed out two different modes of 
treating them‖ (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.38).  Therefore we can conclude that he 
saw his natural circumstances being understood as aligned to a deductive 
method.  
He also warned, in an example of one his must convoluted sentences, against 
analysis based within one particular concrete economic reality because of the 
non-economic disturbances that interfered or disturbed true understanding of 
the purely economical: 
We ought always to remember, that all inquiries into the 
production and distribution of wealth, according to some present 
or pre-existing state of society; or as both may be limited and 
influenced by regulations emanating from governments, or 
constitutions of society, the offspring, perhaps, of some palpable 
violation of the natural laws of distribution, if not of production; 
though not wholly vain and unprofitable, must be shallow and 
imperfect. (ibid, p.35-6)  
With such a caution in mind, one would have to shy away from the inductive 
and rely rather on deductive logic.  That this is effectively what Hodgskin was 
attempting can be seen from various comments he made regarding the science 
following on from certain principles or axioms.171   
With the character of social circumstances being variable with the caprice of 
government and social systems, general principles could not be used to 
characterise particular social circumstances. Thus Hodgskin concluded that 
political economy was a science that deduced from general natural laws; 
Of the natural laws and circumstance which regulate the 
production and distribution of wealth – they being permanent and 
ascertainable as any other laws regulating the material world – 
there may be a science. (ibid) 
                                            
171 For example:- 
Having established the principle, that all wealth is created by labour, it 
follows that the whole difference between … a nation rising into power 
and one stationary or sinking to decay, must be referred to the different 
modes in which labour is applied and its produce distributed. (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.23) 
This is as certain as any axiom of mathematics; and the stimulus to 
labour involved in it, comprehending our existence, is as great as 
possible. (ibid, p.27) 
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A Hypothetical Science 
In his System of Logic (1843) J.S. Mill argued that there could be no truly 
deductive sciences as all such deductions stemmed from inductive processes: 
From these considerations it would appear that Deductive or 
Demonstrative Sciences are all without exception, Inductive 
Sciences; that their evidence is that of experience; but that they 
are also, in virtue of the peculiar character of one indispensable 
portion of the general formulae according to which their inductions 
are made, Hypothetical Sciences. Their conclusions are only true 
on certain suppositions, which are, or ought to be, approximations 
to the truth, but are seldom, if ever, exactly true; and to this 
hypothetical character is to be ascribed the peculiar certainty, 
which is supposed to be inherent in demonstration.  (Mill, VII, 
p.253) 
Hence from this perspective it might be more accurate to depict Hodgskin‘s 
natural circumstances as a hypothetical exposition of an abstract formation of 
an economy not only exclusive of governmental activity but excluding all but 
purely economical factors.  Thus we should recognise the situation that 
Hodgskin was describing in Popular Political Economy as a hypothetical 
situation that he believed could have a useful application in enabling the 
identification of the affects of non-economic factors on society as a whole. 
Thus the object of political economy is to discover all the natural 
laws and circumstances, which influence and regulate the 
production of wealth. … Having discovered them, it examines by 
them the consequences of social regulations as far as they 
influence wealth; (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.42) 
Hence the natural laws and circumstances were endogenous to his hypothetical 
economy whereas what he called social circumstances were exogenous to this 
imagined state he constructed.  
Imaginary Constructions 
The use of such an imaginary construction can be seen to be akin to more 
modern economic methods.  In a brief overview of this method we will touch, by 
way of example, on one particular exposition of this method as expressed in 
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Mises‘ Human Action (1949), which appears to align quite closely with 
Hodgskin‘s method:172 
An imaginary construction is a conceptual image of a sequence of 
events logically evolved from the elements of action employed in 
its formation. It is a product of deduction, ultimately derived from 
the fundamental category of action, the act of preferring and 
setting aside. (Mises, 1949. p.237) 
Although Hodgskin believed his economics would eventually have useable 
consequences, as we have already seen in a previous chapter, he did not 
envisage his science as directly impacting on production, but rather colouring 
our understanding.  As such his abstractions were distant from reality. 
In designing such an imaginary construction the economist is not 
concerned with the question of whether or not it depicts the 
conditions of reality which he wants to analyze. Nor does he 
bother about the question of whether or not such a system as his 
imaginary construction posits could be conceived as really 
existent and in operation. Even imaginary constructions which are 
inconceivable, self-contradictory, or unrealizable can render 
useful, even indispensable services in the comprehension of 
reality, provided the economist knows how to use them properly. 
(ibid) 
Thus as Mises pointed out, the worth of such abstractions lay in their 
consistency with the objectives to which they were aimed; 
Their function is to serve man in a scrutiny which cannot rely upon 
his senses. In confronting the imaginary constructions with reality 
we cannot raise the question of whether they correspond to 
experience and depict adequately the empirical data. We must 
ask whether the assumptions of our construction are identical with 
the conditions of those actions which we want to conceive. (ibid, 
p.238) 
The coincidence of the method of Mises and Hodgskin can then be seen in their 
recognition that their imaginary constructions could be used to identity the 
consequences of situations that could not otherwise exist in isolation; 
The main formula for designing of imaginary constructions is to 
abstract from the operation of some conditions present in actual 
action. Then we are in a position to grasp the hypothetical 
                                            
172 The validity of the use of Mises here will be shown to be in both the coincidence of 
his method with Hodgskinřs and also the conclusions that Mises drew as to the Classical 
economistsř use of the term natural. 
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consequences of the absence of these conditions and to conceive 
the effects of their existence. (ibid) 
Mises then proceeded to explain that for an economist the initial imaginary 
construction created would be what he called a Pure Market Economy, which is 
effectively what Hodgskin was describing. 
The Pure Market Economy 
Thus Mises gave his explanation of what an imagined state would be; 
The imaginary construction of a pure or unhampered market 
economy assumes that there is division of labor and private 
ownership (control) of the means of production and that 
consequently there is market exchange of goods and services. It 
assumes that the operation of the market is not obstructed by 
institutional factors. (ibid) 
Thereby such an economy presented a free market for consideration before the 
complications of governmental factors are brought to bear: 
The market is free; there is no interference of factors, foreign to 
the market, with prices, wage rates, and interest rates. Starting 
from these assumptions economics tries to elucidate the operation 
of a pure market economy. Only at a later stage, having 
exhausted everything which can be learned from the study of this 
imaginary construction, does it turn to the study of the various 
problems raised by interference with the market on the part of 
governments and other agencies employing coercion and 
compulsion. (Mises, 1949, p.239) 
This coincided with what Hodgskin claimed to do.  Indeed Mises seems to have 
believed that this is what economists of the Classical period had tended to do.  
Further he saw their use of the term natural as being directly pertinent to the 
imaginary construction of such a pure market economy. 
It is also true that the classical economists and their epigones 
used to call the system of the unhampered market economy 
"natural" and government meddling with market phenomena 
"artificial" and "disturbing." But this terminology also was the 
product of their careful scrutiny of the problems of interventionism. 
They were in conformity with the semantic practice of their age in 
calling an undesirable state of social affairs "contrary to nature." 
(ibid, p.239-240) 173 
                                            
173
 It is also interesting to note that J.B. Clark also associated the Classical economistsř 
use of the term natural with a hypothetical constructed state: 
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Thereby from such a perspective, we can see that the term natural was used by 
Hodgskin to relate to endogenous factors within his abstracted construction of a 
pure market economy.  Following on from this would be the recognition of the 
artificial in this sense as the exogenous. 
Hence the next chapter of this thesis will look at Hodgskin‘s concentration on 
Labour as the subject matter of political economy.  We will then move onto the 
issues of the produce of labour, value and prices.  The concluding chapter will 
draw these various issues together to illustrate how, contrary to the majority of 
his contemporaries, Hodgskin held a distinctly endogenous theory of growth.   
 
                                                                                                                                
The term natural, as used by classical economists in connection with 
standards of value, wages and interest, was unconsciously employed as 
an equivalent of the term static; (Clark, 1899, p.vi) 
Although it must be recognised that Clarkřs static state was similar to a pure market 
economy it did not explicitly omit governmental action only changes in general which 
also excluded technological change. (ibid, p.29) 
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Chapter 4 
Labour 
Agenda 
The agenda for this chapter is initially to present an exposition of what Hodgskin 
meant by the term labour and then to place this within the context of the 
contemporary debates regarding labour and its role in political economy. 
Our intention is to show that by labour Hodgskin meant any intentional 
purposive human action aimed at either the creation of wealth, or the more 
immediate needs of subsistence.  By human action Hodgskin was referring to 
both physical and mental activities.  Thus his comprehensive notion of labour 
included not only superintendence of production, but such endeavours as trade 
and banking that aided the societal production of wealth.  Hodgskin also 
acknowledged that labour included activities remunerated by what might 
otherwise be seen as profit (as a proportionate share of turnover) rather than a 
just a simple wage or salary. 
We will also endeavour to demonstrate how his contemporaries often had far 
more restrictive notions of labour. Some of their concepts limited labour to just 
physical rather than mental work, or confined labour to only those activities for 
which a wage was received. Thus we explore the general position of not only 
contemporaries such as J.B. Say, Malthus and J.R. McCulloch, but also two 
economists, William Thompson and Thomas Cooper, who responded directly to 
Hodgskin. 
Introduction 
Within Hodgskin‘s humanistic political economy the most crucial element was 
labour – ―the science of which I am to treat, is strictly and exclusively confined 
to labour and its products‖ (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.4).  This led him to surmise that 
labour‘s productivity was the principle area of interest. 
Now we want to know all the circumstances which influence the 
productive power of labour, the prosperity or decay of nations, 
and, in a general sense, the opulence and poverty of individuals; 
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and to ascertain all these circumstances is the great object of 
political economy. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.15) 
Despite these concerns, Hodgskin‘s most famous work Labour Defended had 
been primarily devoted to a consideration of capital, rather than labour.  This 
work had been an attempt to counter the claims of what Hodgskin saw as the 
vested interests of capital to an exaggerated share of the output of labour‘s 
production.  Thus, as its title suggested, it was a polemic against capital rather 
than a direct exposition on labour, ―not so much to show what labour ought, as 
to what capital ought not to have‖ (Hodgskin, 1825, p.6).  It was the subsequent 
Popular Political Economy (1827) that contained his most detailed exposition of 
his thinking on labour 
Ambiguities over the Term Labour 
With labour as his leading concern, it is imperative that we understand what 
Hodgskin (as well as his contemporaries) perceived by the term labour. 
However, this might not be as straightforward as one might think:- 
It may appear unnecessary to define a term having a meaning so 
precise and so generally understood.  Peculiar notions respecting 
the cause of value have, however, led some Economists to 
employ the term labour in senses so different from its common 
acceptation, that for some time to come it will be dangerous to use 
the word without explanation. (Senior, 1836, p.57) 
Asking ―what was meant by labour?‖ might initially seem an superfluous 
question, however for the purpose of this thesis, and to avoid the dangers 
referred to by Senior, it is one that needs to be understood, within the context of 
the time at which Hodgskin was writing, as one that was then still being posed, 
for example: 
There is, perhaps, no definition of Labour by any British 
Economist. (Senior, 1826, p.233)174 
                                            
174 Ambiguous terms used in Political Economy by Nassau Senior (1790-1864), 
originally published as an appendix to Richard Whatelyřs Elements of Logic (1826). 
This text was reproduced by Senior in his An Outline of the Science of Political 
Economy (1836) as an appendix Ŕ On certain terms which are peculiarly liable to be 
used ambiguously in Political Economy.  
Senior recognised the attempts by J.B. Say and Henri Storch to define labour, hence 
the qualification of ŖBritish Economistsŗ.  Senior saw Whately (1787-1863) as the 
exception amongst his contemporary economists (in comparison to James Mill, 
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To many of our readers it may be [a] matter of surprise that we 
should deem it necessary to give a formal definition of a word so 
simple, and so generally understood, as the term labour.  The fact 
is, that recent economical writers, of no inconsiderable eminence, 
have employed their terms in so many different senses, and 
extended their signification to so many dissimilar things, that the 
language of the science has been rendered loose and 
indeterminate; and that in using the most familiar words, it often 
becomes necessary, not only to explain what their meaning is, but 
to point out what it is not. (Torrens, 1834, p.2) 175 
A further difficulty highlighted by Senior, arose when defining words within 
political economy, because there were few discrete terms that did not impinge 
upon the use of other expressions within the science: 
The reasonings in Political Economy are, however, so mutually 
dependent, that it is seldom possible to define one term without 
introducing into the definition others equally obscure. (Senior, 
1827, p.37) 
Aims 
This chapter, on Labour, aims to discuss the following questions; 
 What did Hodgskin mean by labour, and what activities did he include as 
labour? 
 What did Hodgskin exclude from the term labour? 
 How was Hodgskin‘s determination of labour at variance with that of his 
contemporaries?   
 How were these contemporaries‘ contrary views linked with their different 
concerns of their analysis? 
One of the main principles upheld within this chapter is that an understanding of 
what Hodgskin encompassed by the term labour is crucial to comprehending 
his economic thought and reasoning.  If we are to separate verbal from real 
substantial questions, a detailed exploration of the term labour (and its usage) 
within the writings of Hodgskin and his contemporaries will be justified. 
                                                                                                                                
McCulloch, Torrens, Malthus and Ricardo) especially with regard to his views on value 
and wealth (Senior, 1836, p.22-25). 
175 It is obvious from Torrensř text that he was especially critical of McCullochřs 
application of the term labour to non-human agency.  
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By way of example, an appreciation of wages, as the reward for labour, would 
be flawed without an appropriate understanding of that labour.   Any discussion 
of the distribution of wealth would likewise be devalued by flawed conjecturing 
on labour and wages, which in turn would compromise any perception of profits 
and their relationship to wages. Without a clear demarcation of what labour 
actually is, a ―labour theory of value‖ becomes little more than a catch-phrase, 
and any meaningful discussion upon it loses credibility. 
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Section one 
What was meant by Labour? 
 
Words, it must be remembered, always stand for some facts, 
some ideas, or some emotions, and they are fully explained when 
we are fully aware of the facts they signify. (Hodgskin, 1827b, 
p.10) 
The Axiom of Labour 
To understand Hodgskin on labour, and much else that followed in his 
economic theorising, we must accept that he started with what amounted to an 
axiom, as to the necessity of labouring, in the sweat of the brow.176  That man 
can live only by his efforts and wits, was a concept we can see recurring 
throughout his writings. 
Man is doomed to eat bread by the sweat of his brow; and 
naturally those who do not work can have nothing to eat.  If we do 
not labour, we can have no food, and must inevitably perish.  This 
is as certain as any axiom of mathematics; … The necessity for 
man to labour … is a law of the universe, like the principle of 
gravity. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.27-8) 
The first person who uttered the sentence, ―By the sweat of the 
brow shall man eat bread,‖ only stated in a few plain and fitting 
words the law of all production. (Hodgskin, BG., 13th Aug. 1862) 
This idea was not unique to Hodgskin. And similar expressions of necessity 
can, for example, be found in the writings of James Mill and McCulloch: 
Of the laws of nature, on which the condition of man depends, that 
which is attended with the greatest number of consequences, is 
the necessity of labour for obtaining the means of subsistence, as 
well as the means of the greatest part of our pleasures. (Mill, 
1820, p.4) 
                                            
176 This phrase has a biblical root Ŕ ŖIn the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till 
thou return unto the ground:ŗ (Genesis, 3,19).  In Labour Defended Hodgskin also 
referred to Ŗthe admirable maxim that Řhe who sows shall reapř ŗ (Hodgskin, 1825, 
p.32), which again had biblical origins Ŕ Ŗwhatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also 
reapŗ (Galatians, 6,7). 
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The consumption of wealth is indispensable to existence; but the 
eternal law of Providence has decreed, that wealth can only be 
procured by industry, – that man must earn his bread in the sweat 
of his brow. (McCulloch, 1825, p.12: & 1849, p.7) 
A similar, but more secular, appreciation of the importance of labour was given 
in William Thompson‘s An Inquiry into The Principles of The Distribution of 
Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness (1824): 
It is expressed in one striking sentence: ―Labor is the sole parent 
of wealth‖ ([Thompson, 1824, p.]6). This statement occupies in 
Thompson‘s thought the position of an axiom.  It need not be 
proved, for it is self-evident.  Can it be seriously questioned? 
Certainly not.  ―Did there exist in nature any other means of 
producing or increasing wealth, but by the labor superadded to 
raw materials, or to the productive powers of nature?‖ ([ibid, 
p.]181). To pose this question is to answer in the negative. (Stark, 
1943, p.105) 177   
Beneficial Labour 
George P. Scrope seems to have held a position somewhat akin to Hodgskin in 
terms of nature‘s benevolence.178  Although he was less concerned with labour 
as the sole source of subsistence, more that it was morally beneficial when 
compared to idleness.   
Nature has likewise beneficently provided, that if the greater 
portion of her sons must earn their bread by the sweat of their 
brow, that bread is far sweeter for the previous efforts, than if it fell 
spontaneously into the hand of listless indolence. (Scrope, 1833, 
p.47-8) 
When compared to Scrope we can see that Hodgskin‘s approach was not 
simply an ethical one with regard to labour‘s reward or well-being.  Hodgskin‘s 
                                            
177 The expression Ŗparent of wealthŗ was used by Hodgskin in The Economist (a 
review of George Cornwall Lewisř Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics), 
ŖAt every period of the world labour has been the parent of wealthŗ (Hodgskin, 1852, 
p.1327).  Even the anti-Hodgskin Rights of Industry had accepted that Ŗlabour is the 
parent of all wealthŗ (Knight, 1831, p.63). 
178 George Poulett Scrope (1797-1876), the brother of Charles Poulett Thompson (later 
Lord Sydenham), was a noted economist and geologist.  He was MP for the Stroud seat 
vacated by David Ricardořs son, (also David Ricardo - who had resigned because of 
electoral malpractice).  He was also a major contributor to the Quarterly Review. 
Professor William Kernřs paper in the Journal of the History of Economic Thought 
(Sept. 2003) - McCulloch, Scrope and Hodgskin: Nineteenth-century versions of Julian 
Simon argued that Scrope, like Hodgskin and McCulloch, was anti-Malthusian and that 
these three held similar views in terms of the benefits of population growth and 
technology driven long-run increasing returns to scale (Kern, 2003, p.289-301).  
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labour was an animalistic mechanism that met ―the natural wants of animal 
existence‖ (Hodgskin, 1832, p.155); anyone who did not labour would starve, 
unless sustained by the labour of others.179  It was not that labour should be 
performed as morally beneficial or uplifting, as in Scrope‘s work.  For Hodgskin 
there was no additional sweetness to be provided by labouring, it was just the 
exertion unavoidable to life and survival.180   
Thus it was, for Hodgskin, a trans-historical fact or natural law that humans 
must work to feed themselves.  It was an inescapable law of necessity that 
arose from their relationship with the physical world.  Any actions that attempted 
to divert man away from this necessity would, in so doing, be conflicting with the 
laws of reality and hence tend towards failure.   
The law of nature is, that industry shall be rewarded by wealth, 
and idleness be punished by destitution; the law of the land is to 
give wealth to idleness and fleece industry till it be destitute. 
(Hodgskin, 1832, p.154) 
Not that this prospect deterred man from attempting to follow such an 
apparently ill-fated track.  For Hodgskin, it was the attempted pursuit of the 
impossible, which was a major source of man‘s misery and poverty.  He felt it 
his duty to highlight the futility of such a negative pursuit, for it was only by an 
enlightened knowledge and application of the physical laws of the universe, that 
man could became disentangled from such misconceptions.   
Admitting that men have, to a certain degree, the power of 
throwing the necessity to labour off their own shoulder; as they 
may alter the direction of the influence of gravity, in making a 
                                            
179 In Labour’s Wrongs and Labour’s Remedy (1839) the Ricardian Socialist John F. 
Bray made the point that labour was actually a character of all animals in that they 
needed to labour to survive: 
ŖThou shalt labourŗ Ŕ rests alike on all created beings.  To this great law, 
from the minutest animalcule in a drop of water, to the most stupendous 
whale which dives beneath the waves of the ocean, there are naturally, 
and there should be artificially no exceptions. (Bray, 1839, p.43) 
Such a concept of labour would have been inconsistent with Hodgskinřs notion of 
labour as human exertion separate from the work of cattle and other animals. 
180 Indeed some anthropologists have noted that in Ŗprimitive societiesŗ there was no 
word for work (as a human activity) or labour, and have concluded that: 
amongst such subsistence groups work is so synonymous with living and 
breathing that no word is needed for it. On their economic level one does 
not distinguish between working and not working, but only between 
waking and sleeping, because to be awake means to be working. 
(Kranzberg & Gies, 1975, p.3-4) 
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fountain rise from the earth into the atmosphere; the question 
occurs, will throwing off this necessity, by the appropriation of 
other men‘s produce, not be followed by certain and inevitable 
consequences? (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.30) 
This was asked as a rhetorical question given that Hodgskin saw it answered in 
the poverty and wretchedness of the labouring classes, for: – 
every long-continued attempt in one class of men to escape from 
the necessity of labour imposed on our race, that every 
infringement of a man‘s right to use, consume, and enjoy his own 
produce, has ever been attended with disastrous consequences. 
(ibid) 
Hodgskin‘s reference to the condition of working men as a class issue, not only 
raised alarm with the intelligentsia of the property owning classes, but found 
resonance in the burgeoning working class movement.   
The Sufficiency of Labour 
Hodgskin went further than just considering labour as a necessary condition to 
man‘s existence.  Given that man must work to provide for himself; if he did 
labour then he would be provided for.  Labour was the necessary and sufficient 
condition for man‘s survival. 
It is a law of our being, that we must eat bread by the sweat of our 
brow; but it is reciprocally a law of the external world, that it should 
give bread for labour, and give it only for labour.  Thus, we see 
that the world, every part of which is regulated by unalterable 
laws, is adapted to man, and man to the world. (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.28) 
This should be seen within the context of Hodgskin‘s faith in the benevolently 
progressive nature of the universe.  To our modern understanding, it may seem 
naïve and presumptuous to assume that if the universe is left to its own devices 
all will go well, on the whole, for everybody.  Hodgskin was undoubtedly making 
an assumption that could not be justified other than as an issue of faith in 
providential progress.181 
The fundamental idea from which Thomas Hodgskin starts is 
essentially the same one from which François Quesnay and Adam 
                                            
181 It appears that Hodgskin was aware that this was an assumption that might be open 
to rebuttal Ŕ ŖWhatever may be the operation and effects of natural laws and 
circumstances, which is what we are principally interested in knowing, whether 
beneficial or otherwise,ŗ (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.37). 
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Smith had started: the conviction that there is a great and 
beneficent order of the universe which comprises the human and 
physical worlds alike. (Stark, 1943, p.52) 
Hodgskin‘s economics were not dependent on a static beneficent providence, 
but on a concept of dynamic progress, which would not be progressive if it were 
not beneficial. Or to express it another way: nature was beneficial because it 
progressed rather then the beneficence ensuring progress . 
A Problem Stated 
A problem, in terms of definition, was highlighted by Senior: 
First with respect to the term Labour.  That word, as well as its 
corresponding terms, Arbeit, travail, and lavoro, all signify, not a 
thing but an act.  They are gerunds of the verbs to labour, 
arbeiten, travailler, and lavorare.  But what we want to express, 
not the act performed by the labourer, but the instruments which 
he uses. These are his powers of body and mind; a class for 
which the more manageable German language offers the word 
Arbeitskraft, but for which in English, we cannot find a more 
concise expression.  (Senior, 1848, p.306)  
Thus Senior raised a question as to whether labour was an act or an instrument 
of production.  Labourers received wages for their actions, not for themselves 
as instruments of production as characterised by their ―powers of body and 
mind‖.   If the instruments found no use or were not activated they would not 
receive any reward; workers were not paid for their abilities but for the use of 
their abilities. In the end this may be an unfruitful distinction, but we could 
extend the issue to the rewards of capitalists and landlords.   
Do capitalists and landlords receive profits and rents because of their actions or 
as instruments?182  Plainly that portion of rent received by landlords as 
differential rent (in the Ricardian sense) was not for any action on their part but 
for the instrument or resource in their possession. It seems that one 
consequence of Ricardian rent theory was to class the landlords as passive 
actors, which suited Hodgskin‘s purposes.   
                                            
182 By landlords we mean the owners of non-produced resources as distinct from 
capitalists as the owners of produced resources.  It might be argued that landlords 
receive rent because of the actions of labour and capital applied to their instrument. 
However, Hodgskin had gone further than this, and following John Locke, had 
dismissed land as an almost passive instrument in the production process. 
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Hodgskin fell back on Ricardo‘s theory of rent to dismiss the 
landlord as a passive agent in the production process (Blaug, 
1958, p.143) 
Nonetheless, the distinction was less obvious for labour and capital.  The 
question was thus three-fold; firstly are rewards received because of actions or 
possessions? Secondly, was such a distinction of any significant concern?  We 
might also ask whether there was an inconsistency of analysis in which some 
factors of production were the actions whereas others simply instruments? 
If labour is a form of human action it would seem necessary for it to result in 
some form of consistent consequence or reaction. There would thereby be a 
relationship between that action and its consequence.   We could go as far as 
ascribing the defining aspect of that action as the relationship between the actor 
and the external world about them.  An action is the affect of an agent upon the 
environment and any definition that excludes this aspect would be incomplete. 
Labour as Action 
In Popular Political Economy, when commenting upon fixed capital, Hodgskin 
made the following observation: 
Machines, tools, and coals, undoubtedly facilitate labour; but we 
must labour to prepare or obtain them.  That the labour employed 
in preparing them facilitates subsequent production, no man can 
deny; but when it is admitted that labour produces all things, even 
capital, it is nonsense to attribute productive power to the 
instruments labour makes and uses.  All capital is made and used 
by man; and by leaving him out of view, and ascribing productive 
power to capital, we take as the active cause, which is only the 
creature of his ingenuity, and the passive servant of his will. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.246-7) 
Unlike Senior, Hodgskin was not interested in the instruments of production, but 
in the actions of the labourer, or mankind in general, as the active or efficient 
cause of production.  Skill and knowledge were, like fixed capital, instruments 
used by labour - ―knowledge and skill informing and directing labour‖ (Hodgskin, 
1825, p.45).  Hodgskin‘s argument was that it was not labour‘s faculties or 
instruments, but the action of the labourer that performed the work of 
production.  This position was recognised by Werner Stark; 
It is obvious and undeniable that all social wealth is the outcome 
of human exertion, but is human exertion alone sufficient to create 
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social wealth? Two things, Hodgskin seems to answer to this 
argument, must necessarily be kept apart: the technical, and the 
social, production of wealth.  Technically speaking, the soil is, of 
course, a factor of production – but so are all the things which 
economists are wont to disregard because they are free: … But 
from the social point of view, land is … as little an element of 
costs as wind and light. … What is true of the productive capacity 
of the soil, is true also of the productive capacities of capital. … 
Yet though capital, as much as land, is certainly a technical, it is 
as little as land a social, factor of production. (Stark, 1943, p.54-
55)  
To what extent economics should encompass the technical is a methodological 
question which we will not cover here.  What is important here is to understand 
that in connection with Hodgskin‘s position, is that in much of his work he was 
content to minimise the influence of the technical, as matters external to 
Political Economy.  Hodgskin was trying to identify trans-historical truths and, as 
such, saw factors or instruments of (and influences on) production, such as 
governments, laws, regulations, social relations, and technologies, as 
historically placed in time and beyond the concern of his political economy, i.e. 
exogenous.  
the consideration of it no more forms part of the science of 
political economy, than the consideration of ships or steam-
engines; or any other instruments employed to facilitate the 
production and distribution of wealth. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.178-9) 
Labour or Work? 
In a letter to The Trades Newspaper (shortly after the publication of Labour 
Defended) Hodgskin expressed what he saw as a confusion of language that 
entertained the possibility that machines worked. He was probably also 
addressing the application of the term labour to cover both human agency and 
the productions of machinery, as found within the work of McCulloch. 
There is a common mode of expression which seems to me to be 
productive of serious errors, and which I shall, therefore, 
endeavour to correct.  It is usual to speak of a machine, a steam-
engine for example, as doing a certain quantity of work. … The 
fact is, that the engine is only an instrument of the engineer.  It 
does no work; but a few engineers, and the persons who assist in 
making and working engines, are enabled, by their peculiar talents 
and skill, to do as much work as could formerly be done by 
several millions of people.  The engineer does the work, not the 
engine; (Hodgskin, TN. 25th Sept. 1825) 
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Hodgskin in this way attacked the terminology that used the words ―work‖ and 
―labour‖ for both machinery and labourers.  This in itself may be seen as an 
issue of logomachy, and thus relatively unimportant. The situation might have 
been simplified if he himself had distinguished between the two words labour 
and work.183    Torrens suggested a nomenclature that might have been useful 
in avoiding such confounding distinctions: 
Instead of applying the same common term to the several 
agencies of men, of cattle, of machines, and of nature – we 
should say the labour of men, the work of cattle, the action of 
machines, and the operations of nature. (Torrens, 1834, p.3)184 
Hodgskin dealt with labour as a distinctly human activity, and his concern, if we 
look beyond the logomachy, was not with the instrument but with the action.  He 
was stressing that instruments of themselves can perform no task unless 
guided by human agency.   
Two Species of Labour  
Hodgskin had laid out what he considered incorporated within the term ―labour‖ 
in Labour Defended, and knew that he was at odds with views expressed in 
other economic works and opinion. 
Unfortunately, also, there is, I think, in general, a disposition to 
restrict the term labour to the operation of the hands.  But if it 
should be said that the skill of the practised labourer is a mere 
mechanical sort of thing, nobody will deny that the labour by which 
he acquired that skill was a mental exertion.  The exercise of that 
skill also, as it seems to me, requiring the constant application of 
judgment, depends much more on a mental than on a bodily 
acquirement.  Probably the mere capacity of muscular exertion is 
as great, or greater, among the most productive tribes of Indians 
                                            
183 Perhaps Hodgskin should have taken more heed of his own earlier comments on 
language Ŕ  
use is said to be the tyrant of language.  Though it decides whether we 
shall adopt or reject certain phrases, it can of itself never be of sufficient 
authority either to justify or condemn them.  If usage were to be the only 
authority for speech, there would probably be no error of language which 
might not be justified. (Hodgskin, 1820ii, p.326)   
184 Torrens also provided a definition of labour that was concerned with human action, 
but  which separated the mental and physical  Ŕ 
The term labour, then, when its meaning is unqualified by the epithet 
Ŗmental,ŗ or Ŗintellectual,ŗ signifies the action of the human muscles, 
directed to obtain the objects of desire; and it signifies nothing more. 
(Torrens, 1834, p.4) 
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as among the most productive Europeans; ...  But I have shown 
that the greater efficacy of fixed capital depends on the skill of the 
labourer; so that we come to the conclusion that not mere labour, 
but mental skill, or the mode in which labour is directed, 
determined its productive powers. I therefore would caution my 
fellow-labourers not to limit the term labour to the operations of 
the hands. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.25-6) 
This passage is worthy of note in terms of its application to three different 
issues. Firstly, the improved productiveness of workers was portrayed as 
inseparable from their knowledge encapsulated in the technology used.  Mental 
exertions were necessary for both the creation and the use of new techniques.  
He here broached the relationship between labourers‘ skills and the quality of 
capital.185   
Secondly, there was the appeal to labourers themselves not to dismiss mental 
labour as less worthy than, or distinct from, physical labour.  The fact that such 
a plea was necessary was reflected in William Thompson‘s criticism, in his 
Labour Rewarded (1827), on this characterisation of labour that included mental 
labour in Hodgskin‘s Labour Defended.     
Thirdly, in his reference to ―tribes of Indians‖ and ―productive Europeans‖ 
Hodgskin introduced the concept that physical skills and labour actually 
                                            
185 Although this thesis does not necessitate an extensive exposition of capital, as 
Hodgskin detailed in Labour Defended, it is, nevertheless, note-worthy that one of 
Hodgskinřs crucial points in this pamphlet was that the quantity of capital was relatively 
unimportant when considered against its quality. 
it is not, however, the quantity but the quality of the fixed capital on 
which the productive  industry of a country depends.  Instruments are 
productive, to use the improper language of the political economist, not 
in proportion as they [are] multiplied but as they are efficient. 
(Hodgskin, 1825, p.19) 
Later in this paragraph Hodgskin stressed the connection between the quantity of 
what is produced to the quality of capital Ŕ  
the quantity of commodities they produce will depend on the efficiency 
of their fixed capital. (ibid, p.20) 
Unfortunately the 1922 re-typeset edition of Labour Defended, sometimes known as 
the ŖCole editionŗ because of G.D.H. Coleřs Introduction, reproduced this section with 
the word quality replacing the original quantity;- 
the quality of commodities they produce will depend on the efficiency of 
their fixed capital. (Hodgskin, 1922, p.69) 
This error is further exasperated by the fact that most of the later republished 
editions and internet versions of Labour Defended were reprints of this 1922 edition, 
which also contained a number of other typographic mistakes. 
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diminished with technical progress and became less important when compared 
to the mental skills acquired and mental labour practised by labourers. 
In Popular Political Economy (1827), Hodgskin again emphasised the dual 
aspects of labour: 
Thus we have at once two species of labour to which it behoves 
us to attend; viz. the labour of observing and ascertaining by what 
means the material world will give us most wealth, and the labour 
of carrying those means, when ascertained, into execution.  For 
the sake of distinction, I shall call the former mental, the latter 
bodily or muscular labour.  Unless we keep this distinction in view, 
and are at all times aware of the equal necessity for observing the 
laws of the material world, and for carrying observations into 
practice, we shall not comprehend the complicated phenomena of 
production.  Those also who work chiefly with their hands, may be 
apt to over-estimate their share in producing wealth; and those 
whose business is chiefly to observe, may look down, as, in fact, 
they do now, with somewhat of disdain on those who execute 
what observation dictates. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.45-6) 
Hodgskin was not alone, at this time, in recognising mental and manual 
labour.186  McVickar had also made a similar distinction, although for him 
mental labour could only be involved with the creation of immaterial items.187 
                                            
186 Although for Hodgskin most economists paid insufficient attention to the issue of 
mental labour: 
the vast effects of mental labour [have] been in general either over-
looked in works treating political economy, or ascribed to some other 
causes.  Its influence, in fact, is so obvious and familiar, that it seems on 
this account to have been thought not worthy of philosophic 
investigation.  Numberless observations are scattered through the pages 
of the economists on the subject; but by no one of them has it been 
treated of with a view to explain or discover the general laws which 
influence, regulate, and limit the progress of knowledge. (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.76) 
187 John McVickar (1787-1868) visited London and lectured there during the late 
1820.s and early 1830.s and had his Introductory Lecture to a course of Political 
Economy republished in London:Ŕ 
The original and most influential popularizers of Ricardořs views were, 
in the homeland, John Ramsey McCulloch, and in the United States, the 
Reverend John McVickar. The core of The Outlines of Political 
Economy [1825] … is the most influential of McCullochřs expositions of 
the Ricardian system and McVickarřs notes for what might be called the 
American edition of McCullochřs [1824] essay [Political Economy for 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica] (Dorfman, 1966, p.5). 
Mr. MřCullochřs Outlines of Political Economy, first published in the 
supplement to the Edinburgh Encyclopaedia [sic], has lately been re-
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This contrasts with Hodgskin‘s work where mental labour is necessarily the 
originator of both material and immaterial products. 
Labour the original and primary agent of all Production.  In nature, 
1. Manual, yielding material products, as grain, cloth, &c. 2. 
Mental, yielding immaterial products such as skill, science, &c. 
(McVickar, 1825, p.178)   
Not only did Hodgskin identify what he called ―two species of labour‖ – mental 
and muscular – but noted that neither could be performed without the other.  
Hence, ―both mental and bodily labour are practised by almost every individual‖ 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.47), for even ―The meanest labourer must use some 
mental exertion‖ (ibid, p.48).   
Productive Labour 
For Hodgskin the branding of labour as productive or non-productive was a 
false distinction that helped capitalists to justify exaggerated profits.  For 
Hodgskin all labour expended was characterized as productive if the labourer 
made a living as a result.  
No industry is unproductive but that, the product of which no 
person will buy, and which does not contribute to the individual‘s 
subsistence or gratification. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.50) 188 
Returning to his axiom that ―we live by the sweat of our brow‖ the labour that 
enabled life to persist must be productive, if it were capable of supporting and 
re-producing that life. 
It will be found of importance to establish the principle of all labour 
being productive, which enables the labourer to subsist.  The 
object in labouring is to supply the individual‘s wants.  Nature 
gave him his faculties and powers for this purpose; for this 
purpose only, and not for the purpose of supplying the wants of 
other men whom she equally endowed.  If his labour, in addition to 
supplying his own wants, will supply the wants of other persons, 
will enable him to rear up a family, and pay taxes, rent, and profit, 
so much the better: the society may increase the faster; but if his 
labour is not so productive, if it only enable him to subsist, 
                                                                                                                                
published … with some very useful notes by the Rev. Mr. McVickar, 
and which I think the best text book at present I can recommend. 
(Cooper, 1826, p.14) 
188 By Ŗindustryŗ Hodgskin, as was quite common at this time, was referring to the 
efforts and exertions of labourer, rather than the more modern connotation of 
manufacturing.  
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replacing whatever tools, seed, corm &c., so that his condition is 
not gradually deteriorated, his labour is productive.  (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.50-1) 
Not only were Hodgskin‘s views on productive and unproductive labour contrary 
to much (but not all) that had been written on the subject, they were also an 
attack on the exploitative nature of capitalist society. 
It is maintained, for example, that labour is not productive, and, in 
fact, the labourer is not allowed to work, unless, in addition to 
replacing whatever he uses or consumes, and comfortably 
subsisting himself, his labour also gives a profit to the capitalist on 
all the capital which he uses or consumes, while engaged in 
producing: or unless his labour produces a great deal more in the 
present state of society, than will suffice for his own comfortable 
subsistence.  Capitalists becoming the proprietors of all the wealth 
of the society, as it is produced, act on this principle, and never – 
as the rule – will they suffer labourers to have the means of 
subsistence, unless they have a confident expectation that their 
labour will produce a profit over and above their own subsistence.  
This is so palpable a violation of the natural principle above 
stated, – it is so completely the principle of slavery, to starve the 
labourer, unless his labour will feed the master as well as himself, 
that we must not be surprised if we should find it one of the chief 
causes, wherever it exists, and it exists almost universally, of the 
poverty and wretchedness of the labouring classes. (ibid, p.51-2) 
Hodgskin disagreed with the concept of productive and unproductive labour, 
which he saw linked to the issue of whether profits could be extracted from the 
labourers‘ efforts.  This idea of productive and unproductive labour, as it was 
presented in Adam Smith‘s Wealth of Nations, was subject to censure by 
economists critical of Smith on labour.  One such critic was Malthus.  
Malthus’ Earlier View on Labour 
In the 1820 edition of his Principles of Political Economy Malthus had adopted a 
position regarding labour that might initially appear akin to that of Hodgskin. 
Malthus was critical of Smith‘s distinction between productive and unproductive 
labour because of what he saw as various anomalies and inconsistencies. He 
sought to resolve these by resort to a question of degree rather than absolute 
opposites. 189 
                                            
189 As one of Hodgskinřs critics noted that Ŕ 
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If we do not confine wealth to tangible and material objects, we 
might call all labour productive, but productive in different 
degrees; and the only change that would be required in Adam 
Smith‘s work, on account of this mode of considering the subject, 
would be, the substitution of the terms more productive and less 
productive, for those of productive and unproductive. (Malthus, 
1820, p.38) 
For Hodgskin there should be no downplaying of some labour as less 
productive than others: 
It is impossible, therefore, to distinguish which of the various 
species of industry practised in a well-peopled country is most 
productive, or most useful.  All of them seem equally necessary, 
and every species of labour, whether mental or bodily, must 
equally be called productive, if it procure a subsistence for him 
who practises it. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.49-50) 
Malthus‘ concept of degrees of productiveness did not endure in his writing and 
subsequently did not form part of his Definitions in Political Economy (1827); 
and had been withdrawn by the time of the 1836 edition of his Principles.190    
In Definitions in Political Economy (1827) Malthus had provided his summary of 
the discipline‘s critical definitions concerning labour: 
 
                                                                                                                                
Dr. Malthus would modify Adamřs Smithřs doctrine, by dividing labour 
into more or less productive.  But I [do] not see the advantage to be 
gained.  Suppose a man spends a dollar at a game of billiards; to him, 
that dollar is as much lost as if he had dropt in the ocean, or had never 
possesst it.  There is no room for more or less in such a case it is gone; in 
toto as to the player. (Cooper, 1826, p.102) 
Mark Blaug also remarked on this issue that - 
Malthus imagined a scale of productive labor graded according to the 
size of the net physical product created by each type of labor.  In this 
hierarchy agricultural labor was to rank first owing to Ŗthe natural pre-
eminence of agriculture. (Blaug, 1958, p.95) citing (Malthus, 1820, 
p.30). 
190 ŖRicardo objected to this scheme because it contradicted the concept of marginal 
rent and no more is heard of in the second edition of the Principles [of Malthus]ŗ 
(Blaug, 1958, p.96). 
A large part of Malthusř Definitions was an attack on McCullochřs notorious 
Ŗextension of the term labour to all the operations of natureŗ (Malthus, 1827, p.99) in 
McCullochřs Principles of Political Economy (1825). It was probably McCullochřs 
extensive use of the word labour (as well as Ricardořs particular terminology) that 
sparked much of the discussion regarding definitions in general and upon the meaning 
of labour.  We would not suggest that these discussions were necessarily the result of 
Hodgskinřs work.  
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LABOUR 
10. The exertion of human beings employed with a view to 
remuneration.  If the term be applied to other exertions, they must 
be particularly specified. 
PRODUCTIVE LABOUR 
11. The labour which is so directly productive of wealth as to be 
capable of estimation in the quantity or value of the products 
obtained. 
UNPRODUCTIVE LABOUR 
12. All labour which is not directly productive of wealth.  The terms 
productive and unproductive are always used by political 
economists in a restricted and technical sense exclusively 
applicable to the direct production or non-production of wealth. 
INDUSTRY 
13. The exertion of the human faculties and powers to accomplish 
some desirable end.  No very marked line is drawn in common 
language, or by political economists between industry and labour; 
but the term industry generally implies more superintendance and 
less bodily exertion than labour. (Malthus, 1827, p.236-7) 
These definitions are illustrative of Malthus‘s terms at the time of Hodgskin‘s 
works in the late 1820.s and may be seen as illustrative of the economic 
concerns of the period. 
The Inclusion of Profits 
Although Hodgskin considered that wealth included the ―intangible and 
immaterial objects‖, he might have been more sympathetic with Malthus‘s 
original (1820) terms than with his later definitions.  However, Hodgskin‘s 
criticism was upon the capitalists‘ employment of only the most productive 
labour (over a certain threshold) rather than utilizing all productive labour.   
Where Malthus here differed from Hodgskin was with regard to the creation of 
profits as a necessary part of productive labour.  For example, in the section 
where Malthus specifically dealt with the distinction between productive and 
unproductive labour; 
All labour, for instance, might be stated to be productive of value 
to the amount of the value paid for it, and in proportion to the 
degree in which the produce of the different kinds of labour, when 
sold at the price of free competition, exceeds in value the price of 
labour employed upon them. … The labour least productive of 
wealth would be that, the results of which were only equal in 
exchangeable value to the value paid for such labour (Malthus, 
1820, p.38-9). 
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These remarks, when compared with those of Hodgskin‘s regarding productive 
labour highlight how far Hodgskin was from Malthus‘ position.  Hodgskin‘s 
perspective aligned to the position and interests of the workers, whereas 
Malthus was considering the position from an economy where profits were 
necessary or production would not proceed. 191 
Hodgskin’s Perspective 
For Hodgskin, it was counter-productive that the mere possession of property 
(as a means of production) granted anyone an entitlement to subsistence.  The 
concern that without reward, those with possessions would not become 
involved in production was not Hodgskin‘s main interest, as their possession 
was particular to the specific (capitalist) and legal mode of production and thus 
distinct from the underlying laws of production.  
Such possessions were effectively tools and were made to be used by labour. 
Reviving the Robinson Crusoe analogy, a tool is made to make labour easier, 
not because the tool has some worth independent of use and labour.  
Subsequent to the division of labour the mode of remuneration by which a tool-
maker received a reward for their work was as an intermediary and could be a 
wage, salary or indeed a mark-up or commission, as Hodgskin had shown 
legitimate for dealers, traders and bankers (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.206). 
The maker of tools received their reward for producing the tool, they did not 
become empowered to extract a continuing profit form from each and every 
continued use of the tool into an indefinite future, which they could entail to 
succeeding generations.  It was this Hodgskin that was referring to with his road 
analogy in Labour Defended. 
A road is made by a certain quantity of labour, and is then called 
fixed capital; the constant repairs it needs, however, are a 
continual making, and the expense incurred by them is called 
                                            
191 Hodgskin was not alone in this as illustrated by Scropeřs 1831 article, The Political 
Economists, in the Quarterly Review, that seemed to concur with Hodgskin that all 
labour was productive:Ŕ  
We think there can be no difficulty in defining productive labour to be 
that of which the result is a saleable article: it will include that of 
professional persons, officers of government, authors, artists, merchants, 
tradesmen, labourers, &c.  Unproductive occupations (for, correctly 
speaking, all labour is productive) are those which are productive only of 
gratification to the agent (Scrope, 1831, p.6). 
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circulating capital.  But neither the circulating nor the fixed capital 
return any profit to the road-makers, unless there are persons to 
travel over the road, or make a further use of their labour.  The 
road facilitates the progress of the traveller, and just in proportion 
as people do travel over it, so does the labour which has been 
employed on the road become productive and useful.  One easily 
comprehends why both these species of labour should be paid, - 
why the road maker should receive some of the benefits, accruing 
only to the road user; but I do not comprehend why all these 
benefits should go to the road itself and be appropriated by a set 
of persons who neither make nor use it, under the name of profit 
for their capital. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.16)192 
Hodgskin stressed that those who held property should still labour to procure 
subsistence.  The ownership of possessions should not, of itself, guarantee the 
further appropriation of the means to life.  The fact that those who owned 
property were able to gain an income from that ownership was the result (for 
Hodgskin) of legal enactments and government actions, rather than purely 
economical reasons, which amounted to a perversion of the natural necessities 
of man, and thereby exogenous to the hypothetical pure market economy.  If 
property ownership did enslave labourers, this was only possible because of the 
legalised, fraudulent or violent appropriation from those otherwise entitled, by 
their labour, to appropriate the full results of their own productive labour. 
Extensive Labour193 
If we are to class Hodgskin‘s Labour as substantially distinct when compared to 
that prevalent among his contemporaries, we might ask if it would be better to 
use a different term for Hodgskin‘s extensive but exclusively human labour?  
Labour that is only productive in so far as it adds to wealth, profit or capital 
                                            
192
 Karl Marx specifically commented on this section in his Grundrisse:- 
From a viewpoint such as Lauderdale's etc., who would like to have 
capital as such, separately from labour, create value and hence also 
surplus value (or profit), fixed capital - namely that whose physical 
presence or use value is machinery - is the form which gives their 
superficial fallacies still the greatest semblance of validity.  The answer 
to them, e.g. in Labour Defended, [is] that the road-builder may share 
[profits] with the road-user, but the "road" itself cannot do so. (Marx, 
1993, p.703) 
193 We will adhere to the term extensive labour when referring to the notion of labour as 
human action in the comprehensive sense that incorporates both mental and physical 
labour, as well as what some considered productive and unproductive labour.  When 
referring to the notion of labour that included non-human agency we will use the term 
expansive labour.  
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(whether material or immaterial) is a more restrictive entity than that 
encompassed within Hodgskin‘s labour that was extended to enabled the 
labourer to construct, at the very least, their survival.  Perhaps adopting the 
term ―industry‖, for one or the other, might have resolved the issue.194  
That which was termed unproductive labour was generally still paid a wage.  
Wages were not limited to productive labour.  All labourers in Hodgskin‘s 
extensive sense were capable of receiving wages.195  In an example often given 
in the 18th and 19th centuries, servants were unproductive in that they did not 
provide their masters with profits; what they provided, were services.  Even 
service providers can be split between those that do and those that do not 
provide profits to their employers.  Nevertheless, the providers of both 
productive and unproductive services were still labourers.196 It thus seems that 
Hodgskin‘s exclusion of profitability from labour was not a substantive 
differentiation.  
The distinction between productive and unproductive labour has been burdened 
by the negative connotations associated with the term ―unproductive‖ labour.  It 
was perhaps to avoid such implications that William Paley had used the terms 
productive and instrumental labour (Paley, 1786, p.448).  Although such terms 
may have reduced the negative undertones of the distinction, it would not have 
altered the fact that there was considerable debate as to what should be 
included within each term.  Ultimately, such wrangling amounted to logomachy 
and in this sense was of little import, especially if we conceive of all labour as 
being directly or indirectly instrumental to production.  
The significance was with what the term labour incorporated.  As we shall see 
in the section that follows this, McCulloch amongst others, extended the use of 
                                            
194 William Thompson can be seen to have used the term Ŗexertionŗ as well as labour 
and industry. 
195 We are assuming here, that the definition as labour as simply that which receives a 
wage is inadequate, as labour would then be an agency denoted by its remuneration 
rather than something definable in its own right.  Just as it would be equally short-
sighted to define capital simply as that for which profit is received. 
196 To adopt a representation where some services are provided by labour and others by 
differently termed human agency would be over-complicating matters; some wages 
would be paid for labour, some for another form of activity. As we shall discuss 
presently, the understanding of Senior was that labour was the provision of a service.  
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the term labour to non-human activities. Once we appreciate the differences in 
terminology, the scale of the disagreements begins to fade. 
When Hodgskin spoke of labour it was of a purposive human mental and 
physical activity, but this was not the case for all other economists.  The fact 
that others used the term labour with different meanings, is important when we 
attempt to understand why Hodgskin so heavily emphasised the role of labour 
in production, particularly as he had done in his polemic arguments against 
capital in Labour Defended. 
Hodgskin included self-employment, management, superintendence and 
entrepreneurial activity all as forms of labour. In fact any human activity that 
aided or facilitated production amounted to labour. 
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Section two 
Contemporary Deliberations 
J.R. McCulloch
197     
After Ricardo‘s death, McCulloch came to be regarded as the 
main representative of the Ricardian tradition. (Sraffa, 1952, in 
Ricardo, VI, p.xxii) 
McCulloch‘s position on labour was representative of the Ricardian tradition that 
Hodgskin is often aligned to.  This tradition was characteristic of many 
economic works at the time Hodgskin published his three main books and 
hence puts those works in perspective, even when we disassociate Hodgskin 
from the Ricardian Socialist school.  These aspects, plus the personal 
connection between the writers early in their careers, gives good reason for an 
exploration of McCulloch‘s writings.198 
Hodgskin‘s review in The Economist (1851) of McCulloch‘s wage-fund theory is 
also worthy of consideration within the context of McCulloch‘s other 
observations on labour. 
The Edinburgh Connection 
John Ramsey McCulloch (1789-1864) was very much a contemporary of 
Hodgskin. Not only were they known to each other, but during Hodgskin‘s 
second stay in Edinburgh (1818-1822) McCulloch was ―Hodgskin‘s principal 
contact in Scotland‖ (Stack, 1998, p.75) and reportedly they often dined 
together (Blaug, 1958, p.147).  Hodgskin apparently courted McCulloch as a 
                                            
197 McCulloch seems to have suffered from a variety of spellings of his name (even on 
the title pages of his own works) Ŕ i.e. McCulloch, McCulloch, MřCulloch, 
MacCulloch, Macculloch, Maculloch and MCulloch.  We shall attempt to be consistent 
and use McCulloch, other than in quotations from other writers. 
198 Although Francis Place was Hodgskinřs closest contact and confidant during the 
initial part of this period, his only published works were a defence of Malthus against 
Godwin Ŕ Illustrations and Proofs of the Principle of Population (1822), and An Essay 
on the State of the Country (1831). Neither of these provided an adequate economic 
point of reference for comparison. 
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source of journalistic commissions; in exchange McCulloch used Hodgskin as a 
link to Francis Place and other London radicals. 199 
McCulloch was the editor of The Scotsman and, according to Stack ―the author 
of all the economics articles in The Edinburgh Review” (Stack, 1998, p.75).  
O‘Brien noted that between June 1818 and July 1837 McCulloch had 78 articles 
published in The Edinburgh Review; ―Although he had no monopoly of 
economic articles, he was certainly a predominant contributor for about two 
decades‖ (O‘Brien, 1995, VIII, p.lxx).200 
The publications that McCulloch was involved with were not insignificant – ―The 
Edinburgh Review and McCulloch‘s Scotsman were arguably the apex of 
libertarian journalism‖ (Reisman, 1996, p.xlv). The Edinburgh Review was, 
when compared to other journals of its time such as the Quarterly Review, and 
the Westminster Review held in high esteem: 
                                            
199 We know that McCulloch and Ricardo were corresponding from June 1816 
(Ricardo, VII, p.37), but they did not actually met until May 1823 (Ricardo, VI, p.xxii). 
It was through Hodgskin, during his first period in Edinburgh (1813-1815), that 
McCulloch was introduced to Place, in connection with Placeřs main concern of the 
time - the repeal of the Combination Acts, and hence to David Ricardo. 
Thus Place sent McCulloch material on the Combination Laws … he 
[McCulloch] did in fact write articles in the paper on the Combination 
Laws, and Placeřs verdict was that McCulloch had been extremely 
helpful through his writings in the Scotsman. (OřBrien, 1970, p.27) 
200 Although Stack cites D.P. OřBrienřs McCulloch (1970), OřBrien was quite certain 
that McCulloch Ŗhad no monopoly of economic articlesŗ in the Edinburgh Review.  In a 
footnote OřBrien acknowledged a 1953 article in the Journal of Political Economy (vol. 
61, [June 1953,] p.232-259), by Frank Whitson Fetter, showing that only 78 of the 132 
economic articles (1818-1837) could be attributed to McCulloch (OřBrien, 1970, p.34). 
ŖThe size of McCullochřs output was no doubt due to his shortage of moneyŗ 
(OřBrien, 1970, p.35). The scale of McCullochřs contribution to the Edinburgh Review 
can be seen compared to other major contributors: 
 Eight economic articles, all in the years 1802-1806, and six on other 
subjects, by [Francis] Horner; seventy-eight articles all bearing on 
economics, by McCulloch in 1818-1837; and eleven economic articles 
by [Nassau] Senior in 1841-1849. (Fetter, 1957, p.1)   
The circulation figures for the Edinburgh Review were a Ŗvery respectable 14,000 at 
timesŗ (OřBrien, 1995h, p.vii & p.lxx).  For comparison the circulation figures for The 
Economist Ŗin 1845 rose to 2,894ŗ Ŕ Ŗin 1847 circulation peaked at 4,483 and over the 
next few years settled at around 3,500ŗ.  
1843 Ŕ Economist 1,969, Punch 3,938, Spectator 3,557; 
1848 Ŕ Economist 4,245, Punch 7,366, Spectator 3,283; 
1853 Ŕ Economist 4,106, Punch 7,567, Spectator 2,817; (Edwards, 1993, p.35) 
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none of these journals equalled the Edinburgh either in 
contemporary economic influence or in significance in the history 
of economic thought (Fetter, 1957, p.1). 
The political and economic affiliations of the Edinburgh Review did not go un-
noticed by William Thompson, whose criticisms were directed against 
McCulloch. 201   . 
It is difficult to conceive how such men as the Edinburgh 
Reviewers, (partisans and apologists, though they are of the Whig 
branch of the oligarchy, who trade in the words of liberality and 
justice that may supplant their Tory competitors in the pleasures 
of ruling and the enjoyment or distribution of the public-plunder-
prizes of competition) could deliberately misrepresent facts, 
(Thompson, 1827, p.96-97).  
McCulloch had reviewed Hodgskin‘s Travels in the North of Germany (1820) 
quite favourably in the Scotsman (12th Feb. 1820).202  He was also instrumental 
in getting two of Hodgskin‘s articles on Germany published in The Scotsman, 
but these were unpaid commissions. Although ―Hodgskin always retained a 
grudging respect for McCulloch‖, he had felt that ―McCulloch discouraged every 
project Hodgskin proposed‖ (Stack, 1998, p.76). 203 
                                            
201 As we shall discuss subsequently Hodgskin was to distance himself from the Whigs 
in his criticism of what he saw as the Whig publications, published under the auspices 
of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, for their attempts to Ŗshield the 
minds and eyes of the people from contamination of radical doctrinesŗ (Hodgskin, 
1832, p.167.n). 
Nevertheless by his aspirations to contribute to the Edinburgh Review in the 1820.s 
Hodgskin could also be associated with Thompsonřs criticisms. 
202 A lengthy but far less receptive review of Travels in the North of Germany had also 
appeared in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine at about the same time. This had 
referred to Hodgskin as Ŗa radical traveller and a Cockney philosopherŗ (BEM., Feb. 
1820, p.537) 
203 During his second period in Edinburgh Hodgskin became increasing discontented 
with his inability to secure a regular or sufficient income and the distance from his 
family in London.   
McCulloch was also on the lookout for commissions and income at this time Ŕ  
The shortage of money which affected McCulloch during the years when 
he was living by the pen undoubtedly explains the readiness with which 
he contributed [to the Edinburgh Review] (OřBrien, 1995, VIII, p.vii). 
McCulloch pleaded financial hardship even though he was the owner of 
Auchengool Ŕ a small freehold estate Ŕ Ŗthe little property belonging to me in the south 
of Scotlandŗ (McCulloch, 23rd Dec. 1821, in Ricardo, IX, p.135). 
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Eventually towards the end of 1822, ―In poverty, greatly disappointed‖ 
(Reisman, 1996, p.xlv) Hodgskin moved back to London, to the job secured for 
him by James Mill, as a parliamentary reporter on The Morning Chronicle. 204  
After his return to London, Hodgskin still had occasion to refer to The 
Scotsman, and when he wrote about ―one of the most learned, and diligent of 
their opponents (a writer in the Scotsman)‖ (Hodgskin, TN., 12th Feb. 1826), he 
was probably referring to McCulloch. 
A further tie between Hodgskin and McCulloch was their interest in naval 
matters.  ―McCulloch loathed conscription and argued that it was better to pay 
to obtain sailors‖ (O‘Brien, 1995, p.xlviii).  This common interest accounts for 
McCulloch‘s assistance in getting Hodgskin‘s Abolition of Impressment printed 
in The Edinburgh Review (Oct. 1824), where Hodgskin argued for the abolition 
of impressment on economic (financial) grounds, as well as with the more 
ethical arguments he had used in An Essay on Naval Discipline (1813).205   
In late 1851 Hodgskin reviewed the re-publication of McCulloch‘s Treatise on 
the Rate of Wages (1851) for The Economist.  Hodgskin concluded that the 
work was ―not to be numbered amongst those of high philosophy‖.  
Nevertheless, it was, ―like all his productions… a carefully-written work, with 
many sound reflections and much varied research‖ (Hodgskin, E., 27th Dec. 
1851, p.1440-1).  Hodgskin‘s doubted its relevancy, it having been not much 
changed since the original of 1826.  A revised second edition of the work was 
published shortly afterwards, in 1854, presumably attempting to make it more 
relevant. 206 
                                            
204 Along with the young John Stuart Mill, McCulloch was also writing for the Morning 
Chronicle around this time Ŕ for example it was McCulloch who wrote their Obituary of 
Ricardo (23
rd
 Sept. 1823). 
205 Apart from this there are no further accounts of them having met again after 
Hodgskin finally left Edinburgh. Although Hodgskin may well have attended 
McCullochřs memorial Ricardo lectures in London. 
206 Full title: A Treatise on the Conditions which determine the Rate of Wages and the 
Condition of the Labouring Class.  There were, in McCulloch lifetime, three versions of 
this work (1826, 1851, & 1854).  The 1851 version was Ŗa rifacimento of a little work 
on the same subject published … several years agoŗ (Hodgskin, E., 27th Dec. 1851, 
p.1439).  The 1826 edition was entitled An Essay; it became A Treatise for the 1851 
version.  The 1854 version was a revised second edition and is the rendering now 
generally available.  The British Library has copies of the 1851 printing but apparently 
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Introduction to A Treatise  
In the Introduction to his Treatise McCulloch admitted that ―Taken in its widest 
sense, the term labourers is very comprehensive‖ (McCulloch, 1854, p.1).  In 
this comprehensive sense, it would embrace all those that Hodgskin had 
classed as manual and mental labourers.  Like Hodgskin‘s conception, it would 
also have included all those workers, managers, supervisors and entrepreneurs 
that were involved in the production process. 
Masters, it is evident, are labourers as well as their journeymen.  
In this character their interest is precisely the same as that of their 
men … they may be called employers as well as labourers, 
(Hodgskin, 1825, p.27). 
The term labour was extended, by McCulloch, to cover the activities performed 
by landlords and capitalists to ensure that their resources (natural and 
produced) maintained their serviceability, to which, presumably, Hodgskin 
would have not objected. 
The judicious management of a large estate, or other property, 
requires much care and circumspection. Without this, it may 
probably be wasted or dissipated; and, at all events, it cannot be 
applied to its legitimate ends, of advancing the interests and the 
honour of its possessors, and the well-being of their tenants, 
dependants, and neighbours. (McCulloch, 1854, p.2) 
McCulloch used a passage from William Paley (Works, v.28, 1819), which 
interestingly accepted the notion of non-physical labour, to justify this 
position;207 
Every man has his work.  The kind of work varies, and that is all 
the difference there is.  A great deal of labour exists besides that 
of the hands; many species of industry beside bodily operation, 
requiring equal assiduity, more attention, more anxiety.  It is not 
true, therefore, that men of elevated stations are exempted from 
work; it is only true that there is assigned to them work of a 
different kind; whether more easy or more pleasant may be 
                                                                                                                                
none of the 1826 first edition.  Our comments have been prepared with reference solely 
to the 1854 second edition, taken as his definitive version of this work. 
207 As Hodgskinřs biographer noted William Paley (1742-1805) was a significant 
influence at this time - Ŗwas universally read and knownŗ (Halévy, 1928, p.193). A 
further exposition of the relationship of Hodgskinřs work to that of William Paley 
would be a useful exercise, especially with regard to Paleyřs Chapter 11 Ŕ Of 
Population and Provision - in Book VI of his The Principles of Moral and Political 
Philosophy; however this would be beyond the scope thesis. 
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questioned; but certainly not less wanted, not less essential to the 
common good. (Paley, in McCulloch, 1854, p.2) 
Limits to the term Labourers 
Having recognised that, in an extended sense, the majority of society actually 
laboured, McCulloch proceeded to put this fact aside, and confined his use of 
the term labourer solely to manual workers. 
In the following treatise the term labourers is taken in its popular 
and more confined sense.  Our investigations refer to the wages 
of those only who labour with the hand, as contradistinguished 
from those who labour with the head. (McCulloch, 1854, p.2) 
Thus not only did McCulloch leave out those whose labour might be called 
mental, but also downplayed the possibility of mixed modes of labour. As 
highlighted by Hodgskin, it was impractical to separate the physical and mental 
aspects of labour; as no act of labour was possible without some form of mental 
process being combined with physical exertion.   
McCulloch‘s claim that there was a wage-fund of circulating capital solely 
designated for the payment of wages of manual labour, could have been 
criticised on the grounds that it left unexplained the remuneration of mental 
labour.208   
Hodgskin highlighted the passage where McCulloch confined his work to labour 
of the hands, but then, in a manner typical of his later writings, turned this into 
an issue of property. 
It is confined, therefore, to certain classes of whom the peculiar 
characteristic is, that they posses little or no property, and are 
employed by those who possess property. (Hodgskin, E., 27th 
Dec. 1851, p.1439) 
Whether, as Hodgskin assumed in his review, the connection between manual 
labour and the lack of property, is theoretically justified, may be questionable.  
                                            
208
 If it was accepted that a complete separation of the two species of labour was 
impossible, then the implication would be that mental labour went unrewarded, or else 
there was a separate fund of circulating capital destined for mental labour.  If the notion 
that there could be a separated fund of capital destined for use as the labourersř wages is 
seen as problematical (for example in Longe, 1866, p.37-43 and as later accepted by 
J.S. Mill in his Fortnightly Review articles of 1869) then the concept of two funds 
would also have been unreasonable. 
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Although in practical terms, in the mid 19th century, it might not have been too 
unreasonable.209 Hodgskin then gave his summary of the wage-fund theory: 
Accordingly, the extent to which they [labourers] are employed 
and the rate at which they are remunerated (wages), depend on 
the amount of the property (capital) possessed by those who 
employ them, and appropriated to that purpose, compared to the 
number of labourers seeking employment. (Hodgskin, E., 27th 
Dec. 1851, p.1439) 
Hodgskin downplayed the relevance of the wage-fund theory as little more than 
an outdated notion fixed in time, pertinent to a specific set of social relations, 
with significance only to concerns which society had by 1851 moved away from. 
In particular Hodgskin attacked the wage-fund theory‘s assumption of a rigid set 
of social relations in terms of the distribution of property.  Hodgskin claimed that 
these social relations, as the major cause of ―discontent‖, had been left 
unaddressed by McCulloch and the wage-fund theory in general. 
Treating only of the relation betwixt one species of property and 
the demand for labour, it is obvious that, so far as the whole of 
society and social progress are concerned, the book has a limited 
scope; and though within this scope the subject is ably and 
carefully treated, it does not throw much light on many of the 
important problems which now vex society by demands for 
solution. … Discontent, right or wrong grows from the existing 
facts that some men are possessed of property, who employ 
labourers and pay wages; and other men possessed of no 
property, are compelled to seek employment and ask for wages.  
These facts Mr. McCulloch assumes as the basis of his book; and 
necessarily, therefore, he gives no explanation of those facts, nor 
does he state anything to satisfy the Socialists and Communists 
that the condition of labourers dependant on wages is natural and 
inevitable.  The complaints … are directed against the distribution 
of property; and on the principle of that distribution a work which 
assumes its existence and merely points out some of its 
                                            
209 McCullochřs wage-fund theory, which required that wages were determined by a 
fund of capital predestined to pay the manual labourersř wages, might also support 
Hodgskinřs assertion regarding property.  Wages were only to be sourced from 
capitalistsř funds, as distinct from other funds that labourers may themselves have had 
access to.  If the workers had such funds, the wage-fund theory would presume these 
funds outside of the reserve of capital destined for wages, on two grounds.  Firstly, in 
terms of pre-destination, which was determined by the capitalists rather than by the 
labourers themselves.  Secondly, funds held by labourers for their own remuneration 
would theoretically be seen as subsistence revenue and thus not capital.  This argument 
formed a part of Longeřs Refutation of the Wage-Fund Theory (1866).  
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consequences, throws no new light.  (Hodgskin, E., 27th Dec. 
1851, p.1440) 
This being said Hodgskin did perhaps miss an opportunity to highlight the issue 
of the inseparability of mental and physical labour.  This may have been for 
stylistic or political reason, or simply that the issue, of distinguishing mental and 
physical labour, was deemed far less important by the 1850.s.  In addition, it is 
evident that he felt it more prudent to tackle issues that were giving prominence 
to the burgeoning socialist and communist movements in the working class. 
J.B. Say’s Contribution 
J.B. Say‘s notion of labour in his Treatise on Political Economy is worth 
reviewing given its apparent influence, particularly on McCulloch. 
By the term labour I shall designate that continuous action, 
exerted to perform any one of the operations of industry, or a part 
only of one of those operations. (Say, 1821, p.85) 
This notion of labour was emphasised in Say‘s condemnation of Smith‘s claim 
that human labour was the source of all value. 
To the labour of man alone he [Adam Smith] ascribes the power 
of producing values.  This is an error.  A more exact analysis 
demonstrates, … that all values are derived from the operation of 
labour, or rather from the industry of man, combined with the 
operation of those agents which nature and capital furnish him 
(ibid, p.xl). 
Thus for Say labour was not confined to human agency.  Capital was just as 
capable of performing labour as man or natural resources.   
There will, therefore, be no difficulty in comprehending the terms 
labour or productive service of nature, and labour or productive 
service of capital. … The labour performed by natural agents, and 
that by pre-existent products, to which we have given the name of 
capital, are closely analogous, and are perpetually confounded 
one with the other: (ibid, p.86). 
Non-Human Labour  
In contrast to Say‘s expansive use of the term labour, Malthus presented labour 
as intrinsically a human action, as the normal understanding: 
Adam Smith, and all other writers, who have happened to fall in 
my way, have meant, by the term labour, when unaccompanied 
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by any specific adjunct, the exertions of human beings; (Malthus, 
1827, p.99)210 
These comments formed part of Malthus‘s criticism of McCulloch‘s expansive 
use of the term labour for non-human processes, which were highlighted in 
McCulloch‘s discussion of wine maturing in a cellar.  
When he [McCulloch] uses the expression, ―additional labour 
actually laid out upon the wine,‖ who could possibly imagine that, 
instead of meaning human labour, he meant the processes 
carried on by nature in a cask of wine during the time that it is 
kept.  This is at once giving an entirely new meaning to the term 
labour. (Malthus, 1827, p.104) 211 
However, we can see that this concept was not original to McCulloch, as it was 
predated by Say‘s work, from where it did not attract Malthus‘ attention.212   
There can be little doubt that McCulloch was well aware of Say‘s work as he 
wrote a review of the 1821 translation of Say‘s Treatise for the Scotsman (21st 
April 1821); Say‘s works were apparently well read and had often been referred 
to in British circles prior to their translation into English. 
Nonetheless, McCulloch‘s opinion of Say was not particularly favourable, as he 
noted in his Catalogue of Books, the Property of a Political Economist (1862), 
when commenting on the 1826 edition of Say‘s Traité d‟Economie Politique in 
his collection:- 
This is a sort of French Wealth of Nations.  There is little of value 
in it that is not to be found in the English prototype; but being well 
arranged, having sundry new illustrations, and being concise and 
well written, it became popular … But despite its merits, it was 
permitted by its author to become in many respects sadly 
                                            
210 Despite this there were instances within political economy that to some extend 
confused human-labour and the use of the term labour to indicate non-human activity, 
or what we have called expansive notion of labour.   
For example Charles Knightřs response to Hodgskin, the Rights of Industry, noted 
that ŖThe principal labourer in Egypt is the river Nile,ŗ (Knight, 1831, p.125; 1845, 
p.84; 1855, p.151). 
Another example can be seen in William Ellisř reference to Ŗhorse-labourŗ (Ellis, 
1826, p.60). 
211 The correspondence between Ricardo and McCulloch, culminated in Ricardořs 
recognition that ŖMCulloch uses the word labour in a sense somewhat different to 
Political Economists in generalŗ (Ricardo, IX, p.377). 
212 Malthusř comments in his Definitions in Political Economy (1827) directed against 
Say were limited to his use of the term utility. 
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deficient.  Say seems to have been weak enough to flatter himself 
with the idea that political economy had in his hands attained to its 
utmost degree of perfection! … the first edition of his book, 
published in 1802, differs but little in detail, and nothing in 
principle, from the last, which was published in 1826.  In 
consequence it has ceased to be of any use as a scientific 
treatise, though in other respects it continues to be of some 
importance. (McCulloch, 1862, p.290-1) 
Despite Say‘s criticism of Smith, McCulloch, as others have done, viewed Say‘s 
Traité d‟Economie Politique as an interpretation of the Wealth of Nations. 
The Direct Responses to Hodgskin 
No member of the English socialist group seems to have been 
more widely read on both sides of the Atlantic, and the 
significance of his [Hodgskin‘s] position was instantly recognised.  
He was controverted, amongst others, by Samuel Read in 1829, 
Thomas Cooper in 1830, and Brougham in 1831.  He is quoted by 
Marx in the first draft for his larger work, which he published in 
1859; and Cooper speaks of his doctrines as having influenced 
the New York School of socialists and the Free Inquirer. (Foxwell, 
1899, p. lvi-lvii)213  
Thompson, Cooper and Read produced the immediate responses to Hodgskin. 
These reactions to Hodgskin may appear to be peripheral, but he, like his 
contemporaries the Ricardian Socialists (e.g. Gray, Bray, Hall, and Ravenstone) 
only engendered a limited response from the mainstream economists.  As Mark 
Blaug commented: 
Despite the attacks on Hodgskin by some writers, the sparseness 
of references to the views of the Ricardian socialists is striking.  
Both James Mill and McCulloch knew Hodgskin personally, yet 
never mentioned his books, nor gave any public hint of knowledge 
of the ―labour theorists.‖ (Blaug, 1958, p.147) 
                                            
213 When Hodgskin had published The Natural and Artificial Right of Property in 1832 
he had, like Foxwell, believed that the Rights of Industry (1831) had been written by 
Lord Brougham, whereas we are now aware that Charles Knight was its author.  
However, by the time Hodgskin reviewed Knightřs Knowledge is Power (1854) in The 
Economist (Hodgskin, E. 30
th
 Dec. 1854), Knight had acknowledged his authorship of 
the earlier work (Knight, 1954, p3). 
Knightřs Rights of Industry (1831) was an anti-Hodgskin defence of the legal right 
of capital to its reward and as such had little to contribute directly concerning labour.  
Attention will be drawn to those areas where it did refer to our present concern, by way 
of footnotes, when appropriate. 
The Marx work referred to by Foxwell was presumably A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy (1859). 
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In an article in the Edinburgh Review in 1845 he [J.S. Mill] referred 
to Knight‘s Rights of Industry which, as we know, quotes Hodgskin 
at length. But nowhere did Mill intimate that the writings of 
Thompson and Hodgskin had any bearing on the subject matter of 
political economy or on the question of socialism. (ibid, p.148)214 
Blaug gave no reason to explain the sparseness of the response to Hodgskin 
and his socialist contemporaries but did note James Mill‘s letter to Lord 
Brougham (3rd Sept. 1832) which referred to Hodgskin‘s ―mad nonsense‖ in 
promoting ―the rights of the labourer to the whole produce of the country‖.  In 
the same letter Mill, commenting on the meetings that promoted such a stance, 
suggested that – ―The newspapers should suppress all knowledge of these 
rascally meetings, by abstaining from the mention of them‖ (Bain, 1882, p.364).  
The policy seems to have been to discourage extremist ideas by refraining from 
mentioning them.215  
However sparse the written responses to Hodgskin are, they are more readily 
available than for most of his contemporary ―labour theorists‖, and we shall take 
the opportunity of commentating upon Thompson‘s and Cooper‘s contributions 
here, as they relate to the debate on what the term labour should encompass. 
Thompson’s critique of Hodgskin’s Labour 
One of the most immediate and direct responses to Hodgskin‘s work was 
William Thompson‘s Labor Rewarded. This begun with an extensive 
                                            
214 However, in his Autobiography Mill favourably referred to William Thompson, 
despite his Owenite connections : Ŕ 
the principle champion on their [Owenite] side was a very estimable man, 
with whom I was well acquainted, Mr. William Thompson, of Cork, author 
of a book on the Distribution of Wealth and of an ŖAppealŗ in behalf of 
women (Mill, 1873, p.105). 
215 McCullochřs Catalogue noted that he possessed a copy of Hodgskinřs Travels in the 
North of Germany (1820) but none of his other works (McCulloch, 1862, p.185). 
Hodgskinřs works were also absent from McCullochřs Literature of Political Economy 
(1845).  Neither was there any mention of works by the Ricardian Socialists within his 
library of over 8,000 books. 
However McCulloch did mention Hodgskin in the 1830 edition of his Principles, 
but this reference was absent from all subsequent editions: 
There are some striking and useful remarks on the influence of 
observation and knowledge on production, in Mr. Hodgskinřs work 
entitled ŖPopular Political Economy.ŗ (McCulloch, 1830, p.122n). 
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commentary, initially appreciative, on Hodgskin‘s ―late excellent pamphlet called 
‗Labour Defended‘‖. 216   
What primarily concerns us here was Thompson‘s criticism of mental labour: 
Though the author [Hodgskin] styles himself ―a labourer,‖ it 
appears that he is not a physical producer, he thinks, and writes 
usefully; … He is a mental labourer … Now on what principle is it 
that this mental laborer claims to himself any portion of that wealth 
which the operative classes produce?  He produces no wealth: 
neither directly nor indirectly produces it. (Thompson, 1827, 
p.2)217 
Thompson insisted that Hodgskin‘s scheme ―would exclude all but the 
producers of physical wealth from any share of the national produce‖. However 
having referred to the ―active contributors, whether by mind or muscle‖ (two 
paragraphs earlier) he seemed in one sense to have accepted mental labour as 
contributing to the production of physical wealth.   
Mental Labour in Thompson’s Work 
This apparent contradiction can be resolved by seeing that Thompson accepted 
that mental labour could contribute to ―the common happiness‖ (or utility) but 
only physical labour could be productive of physical wealth. Thompson also 
used this as his justification for capital, along with mental labour, receiving a 
share of the labourers‘ produce.  Although there was still some ambiguity as to 
the role of mental labour. 
One branch, though a very important, perhaps the most important, 
branch of utility, is the production of physical wealth: but it is not 
the only branch.  Wealth is only useful as it tends to happiness: 
there are other sources of happiness besides wealth.  It is not 
therefore conclusive against the claims of capital to a share of the 
national produce, that it does not itself produce wealth.  No more 
                                            
216 Apart from the favourable commentary on Labour Defended that coincided with its 
first publication between August and October 1825 Thompsonřs Labour Rewarded may 
be seen as the first concerted reply (rather than review) to Labour Defended.  Labour 
Rewarded  was prefaced with an Advertisement dated March 1826, although not 
published until 1827:- Ŗa reply to Thomas Hodgskinřs Labour Defended, which was 
then exerting considerable influence among London workmenŗ (Pankhurst, 1954, p.74).   
217 Although by 1831 even the anti-Hodgskin Rights of Industry accepted the validity of 
mental labour:  ŖThe writer who applies his understanding to the discovery and 
dissemination of moral and political truth, is a profitable labourer.ŗ Also, ŖNo one can 
say that the mental labourers are not workersŗ (Knight, 1831, p.150 & p.152). 
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does any species of mental labor or pleasure-producing 
accomplishment produce wealth (Thompson, 1827, p.3).218 
It seems that Thompson‘s uncertainty might be resolved by viewing mental 
labour in three forms;  
 That which was used in conjunction with physical labour to produce 
physical wealth. This covered the knowledge and contributions of the 
mind that were necessary to production of wealth.219 
 That mental labour which resulted in utility (happiness) but not wealth. 
 That mental labour which resulted in no utility (happiness) or wealth. This 
would be the isolated individual mental labour that did not contribute 
anything material or immaterial to the general happiness of society, and 
was of no real import to our considerations here. 
The dispute between Hodgskin and Thompson on mental labour, therefore 
comes down to the latter‘s distinction between wealth and utility.   
Thompson’s Wealth and Utility 
Thompson did not deny the utility of what Malthus had referred to as immaterial 
wealth; he just did not include it within the term wealth. 
Wealth is limited to the physical means or materials of enjoyment.  
Labor or muscular exertion can be occupied on physical things 
only: they only are capable of accumulation. There are numerous 
means of enjoyment besides those of a physical nature, besides 
those which are tangible, visible, or which tend, through any of the 
senses, to the production of happiness.  All of these numerous 
means of enjoyment, though founded on and resolved into 
exterior and interior sensation or feeling, may clearly and usefully 
be considered apart: physical enjoyment, meaning those 
pleasures only which directly affect the senses.  There are moral 
and intellectual, as well as physical, pleasures; and what the two 
                                            
218 Thompson had, of course, commented on wealth in his earlier Distribution of 
Wealth: 
The word, wealth, signifies Ŗthat portion of the physical materials or 
means of enjoyment which is afforded by the labor and knowledge of 
man turning to use the animate or inanimate materials or productions of 
nature.ŗ  Perhaps it may be useful to bear in mind in more compendious, 
if not as accurate terms, that wealth is Ŗany object of desire produced by 
labor.ŗ (Thompson, 1824, p.6) 
219 Accepting that applying the term physical is tautological in Thompsonřs sense, as 
wealth can only be physical.  
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former want in intensity is more than compensated by their facility 
of acquisition or cheapness, their permanence, and facility of 
reproduction  With these moral and intellectual sources of 
happiness we are not now concerned, as they are not directly 
comprehended in the meaning attached to the word, wealth.‖ 
(Thompson, 1824, p.8) 
When Thompson assailed Hodgskin, he was assuming that Hodgskin‘s mental 
labour was only productive of immaterial benefits.  This was a miss-reading of 
Labour Defended as it was undoubtedly Hodgskin‘s intention to envisage that 
mental labour created material and immaterial wealth.  The passages from 
Thompson given previously show that he did not completely exclude the 
possibility of knowledge or the contribution of the mind, as sources of wealth. 
Thus we are left with the anomaly of Thompson‘s ordering of wealth and utility.  
It is plain from his Distribution of Wealth (1824) that human happiness was his 
overriding concern and that wealth was only a consideration as it contributed to 
that happiness.   
Utility, calculating all effects, good and evil, immediate and 
remote, or the pursuit of the greatest possible sum of human 
happiness, is the leading principle constantly kept in view, and to 
which all others are but subsidiary, in this inquiry. (Thompson, 
1824, p.1) 
However, it is unfortunate that Thompson was imprecise with his terminology. 
When he wrote about distribution, it is sometimes as the distribution of wealth 
and at other places the distribution of happiness or utility.  Perhaps he should 
have been more specific and ensured that no confusion between the two was 
possible, especially given his particular distinction between wealth and utility.  
Nevertheless, he was consistent within his definition of wealth (as the utility that 
results from labour) and labour receiving the whole produce of its efforts.  If 
wealth was defined as only that which labour produced then that which capital 
produced was not wealth but that other utility that resulted from such 
production, over and above his rather limited definition of wealth. 
Thus Thompson was at odds with Hodgskin with regards to their claims that 
labour should receive the whole of its produce.  Both argued that all wealth 
should go to reward the labourers, but they differed in what this wealth was.   
When Thompson accepted that Hodgskin had shown that capital was unentitled 
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to any wealth, this was only with regard to his own definition of wealth and not 
Hodgskin‘s use of the term wealth.  In this there were quite different claims for 
labour.  For Thompson labour had a claim to that part of what was socially 
produced that was wealth (in his terms), but Hodgskin‘s was a far wider claim: 
that labour should be rewarded with all that it socially produced.  
Malthus had defined Produce as the ―wealth created by production‖ (Malthus, 
1827, p.235); for Thompson wealth was only a portion of that produce. 
Thomas Cooper 
After William Thompson observations upon Hodgskin‘s work, were also made 
by the American Rev. Thomas Cooper (1759 -1839). 220   
Some members of Robert Owen‘s co-operatives had no doubt 
read his Labour Defended in America, and in 1830 Thomas 
Cooper, the American economist, in the second edition of his 
Lessons [sic] in Political Economy, took this book as a text in his 
refutation of the new tendencies of what he called the ―mechanical 
Political Economists‖. (Halévy, 1956, p.128-9)221 
We are fortunate that these Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy are 
available in two editions. The 1826 first edition made no reference to Thomas 
Hodgskin‘s work or ideas, whilst the 1830 second edition contained numerous 
references and an additional final chapter – Distribution of Wealth – which 
directly addressed many issues raised in Labour Defended and Popular 
Political Economy.  We can thereby see how Cooper‘s views developed 
between these two editions.  Many of the modifications between the editions 
may be attributable to Hodgskin‘s influence, as well as being illustrative of the 
progress in political economy around this time.222  
                                            
220 Not to be confused with the English Rev. Thomas Cooper (1805-1892) Ŕ a Chartist 
activist. The Thomas Cooper we refer to herein was a lecturer in Chemistry and 
Political Economy at the South Carolina College.  
221 The original French version of Halévyřs work refers to Cooperřs ŖLeçons 
dřEconomie politiqueŗ which when retranslated back to English in 1956 became 
ŖLessonsŗ rather than the original Lectures. Halévyřs footnote referred to the original 
title as ŖLecturesŗ (Halévy, 1903, p.141) 
222 Although he was based in America we know that Cooper was well versed in 
conditions in Britain (he was British born and left England in 1780).  He noted that the 
second edition of James Millřs Elements of Political Economy (1824) was Ŗa master 
piece of close and logical reasoningŗ but regretted that it had not been published in the 
United States (Cooper, 1826, p.14).  So it seems that he had access to Millřs work even 
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Cooper‘s Elements conveniently began with a chapter on Definitions & 
Elementary Truths so we can see the differences between the two editions with 
regard to his definition of labour.  This went from an initial curt and lowly 
ordered position to a more extensive and immediate arrangement.223 
Labour. Human exertion employed to produce or confer value or 
utility on any raw material. (Cooper, 1826, p.30) 
Labour. Human exertion employed to produce or confer some 
desirable quality or property (that is, exchangeable value,) on 
some raw material.  Hence, labour is the main or rather the only 
source of wealth.  Labour is for the most part, hired and exerted 
for the sake of wages or remuneration paid by the employer.  
When we speak of labour, we usually refer to the mere bodily 
exertion of a day labourer, exclusive of acquired skill. (Cooper, 
1830, p.37) 
A statement analogous to those of Hodgskin then followed this definition, in the 
1830 edition, which showed that Cooper‘s attention had become more focused 
on labour.  
Political Economy itself may be considered as that science which 
determines the circumstances that influence the productive power 
of human labour, and the distribution of the proceeds. (ibid) 
Thus there seems to have been a certain degree of conformity between 
Hodgskin and Cooper, which extended to their respect for Adam Smith and the 
advocacy of Free-trade. 
                                                                                                                                
though it was not generally available in the USA, unlike Hodgskinřs work.  There were 
reports in the Mechanics Magazine of Cooperřs Chemistry lectures at the London 
Mechanicsř Institute during 1826 and 1827, so we know he was in London at about this 
time too. 
Although in most matters Cooper can be appreciated as a Ricardian, he seems to 
have of disagreed with Ricardo and James Mill on the issue of gluts, and followed 
Malthusř ideas as far as these were concerned: ŖMr. Mill in his Political Economy, 
denies there can be a general glut, 3
rd
 edit. p. 232.  I do not agree to his reasoningŗ 
(Cooper, 1830, p.41). 
Added significance was given to Cooperřs work by its use as an authority in The 
Rights of Industry (1831), which was produced by The Society for the Diffusion of 
Useful Knowledge (Knight, 1831, p.204-8) as a direct rebuttal of Hodgskinřs Labour 
Defended and Popular Political Economy.   Hodgskin also cited Cooperřs Lectures in 
his own Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted (Hodgskin, 1832, p.170). 
223 In the first edition labour was the 17th term explained (on the fifth page of text): in 
the second it was elevated to the fourth term (on the third page). 
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The significant point of difference between them was in their perceptions of how 
capital should be accumulated.  For although Cooper accepted that labour 
should receive all it produced, he saw capital as a form akin to labour and thus 
entitled to its produce and accused Hodgskin of not putting the capitalists‘ case 
forward:- ―Mr. Hodgskin and the mechanics, do not state the argument on the 
other side‖ (Cooper, 1830, p.350). 
For Cooper all capital was the result of previous labour, but solely the labour of 
the capitalist who possessed it, there was no question or possibility of unjust 
appropriation.  Even the ownership of land could only be the result of the just 
efforts of the landlord.224  Cooper thus viewed capital as saved labour.225 As 
such the appropriation of land and capital was the necessary consequence of 
the status quo that Hodgskin could never allow.  
A final point of interest we will deal with here, in regard to Thomas Cooper, is 
the relationships between labour, capital and skill.  
Labour and Skill 
As we have seen above Thomas Cooper‘s definition of labour excluded 
―acquired skill‖.  However there is a peculiarity that is worth highlighting as it 
can be related to an important feature of Hodgskin‘s interest in labour – 
knowledge.  Within Cooper‘s definitions there were three components to value – 
labour, capital and skill: 
Value. Utility, real or fancied, conferred by skill, labour, and 
capital. (Cooper, 1830, p.38) 
By Wealth I mean a plentiful possession of those material objects 
on which exchangeable value has been conferred by human skill 
and labour (ibid, p.36) 
Exchangeable Value. That property conferred on any raw material 
by means of human skill, labour and capital. (ibid, p.41) 
                                            
224 Samuel Read had allowed that ownership of capital or land resulted from Ŗtheir own 
or fatherřs industry and parsimony, or good fortuneŗ (Read, 1829, p.43).   There was 
never a question of Ŗgood fortuneŗ as far as Cooper was concerned; it could only be by 
previous labour. 
225 ŖMr Ricardo admits labour and capital are the same, the latter being only labour in a 
particular formŗ (Hodgskin, E., 28th Oct. 1848, p.1227).  For example Ŗless capital, 
which is the same thing as less labourŗ (Ricardo, I, p.82). 
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An inconsistency arises in that the natural price of commodities, for Cooper, 
consisted of the cost of the raw materials (rent), labour (wages) and capital 
(profit) but skill did not enter into the price.  Cooper failed to sufficiently explain 
how skill was to be rewarded, as he explained that wages were that ―given as a 
compensation to the labourer, for his labour‖ (ibid, p.37).  However, this labour 
was ―exclusive of acquired skill‖ (ibid) 
Cooper held to the Ricardian notion of capital being resolvable into labour and 
extended this to skill – ―Skill and capital … by ultimate analysis, are resolvable 
into labour‖ (Cooper, 1830, p.27).  
So there was the logical contradiction of labour excluding skill but that skill in 
effect being resolvable labour.  This is representative of a certain confusion 
regarding labour.   
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Chapter 5 
The Produce of Labour 
 
Agenda 
Having shown that for Hodgskin political economy was the science of 
production by labour and clarified what he meant by labour, this chapter looks 
at what was actually produced. To this end we initially discuss notions of 
wealth, utility and commodities.  We use Nassau Senior‘s work to illustrate that 
labour can be conceived as the service of providing or producing commodities.  
As such all labour, in Hodgskin‘s extensive sense, directed towards the 
production of commodities, can be conceived of as a service and there was no 
real distinction between labour seen as a service or labour as the direct creation 
of a commodity.  
The second part of this chapter will unpack the infamous notion that labour 
should be rewarded with the whole product of labour.  We will show that, given 
Hodgskin‘s extensive concept of labour, all those services provided by differing 
people, whether capitalist or labourers can be envisaged as constructive and 
thereby due a share in what is collectively produced.   
Although it was not Hodgskin‘s assertion that the whole product of labour 
should be shared only amongst the lower classes, such a claim was naively 
seen as implicit in his work.  We will show that Hodgskin‘s claim was that those 
who provided no constructive service towards production but simply 
appropriated the goods produced by others, had no justifiable claim on the 
product of others.   
It was Hodgskin‘s contention that so insubstantial were these idlers‟ rights on 
the property created by labourers that legal instruments had to be enforced so 
that the whole product of labour was not distributed to the labourers.     
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Section One 
Wealth, Utility and Commodities 
 
Introduction 
Having already referred to labour as purposive human action, we shall in this 
section concentrate on the arguments of Senior to highlight the ends those 
actions are aimed at.  Starting from a conception of production as the creation 
of wealth and utility via the manipulation of matter that we find for example with 
McCulloch, and taking into consideration the material or immaterial nature of 
wealth, we will proceed to Senior‘s exposition on the nature of services and 
commodities in his Outline of The Science of Political Economy (1836).   
McCulloch on Wealth and Utility 
If we compare Thompson and McCulloch on their notions of wealth and utility 
we find that McCulloch articulated wealth as utility that was exchangeable. 
Whereas for Thompson wealth was only a portion of the utility available to 
humanity; wealth, by definition, was that utility created by labour.  For some 
other writers wealth was defined by its possession of utility.  The distinction may 
be subtle and in the end insubstantial, but it is one we need to fully understand 
if we are to fully comprehend the political economic ideas of the time.  
McCulloch put wealth, and specifically the results of labour, on a footing that 
denied the possible production (as creation) of anything material: 
By production, in the science [of Political Economy], we are not to 
understand the production of matter, for that is the exclusive 
attribute of Omnipotence, but the production of utility, (McCulloch, 
1824, p.224: also, 1849, p.61; 1864, p.5;) 
McCulloch‘s position was very similar to that of the Count Destutt de Tracy in 
the presentation of the ideas surrounding production.226   
                                            
226 The work of the Comte, Antoine Louis Claude, Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) was 
apparently well known and he is said to have coined the term Ŗideologyŗ (as the science 
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All the operations of nature and art resolve into transmutations, 
into changes of form and of place. (Tracy, 1817, p.19) 
This passage seems to resurface in McCulloch: 
All the operations of nature and of art are reducible to, and really 
consist of transmutations, that is, of changes of form and of place 
(McCulloch, 1824, p.224;  also 1849, p.61; 1864, p.5). 227 
The limits of what could be done by labour were further accentuated by Tracy: 
What then do we do by our labour, by our action on all the bodies 
which surround us?  Never any thing, but operate in these beings 
changes of form or of place, which render them proper to our use, 
which make them useful to the satisfaction of our wants.  This is 
what we should understand by – to produce: It is to give things an 
utility which they had not.  Whatever be our labour, if no utility 
results from it is unfruitful.  If any results it is productive. (Tracy, 
1817, p.20)  
                                                                                                                                
of ideas) for his Élémens d’idéologie (1801-1815).  His A Commentary and Review of 
Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws was published in 1811 and within the year translated into 
English by Thomas Jefferson and seems to have been influential on Jefferson, and on 
Hodgskinřs earliest ideas about the need to minimise government and his understanding 
of law.  
David Ricardo met him in 1822 and described him as Ŗa very agreeable old 
gentleman, whose works I had read with pleasure.  I do not entirely agree with him on 
Political Economy Ŕ he is one of Sayřs school Ŕ there are nevertheless some points of 
difference between themŗ (Ricardo, IX, p.248).  Ricardo, in his Principles, had used 
Tracy to argue against Say; here he referred to him as Ŗa very distinguished writerŗ 
(Ricardo, I, p. 284-5).  
227 In a footnote in his Principles McCulloch acknowledged Tracy and laid out Tracyřs 
following paragraph (in the original French) to this one given to here.  However, the 
closeness of Tracyřs words as translated by Thomas Jefferson in 1817, to those that 
opened Part II. Production of Wealth of McCullochřs article Political Economy (1824) 
in the Encyclopaedia Britannica should have been acknowledged more directly and 
were still insufficiently credited in the fifth edition of McCullochřs Principles of 
Political Economy (1864, p.5).  Tracyřs Treatise on Political Economy had been 
published, as part 4 of his Élémens d’idéologie, in 1815 and was available in English.  
McCullochřs Catalogue notes he possessed two copies of Tracyřs Traité d’Economie 
Politique (1815 and 1823 editions) and illustrates his admiration of the book, especially 
when compared to Sayřs work: 
Having been published before the true doctrines in regard to rent and 
profits had been established, this book is, in some respects, defective; but 
it is, notwithstanding, highly deserving of the readerřs attention, and is, 
probably, on the whole, preferable to any work on political economy that 
had been published in France, when it appeared.  The nature of 
production has never been so well explained in the following paragraph 
ŖTotes les operations de la nature et de lřart se reduisent à des 
transmutations, à des changemens de formes et de lieux.ŗ  (McCulloch, 
1862, p.293-4).   
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These limitations bore comparison with Say‘s exposition: 
Objects, however, cannot be created by human means; … All that 
man can do is, to re-produce existing materials under another 
form, which may give them a utility they did not before possess, or 
merely enlarge one they may have before presented.  So that, in 
fact, there is a creation, not of matter, but of utility; and this I call 
production of wealth.  … Production is the creation, not of matter, 
but of utility. (Say, 1821, p.62)228 
Torrens as early as An Essay on the Production of Wealth (1821) had explained 
the creation of wealth in a manner akin to Say and Tracy, however he still 
maintained that wealth consisted of the material only; 
man, incapable of creating any thing, can do no more than 
appropriate, or in some way modify, the materials which nature 
has presented to his hand.  Wealth is matter, under a particular 
form.  The form we may give, but the creation of the matter is not 
only beyond our power, but above our comprehension; (Torrens, 
1821, p.68). 
                                            
228 Sayřs Treatise on Political Economy although written in 1803 was banned by 
Napoleon,  and not re-published until 1814.  It was translated into English in 1821. ŖM. 
Say has been translated over and over, into every language in Europeŗ (Senior, 1852, 
p.11).   Napoleonřs attitude towards Political Economy was noted by Senior Ŕ ŖHe 
[Napoleon] had an utter horror of Political Economy; the principles of which, he said, if 
an empire was built of granite, would grind it to powderŗ (Senior, 1827, p.31).  A 
negative attitude seems to have persisted even after Napoleon Ŕ ŖI am sorry the 
Government of France is prejudiced against Political Economy.ŗ (Ricardo, V111, p.228 
[4
th
 Sept. 1820])   
It should be noted that Hodgskin tended to refer less to Sayřs Treatise but more to 
Sayřs Notes in his edition of Henri Storchřs Cours d’Economie Politique.   Hodgskin 
may have also been influenced by his attendance at Sayřs lectures in Paris in 1819. 
Malthus was concerned that Sayřs interest in production as the creation only of 
utility and not matter, was an unnecessary complication: 
The object of M. Say seems to have been to show, that production does 
not mean production of new matter in the universe, but I cannot believe 
that even the Economists had this idea; and it is quite certain that Adam 
Smithřs definition completely excludes it. (Malthus, 1827, p.21) 
Malthus was also critical of McCullochřs Essay on Political Economy in the 
Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica (1823), which he reviewed for The 
Quarterly Review: 
This may be strictly true; but, as Adam Smith had before called those 
modifications of matter which adapt it to the tastes and wants of society, 
production, we see no advantage in a change of terms.  On the contrary, 
it appears to us obviously calculated to mislead; (Malthus, QR., Jan. 
1824, p.304) 
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Also in 1821, James Mill had given a similar statement in his Elements of 
Political Economy where he confined the realization of human agency to the 
movement of raw material: 
It is found that the agency of man can be traced to very simple 
elements.  He can, in fact, do nothing more than produce motion.  
He can move things towards one another, he can separate them 
from one another: the properties of matter perform all the rest. … 
In strictness of speech, it is matter itself which produces the 
effects.  All that man can do is to place the objects in a certain 
position. (Mill, 1821, p.5-6) 
Immaterial Wealth 
The point of interest in this perspective, of Tracy, Say, Mill, Torrens and 
McCulloch, is the recognition that production could not produce anything new in 
a physical sense.  All that labour could produce was an effect upon pre-existent 
physical material.  As subsequently recognised by Whately and Senior, one 
pertinent aspect of this argument, was that it could be used to undermine both 
the supremacy of physical labour as the productive ―parent of wealth‖, and the 
definition of wealth as only material items.229  Thereby wealth becomes the 
accumulation of the utility created by labour.  Nevertheless that labour must 
include the physical and mental as it was hard to deny that mental labour 
contributed to material wealth or to the utility that was embodied in material or 
immaterial wealth.230 
There arose from this consideration of wealth and utility, a question as to 
whether the immaterial could be considered as wealth:  
For instance, when the copy-right of a book is sold to a bookseller, 
the article transferred is not the mere paper covered with writing, 
                                            
229 As the Quarterly Review noted:- 
Mr McCulloch, indeed, by the use of the words Řarticles or productsř 
would, at first sight, appear to contemplate only material substances; but 
in the subsequent parts of his work (the chapter on Consumption, for 
example) it is evident, that he designs his definition to embrace Řall the 
purchaseable means of human enjoyment,ř including, together with 
material objects, the gratification afforded by the talents of players, 
authors, artists, the service of menials, the protection of governments, 
&c. (Scrope, QR., 1831, p.3)  
230 Senior had recognised the role of mental labour in his Three Lectures on the Rate of 
Wages (which was a prelude to his 1836 Outline of the Science of Political Economy) Ŕ 
ŖWages are the remuneration received by the labourer for having exerted his faculties of 
mind and body;ŗ (Senior, 1831, p.1).   
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but the exclusive privilege of printing and publishing.  It is plain 
however, on a moment‘s thought, that the transaction is as real an 
exchange, as that which takes place between the bookseller and 
his customers who buy copies of the work.  The payment of rent 
for land is a transaction of a similar kind: for though the land itself 
is a material object, it is not this that is parted with to the tenant, 
but the right to till it. (Whately, 1832, p.10)231 
Nassau Senior extended his definition of wealth so that it was not restricted to 
material products or to have been necessarily created by labour: 
The definition of Wealth, as comprehending all those things, and 
those things only, which have Value, or, in other words, which 
may be purchased or hired, does not, we believe, precisely agree 
with that adopted by any Economist except Archbishop Whately. 
The principal differences are these: some writers confine the 
term Wealth to what have been termed material products; some to 
those things which have been produced or acquired by human 
labour; and some object to the ideas of value or exchange being 
introduced into the definition of Wealth. (Senior, 1836, p.22) 232 
                                            
231 Whately (and most writers of his time) apparently saw copyrights as immaterial, as 
they could not be material in the sense of a physical entity.  However, when we get to 
Alfred Marshall copyrights were considered as material wealth as they pertained to 
material matters, as opposed to personal qualities.  Thus for Marshall the early 19
th
 
century debate on immaterial wealth would have been unimportant, as he classed most 
of what they viewed as immaterial as being material.  The meaning of the term material 
seems to have changed significantly, and (for Marshall) encompassed all that was not 
personal. 
Desirable things or goods are Material, or Personal and Immaterial. 
Material goods consist of useful material things, and of all rights to 
Hold, or use, or derive benefits from material things, or to receive them 
at a future time.  Thus they include the physical gifts of nature, land and 
water, air and climate; the products of agriculture, mining, fishing, and 
manufacture; buildings, machinery, and implements; mortgages and 
other bonds; shares in public and private companies, all kinds of 
monopolies, patent-rights, and copyrights; also rights of way and other 
rights of usage. (Marshall, 1920. p.54 [bk.II, c.ii, s.1]) 
Marshall in this section also made the distinction that Ŗinternal Personal goodsŗ, 
such as skill, Ŗa personřs qualities and faculties for actionŗ and presumably knowledge, 
were non-transferable, and although desirable are not wealth as Ŗnot all desirable things 
are reckoned as wealthŗ (ibid).  Marshall went on to stress this further Ŕ  
Thus it [wealth] excludes all his own personal qualities and faculties, 
even those which enable him to earn his living, because they are Internal. 
(ibid, p.57[s.2]) 
232 These were propositions that Senior had held from early in his career: 
That wealth consists of all those things and of those things only, which 
are transferable; which are limited in quantity; and which, directly or 
indirectly, produce pleasure of prevent pain: or to use an equivalent 
expression, which are susceptible of exchange: (including under 
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It is the consideration of wealth as inclusive of the immaterial that is of interest 
here.  This possibility of immaterial wealth (noted in terms akin to Tracy‘s 1817 
notion of production) did not appear in Senior until his Outline of The Science of 
Political Economy. 
To produce, as far as Political Economy is concerned, is to 
occasion an alteration in the condition of the existing particles of 
matter, for the occasioning of which alteration, or for the things 
thence resulting, something may be obtained in exchange. This 
alteration is a product. It is scarcely necessary to remind our 
readers that matter is susceptible neither of increase nor 
diminution, and that all which man, or any other agent of which we 
have experience, can effect, is to alter the condition of its existing 
particles. (Senior, 1836, p.51) 
Commodities and Services 
Thus Senior concluded that the difference between material and immaterial 
products was as insubstantial as that between commodities and services.  He 
viewed such distinctions as artificial and dependent upon perceptions. 
It appears to us, however, that the distinctions that have been 
attempted to be drawn between productive and unproductive 
labourers, or between the producers of material and immaterial 
products, or between commodities and services, rest on the 
difference existing not in the things themselves, which are the 
objects considered, but in the modes in which they attract our 
attention. (Senior, 1836, p.51) 
Thus if our attention was upon the object resultant at the end of production, we 
would view the product as a material commodity.  However, if we focus on the 
actual act of production rather than its result we would have seen a service.  
Senior used the example of cobblers;  
A shoemaker alters leather, and thread, and wax, into a pair of 
shoes.  A shoeblack alters a dirty pair of shoes into a clean pair.  
In the first case our attention is called principally to the things as 
altered.  The shoemaker, therefore, is said to make or produce 
                                                                                                                                
exchange, hire, as well as absolute purchase;) or, to use a third 
equivalent expression, which have value (Senior, 1827, p.35). 
Senior repeated this definition in his Outlines (1836) but with an additional 
qualification after the word value: 
a word which in a subsequent portion of this Treatise, we shall explain at 
some length, merely premising at present that we use it in its popular 
sense, as denoting the capacity of being given and received in exchange. 
(Senior, 1836, p.6) 
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shoes.  In the case of the shoeblack, our attention is called 
principally to the act as performed.  He is not said to make or 
produce the commodity, clean shoes, but to perform the service of 
cleaning them. In each case there is, of course, an act and a 
result; but in the one case our attention is called principally to the 
act, in the other to the result. (Senior, 1836, p.51-2).  
Senior further highlighted that in many circumstances it was merely a matter of 
nomenclature whether the result of production was a commodity or a service.  
He showed this with the simple example of a cook who ―is not said to make 
roast beef, but to dress it: but is said to make a pudding‖.  Thus if what resulted 
from labour happened to possess a new name it was considered ―in our minds, 
a new thing‖ and consequently became a commodity and the labour that 
created it productive (Senior, 1836, p.52).  An additional distinction resulted 
from the perceptions involved in payment. 
The principle circumstance, however, is the mode in which the 
payment is made.  In some cases the producer is accustomed to 
sell, and we are accustomed to purchase, not his labour, but the 
subject on which that labour has been employed; as when we 
purchase a wig or a chest of medicine.  In other cases, what we 
buy is not the thing altered, but the labour of altering it, as when 
we employ a haircutter or a physician.  Our attention in all these 
cases naturally fixes itself on the thing we are accustomed to 
purchase; and accordingly as we are accustomed to buy the 
labour, or the thing on which that labour has been expended, – as 
we are, in fact, accustomed to purchase a commodity or a service, 
we consider a commodity or a service the thing produced. (Senior, 
1836, p.52) 
Although Senior saw the payment mode as the ―principle circumstance‖ it may 
be argued that the way in which payments are made owes much to the 
linguistic accidents of nomenclature. For example nowadays we might ―have a 
haircut‖ or ―go for a haircut‖.  The former is a service, whereas the latter is seen 
as a commodity.  Senior touched on how such changes of language were 
brought about when he noted that the division of labour was responsible for 
changing weaving from the domestic occupation of servants serving their 
masters, to a manufacturing industry;  
the division of labour must be said to have turned spinners and 
weavers from unproductive into productive labourers; from 
producers of immaterial services into producers of material 
commodities (Senior, 1836, p.53).  
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Senior identified that such changes resulted from developments in the social 
structure of society and production whereby originally ―almost all manufactures 
are domestic; the Queens and Princesses of heroic times were habitually 
employed in overlooking the labours of their maidens‖ (ibid).  It was the freedom 
from feudal control that lead to changes in language and thereby coloured 
much of our present day perceptions of labour and capital.  These were themes 
common in Hodgskin‘s work, particularly The Natural and Artificial Right of 
Property Contrasted (1832). 
Senior concluded that although the separation of productive and unproductive 
labour was due to the arbitrariness of language and social relations, the 
distinction between commodities and services could still be useful. 
But, objecting as we do to the nomenclature which should 
consider producers as divided, by the nature of their products, into 
producers of services and producers of commodities, we are 
ready to admit of the convenience of the distinction between 
services and commodities themselves, and to apply the term 
service to the act of occasioning an alteration in the existing state 
of things, the term commodity to the thing as altered; the term 
product including both commodities and services. (Senior, 1836, 
p.53) 
The commodity can only be produced as a result of ―the thing‖ in question (the 
raw material) having been altered.  If the spontaneous creation of a commodity 
is deemed impossible as matter can not be created, then all commodities are 
the result of labour providing services that ultimately result in those 
commodities, be they material, immaterial, or intermediate to some other 
commodity.  All labour is thus the purposive service, or human activity that 
creates commodities.233 
Looking back to Torrens‘ classification of ―the labour of men, the work of cattle, 
the action of machines, and the operations of nature‖ (Torrens, 1834, p.3), it is 
evident that only labour is purposive whilst the work, action and operations of 
cattle, machines and nature are reactions which serve a purpose, but are not 
                                            
233 Therefore, labour (as human activity) could not be a commodity unless it was 
assumed that it was created for the purpose of production.  Whilst the breeding of cattle 
might be for production, it might be hoped that humans do not breed for such purposes.  
Labour could only be considered a commodity when viewed as an instrument of 
production. 
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themselves the result of any decisive act independent of human activity.  It is 
perhaps in this sense we can look at labour as the ―parent of wealth‖. 
As far as the end of the purposive action known as labour is concerned, Senior 
showed, what Hodgskin only intimated, that it was the service of creating 
commodities. The form that those commodities took, whether material, 
immaterial, or intermediate was unimportant.  
Hodgskin on Motion 
Hodgskin‘s view on the issue of production as motion does not readily appear in 
his main works or even his Economist writings, perhaps because he did not 
deem it worth while stating the obvious.  However, for whatever reason, he did 
return to the issue in his later years where he expressed his view in articles 
published in the Brighton Guardian in 1864:- 
All action is motion; we perform only motion, and all the 
phenomena of the universe … are manifested to us only as 
motion. … The one term, motion, – motion imparted to all things, 
and all things existing in motion, – signifies all that man knows 
and all that man can ever learn. (Hodgskin, BG., 6th July 1864) 
Labour, therefore, and nothing but labour, is that peculiar part of 
motion – (Mr McCulloch calls it transmutation) – which is the sole 
object of that science erroneously called Political Economy.  It is 
the science or methodised knowledge of labour, of what labour 
effects, and of all the natural laws which labour follows. 
(Hodgskin, BG., 30th Nov. 1864) 
These passages leave little doubt that Hodgskin not only saw labour as the 
―sole object‖ of political economy, but that labour equated to the movement or 
motion of objects by people. If production was the movement or rearrangement 
of objects, then labour was the only active agency could be responsible for the 
service of initiating that motion. 
Market Economy Labour 
It is also evident that when Hodgskin wrote about labour it was about purposive 
action not only in a social setting but in a market situation, as that which was 
performed solely for the isolated self would generally fall outside political 
economy‘s remit. 
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Of such labour intended for the labourer‘s own immediate 
gratification, which constitutes, in an advanced state of society a 
very small part of the whole, nothing can be said in a political-
economical point of view. It may be wicked or it may be wise; it 
may be frivolous or it may be important; but it has its beginning 
and its termination with the individual; and though the moralist 
may think it worthy of remark, the economist rejects it from his 
science. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.50) 
Thus Hodgskin‘s political economy was concerned with labour as performed in 
the creation of commodities for sale or commercial purpose; 
In general, however, labour is directed towards the production of 
some commodity for sale, (ibid). 
Thus when Hodgskin was discussing production we should recognise that he 
was not concerned with individualist, isolated or primitive fabrications, but 
relatively sophisticated market economies where goods were created to be 
exchanged.  Thus labour was, in the same sense that Senior had elucidated, 
the labourers‘ service that enabled goods to be created and brought to market.    
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Section Two 
The Whole Product of Labour 
Introduction 
It has been a question of much difficulty, to ascertain what portion 
of its product, labour ought to receive, and probably the question 
will never be settled with much precision and certainty. (Raymond, 
1823, p.192) 
The revolutionary fulcrum of Thomas Hodgskin‘s Labour Defended was his 
attempt to answer this question by considering the labourers‘ reward in relation 
to their productivity. His proposition was that workers‘ wages should be 
considered from a micro-economic perspective that related what the labourer, 
as a contributor to production, actually produced to the reward for that factor, 
i.e. their wages. 
The prevailing viewpoint in political economy at that time had been a relatively 
macro-economic vision that looked at what society as a whole produced and 
how that was distributed to the various classes that made up that society. This 
was exemplified in the opening lines of the Preface of Ricardo‘s Principles:234 
The produce of the earth – all that is derived from the surface by 
the united application of labour, machinery, and capital, is divided 
among the three classes of the community; namely the proprietor 
of the land, the owner of the stock or capital necessary for its 
cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated. 
(Ricardo, I, p.5)235   
The micro-economic perspective in Ricardo‘s Principles was based on the 
apparent attitude that conceived labour as a commodity ―like all other things 
                                            
234 This opening paragraph of Ricardořs (2nd Edition, p.1) was quoted in full in 
Hodgskinřs Labour Defended (Hodgskin, 1825, p.6) 
235 Ricardořs letter to Malthus (9th Oct. 1820) emphasised his concern with the 
proportionate shares that each class received: 
Political Economy you think is an enquiry into the nature and causes of 
wealth Ŕ I think it should rather be called an enquiry into the laws which 
determine the division amongst the classes who concur in its formation.  
No law can be laid down respecting quantity, but a tolerably correct one 
can be laid down respecting proportions. (Ricardo, VIII, p.278) 
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which are produced and sold, and which may be increased or diminished in 
quantity‖ (ibid, p.93). Thus the cost of production of labour determined its price: 
The natural price of labour is that price which is necessary to 
enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist and to 
perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution. (ibid, 
p.93) 
In this Ricardian scheme the reward to capital was not related to its cost of 
production but was simply the residue that remained after wages and rent had 
been deducted from the price attained for produced goods in the market: 
The remaining quantity of the produce of the land, after the 
landlord and the labourer are paid, necessarily belongs to the 
farmer, and constitutes the profits of his stock. (ibid, p.112)236 
This notion of profits as the remainder after the deductions of rent and wages 
thus highlighted the conflict of interests that was to trouble the minds of 
economists for much of the 19th century.237 
                                            
236 Oswald St Clair summarised the proposition and some of its consequences in his 
Key to Ricardo: 
Seeing that in this case wages and profits make up the whole amount of 
the product, it follows that the larger the proportion that goes to the one, 
the smaller must be the proportion remaining for the other.  Although 
this appears to be a mere arithmetical truism, it forms one of Ricardořs 
principal tenets; profits rise if wages fall, and fall if wages rise. (St. 
Clair, 1957, p.5) 
Or by assuming production on land that did not give rise to (differential) rent Ŕ 
ŖProfits as a share of output are equal to the physical product at the margins of 
cultivation minus the subsistence wage fundŗ (Blaug, 1976, p.23).   
237 ŖThroughout this country at present there exists a serious contest between capital 
and labourŗ (Hodgskin, 1825, p.2). To be more precise, but less akin to the terminology 
of the time, the conflict was between the labourers and the owners (and interests) of 
capital. 
An illustration of a negative prognosis upon this conflict was given by Richard T. 
Ely in his article The past and Present of Political Economy for The Overland Monthly 
(Vol. II No. 9, Sept. 1883). 
And then the doctrine of identity of interest of laborer and labor-giver! If 
it only held in real life, the solution of the Social Problem would indeed 
be an easy task. Business men know, however, that the share of the 
produce of labor and capital received by labor diminishes by so much the 
profits of capital, and that the larger the proportion of profits received by 
capital, the smaller the proportion received by labor. That there is a 
harmony of interests between the different classes of society, "is at best a 
dream of human happiness as it presents itself to a millionaire." [Gustav 
Cohn, on Political Economy in Germany. Fortnightly Review, Sept. 1, 
1873] (Ely, Sept. 1883, p.230) 
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Whilst Hodgskin was able to admit that the Ricardian proportional division 
between wages and profits occurred in the reality of current economic affairs, 
he did not accept that this was the inevitable result of inescapable economic 
laws that would have prevailed in his hypothetical pure market economy.   
Wages vary inversely as profits; or wages rise when profits fall, 
and profits rise when wages fall; and therefore profits, or the 
capitalist‘s share of the national produce, which is opposed to 
wages, or the share of the labourer. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.5) 
Hodgskin saw this existing situation as the result of particular social power 
relations, structures, and legal frameworks.  He envisaged that a pure market 
economy could evolve a distributive system that would reward each constituent 
of production in proportion to the contribution that particular factor made.    
Labour Defended 
Labour Defended was, as its full title made plain, a defence of the labourers‘ 
interests against the claims of capital – ―To suggest some arguments in favour 
of labour, and against capital, is my chief motive for publishing the present 
pamphlet‖ (Hodgskin, 1825, p.2).  
Hodgskin‘s view, as expressed in a contemporary letter to the Trades‟ 
Newspaper, was that labour‘s productivity was not considered when 
determining its share of society‘s output: 
Wages, let me remind your readers, have no reference whatever 
to the quantity produced by the labourer.  At present all produce 
belongs in the first instance, to the landlords and capitalists; and 
wages is that sum which they must give for labour.  It is clear that, 
they will never give a farthing more than they can help.  They 
must have labourers; and therefore the natural price of labour is 
usually defined to be that price which is necessary to enable the 
labourers, one with another, to subsist, and to rear up as many 
labourers as the owners of all the produce of a country choose to 
pay and employ.  (Hodgskin, TN., 16th Oct. 1825) 
Hence wages in accordance with Ricardian theory were maintained at or near 
to subsistence levels given the power that capitalists held over the labourers: 
The labourer‘s share of the produce of a country, according to this 
theory, is the ―necessaries and conveniences required for the 
support of the labourer and his family; or that quantity which is 
necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist 
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and to perpetuate their race, without either increase or 
diminution.‖  Whatever may be the truth of the theory in other 
respects, there is no doubt of its correctness in this particular.  
The labourers do only receive, and ever have only received, as 
much as will subsist them, the landlords receive the surplus 
produce of the most fertile soils, and all the rest of the whole 
produce of labour in this and every country goes to the capitalist 
under the name of profit for the use of his capital. (Hodgskin, 
1825, p.6) 
For Hodgskin, capital‘s effectiveness resulted from current labour rather than 
from anything inherent in past or stored labour as capital or capital goods: 
those benefits to civilisation, those vast improvements in the 
condition of the human race, which have been in general 
attributed to capital, are caused in fact by labour, and by 
knowledge and skill informing and directing labour (Hodgskin, 
1825, p.33) 
In fact capital seems to mean, when ultimately analysed, little 
more than, or be very little different from, the power of one man, 
however obtained, over the labour or produce of labour of 
another. (Hodgskin, E. 30th Dec. 1854, p.1454)  
Hodgskin concluded Labour Defended, after having illustrated what he saw as 
the non-productiveness of capital, with a call for labour to be rewarded by an 
equivalent of what it produced rather than the bare subsistence level that 
employers impose. 
the best means of securing the progressive improvement, both of 
individuals and of nations, is to do justice, and allow labour to 
possess and enjoy the whole of its produce. (Hodgskin, 1825, 
p.33) 
Hodgskin’s Claim 
Hodgskin asserted that labour should be rewarded with what it produced.  All 
the contributing labour should be rewarded according to what it contributed. The 
assumption that labour should be rewarded with all that is produced, from this 
statement of Hodgskin‘s, is made by recognising Hodgskin‘s claim that only 
labour can contribute, but, as we shall illustrate subsequently, this was as much 
down to a definition of labour, as we have already discussed, as an 
understanding of the efficient cause of production. 
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There are several passages that support the assertion that Hodgskin did not 
view the whole produce of labour as the whole output. For example, in Natural 
and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted Hodgskin discussed the difficulty of 
assigning ―the mutual shares of any two persons engaged in producing an 
article‖. He used the example of a ―weaver buying the yarn from the spinner, as 
the spinner buys the raw material from the merchant importer‖ (Hodgskin, 1832, 
p.35).  Thus the weaver was left with the whole product but had to pay from this 
a sum to the spinner for the yarn, which would leave the weaver with the 
equivalent of the whole product of his labour.  Likewise the spinners had to pay 
for their raw material to leave them the equivalent of the whole product of their 
labour. 
In a similar discussion in Labour Defended regarding the division of ―the 
produce of all‖ Hodgskin again stated it was up to individuals to apportion the 
whole produce between themselves. 
While each labourer claims his own reward, let him cheerfully 
allow the just claims of every other labourer: but let him never 
assent to the strange doctrine that the food he eats and the 
instruments he uses, which are the work of his own hands, 
become endowed, by merely changing proprietors, with 
productive power greater than his, and that the owner of them is 
entitled to a more abundant reward than the labour, skill and 
knowledge which produce and use them. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.27) 
Hodgskin here did not say that the providers of the instruments the labourer 
used were not entitled to any reward but that reward did not change in quantity 
simply because it was the property of a capitalist. 
The Problem of Interest 
In his review of Edward Kellogg‘s Labour and other Capital (1849) Hodgskin 
reproduced the example from Dr. Price of the all consuming nature of 
compound interest that he had previously used in Labour Defended (1825).238 
                                            
238 In Labour Defended Hodgskin had noted that: 
Dr. Price has calculated the sum of one penny put out to compound 
interest at our Saviourřs birth, at 5 per cent., would in the year 1791 
amount to a sum greater than could be contained in three hundred 
millions of globes like this earth, all solid gold. (Hodgskin, 1825, p.22) 
This passage can be seen recycled in The Economist: 
Dr. Price, as most of our readers are probably aware, showed by 
calculations, about 50 years ago, that the sum of one penny put out to 
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He also provided a concise explanation as to what he saw as the relationship 
between interest and the labourers‘ resultant reduction to subsistence wages: 
Many years ago that calculation was adduced to show that capital, 
bearing interest or put out to profit, and a portion of the interest 
being saved and continually put out again to interest, must 
necessarily absorb all other wealth, leaving to labour, without 
which capital can have no profit, a bare subsistence, and leaving 
for rent only the surplus which remains from the best lands after 
the profit of capital employed on the worst lands, necessarily tilled 
for subsistence, has been paid. (Hodgskin, E., 17th March 1849, 
p.303) 
The sheer magnitude of compounded interest would accelerate faster than 
could be hoped to be met by labour striving to match its growth. 
Of course the ultimate term to which compound interest tends can 
never be reached.  Its progress is gradually but perpetually 
checked, and it is obliged to stop short of the desired goal. 
(Hodgskin, 1825, p.23) 
Hodgskin pointed out that in contemporary political economy this was generally 
seen as a falling rate of profit, resulting from either of two reasons, although he 
was satisfied by neither explanation: 
The political economist either say with Adam Smith, that the 
accumulation of capital lowers profits, or, with Mr. Ricardo, that 
profits are lowered by the increasing difficulty of procuring 
subsistence. Neither of them have assigned it to the right cause, 
the impossibility of the labourer answering the demands of the 
capitalist. (ibid) 
Hodgskin was not opposed to what may be seen as profit in the sense of a 
share (of turnover) as long as that gain could be associated with some 
labouring activity. It was rather unearned or non-labouring profit, which 
continued ad infinitum, that Hodgskin objected to.  Hodgskin made this 
distinction in Labour Defended when he referred positively to ―simply profit‖ but 
counter distinguished this with ―compound interest‖ (Hodgskin, 1825, p.23).  
                                                                                                                                
compound interest at our Saviourřs birth, at five per cent, would be in the 
year 1791 amount to a sum greater than could be contained in three 
hundred millions of globes like this earth, all solid globes [sic]. 
It seems that later in his career, at The Economist, the words of Labour Defended 
could be safely reproduced (even allowing for the typographic error). 
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Profiteering Labourers 
Hodgskin highlighted that ―Masters, it is evident, are labourers as well as their 
journeymen‖ and hence as labourers these ―Masters‖ should receive their 
legitimate rewards and as ―the contrivers and enterprising undertakers of new 
works … they deserve the respect of the labourers‖.  These entrepreneurs were 
thereby ―a useful class of labourers‖ (ibid).  
There was no concept in these passages of labourers just acquiring the final 
output of production.  In their role as labourers, those who would be classed as 
capitalists received their share as the product of their labours. It was as mere 
un-labouring idle capitalists that they would be undeserving of any reward.  
By way of example we can see in Popular Political Economy (1827) a 
discussion of money and the history of banking, where Hodgskin referred to 
bankers as labourers: 
Thus arose that class of men called bankers, who are still very 
important, and have long been very useful labourers. (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.206) 
Hodgskin was equally receptive to the legitimacy of the labour of traders and 
dealers ―who merely buy and sell with a view to gain‖ (ibid, p.145) so as to 
perform a useful service – ―They reconcile the apparent incongruity of nature, 
and while labouring for themselves are useful to others‖ (ibid, p.149).  However 
these labours are not paid by salary or wages in the normal everyday sense of 
the words but by commission or profit made on their transactions.  
Retail dealers receive no wage for their services. They are paid by 
making a profit on what they sell; and on this account they are 
generally objected to. (ibid, p.151) 
But Hodgskin did not object to them and although their remuneration may not 
have been in the usual form of a wage or salary, it was nevertheless the reward 
for their labour and thus, in a strict functional economic form, was a wage rather 
than the profit or interest as made by an apparently idle capitalist.239 
                                            
239 It may be expedient therefore to term all income gained by the mere ownership of 
property as interest rather than profit, as profit could be a labouring reward and as such 
could be laboriously and (for Hodgskin) legitimately made.  Wages could thus be seen 
as any salary, reward, gain, or any other remuneration that resulted from human activity 
or labour. 
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In his review of C. Morrison‘s An Essay on the Relations between Labour and 
Capital (1854) Hodgskin showed that he accepted that all people laboured or 
provided a service to some degree: 
We know of no thoroughly idle people – all are workers:  it is a law 
of man‘s nature that he works; (Hodgskin, E. 29th April 1854, 
p.458) 
Thus it was not so much who should be rewarded, but relating labour to its 
appropriate reward that was the foremost issue.  As it stood within the initial 
form of Ricardianism there was no such relationship between labour and what it 
produced.  It was this link that Hodgskin championed. 
The success of Labour Defended can be seen in the fact that in order to 
counter his propositions the productiveness of capital had to be examined, and 
promoted.240 The notion that capital warranted the whole residue of production 
after rent and subsistent wage deduction was, for many, no longer tenable, or at 
the least had become questionable.241  
Labour Rewarded 
In his Labour Rewarded; Thompson received Hodgskin‘s pamphlet favourably, 
but not without some criticisms.  
                                            
240 Indeed Lord Lauderdale had noted that these issues had not been particularly of 
concern within political economy Ŕ  
What is the nature of the profit of stock?  and how does it originate? Are 
questions the answers to which do not immediately suggest themselves.  
They are, indeed, questions that has seldom been discussed by those who 
have treated on political œconomy; and important as they are, they seem 
nowhere to have received a satisfactory solution. (Lauderdale, 1819, 
p.155) 
In her The Ricardian Socialists (1911), Esther Lowenthal claimed priority for 
Hodgskin in relation to proposing that labour should be rewarded with the whole 
product, although she associates this with the Labour Theory of Value, which we will 
later show Hodgskin did not adhere to in the form it is usually portrayed in. 
In his use of the labor theory of value to back the claim of the laborer to 
the whole produce of industry, Hodgskin is the earliest of the English 
socialists, for his Ŗ[Travel in the North of] Germanyŗ antedates by some 
years the work of both Thompson and Gray.  It is a claim, however, that 
was very much in the air, and his statement differs in no way from that of 
his contemporaries. (Lowenthal, 1911, p.72)  
241 Although as J.B. Clark was to note in his 1883 article Recent Theories of Wages, the 
separation of wages and productivity still lingered towards the end of the 19
th
 century. 
The divorcement of wages and products is made the ground of inferences 
so important as to justify the closest examination of the principles from 
which they are derived. (Clark, NE., May 1883, p.355) 
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The title of this address to you has been suggested, as you will 
perceive, by a late excellent pamphlet called ―Labour defended.‖ 
The object of that pamphlet has been to show that labor and 
materials are the sole constituents of wealth, that capital is the 
mere creature of the two; that capital, the creature of these two 
original means of production, is not entitled to the same 
consideration with them; that most of the effects commonly 
attributed to capital, arise from co-existing labor; that the holders 
of capital are therefore unentitled to the same remuneration with 
the producers of wealth, or with the active contributors, whether 
by mind or muscle, to the common happiness. (Thompson, 1827, 
p.1-2) 
The year before Labour Defended Thompson had published his book An Inquiry 
into the Principles of the Distribution of Wealth most Conducive to Human 
Happiness (1824), which contained some points not too dissimilar in essence 
from those in Labour Defended that may well have influenced Hodgskin. 
For Thompson labour was ―the parent of Wealth‖, thus he proposed that 
―Wealth is produced by labor; no other ingredient but labor makes any object of 
desire an object of wealth‖ (Thompson, 1824, p.6).  Coupled with this, another 
proposition could also be seen similar to Hodgskin‘s: 
The produce of no man‘s labor, nor the labor itself, nor any part of 
them should be taken from the labourer, without an equivalent by 
him deemed satisfactory. (ibid, p.78)  
However for Thompson as the purpose of wealth creation was solely to 
increase human happiness, this second proposition, which for him amounted to 
complete social equality, was limited by the overriding pursuit of increasing 
human happiness.242 
Wherever equality does not lessen production, it should be the 
sole object pursued.  Wherever it decreases really useful 
production, (that which is attended with preponderant good to the 
producers,) it saps its own existence, and should cease. 
(Thompson, 1824, p.91)   
                                            
242 It is interesting to note that in this context Thompson fleetingly touched on the 
concept that was to become known as Diminishing Marginal Utility: 
If this system of absolute equality were consistent with production, it 
ought to be universally adhered to.  Successive portions of wealth 
diminish in their power of producing happiness when added to the same 
individualřs share: but when divided amongst many individuals, the 
productive power of each portion is wonderfully increased, although the 
glitter of the effect may not be so apparent. (Thompson, 1824, p.91) 
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The consequence of these two propositions (that only labour can produce 
wealth and that labour should be rewarded with an equivalent of that produced 
wealth) could be seen as the claim that labour should effectively receive the 
whole worth of the product of its labour.   
The fact that in Labour Defended Hodgskin appeared to emphasise such a 
claim, alarmed Thompson: 
All the reasons and illustrations contained in the pamphlet come 
simply to this; that inasmuch as those who live on the interest or 
profit derived from capital do not themselves personally aid in the 
production of wealth, they ought, on that account, to be debarred 
from sharing any part of that wealth, the product of the national 
industry. (Thompson, 1827, p.2) 
Thompson‘s estrangement from Hodgskin can be seen to be based upon three 
main issues. 
Firstly, for Thompson, wealth could only be physical and as such only created 
by physical labour.  Hence Thompson made his point that mental labour (such 
as Hodgskin writing) did not aid in the production of physical wealth and would 
therefore, like idle capitalists be debarred from receiving any income – ―Why 
then should mental labor receive that reward which is denied to capital?‖ (ibid, 
p.3).  In his Popular Political Economy (1827) Hodgskin made it abundantly 
clear that he considered mental labour as not only inseparable from physical 
labour, but, given improved knowledge and modes of production, it became 
increasingly more productive and important as society progressed, and thus 
equally worth its share of labour‘s product along with physical labour. 
Secondly, the ultimate end of production was from Thompson‘s standpoint the 
creation of greater human happiness.  If it could be shown or presumed that 
giving idle capitalists or mental labours a share of the national output would 
increase overall human happiness then it would be expedient so to do: 
Another, a paramount, principle is covertly admitted, – the 
tendency of modes of action or states of things, to increase 
happiness, or promote preponderant good.  Without the aid of this 
paramount principle, mental labour must be excluded, as well as 
capital, from any share in the products of labor. With the aid of this 
principle, capital, or those who live on profit and interest, may be 
admitted to a share in the products of muscular industry. 
(Thompson, 1827, p.3) 
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Whilst Thompson saw economic policy as dominated by this happiness 
maximising principle, Hodgskin was not directly concerned with economic policy 
but simply in stating what he saw as economic laws independent of expediency 
or moral judgements.  Hodgskin accepted that individual behaviour would be 
best served by each seeking to maximise their own happiness. However, he 
was not tied to what Thompson saw as a paramount principle when discussing 
what reward was due to mental and physical labour. 
Thirdly, Thompson saw competition as a bane rather than a boon and thereby 
pursued an economic framework based on co-operation and socialistic 
principles. For him the failure of the labouring classes to have attained a fair 
and just remuneration for its labour was the result of competition pitting all 
against each other.  He also noted that Hodgskin was apparently unique 
amongst pro-competitive economists in calling for labour to be rewarded with 
the whole of its product. 
The author of the pamphlet ―Labour Defended,‖ stands alone, as 
far as I know, amongst the advocates of Individual competition, in 
even wishing that labor should possess the whole of the products 
of its exertions.  All other advocates of individual competition look 
on the notion as visionary, under the Competitive System.  I think 
with them, that the possession by Labor of the whole product of its 
exertions, is incompatible with individual competition; (Thompson, 
1827, p.97) 
It would seem that this was indeed the case, after the short term exposure of 
economic heterodoxy generally known as Ricardian socialism. As we will 
discuss later, it was not until the emergence of Austrian Economics in the latter 
part of the 19th century, that the issue of labour‘s reward in relation to its whole 
product again became an issue of debate. 
Hodgskin saw fault with the legal system and its self-interested domination over 
the labouring class as the reason why competition had not attained its full 
potentially liberating ends.  For Thompson the overriding principle of maximising 
happiness would enlighten workers into a distributive system based on equality 
rather than justly claiming their own. 
Though labor might be secured in the right to the whole products 
of its exertions, it does not follow that labor might not, in order to 
ensure a vast increase in production and enjoyment to everyone, 
as well as mutual insurance from all casualties, voluntarily agree 
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before production to equality of remuneration – should such 
agreement be demonstrated to be productive of such effects. 
(Thompson, 1827, p.37)     
Thus Thompson‘s concerns and his differences with Labour Defended resolved 
around the authors‘ differing perspectives and economic agendas rather than 
anything substantial. Thompson‘s objections against mental labour were 
resolved by Hodgskin‘s recognition of mental labour‘s role in production, and 
they both agreed that the worker had a right to his product but disagreed as to 
how that right should be put into practise. 
Samuel Read’s Response 
The first economist to meet the socialists on their own grounds 
was Samuel Read (Blaug, 1958, p.144) 
The defenders of capitalism were aroused to refute him 
[Hodgskin].  One such was Samuel Read in his Natural Grounds 
of Right to Vendible Property of 1829. (Halévy, 1956, p.128) 
After Thompson the next response to Labour Defended came in Samuel Read‘s 
Political Economy: An Inquiry into the Natural Grounds of Right to Vendible 
Property or Wealth (1829), which was a direct attempt to assimilate the 
question of rights to property within political economy:243 
                                            
243 Read professed to follow Smith in his stated opposition to both Ricardo and 
Malthus.  Read Ŗclaimed to be returning to Smithŗ (OřBrien, 1970, p.140) Ŕ a position 
that Hodgskin also aligned with, especially in his letters of 1820 to Francis Place. 
Seligman also recognised Readřs contribution to the political economy of the time. 
Although in the main a conservative and almost an orthodox economist, 
notwithstanding his objections to the Malthusian theory, Read deserves 
recognition in four particulars: he is an acute critic of some of the weak 
points in the classical theory of distribution; he is the first economist to 
show the connection between Ricardian economics and Ricardian 
socialism; he is in part the originator of the risk theory of profits, and he 
is above all the first English [sic] economist who, while unreservedly 
recognising the function of capital, emphasizes the fact that the capitalist 
has duties as well as rights, and that economics is a science not only of 
what is, but of what ought to be. (Seligman, 1903, p.106) 
Read citied (favourably and otherwise) Adam Smith (WN and Theory of Moral 
Sentiments), Ricardo, Torrens, Malthus, McCulloch, William Paley, Samuel Bailey, 
Lord Lauderdale, Sir Walter Scott, Alexander Hamilton, David Hume, J.B. Say, 
William Godwin, Perronet Thompson, Patrick Colquhoun, various anonymous works 
and from the Edinburgh Review and Scotsman,, as well as numerous North American 
publications.  Readřs writings, unlike many contemporary works, were relatively 
precise in its referencing of quotations used. 
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Political Economy has been hitherto designated as the science 
which treats of the production and distribution of wealth, and it has 
been totally overlooked that this includes the demonstration of the 
right to wealth.  It is here therefore, for the first time, treated as an 
investigation concerning the right to wealth, (or property;) and this 
innovation, while it gives a more important and a more definite 
object to the science, presents it under a new and totally different 
aspect from that in which it has hitherto appeared, and causes it 
to assume an entirely new shape. (Read, 1829, p.ix)244 
Read recognised that labour was not alone in its mal-estimation of its due; both 
sides of the debate, labour and capital, were at fault with their claims as to the 
share received from the national output. 
Although it seems to be one of the most obvious things 
imaginable, that, in all advanced periods of society, capital is at 
least as potent as labour in the production of wealth; yet the 
labourers have been flattered and persuaded that they produce 
all; whilst the capitalists, on the other hand, not contented with 
their proper and just advantages, as being the possessors and 
proprietors of capital, and with the profit naturally and fairly arising 
from it, have combined and established laws of preference and 
                                                                                                                                
Readřs first work had been the explicitly entitled Exposure of certain Plagiarisms of 
J.R. McCulloch (1819) published in Edinburgh; OřBrien referred to Read as 
McCullochřs Ŗold enemyŗ (OřBrien, 1970, p.140). In the closeness of the Edinburgh 
academia we might presume that Hodgskin was aware of Readřs early work especially 
his General Statement on the Subject of Population (1821). This was Readřs attack on 
Malthusian population theory, in which Read adopted an approach not dissimilar to 
Hodgskinřs own concerns. 
The obstacles which prevent the full and equal population of the globe, 
and which hinder mankind from dwelling and increasing in its different 
parts, in numbers proportional to the various advantages of climate, 
situation, and soil, are all referable to the deficiency and imperfection of 
political institutions, laws, and government. (Read, 1821, p.5) 
The eminence of Samuel Readřs work can be seen demonstrated when Scrope 
reviewed the leading works on political economy for his 1831 Quarterly Review article, 
his choices were Malthusř Definitions (1827), McCullochřs Principles (1830) and 
Samuel Readřs Political Economy (1829) Ŕ ŖPoulet Scropeřs … attack on political 
economy was so strong that John Stuart Mill was drawn to accuse Scrope of arrogance 
Ŕ Examiner, January 30, 1831, p.68.ŗ (OřBrien, 1970, p.76) 
244 A short Notice commenting on Readřs Political Economy in The Monthly Review of 
March 1830 seems to have concurred with Readřs own assessment: 
Mr Read, indeed, has evidently investigated the subject with a great deal 
of original and independent thinking.  Political Economy has, hitherto, 
been confined to the production and distribution of wealth, whereas Mr. 
Read carries it a step further, and begins by investigating the right to 
wealth or property.  This innovation evidently gives a more definite and 
important object to the science, and causes it to assume a form altogether 
novel. (Monthly Review, March 1830, p.469). 
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favour – laws of restriction, monopoly, and exclusion – which 
increase their profit beyond its legitimate bounds, and really 
trench upon the rights of the labourers, not only as limiting 
unnecessarily and partially, and consequently unjustly, the field for 
their exertions, but in various ways preventing those exertions 
from being crowned with that ample and adequate remuneration 
which would naturally and necessarily reward them under a 
different and juster system. (Read, 1829, p.xxix-xxx) 
Thus Read acknowledged that labour was being denied its full just reward 
because of the activities of the capitalists, but was alarmed at the extremity of 
the notion that only labour created wealth, and the oft drawn conclusion from 
that, that all wealth should go to those who laboured.   
Whilst Hodgskin avowed it necessary for all to labour, Read envisaged a class 
of person who, being landlords or capitalists, had escaped from this necessity 
and should therefore be classed as non-labourers. 
All that is intended by the term non-labourers, as applied to 
designate this class, is merely to recognise their right and 
privilege, and to distinguish them from those who must 
necessarily labour: for only the persons entitled to the privilege 
implied by this term are the proprietors of land and the proprietors 
of capital. (ibid, p.43)   
These privileges attained by non-labourers were, for Read, reasonable, seeing 
the contribution that capital made to production. Read accepted that such 
privileges were not necessarily earned but could be the result of good luck;  
having been emancipated or exempted from all obligation or 
necessity to labour by their own or their father‘s industry and 
parsimony, or good fortune, which enabled them to amass, or to 
produce that capital or store of wealth, (ibid) 
Having accepted the possibility that capitalists‘ rewards were not necessarily 
solely the upshot of their own productive activity, with his recognition of ―good 
fortune‖, Read had to seek for capital‘s recompense in its own productive 
capacities. Hence much of Read‘s book was an attempted justification of 
capital‘s share of national output.245 Read accepted that labour‘s share should 
not be seen as restricted to subsistence levels. Although it often was reduced to 
                                            
245 The notion that profit was the reward for abstinence or some initial activity such as 
parsimony or foregone utility or pleasure, had yet to arise, initially within G.P. Scropeřs 
review of Readřs work. 
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this level in practice, this was not a theoretical necessity as it had often been 
portrayed as. 
Additionally, Read was unable to accept that capital could be reduced down to 
a quantity of past labour, but held some intrinsic worth over and above the 
labour necessary to create it.  In the section where he specifically refuted 
Labour Defended (book 1, chapter ix, section iii) Read made his point that 
capital was the product of both labour and other capital, but never solely labour: 
As to the question [Labour Defended, p.14], ―Are they, (viz. 
instruments and machines) or are they not the produce of labour?‖ 
I distinctly answer, No, they are not.  They are not the produce of 
labour alone, but of labour assisted by capital.  I will only illustrate 
this answer further than it already has been done, by remarking, 
that, as we saw before, the produce of an improved and cultivated 
field was not wholly the produce of the labourer who merely 
ploughed and sowed it last; and as we now see that the cutting of 
a tree into planks in a few minutes by a saw-mill is not wholly the 
work of the person who guides the machine, but rather of the 
machine itself chiefly, so the construction of the machine was not 
effected without the assistance of another machine, and 
innumerable previously accumulated capitals. And so of all other 
machines or instruments, or fixed capitals. (Read, 1829, p.131) 
Hodgskin had accepted that fixed capital was indispensable to production –  
Every man must admit that by means of instruments and 
machines the labourer can execute tasks he could not possibly 
perform without them; (Hodgskin, 1825, p.14).   
However Hodgskin‘s overall contention was that without human action, no 
production could take place; as we discussed previously, labour was the 
effective cause of production. 
Read‘s other argument with Labour Defended was the assertion by Hodgskin 
that a stock of goods such as food and clothes, circulating capital, did not 
actually need to be in existence prior to production, as long as there was a 
conviction that such daily requirements would be produced and be available as 
and when required.  Read was one of those who persisted in the argument that 
such stock would have to be in existence prior to production and hence 
circulating capital was of itself productive (Read, 1829, p.125-6). 
    
 215 
Other Contemporary Reactions 
In a letter to Lord Brougham, James Mill alleged that Hodgskin‘s work 
amounted to ―the subversion of civilised society; worse than the overwhelming 
deluge of Huns and Tartars‖:246 
The nonsense to which your Lordship alludes about the right of 
the labourer to the whole produce of the country, wages, profits, 
and rent, all included is the mad nonsense of our friend 
Hodg[s]kin, which he has published as a system and propagates 
with the zeal of perfect fanaticism. (Mill, 3rd Sept. 1832: in Bain, 
1882, p.364)247 
                                            
246 In his The Life of Francis Place (1898) Graham Wallas concluded that Millřs letter 
to Brougham resulted from an exchange of letters between James Mill and Francis 
Place in October 1831 where Place had explained that a delegation to Mr. Black (the 
editor of the Morning Chronicle) could be traced back to Hodgskin.  
The doctrine they are now preaching is that promulgated by Hodgskin in 
a tract in 1825, entitled ŖLabour Defended against the Claims of Capitalŗ 
(Place to Mill, 26
th
 Oct. 1831: cited in Wallas, 1898, p.274n) 
247 The association between labour and its produce was not uncommon in the early 
nineteenth century and should not be seen as originating either with Hodgskin or the 
Ricardian Socialists, although popularised by them. As Hodgskin pointed out John 
Locke had asserted that Ŕ Ŗfor the labour being the unquestionable property of the 
labourer, no man can have a right to what that is joined toŗ (Locke, 1690, Bk. II. Ch.5, 
s.27: Hodgskin, 1832, p.25). 
For example, in James Millřs Essay on Government a similar notion was broached, 
five years before Hodgskinřs Labour Defended, which could be interpreted as assigning 
the whole produce of labour as the maximum reward that should be achieved by labour; 
to obtain labour in the greatest possible quantity, we must raise to the 
greatest possible height the advantage attached to labour.  It is 
impossible to attach to labour a greater degree of advantage than the 
whole of the product of labour.  Why so? Because, if you give more to 
one man than the produce of his labour, you can do so only by taking it 
away from the produce of some other manřs labour.  The greatest 
possible happiness of society is, therefore, attained by insuring to every 
man the greatest possible quantity of the produce of his labour. (Mill, 
1820, p.5) 
James Mill appears not to have associated his own remarks with those later echoed 
in Labour Defended. 
Before James Mill, Lord Lauderdale recognised that the Lockean position could be 
used to understand capitalřs profit as exploitative of labour. 
If this, however, was a just and accurate idea of the profit of capital, it 
would follow that the profit of stock must be a derivative, and not an 
original source of revenue; and capital could not therefore be considered 
as a source of wealth, its profit being only a transfer from the pocket of 
the labourer into that of the proprietor of stock. (Lauderdale, 1819, 
p.157-8) 
Ricardo seems to have accepted that rents were a transfer of wealth created 
elsewhere Ŕ Ŗrent is not a creation but a transfer of wealth.  It is the necessary 
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This exemplifies the typical misrepresentation of what Hodgskin was actually 
writing.  It was only unearned income as profits or rent that Hodgskin objected 
to.  What was by some called profit, for Hodgskin amounted to wages of 
supervision or the reward for the capitalists‘ actions and was thus not unearned.  
Hence there was a considerable degree of logomachy surrounding this issue. 
Subsequently the workers‘ right to the whole produce of labour became 
couched within the issue of the security of property. For James Mill and 
Bentham such security could only be maintained with legal protection.248  In 
contrast to this Benthamite position Hodgskin asserted that there was an 
inherent or natural right of security in one‟s own. He not only claimed that it was 
unwarranted and contradictory to separate the right of property from the right to 
the whole produce of labour, but that it was hypocritically denied in the usual or 
orthodox acquiescence to legal property rights. 
It is not a little extraordinary that every writer of any authority, 
since the days of Mr. Locke, has theoretically adopted this view of 
the origin of the right of property, and has, at the same time, in 
defending the present right of property in practice, continually 
denied it.  (Hodgskin, 1832, p.26)249  
Nevertheless, the contention that the right to the whole produce of labour was a 
claim to the whole output of production was maintained. 
The whole of price therefore, belongs of right, to him who alone 
confers the value, which produces price.  Profits charged by the 
capitalist, are a fraud on the operative, who is thus robbed of what 
he alone has earned, and which would have no existence but for 
his skill and industry. 
Such is the argument if I understand it.  Mr Hodgskin and the 
mechanics, do not state the argument on the other side. (Cooper, 
1830, p.350)250  
                                                                                                                                
consequence of rent being the effect and not the cause of high price.ŗ (Ricardo, VII, 
p.120).  In his Principles Ricardo cited a passage from Buchananřs edition of The 
Wealth of Nations to which he stated that ŖI fully agreeŗ Ŕ that rent was Ŗnothing more 
than a revenue transferred from one class to another;ŗ (Ricardo, I, p.398-9).   
248 Ŗboth Mr. Mill and M. Dumont [Benthamřs French translator], describe the right of 
property to be the offspring of law.ŗ (Hodgskin, 1832, p.16) 
249 David Ellerman noted that ŖHodgskin points out the inconsistency of orthodox 
social theorists who pay lip service to Lockeřs theory and then defend the usual 
arrangements of propertyŗ (Ellerman, 1992, p.51). 
250 Hodgskin never referred to price when discussing the claims of labour to the whole 
product.  He kept his discussion on price quite separate (as we shall do see in our later 
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In London James Mill, Lord Brougham and Charles Knight established the 
Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. Thomas Cooper was cited in 
their direct attacks on Hodgskin‘s Labour Defended in such works as The 
Results of Machinery and The Rights of Industry (1831) published in their series 
of works under the umbrella title of The Working Man‟s Companion in the early 
1830.s.  The Rights of Industry was republished in subsequent editions entitled 
Capital and Labour (1845) and Knowledge is Power (1854).  Although initially 
published anonymously, these later editions were acknowledged as the work of 
Charles Knight who accepted authorship of the earlier works. 
Hodgskin’s Reaction to the Diffusion Society  
Hodgskin was angered by these publications, particularly the personal tone that 
they, who he had previously seen as friends, adopted towards him.  To this end 
they elicited two publications from Hodgskin. Firstly, a second edition of Labour 
Defended with an additional Notice dated December 1831, that illustrated his 
strength of feeling: 
The attempt lately made by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge, with the Lord Chancellor at its head, to flatter the 
capitalists and delude the labourers by a collection of old and new 
stories, arranged in a little book, being a volume of The Working 
Man‘s Companion, called The Rights of Industry. Section 1. 
‗Capital and Labour,‘ with a view to prove the utility of capitalists, 
and the natural dependence of labourers, and thereby to show, 
that even now the latter is indebted to the former for the supply of 
his wants; together with the notice which that book takes of this 
little publication, denouncing its doctrines in no measured terms, 
and affirming, that its author, with others, who are styled 
―Ministers of Desolation,‖ will be able ―to sing their triumphal song 
of Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital, amid the shriek 
                                                                                                                                
Chapter Price).  Cooper did not specify what aspect of price he meant although from its 
tone one might perceive that he was referring to money price.  On this Hodgskin had 
clearly stated that: 
It [natural price] is the prime but not sole regulator of exchangeable 
value, of money and of social price. No commodity can in the long run 
be exchanged for less, though it may for more, labour than it cost.  
Natural price is therefore always the limit in one direction, but only in 
one, to the money price of all commodities.  They cannot be sold for less 
labour than they cost, but they may be sold for more. (Hodgskin, 1827, 
p.233) 
Additionally Hodgskin recognised that changes in money price were a necessary 
economic indicator and regulator of consumption Ŕ they were the Ŗindex to the wants of 
societyŗ (ibid, p.235) 
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of the Jackall and the howl of the Wolf,‖ induces the author now to 
come before the public with a second edition.  He is certainly 
much flattered by observing how very feeble is the impression 
made on his arguments by the work of the Diffusion Society, 
though ―Capital and Labour‖ is obviously directed against his 
book; and remaining convinced of their accuracy, he feels bound, 
though he cannot distribute his work to all the newspapers of the 
Kingdom through the Home Secretary‘s Office, to hold them forth 
as an antidote to the errors which one of the most useless 
societies that ever usurped an honourable name, assumed 
honourable functions, is trying to palm on his countrymen. 
(Hodgskin, 1831, p.iii) 
Secondly, in 1832 Hodgskin published a series of letters to Lord Brougham as 
Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted which continued his 
condemnation of the Society for its personal attacks against him. 
Since then, your society has published a book entitled, ―The 
Rights of Industry, Capital and Labour,‖ one great object of which 
is, to refute, and failing to refute, to decry my little work, called, 
―Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital.‖  In your book, 
for you are the avowed patron and protector of the society, and for 
aught I know, the author of this very work, the present legal right 
of property is held up to the admiration of the people, through a 
whole chapter, and impugners of that right, myself amongst the 
number, are stigmatized as ―bitter enemies of the people,‖ as 
―blind guides‖ as ―ministers of desolation, ― as ―destroyers,‖ and as 
possessing, many other ugly antisocial characteristics.  
Pretending to be the instructors of people, though the works of 
your society have ever been distinguished for the incorrectness of 
their logic and the meagreness of their knowledge, here we find 
you and it defending a natural wrong, because it is a legal right; 
(Hodgskin, 1832, p.165-6)251 
 
                                            
251 When in 1854 Hodgskin reviewed the latest incarnation of these works for The 
Economist, published as Charles Knightřs Knowledge is Power, he noted the original 
opposition to his notion on labourřs property claims: 
He [Knight] took part in opposition to the principle, that the property in 
labour is at all times the foundation of the right of property, and was the 
advocate of capital exclusively. Experience has enlarged his views, and 
he is now sensible that a much wider principle than saving, though that is 
a virtue, is very useful, helps forward social improvement, and, in 
common with many other things, ensures progress and order. (Hodgskin, 
E. 30
th
 Dec. 1854, p.1454) 
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Anton Menger’s Right to the Whole Produce 
In his Introduction to the English translation of Anton Menger‘s The Right to the 
Whole Produce of Labour Herbert Foxwell noted that after the initial responses 
to Hodgskin there were to be no real discussions of him and his contemporaries 
until the 1880.s with such works as Alexander Bain‘s James Mill. A Biography 
(1882) and Graham Wallas‘ The Life of Francis Place (1898). 
After James Mill and Brougham, no leading economist seems to 
have thought the English revolutionary socialism worth notice, and 
the very names of its chief writers were unknown to most of them 
until quite recent times. (Foxwell, 1899, p.lxxvii) 
Foxwell saw this exemplified in J.S. Mill:- 
It is hard to understand how they could have been ignored by J.S. 
Mill.  Holyoake tells us that Mill frequented the meetings of the 
early co-operators.  He must have known of Hodgskin from his 
father, and of Thompson, with whom he had much in common, 
from Bentham. (ibid) 
However Menger in his The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour (1886, 
English translation 1899), as Hodgskin had done in Natural and Artificial Right 
of Property Contrasted, saw the legal system as crucial to distribution.  Menger 
realised that laws, ―being the outcome of quite other than economic 
conceptions‖, were generally opposed to the economically ideal. 
The ideal law of property, from the economic point of view, would 
therefore be attained in a system which ensured to every labourer 
the whole produce of his labour, (Menger, 1886, p.2) 252 
Menger thus recognised that the legally sanctioned position was counter to 
economic expediency. He further stressed that labour did not receive its product 
                                            
252
 Anton Mengerřs fellow Austrian Economist Friedrich von Wieser also recognised 
some legitimism in the claim of the labourer to the whole produce, dependent upon the 
perspective adopted of the imputation issue within the production process. 
Clearly this will depend on the standpoint from which the imputation is 
calculated.  If it is the moral imputation that is in question, then certainly 
no one but the labourer could be named.  Land and capital have no merit 
that they bring forth fruit; they are dead tools in the hand of man; and the 
man is responsible for the use he makes of them.  Evidently all those 
who, in any sort of way, have assisted in bringing about the result, are 
counted among the labourer, - those who direct as well as those who 
carry out.  Indeed, there is no possible doubt that the greatest thanks are 
not due to mechanical exertions, if we are speaking of imputation in the 
highest sense of the word. (Wieser, 1888, p.79-80) 
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because of legalities which enabled the appropriation of labour‘s product by 
landlords and capitalists. 
Our present law of property, which centres in private possession, 
does not, in the first place, guarantee to the labourer the whole 
product of his labour.  By assigning the existing objects of wealth, 
and especially the instruments of production, to individuals to use 
at their pleasure, our law of property invests such individuals with 
an ascendancy, by virtue of which without any labour of their own, 
they draw an unearned income which they apply to the 
satisfaction of their wants.  This income, for which the legally-
favoured recipients return no personal equivalent to society, has 
been called rent (Rent) by the Saint-Simonians and the followers 
of Buchez and Rodbertus; by Thompson and Marx, surplus value 
(Mehrwert); I intend to call it unearned income (arbeitlose 
EinKommen).  The legally recognised existence of unearned 
income proves in itself that our law of property does not even aim 
at obtaining for the labourer the whole of his industry.  (ibid, p.2-3) 
Menger‘s comments are illustrative of several points. Firstly, Menger did not 
dismiss the concept that labourers were entitled to the whole product of labour.  
He did not view the claim to the whole product of labour in what David Ellerman 
called the naïve sense but as an economically legitimate claim that just 
happened not to be legally accepted.253  Foxwell persisted with the criticism of 
the naïve view of the ―claim of labour to the whole produce of industry, without 
deduction of any kind‖ (Foxwell, 1899, p.vii).254 
Secondly, Menger accepted the notion that there was an element of what he 
called unearned income appropriated from the labourers‘ product by the owners 
                                            
253 Fred Dayřs paper John Bates Clark, Socialism and Labour (2008) discussed David 
Ellermanřs exposition of the naïve conception of the claim that labour should be 
rewarded with the whole produce of labour. 
254 Foxwell was, of course, not alone is this apparent misunderstanding.  In a review of 
the English translation of Mengerřs The Right to the Whole Produce of Labor, for the 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Vol. 16, Sept. 1900) 
Richard T. Ely made a similar reading: 
Professor Menger, as a jurist profoundly interested in the development of 
society, endeavors to add to the fullness of our knowledge by a critical 
examination of what many have regarded as the central demand of 
modern socialism, viz.: the right of labor to the entire industrial product, 
and he conducts his examination from the legal point of view. (Ely, 
1900, p.133) 
 Richard T. Ely (1854-1943) was the founder of the American Economic 
Association and like Jon Bates Clark had studied in Heidelberg under Karl Knies, an of 
important economist of the German Historical School. 
 221 
of the ―instruments of production‖ which he deliberately separated from their 
labouring activity.  He suggested that a self-employed worker would be gaining 
unearned income, resultant from the mere ownership of property; 
But even the landlord who farms his own land, and the capitalist 
who engages in industry or trade, still of necessity obtain 
unearned income in the form of rent and profit respectively. 
(Menger, 1886, p.3) 
Given that Hodgskin was not a socialist Menger only mentioned Hodgskin in 
passing in his book.  As Menger‘s work related to the three specific claims of 
the socialists and not solely to the claim to labour‘s product, this was quite 
justified.255  Hodgskin did not make the claims for labour to subsistence or to 
work, which were encompassed within Menger‘s remit.  Menger appeared to be 
in agreement with Hodgskin on ―The recognition of the justifiable claim of the 
labourer to that which his labour has produced gives the first fundamental 
economic right, the right to the whole produce of labour.‖ (ibid, p.6) 
It was the subsequent socialist claims to the ―second economic right, the right to 
subsistence‖ and the ―third economic right, the right to labour‖ that Menger was 
critical of (ibid). In this sense Hodgskin had no place in what Foxwell calls 
Menger‘s ―history and a criticism‖ (Foxwell, 1899, p.vi).  Thus Foxwell‘s lengthy 
discussion of Hodgskin in the Introduction to the English edition of Menger‘s 
work was not so much an extension of ―Dr. Menger‘s inquiry‖, but further 
illustrated the misunderstandings that have been evident in relation to 
Hodgskin‘s economics and particularly to ideas regarding the labourers‘ claim to 
labour‘s whole product.  
Menger’s Conclusions 
After his historical expositions of English socialist writers (which did not include 
Hodgskin) Menger noted two aspects to the claim for labour‘s right to its 
produce: 
The right to the whole produce of labour, in the sense in which it 
figures in socialist theories, leads on one hand to a criticism of 
existing conditions, and on the other hand to constructive 
proposals for their modification.  In its negative critical function it 
                                            
255 ŖAccording to Anton Menger, Socialism usually assumes three economic basic 
rights Ŕ the right to the full produce of labour, the right to existence, and the right to 
workŗ (Mises, 1932, p.48). 
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repudiates as an intolerable injustice all unearned means of 
existence, whether in the form of rent or interest.  Its positive 
constructive function is to allot to every labourer such a share of 
the value of the total production as he by his labour has produced. 
(Menger, 1886, p.159) 
Clearly, Hodgskin, although not a socialist, presented both these negative and 
positive functions in his work, which may explain why he has been repeatedly 
associated with contemporary socialists. 
Menger also aligned the right to the whole product with three possible forms of 
property schemes: 
(1) Private property, always united with separate usance of the 
objects possessed. 
(2) Community of property with separate usance.  
(3) Community of property with community of usance. (ibid, 
p.161) 
Hodgskin held to the first property system of private property with separate 
usance, although he felt the need to reiterate this, because of his association 
with those that Menger saw as socialist.  
allow me to separate myself entirely from them, by declaring that I 
look on a right of property – on the right of individuals, to have and 
to own, for their own separate and selfish use and enjoyment, the 
produce of their own industry, with power freely to dispose of the 
whole of that in the manner most agreeable to themselves, as 
essential to the welfare and even continued existence of society. 
(Hodgskin, 1832, p.24) 
Menger saw the labourers‘ claim as unworkable with individual private property 
due to the legal conditions that would still persist in creating unearned income: 
Under the sway of private property with separate usance, that is 
under the conditions actually dominant in almost the whole of 
Europe, the right to the whole produce of labour can never be 
realised.  For under such an organisation, the means of 
production and consumable commodities being legally assigned 
to separate individuals, the owners are enabled, by virtue of their 
legal monopoly, to draw unearned income in the form of rent or 
interest.  All proposals to combine separate usance and private 
property with the right to the whole produce of labour, whether by 
a reorganisation of credit (Proudhon), or of purchase, exchange, 
and wage contracts (Rodbertus), are inevitably wrecked upon this 
legalised ascendancy of landowners and capitalists. (Menger, 
1886, p.161) 
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However the scheme that Hodgskin favoured was, showing his anarchistic 
tendencies, outside of a legal organisation of society, which Menger seemed 
unable to envisage or contemplate.   Menger, like Bentham and James Mill 
before him, assumed that private ownership could only be sustained with legal 
enactments, whereas Hodgskin, as illustrated in Natural and Artificial Right of 
Property Contrasted (1832), supposed that legality rather corrupted the natural 
property right, or as we have previously discussed, legality was exogenous to 
the purely economical.   
Menger‘s acceptance that remuneration as ―unearned income in the form of 
rent and interest‖ occurring by ―virtue of their legal monopoly‖, was a position 
that Hodgskin had recognised.  Hence for Hodgskin the difficulty that Menger 
saw for combining ―separate usance and private property with the right to the 
whole produce of labour‖ would be alleviated by the removal of the legal 
instruments that enforced ―artificial‖ monopolies. 
Later Expositions 
H.S. Foxwell referred to the claim that the worker had the right to the whole 
produce of labour as ―the cardinal doctrine of revolutionary socialism‖ (Foxwell, 
1899, p.v).   
The claim of labour to the whole produce of industry, without 
deduction of any kind, has, in one or other of the various 
interpretations that may be put upon it, served as the foundation 
of most of the protean forms of modern socialism; (Foxwell, 1899, 
p.vii) 
However, Hodgskin clearly expressed this claim in terms of labour enjoying ―the 
whole of its produce‖ and not as subsequently expressed as the whole produce 
of production. 
When Ludwig von Mises discussed Anton Menger‘s work in Socialism (1932), 
he recognised that an interpretation which confused the whole produce of 
labour with all that was produced (by society) was a verbal confusion: 
that particular demand of socialism appears quite absurd. But to 
the layman it is not so.  The habit of speech with which it is 
expressed derives from the view that value comes from labour 
alone.  Whoever takes this view of value will see in the demand 
for the abolition of private ownership in the means of production a 
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demand for the full produce of labour for the labourer. (Mises, 
1932, p.48) 
Hodgskin did not demand the abolition of private ownership of the means of 
production and yet did uphold a right for the labourers to the whole produce of 
their labour.  Thus the misunderstandings, as illustrated by the comments of 
James Mill and Thomas Cooper in the 1830.s, and later by Foxwell (and Ely), 
seem at best a simple confusion.  
Hodgskin‘s commitment to private property and the labourers‘ right to the whole 
of their produce could only be consistent if the whole produce of labour is taken 
in the sense as expressed by David Ellerman in Property & Contract in 
Economics (1992) – as production‘s output less its inputs, rather than just the 
whole final product of production.  
Concluding Remarks 
Hodgskin‘s claim that labour should receive the whole of its product was not 
particularly perverse or extreme, if understood as we have attempted herein.  
Notwithstanding this it has often been misinterpreted as meaning that the whole 
of output belongs exclusively to the labourers.  In this naïve sense it was neither 
a viable nor a judicious claim to maintain, and we do not believe it was one 
pursued in this manner by Hodgskin. 
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Chapter 6 
Value 
Agenda 
Having considered political economy as the science of labour and investigated 
what constitutes labour and its product we now look at what for some 
economists was a major issue within political economy, namely what was the 
value of the produce that labour created.  Our aim is to dissociate Hodgskin 
from the perspective he is generally portrayed within – that of adhering to a 
labour theory of value.  We will illustrate that Hodgskin, and some of his 
contemporaries, did not hold a strict or objective labour theory of value. Indeed 
he acknowledged what has subsequently come to be understood as a 
subjective notion of value. 
Whist it is true that Hodgskin held what could be called a labour theory of price 
he fully recognised that value and price, whilst not completed unassociated 
concepts, were quite distinct.  Hence before we progress onto the issue of 
prices in our next chapter, we will here discuss Hodgskin on the subject of 
value, so that any confusion associated with the subjects of value and price can 
be avoided. 
Hodgskin on Value 
Hodgskin‘s musings on the topic of value are somewhat scattered as he did not 
directly write on the subject in the same way that he did with Prices.256  Thus 
this section reviews pertinent material in order to get an overall perspective.  
We aim to show that he did not hold to an idea that value, in the sense of 
exchangeable value, was determined by some intrinsic quality embodied within 
a commodity in direct proportion to the labour that produced the item in 
question. 
                                            
256 Indeed Hodgskinřs Economist review of Ricardo illustrated the low priority that 
Hodgskin placed on the issue of value as an economic issue, when he portrayed Ŗthe 
exchangeable variations in the value of commoditiesŗ as being of Ŗcomparatively little 
importanceŗ. (Hodgskin, E., 28th Nov. 1846, p.1557)   
 226 
Further we do not conceive that Hodgskin was unique in his understanding of 
value and that what might be conceived of nowadays as a subjectivist concept 
of value was more widely held than has generally been accepted. Thus not only 
shall we represent Hodgskin‘s position in this regard but we also illustrate 
similar ideas held by some of his contemporaries, particularly Thomas de 
Quincey and John Stuart Mill.   
Hodgskin's Concept of Value  
In his review of Richard Jennings‘ Natural Elements of Political Economy (1855) 
for The Economist (23rd June 1855) Hodgskin commented on Jennings‘ 
assertion that value was a subjective judgement, with surprise that as such a 
claim needed to be emphasised: 
It never has been doubted that value is a mental conception, the 
result of the desires, labours, and interests of individuals, the 
consequence of mutual and contradicting haggling; (Hodgskin, 
23rd June 1855, p.681-2) 
This reflects his claim in Labour Defended that the value created by labour 
could only be determined in the market. 
Each labourer produces only some part of a whole, and each part, 
having no value or utility of itself, there is nothing on which the 
labourer can seize, and say "this is my product, this will I keep to 
myself." Between the commencement of any joint operation, such 
as that of making cloth, and the division of its product among the 
different persons whose combined exertions have produced it, the 
judgment of men must intervene several times, and the question 
is, how much of this joint product should go to each of the 
individuals whose united labours produce it?  
I know no way of deciding this but by leaving it to be settled by 
the unfettered judgments of the labourers themselves.  If all kinds 
of labour were perfectly free, if no unfounded prejudice invested 
some parts, and perhaps the least useful, of the social task with 
great honour, while other parts are very improperly branded with 
disgrace, there would be no difficulty on this point, and the wages 
of individual labour would be justly settled by what Dr. Smith calls 
the "higgling of the market." (Hodgskin, 1825, p.25) 
A recognition of subjective influences upon the conceptualisation of value and 
wealth can be also found in Hodgskin‘s discussion of the benefits of trade and 
the socially useful function performed by merchants; 
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All wealth, it must be remembered, has a relation to our wants. 
The rich and luscious pine-apple, that annually ripens and decays 
in the wilds of Africa, and the majestic trees which flourish and 
fade, century after century, in the unexplored forests of America, 
almost unseen and untouched by a single human being, are not 
wealth. Transport them, however, into Covent-garden market, or 
to the banks of the Thames, and they would instantly acquire that 
relation to the wants of some persons, which gives to a material 
object the characteristics of wealth. This is an extreme case; but 
the business of the merchant is to give, in a degree, this 
characteristic of wealth to every object he deals with. He removes 
commodities from where they possess little, to where they 
possess much value; from where there are few or no persons 
requiring them, and they are of little use, to where they are of 
more use, and where the demand for them is greater; and as far 
as this relation of material objects to the wants of man is 
concerned, he creates wealth as much as the man who, by 
converting wool into cloth, adapts it to the purposes of clothing. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.172-3) 
This passage is significant for its recognition of the relationships between 
human wants with both wealth and value.  It might well be that a conception (or 
measurement) of value could be related to a notion of how much human action 
was necessary to produce a good, but no matter how much human action might 
be involved, without subjective desire, wants or perceived use, the good would 
have no value. 
Hodgskin’s Labour Theory of the Notion of Value 
In his chapter on Money within Popular Political Economy Hodgskin did make 
certain statements that could be interpreted as committing him, contrary to our 
position herein, to what might appear to be a labour theory of value. In order to 
achieve a balanced view it will be necessary to look at this in order to 
appreciate his position as a whole. 
As all commodities are exclusively the produce of labour, there is 
no other rule, and there can be no other rule, for determining their 
relative value to each other, but the quantity of labour required to 
produce each and all of them.  This circumstance establishes 
between metals and all other commodities a natural relation, 
subject only to such variations as may be caused by an increased 
difficulty or facility of procuring any one commodity, including the 
precious metals. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.185) 
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On the surface this might appear an acceptance that value could be resolved by 
some objective quantification of the labour embodied within a commodity or 
necessary to its production.  However, it is plain, by Hodgskin‘s remarks later in 
this paragraph that this is not what he meant.  Rather he was positing the idea 
that the labour embodied in a good provided a psychological stimulus to our 
subjective recognition of value that goods might possess; 
I say different quantities of labour are naturally necessary to 
procure, and different degrees of difficulty are naturally met with in 
procuring all commodities, and these differing quantities of labour, 
these different degrees of difficulty, establish in our minds a 
natural relation of value between all commodities, including the 
precious metals, which, though it may vary, exists at all times and 
places, quite independent of any human laws whatever. (ibid, 
p.186) 
Thus Hodgskin was stressing that the subjective valuation we place on goods is 
largely determined by our perception of the labour that would be necessary to 
produce the commodity, not that some intrinsic or inherent value was embodied 
in an item during its production.  He might well have been misguided in his 
assertion that this was how everybody always did and always would continue to 
value goods, but in his day, the overriding concern of economics with 
production might well have made this seem reasonable.257 
In Labour Defended Hodgskin acknowledged that the individual‘s valuation of 
labour was itself personal, varied according to different forms of labour, and 
was effectively unknowable; 
There is no principle or rule, as far as I know, for dividing the 
produce of joint labour among the different individuals who concur 
in production, but the judgment of the individuals themselves; that 
judgment depending on the value men may set on different 
species of labour can never be known, nor can any rule be given 
for its application by any single person.  As well might a man say 
                                            
257 It might well be conceived that what was so revolutionary about the marginalist 
revolution was not so much the concepts of marginalism or subjectivist valuation, 
which had been around in the early part of the nineteenth century, but rather the change 
of emphasis from a science concerned with producers and production to one that 
encompassed the consumer and their consumption needs, particularly in the area of 
value determination. 
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what others shall hate or what they shall like. (Hodgskin, 1825, 
p.24-5)258 
Thus if Hodgskin had a labour theory of value at all it could be stated in the form 
that individuals‘ subjective personal valuations tended to be aligned with the 
value that they placed on their perception of the labour that would have been 
necessary to produce the good in question.  This is far from being a concrete 
statement that value is objectively determined or related to the labour 
necessary for the production of the item of value.  
Contemporary Notions 
Whether Hodgskin was justified in his assertion that ―It never has been doubted 
that value is a mental conception‖ is a point that requires at least some 
preliminary investigation.  To this end several passages from contemporary 
political economy will be presented to review whether this view of value was 
entertained by other economists. 
Perhaps the most significant is from The Westminster Review‘s review of 
Samuel Bailey‘s Dissertation on Value (1825) from January 1826: 
When a commodity is in demand, and has a class of purchasers, 
at a certain price, it may always be taken for granted, that they 
would give a little bit more for the commodity, if it could not be 
obtained at that price.  What is the cause of this cheapness? Cost 
of production, of course.  Cost of production instead of being the 
cause of value, is more properly the reverse; a cause of non-
value, a cause of the non-existence of a higher degree of value, 
which, but for the cost of production, the commodity would have 
attained.  
Demand is the cause of value.  There is no puzzle about that; 
about which, however, our language master [i.e. Bailey] has 
puzzled himself through several pages.  Cost of production, by 
preventing demand from raising value above its own level, limits 
and determines value; and, therefore may, with great correctness 
be denominated the Regulator of value.  To call it the Cause, is a 
                                            
258 The sparseness of material by Hodgskin on the subject of value means that we have 
had to use examples that in some instances look at value directly from a consumersř 
perspective, whilst other examples, such as this one look at workers in a joint 
production process valuing their produce within that process. Whilst this might not be 
ideal it could be argued that within any production process employers and workers are 
effectively customers of each other. This was a point made by J.B. Clark when he 
asserted that ŖThe employer becomes virtually, the customer of the workmanŗ (Clark, 
1883, p.360).   
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metaphysical blunder.  As well might a tyro in political science 
think to improve our knowledge by calling the pendulum the cause 
of the motion in the hands of the clock.  The pendulum performs a 
function to the motion of the hands of the clock, perfectly 
analogous to that which is performed by the cost of production to 
the value of commodities. (WR., Jan. 1826, p.168) 
Coming as it did within two years of this article the following paragraph from 
Popular Political Economy used some similar terms and concepts and thus it 
would seem that this passage provided an illustration or rationale of ideas akin 
to those that lay behind Hodgskin‘s position.  
The natural or necessary price of commodities is only influenced 
by all those circumstances which make labour more or less 
productive. It is the prime but not sole regulator of exchangeable 
value, of money and social price.  No commodity can in the long 
run be exchanged for less, though it may for more, labour than it 
cost.  Natural price is therefore always the limit in one direction, 
but only in one, to the money price of all commodities.  They 
cannot be sold for less labour than they cost, but they may be sold 
for more. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.233) 
Not that such notions critical of a theory of value based solely on embodied 
labour were new to the 1820.s.  Francis Horner‘s article in the Edinburgh 
Review that reviewed Principes d‟Economie Politiqae (1801) by Nicolas-
François Canard (1750-1833) was particularly critical of Canard‘s ―enunciation 
of the principle … which assigns the quantity of labour employed on a 
commodity, as the essential constituent and measure of its exchangeable 
value‖. Horner noticed that this idea ―which is certainly incorrect‖ could be found 
in many texts going as far back as Aristotle‘s Ethics (Horner, E.R. Jan. 1803, 
p.60). Horner later expressed a notion of value in terms not too distance from 
that of the Westminster Review‘s passage above. 
But the proper mode of introducing this principle into the theory of 
exchangeable value, is, not to state the value of labour as 
constituting the whole price, or forming an adequate measure of it, 
but to view it as a condition which limits the eventual supply of 
each commodity. (Horner, E.R. Jan. 1803, p.62) 
After Horner‘s death but before McCulloch‘s contributions the Edinburgh 
Review still published articles that discussed value as demand determined. 
Corn and Money (Feb. 1816), a review of Robert Wilson‘s An Inquiry into the 
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Causes of the High Prices of Corn and Labour (1815) provided an example of 
this;  
The truth is, that for every article of value, there must always be a 
demand to a certain extent.  If there were no demand, it would 
have no value whatever.  But as both the demand and the supply 
of all commodities is apt to vary, their value is apt to vary also: 
(E.R., Feb. 1816, p.148)    
Hodgskin and The Westminster Review provide examples during the 1820.s of 
this inclination, which, in the 1830.s, can also be seen In Richard Whately‘s 
Lectures on Political Economy (1832); 
A specimen of that introduction of accidental circumstances which 
I have been describing, may be found, I think, in the language of a 
great number of writers, respecting Wealth and Value; who have 
usually made Labour an essential ingredient in their definitions.  
Now it is true, it so happens, by the appointment of Providence, 
that valuable articles are, in almost all incidents, obtained by 
Labour; but still, this is an accidental, not an essential 
circumstance. … In this, as in many other points in Political-
Economy, men are prone to confound cause and effect.  It is not 
that pearls fetch a high price because men have dived for them; 
but on the contrary, men dive for them because they fetch a high 
price. (Whately, 1832, p.253) 
De Quincey on Value 
By the 1840.s Thomas de Quincey‘s Logic of Political Economy (1844) 
contained a discussion on value that was to be repeated in wholesale manner 
by J.S. Mill in his Principles of Political Economy (Book III, Ch. 1-3, 1848). 
Quincey had claimed to ―expose the confusion between ‗market value‘ as a fact 
and ‗market value‘ as a law‖.  His conception contrasted the term value ―in 
popular use‖ with value ―in the technical use‖ (De Quincey, 1844, p.236-7). 
Thomas de Quincey referred to subjective valuations as ―affirmative value‖ 
which he identified as being by antithesis in antagonistic opposition to the 
―negative value‖ or ―resistance price‖ as evidenced in the cost of production.   
And this effect of affirmative value must always continue to act, 
even when the ordinary state of affairs shall have been restored 
… and after the cost or negative value shall have been reinstalled 
as the operative price.  This primary and latent action of the 
affirmative value must not be a moment forgotten. In fact, the 
confusion arising out of this one oversight has been the real cause 
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why the idea of value has never yet been thoroughly and 
searchingly investigated. (Quincey, 1844, p.327)   
Hence, the cost of production was a limit for (exchangeable) price in one 
direction, its minimum, but price was unlimited in the other direction, only being 
bound by the subjective valuations inevitably applied.  The negative aspect, 
being such an incomplete prescription, would, Quincey argued, be secondary to 
the constraint that operated, figuratively, in both directions. 
After much discussion and logical exposition Quincey arrived at his conclusion 
as to the nature of exchange value, which, in some ways, bore comparison with 
the 1826 Westminster Review article, with regards to the two indispensable 
factors of exchangeable value.  J.S. Mill provided a summary of Quincey‘s 
argument on value in his review of Quincey‘s Logic of Political Economy for the 
Westminster Review in June 1845 
After what appears to us a most inordinate over-statement of this 
meta-physical perplexity, he proceeds to state the doctrine, in his 
opinion a novel one, which resolves it. This doctrine is, that while 
both usefulness and difficulty of attainment are necessary 
conditions to the existence of any exchange value, the amount of 
the value is determined not by both jointly, but either wholly by 
one or wholly by the other, according to the nature of the case. 
(Mill, IV, p.397) 
John Stuart Mill on de Quincey 
J.S. Mill‘s review saw Quincey‘s position on value as valid but not necessarily a 
novel or new opinion. 
It would be difficult, we think, to cite a specimen of exposition on 
an abstract subject, more transparently clear, and at the same 
time so scientifically precise. But can Mr. De Quincey be serious 
in maintaining that the doctrine which this passage embodies is a 
novel one? Have not all political economists distinguished 
between articles which can be multiplied to an indefinite extent by 
labour, and articles naturally or artificially limited to a quantity 
short of the demand; and have they not all, from Ricardo 
downwards, affirmed that in the former, and more common case, 
the value conforms on an average to the cost of production, while 
in the latter there are no limits to the value except the necessities 
or desires of the purchaser? (ibid, p.398) 
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So again we have an exposition which seems to justify Hodgskin‘s view that a 
subjectively determined theory of value was conceived of and openly discussed 
in the early part of the 19th century. 
Despite this, it was Malthus‘s complaint against what he saw as the (Ricardian) 
―New School‖ that it held to what we might see as a labour theory of value: 
We now proceed to consider the main principles which more 
especially characterize the new school of political economy.  
These appear to be three, 
1. That the quantity of labour worked up in commodities 
determines their exchangeable value. 
2. That the demand and supply have no effect upon prices and 
values, except in cases of monopoly or for short periods of 
time. 
3. That the difficulty of production on land is the regulator of 
profits, to the entire exclusion of the cause stated by Adam 
Smith, namely, the relative abundance and competition of 
capital. (Malthus, QR., Jan. 1824, p.307-8) 
It is interesting to note that Malthus cited J.B. Say, Storch and Garnier, 
authorities also frequently cited by Hodgskin, for their opposition to the new 
school‘s economics. 
In the Westminster Review of Jan. 1825 J.S. Mill wrote a reply to Malthus‘s 
article that directly addressed the points made in this accusation.  Mill denied 
that the latter two propositions were upheld and the first, what we might see as 
the core of a labour theory of value, was downplayed to an ―insignificant 
dispute‖: 
As for the three propositions which the Reviewer has hit upon, to 
distinguish the "new school" from that of Adam Smith and Mr. 
Malthus, the two last, as here stated, never were maintained by 
them at all: while the first, into which he resolves both the others, 
and which he holds up as the most important of all their doctrines, 
happens to be the least important; and so far is it from being true, 
as he asserts, "that all the peculiar doctrines of the new system 
directly and necessarily flow" [p. 332] from this proposition, that 
not one of their doctrines, nor, so far as we know, of any other 
doctrines, flows from it at all; it being, in truth, more a question of 
nomenclature and classification than one from which any 
important consequences are deduced. Granting, therefore, that 
the Reviewer has completely demolished these three 
propositions--two of which, indeed, we freely concede to him--all 
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the fundamental principles of the "new school" remain untouched. 
(Mill, IV, p.30) 
What then is this great question upon which we are to believe that 
the whole science depends? simply, as we have already 
observed, a question of nomenclature: the question, whether 
these facts, about which all are agreed, shall be contained in one 
expression or another; whether this effect of time, and this effect 
of fixed capital, are ultimately resolvable into labour, and are 
included in the simple expression that value depends upon 
quantity of labour, or not: a question of pure curiosity, and of no 
practical use what-ever. Yet this is the question upon which our 
pseudo-Malthusian pretends to believe, that the whole of the 
peculiar doctrines of the "new school" depend! (ibid, p.32) 
Thus Mill recognised that he and other economists also held that demand and 
supply were the causal factors of value. 
They not only allow that demand and supply have some influence 
on value, but they assert that nothing else has any influence 
whatever, except in as far as it may be calculated to affect either 
the demand or the supply. When they say that cost of production 
regulates value, it is only because cost of production is that which 
regulates supply. If there be two commodities, produced by equal 
cost, what is the reason that they exchange for one another? The 
reason is, because if one of the two bore a higher value than the 
other, when the cost of production is the same, the profits of the 
two producers would be unequal, and it would be the interest of 
one of them to withdraw a portion of his capital from his own 
business and transfer it to that of the other; thus increasing the 
supply of the dearer commodity, diminishing that of the cheaper, 
until the equality of values is restored: and restored, as the reader 
will observe, not in contradiction to the principle of demand and 
supply, but in consequence of it. "It thus appears," says Mr. Mill 
(Elements of Political Economy, 2nd Ed. pp. 88-9) "that the 
relative value of commodities, or, in other words, the quantity of 
one which exchanges for a given quantity of another, depends 
upon demand and supply, in the first instance, but upon cost of 
production ultimately, and hence, in accurate language, upon cost 
of production entirely." (ibid, p.33) 
Mark Blaug, in Ricardian Economics (1958), recognised that Ricardo had been 
widely conceived as an advocate of a labour theory of value, although such a 
supposition was not then a consistent unified theory: 
In the first half of the nineteenth century critics and disciples alike 
concurred in regarding Ricardo as an exponent of the labor theory 
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of value, but the bewildering variety of interpretations suggest no 
consensus on the meaning of that theory. (Blaug, 1958, p.34) 
Blaug summarised Ricardo‘s chapter on value thus; 
So the point of the chapter on value seems to be that, under 
conditions of perfect competition, relative prices of reproducible 
commodities tend to be proportional to the relative quantities of 
embodied labor; in addition, a hypothetical invariable measure 
may be employed to ascertain the source of changes in 
exchanges rations. (ibid, p.35) 
The Westminster Review and later works by Quincey and Mill in the 1840.s took 
the labour theory of value as a tool of analysis rather than a natural law (in the 
sense of a causal fact) of perfectly competitive economic society. 
Culpability for the dominance of what might be aligned to that which the 
Westminster Review of 1826 called the popular rather than technical notion of 
the labour theory of value, might be laid at McCulloch‘s feet. For example in his 
Memoir of the Life and Writings of David Ricardo (1825) he made the assertion 
that may be seen as a causal labour theory of value; 
The fundamental principle maintained by Mr. Ricardo in his great 
work, is, that the exchangeable value, or relative worth, of 
commodities, as compared with each other, depends exclusively 
on the quantities of labour necessarily required to produce them. 
(McCulloch, 1825, p.17) 
It would seem that along with Hodgskin, Ricardians such as De Quincey and 
J.S. Mill, did not accept this in quite the same way as it is often understood 
nowadays, or at least as here expressed, by McCulloch.  
In many reviews of Ricardo, this issue, of what McCulloch called the 
fundamental principle, is not even referred to.  This can be seen for example in 
Quincey‘s The Services of Mr. Ricardo to the Science of Political Economy in 
the London Magazine (March 1824) and John Rooke‘s An Inquiry into Mr. 
Ricardo‟s Theory of the Laws which Regulate the Value of Corn and Gold in the 
Farmer‟s Magazine (May 1820). 
Indeed John Rooke concentrated rather on what would nowadays be seen as 
the marginalist implications of Ricardo‘s work: 
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Though this able and distinguished writer has stated his views in a 
logical and well defined manner, yet, in respect to what regulates 
the value of corn, they come no nearer the truth, than it must be 
the last and finite portion of that commodity added to the general 
stock, which, in some way or other, regulates the value of farm 
produce. (Rooke, 3rd April 1820, p.152) 
De Quincey on Malthus 
Pertinent comments by Quincey on value can also be found in his review of 
Malthus‘s Measure of Value (1823) in the London Magazine (Dec. 1823). 
Quincey was not shy in attacking Malthus‘s logic, and noted that his ―delusions 
are not so much logical as economic‖ (Quincey, L.M., Dec. 1823, p.138): 
The question is – what is the measure of value? I say then that 
the phrase – ―measure of value‖ is an equivocal phrase; and, in 
Mr. Malthus‘s use of it, means indifferently that which determines 
value, in relation to the principium essendi, and that which 
determines value, in relation to the principium cognoscondi. (ibid) 
Quincey recognised that although he needed to ―express scholastic phrases‖ he 
should also be able ―to descend into the arena with no other weapons than 
plain English can furnish‖ (ibid, p.139) 
Let us therefore translate ―measure of value‖ into ―that which 
determines value:‖ and, in this shape, we shall detect the 
ambiguity of which I complain.  For I say, that the word determines 
may be taken subjectively for what determines X in relation to our 
knowledge, or objectively for what determines X in relation to 
itself.  Thus, if I were to ask – ―What determined the length of the 
racecourse?‖ and the answer were – ―The convenience of the 
spectators who could not have seen the horses at a greater 
distance,‖ or ―The choice of the subscribers,‖ then it is plain that 
by the word ―determined,‖ I was understood to mean ―determined 
objectively,‖ i.e. in relation to the existence of the object; in other 
words, what caused the racecourse to be this length rather than 
another length: but, if the answer were – ―An actual 
admeasurement,‖ it would be plain that by the word ―determined,‖ 
I had been understood to mean ―determined subjectively,‖ i.e. in 
relation to our knowledge, what ascertained it? – Now in the 
objective sense of the phrase, ―determiner of value,‖ the measure 
of value will mean the ground of value: in the subjective sense, it 
will mean the criterion of value. (ibid) 
The point that Quincey‘s was making was that Ricardo used labour as the 
objective determiner of value or ground of value; but Malthus was less 
consistent and sometimes also used labour in the subjective sense as the 
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amount of labour commanded by a good. If Malthus used labour in a different 
sense to Ricardo then they were not arguing over the same issue. 
Principium Cognoscondi 
Thus we can relate Hodgskin‘s labour theory of value to the principium 
cognoscondi rather than a principium essendi. Thereby, Hodgskin perceived 
that labour was not the objective ground of value but was rather used as the 
criterion generally adopted when values were considered or determined. 
In conclusion, we can see that whilst Hodgskin undoubtedly saw labour as 
linked to the issue of value, like many of his contemporaries, (especially Mill 
and Quincey) it was not always conceived of as the ultimate regulator of value.  
Whilst the cost of production, whether envisaged as solely labour or a 
combination of factors, could be equated to the effective long-term minimum 
value (in the sense of price or cost of production) that would prevail in the 
market, Hodgskin and quite a few of his contemporaries understood that the 
actual value encapsulated in the market was the result of individual and 
socialised subjective aspects.   
The distinction we must be aware of with regards to early 19th century concepts 
of value, particularly in relation to labour, was whether the notions expressed 
related to the popular or technical meanings.  The implication is that labour was 
the ground or foundation of value in the sense that, excepting monopoly, labour 
was the start of the process from which value was the eventual conclusion. The 
popular sense although technically incomplete, was deemed sufficient for 
ordinary purposes such as polemic rationales or basic dissemination (e.g. as in 
McCulloch and sometimes in Hodgskin‘s journalistic polemic writings).  These 
popularised examinations were not seen to deny the fuller exposition and 
understanding in the more technical discussions of value.  Nevertheless this 
popular notion of value may be the leading treatment that has come down to us, 
for whatever reason, via history. 
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Chapter 7 
Price 
 
Agenda 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate Hodgskin‘s ideas on the nature and 
behaviour of prices.  In order to do this we look at two aspects that are 
particularly pertinent to Hodgskin‘s economics and thereby to the aim of this 
thesis – an explanation of his concept of economic growth. 
a) A Scheme of Prices. We will review Hodgskin‘s threefold scheme of 
prices; i.e. natural price, social price and money price.  A full appreciation 
of these manifestations of price is important not only to understand his 
economics in general, but also the specific differences his terms 
presented when compared to those of his contemporaries.  This is 
especially important for his use of the term natural price. 
b) The Behaviour of Natural Prices. The role played by natural price is 
crucial within Hodgskin‘s concept of growth stemming, as it does, from 
his claim that natural prices inescapably fall over time. This was in direct 
opposition to the prevalent Ricardian and Malthusian positions of his day 
which conceived that prices would generally rise over the course of time. 
Thus secondly we will present an exposition of Hodgskin‘s argument that 
natural prices have a long term tendency to fall.   
These will thereby form the final scene setting before our final chapter Growth, 
where these principles will be brought together with his thoughts on economic 
growth, which is the main theme of this thesis. 
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Section One 
 
A Scheme of Prices 
 
Hodgskin‘s scheme of prices ran throughout his work but was most concisely 
set out within the ninth chapter of Popular Political Economy (1827), aptly 
entitled Prices.  Thus we herein draw predominately from this chapter together 
with reference to other works.  Orientation is also offered through Thomas 
Cooper, who was the only contemporary economist that directly acknowledged 
Hodgskin‘s particular scheme of prices, and via other economists from the early 
19th century, such as Ricardo and Malthus, as well as Robert Torrens‘ 
interesting contributions.  
As was stated in the introduction to this chapter Hodgskin‘s representation of 
prices provided three forms – natural, social and money prices. As such our first 
task in this section will be to make clear how these three forms were 
differentiated and how they were distinct when compared to his contemporaries‘ 
notions of price.  Once this initial demarcation is outlined we concentrate, as 
Hodgskin did himself in his own chapter on Prices, on what he called natural 
price and ensure that its distinctiveness is fully appreciated. 
Three categories of Price 
Like many writers on economics in the early nineteenth century Hodgskin‘s 
basic category of price was termed natural price.  He also used the term money 
price for prices as they were actually paid in the market.  The expression which 
distinguished his nomenclature was social price. 
Social Price. The price that commodities bring when influenced by 
restrictions, monopolies, taxes, and legislative regulations. … This 
is a term used by Thomas Hodgkins [sic] in his Popular Political 
Economy, and I think conveys a useful distinction. (Cooper, 1830, 
p.40-41)  
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The usual terminology of this period perceived a theoretical form of price, such 
as a natural, normal or static price.  Compared with this was the price as 
typically experienced in the reality of actual exchange that varied from the 
various theoretical forms of price to some degree.  Such terms as market, real, 
nominal or money price were applied to this more dynamic and pragmatic 
representation of the actual prices usually encountered in the purchase of 
commodities or services.  
Hodgskin had two theoretical forms of price (natural and social) and one form of 
realised price (money).  It thus becomes necessary to align Hodgskin‘s three 
terms betwixt the more common two. 
As we will discuss, when we examine Hodgskin‘s natural price in more depth, 
most economists tended to explain even the theoretical price is some realistic 
manner rather than holding, as we shall see Hodgskin did, the theoretical price 
in purely abstract terms; as E.K. Hunt noted in his History of Economic Thought; 
Hodgskin was absolutely clear about the fact that his ―natural 
price‖ was a normative concept describing a situation that could 
obtain only if existing governments and laws, which Hodgskin saw 
as unnatural, were abolished (Hunt, 2002, p.169). 
His social price, although closer to prices as realised in the actual world, was as 
we will discuss subsequently, still expressed in theoretical terms, i.e. in labour 
rather than money terms. 
As Hodgskin did in his chapter on Prices, we first introduce money price, 
followed by the distinction between social price and natural price before we, as 
he did, concentrate more fully on the concept and behaviour of natural price. 
Initially we make a brief introduction to Adam Smith‘s terminology regarding 
prices as a scene setting for both Hodgskin and his contemporaries on this 
issue.   This is not intended as an analysis of Smith‘s theory of prices, but 
simply a review of his distinction between natural and market Prices. 
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Adam Smith’s Prices 
Chapter VII of the first book of The Wealth of Nations, Of the natural and market 
Price of Commodities, began with Smith‘s assertion that there were usually 
―ordinary or average‖ rates of wages, profits and rents that tended to exist in an 
economy. 
These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of 
wages, profit, and rent, at the time and place in which they 
commonly prevail. (Smith, WN, p.72) 
By natural, at least in this passage, Smith related that which usually occurred 
rather than, as we shall see when we discuss Hodgskin‘s natural prices in more 
detail, the inevitable result of natural conditions.  In line with this approach 
Smith therefore saw natural prices as effectively those that would occur 
consistent with those customary conditions necessary to bring commodities to a 
position where they could be sold. 
When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than 
what is sufficient to pay the rent of land, the wages of labour, and 
the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and 
bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, the 
commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price. 
(ibid) 
Smith recognised that this natural price, as the costs necessary to bring a good 
to its market, would not necessarily be that price for which, in reality, it sold. 
The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold is 
called its market price.  It may either be above, or below, or 
exactly the same with its natural price.  (ibid, p.73) 
The mechanisms that Smith envisaged for divergence between natural and 
market prices are not of concern to us here, as we only need at this stage to 
identify that such differences were recognised. One might sum up Smith‘s 
position on this issue by seeing natural prices as those towards which market 
prices, affected by competition as well as supply and demand, tended towards. 
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to 
which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating.  
Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good 
deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat 
below it.  But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them 
from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are 
constantly tending towards it. (ibid, p.75) 
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There was perhaps inevitable given that the natural price, as described in 
chapter VII of The Wealth of Nations, being linked to the ―usual or average‖ 
costs of production, would change if market price continued at levels divergent 
from natural price for a sustained period, as exceptional remunerations became 
the norm. 
David Ricardo noted that although the actual or market price of a commodity 
might vary with demand, natural prices did not change with such alterations; 
Let us suppose that all commodities are at their natural price, and 
consequently that the profits of capital in all employments are 
exactly at the same rate … Suppose now that a change of fashion 
should increase the demand for silks, and lessen that for 
woollens; their natural price, the quantity of labour necessary to 
their production, would continue unaltered, but the market price of 
silks would rise, and that of woollens would fall; (Ricardo, I, p.90) 
Nevertheless it was the mechanism of competition that, for Ricardo, would 
eventually equalise capitalists' profits and bring the market price into line with 
the natural price; 
It is then the desire, which every capitalist has, of diverting his 
fund from a less to a more profitable employment, that prevents 
the market price of commodities from continuing for any length of 
time much above, or much below their natural price.  It is this 
competition which so adjusts the exchangeable value of 
commodities, (ibid, p.91) 
As has been the subject of numerous commentaries, for Smith prices were 
effectively the sum of costs of production; an adding up theory of price. This 
remained the dominant concept until David Ricardo challenged this model of 
prices, such that prices were no longer conceived of simply as the sum of the 
component parts.259  Although Ricardo disputed Smith‘s position on how prices 
were determined, Smith‘s terminology of natural and market prices persisted. 
This can also be seen exemplified in Malthus‘s Definitions in Political Economy 
published the same year as Hodgskin‘s Popular Political Economy (1827).  
After devoting several chapters to reviewing various economists‘ definitions and 
usage of terms Malthus gave his own summary statement of economic terms 
which included two that covered prices: 
                                            
259 We will return to the issue of an adding up theory of price when we discuss 
Hodgskinřs natural price in more depth. 
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The Price, the Market Price, or Actual Price of a Commodity at 
any place and time. 
44. The quantity of money for which it exchanges at that place 
and time, the money referring to the precious metals. 
The Natural Price of a commodity at any place and time. 
45.  The price in money which will pay the elementary costs of its 
production, or the money conditions of its supply. (Malthus, 1827, 
p.243-4) 
One point of note from Malthus‘s definitions is his expression of natural prices in 
money terms, which was quite common in the 1820.s.  An exception to this can 
be found in Robert Torrens‘ An Essay on the Production of Wealth (1821). 
Torrens was not only critical of this practice, but also laid out what should be 
meant by price, especially when compared to value: 
The term, exchangeable value, expresses the power of 
purchasing with respect to commodities in general: – the term, 
price, denotes the same power with respect to some particular 
commodity, the quantity of which is given. (Torrens, 1821, p.48) 
Although the use of the expression price without a specific qualification did 
signify for Torrens price in metallic (i.e. money) terms: 
As the precious metals are the things which general consent has 
rendered the immediate instruments of effecting exchanges, the 
term, price, when employed singly and without qualification, is 
understood to imply the sum in the metals, or in the 
representatives of the metals, which must be given for the article 
we require.  (ibid, p.49-50)  
The relevance of Torrens‘ concept of price will become more evident when we 
discuss natural prices. Thus having set the scene, at least as far as 
terminology, we shall now turn to Hodgskin‘s exposition and modifications, as 
far as prices were concerned.   
Hodgskin’s Money Price 
It might at first glance appear odd that unlike most writers who started their 
missives on prices by explaining natural prices, Hodgskin began his chapter on 
prices by expressing, albeit somewhat curtly, what he envisaged as money 
price.  This was probably due, in part, to the fact that his previous chapter had 
been concerned specifically with Money and thus money price followed on 
neatly from that.  Additionally as he was to devote the bulk of his Prices chapter 
to a consideration of natural prices, it was perhaps convenient to deal initially 
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with those forms of price – money and social – that he was not, at that stage, to 
consider at such length as he was natural price. 
In his chapter on Money Hodgskin had introduced that topic by at first stating 
that money itself, as simply a tool of trade, was not necessarily an issue that 
political economy should be overly concerned with; 
It [money] is, in fact, only the instrument for carrying on buying 
and selling, and the consideration of it no more forms part of the 
science of political economy, than the consideration of ships or 
steam engines; or of any other instruments employed to facilitate 
the production and distribution of wealth. (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.178-9) 
Money however was worthy of some consideration on three accounts; firstly 
due to its peculiar position as common currency; secondly as an illustration of 
natural laws in operation and finally because of the numerous arguments that 
had persisted amongst economists on the subject. 
It is different from all other instruments, in respect to its being 
used by the whole community; and not being exclusively the 
property of any individual. It affords also a very instructive proof of 
the manner in which the general laws of nature operate on the 
minds of individuals, producing a uniformity of conduct, equal in 
regularity to any movements of the planets. … Money has 
accordingly attracted much learned attention; and the principles 
which regulate it have been the subject of much debate. (ibid) 
Hodgskin‘s chapter on Prices opened with what might be seen as an almost 
disparaging reference to money price; perhaps borne of his attitude that 
downplayed money as a concern within economics: 
From what has been said on money, the reader will see that the 
term ―money price,‖ as applied to any commodities, only signifies 
the natural relation which exists at any given moment between 
them and a specific quantity of bullion in coin, – the use of bank 
notes, as long as they are payable on demand in precious metals, 
not altering this relation: (ibid, p.219) 
Hence for Hodgskin, money price was simply the nominal amount of money one 
paid for a good when it was purchased.   
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Market Price 
Hodgskin did not use the term Market Price but referred in the main to Money 
Price although sometimes he also used the term nominal price.  However to 
reduce ambiguities that might otherwise arise (particularly when compared to 
other economists‘ terms), especially in our subsequent chapter on Growth, it 
would be expedient to limit our terminology to the expression Market Price but 
be understood to be referring to what Hodgskin termed Money Price.  
Consequently there might be little more that needs to be said in this regard, 
apart from commenting on his observations towards the end of his Prices 
chapter which discussed how market prices varied.  
Money, as well as all the commodities of which it measures the 
value, are subject to variations in their natural price; … and it is by 
no means an easy task, as many persons suppose, to detect the 
real cause of those variations in price which are of daily 
occurrence. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.234-5)260 
For Hodgskin, whatever the causes of variations in price were, long term 
decreases were only advantageous if they resulted from improved technological 
conditions, i.e. the production of the commodity in question required less labour. 
In no case, however, is a fall of price beneficial, unless it be 
caused by a diminution of the labour necessary to bring 
commodities to market.  In all other cases the fall can be only 
temporary, and it takes place at the expense of the producers. 
(ibid) 
Hodgskin also recognised that market prices affected the quantities of 
commodities that would be consumed.  If a commodity‘s price fell then it was 
likely that more of those goods were available and hence more could be 
consumed.  If their prices rose, Hodgskin assumed that less would be 
consumed, and that at the same time producers would be encouraged to 
increase production. 
Variations in prices have very important results.  By bringing 
commodities within, or carrying them out of the reach of a certain 
number of persons, they regulate consumption. (ibid) 
                                            
260 Presumably when Hodgskin here and subsequently wrote about Ŗpriceŗ (unqualified 
by money, natural or social) he meant it in the purely nominal sense as we have seen 
Torrens stated that it should be. 
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This in turn, because market (money) prices were subject to variations caused 
by changes in demand, provided functional information for society as a whole. 
Money price, as determined by the relation of the demand to the 
supply, ―is the nicely poised balance,‖ says Mr. Buchanan, ―with 
which Nature weighs and distributes to her children their 
respective shares of her gifts, to prevent waste, and to them last 
till reproduced.‖  It is also the index to the wants of society; or it is 
the finger of Heaven, indicating to all men how they may employ 
their time and talents most profitably for themselves, and most 
beneficially for the whole society. (ibid)261 
Thus market prices could change with consumers‘ tastes and fashion (or their 
ability to fulfil their wishes), as well as the production conditions of the suppliers.  
From Hodgskin‘s perspective although this was a useful and necessary social 
phenomenon, it was not so useful for analytical purposes where he sought a 
more steady and consistent indicator of productive conditions, which he found 
in his concept of natural price.262 
Natural Price 
As we have shown with Malthus, most writers at the time of Popular Political 
Economy (1827) referred to natural price in money terms, as illustrated by 
David Ricardo;  
Its natural price, its money cost of production, would be altered by 
the altered value of money; and without any increase of demand, 
                                            
261 Presumably Hodgskin was here referring to David Buchanan (1779-1848), who had 
edited the Edinburgh published editions of The Wealth of Nations printed in 1814 and 
1817, which contained one complete volume (of four) of Buchananřs notes on Smith 
and his Wealth of Nations. (Reprinted in Volume II of Adam Smith: Critical Responses 
(2000) edited by Hiroshi Mizuta.)   
This passage was also quoted by Jane Marcet in her Conversations on Political 
Economy (Marcet, 1816, p.181). There is no indication (in Hodgskin or Marcet) 
whether the passage came from his edition of The Wealth of Nations or some other 
work. Although the only other book by Buchanan in the British Museum Library is his 
1844 Inquiry Into The Taxation And Commercial Policy Of Great Britain: With 
Observations Of The Principles Of Currency, And Of Exchangeable Value, he may well 
have published in periodicals. 
The less likely alternative was that it is a quote from Robert Buchanan (1785-1873) 
who was a Professor of Logic at Glasgow University from 1824, although he does not 
appear to have published any books until 1864. 
262 Harking back to our previous chapter on Value, it could be argued that exchangeable 
value could not be too strictly related to embodied labour if it were to be variable to 
such a degree as to provide useful information about consumersř tastes, and producersř 
propensities and conditions. 
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the price of the commodity would be naturally adjusted to that new 
value. (Ricardo, I, p.383)263 
Although Robert Torrens had pointed out the inconsistency of such expressions 
when the qualifier of price used in an expression did not actually relate to that 
item or good against which the price of a commodity was said to be compared: 
Price, then, is the quantity of that particular thing or commodity 
which is given in order to procure another commodity.  …  The 
qualified terms, corn price, labour price, &c. signify, of course, the 
quantity of corn or of labour which must be parted with, in order to 
obtain any given quantity of the commodity we want. (Torrens, 
1821, p.49-50)  
Thus to be consistent with Torrens the qualified phrase natural price would not 
be expressed nominally in money, but in terms similar to those that Hodgskin 
did.  Torrens equated natural price directly to the cost of production. 
The price of things being that which is given in order to procure 
them, it follows, that there must be two kinds of price: namely, 
market price, as the term sufficiently denotes, is that which we 
give in order to obtain any commodity by way of exchange in the 
market :– natural price, on the contrary, is that which we must give 
in order to obtain the article we want from the great warehouse of 
nature, and is the same thing as the cost of production. (ibid) 
It was not money that directly obtained commodities from the ―great warehouse 
of nature‖.  For Torrens (in 1821) it was capital;264  for Hodgskin it was labour.  
It was in this context that Hodgskin expressed natural price.265 
                                            
263 Nevertheless this did not stop Ricardo asserting that the natural price of 
commodities equated to "the quantity of labour necessary to their production" (Ricardo, 
I, p.90).  This may have been, as J.S. Mill acknowledged, due to Ricardo's inconsistency 
in the use of the word "value". 
Occasionally, in his writings, he could not avoid using the word as other 
people use it, to denote value in exchange.  But he more frequently 
employed it in a sense peculiar to himself, to denote cost of production; 
in other words, the quantity of labour required to produce the article; that 
being his criterion of cost of production. (Mill, 1844, p.96) 
264 As shown in Torrensř comments that Ŕ 
natural price, consisting of the cost of production, or in other words, of 
the capital expended in raising or fabricating commodities, (Torrens, 
1821, p.51) 
Market price is that which we give in order to obtain a commodity by 
exchange in the market; natural price is that which we give to effect a 
purchase at the great warehouse of nature: it consists of the several 
articles of capital employed in production, (ibid, p.55) 
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Natural or necessary price means, on the contrary [to money 
price], the whole quantity of labour nature requires from man, that 
he may produce any commodity – the natural or necessary prices 
of money being determined, like that of all other commodities, by 
the quantity of labour required to produce it.  Nature exacted 
nothing but labour in time past, she demands only labour at 
present, and she will require merely labour in all future time.  
Labour was the original, is now and ever will be the only purchase 
money in dealing with Nature. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.219) 
Prime Costs 
For Hodgskin, natural price, being resultant from actual labour in the wide 
sense that we have previously illustrated he viewed labour, did not contain a 
component part to account for profits (as unearned income). Thereby 
Hodgskin's natural price, expressed in labour terms, was independent of 
changes in the rate of profit. 
Profits do not increase the labour necessary to bring a commodity 
to the market, but they enhance its price to the labourer and its 
exchangeable value to any person not a capitalist. (Hodgskin, LP., 
28th May 1820, p.78) 
This was contrary to a notion of natural price that encompassed some portion 
relevant to profits.  In terms similar to Adam Smith, Cooper's natural price, had 
for example, included such profits.  
Natural Price … consists in the cost (if any) of the raw material, 
the amount paid in wages for the labour expended upon the 
article, and the usual profit on the capital employed upon it; all 
reducible to the labour expended upon it before it be fit for market.  
It is that price which will enable the seller to re-produce the article 
in the same market, with a reasonable profit. (Cooper, 1830, 
p.40.) 
Nevertheless what Hodgskin had called natural price, i.e. without profits, was 
recognised by Cooper, but classified as prime costs; 
                                                                                                                                
The constraints imposed on this thesis do not allow for a discussion of the differing 
perspectives of Torrens and Hodgskin on the prime foundation of production as labour 
or capital, although our  previous chapter On Labour should have shown why Hodgskin 
came down in favour of labour  
265 Although to be true to Torrensř remarks Hodgskinřs natural price might better have 
been entitled labour price.  However as Hodgskinřs natural and social prices were both 
denominated in labour terms, his nomenclature was justified to make clear his 
distinction. 
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Prime costs will be this natural price, deducting the profit on the 
capital employed (ibid). 
Smith had likewise used the term prime costs as excluding "the profit of the 
person who is to sell it" (Smith, WN, p.73).  Cooper's definition of prime costs 
was more akin to Hodgskin's natural price as it excluded all profit derived from 
the capital employed in its production. 
Robert Torrens had been critical of the inclusion of profits within natural price 
and saw this as linked to the notion that natural and market prices tended, or 
gravitated, towards each other. 
Those writers, indeed, who contend for the equality of market and 
natural price, include the customary rate of profit under the term, 
natural price, or cost of production.  But this classification is highly 
unphilosophical and incorrect.  The profits of stock never make 
any part of the expense of production; they are, on the contrary, a 
new creation, brought into existence in consequence of this 
expense. (Torrens, 1821, p.51) 
Thus Torrens‘ natural price equated more closely to Adam Smith‘s prime cost. 
Torrens‘ position highlights a problem that can exist if natural price is directly 
related to the cost of production rather than the cost of a good as brought to 
market. 
The excess of market price above natural price, or cost of 
production, is profit; … and therefore, we cannot assert that the 
profit of his stock is included in the cost of production, without 
affirming the gross absurdity, that the excess of value above the 
expenditure, constitutes a part of expenditure. (ibid, p.52-3) 
There could thus be a disparity between the pure cost of production or 
fabrication, in the sense of the labour, effort or cost in actually creating a good 
and the cost of production, in the sense of producing a commodity ready to be 
sold (in the market).  To some extent this could be envisaged as the difference 
between the labour embodied in a good and that commanded by the same 
good.   
Ricardo acknowledged that the amount a labourer had to pay for a commodity 
was never equal to the labour employed in its production; 
if the reward of the labourer were always in proportion to what he 
produced, the quantity of labour bestowed on a commodity, and 
the quantity of labour which that commodity would purchase, 
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would be equal, and either might accurately measure the 
variations of other things: but they are not equal: (Ricardo, I, p.14) 
Although, not intended to directly address the distinction between labour 
embodied and labour commanded, but rather to explain the apparent disparity 
between natural and market prices, as we will illustrate presently, Hodgskin 
formulated his concept of social price. 
A Reconstructed Natural Price 
If productivity is represented by the ratio of output to labour, then its reciprocal 
would be the ratio of labour to output, or as we have previously seen in 
Hodgskin‘s terminology – the natural price.  Thereby a clear inverse relationship 
between Hodgskin‘s natural price and productivity can be conceived that might 
well help us better understand Hodgskin‘s ideas on both prices and growth. 
Social Price 
In Labour Defended (1825) Hodgskin had also emphasised that what labourers 
actually paid for their goods exceeded the natural price: 
The real price of a coat or a pair of shoes or a loaf of bread, all 
which nature demands from man in order that he may have either 
of these very useful articles, is a certain quantity of labour; how 
much it is almost impossible to say, from the manufacture of a 
coat, a pair of shoes or a loaf of bread being completed by many 
persons.  But for the labourer to have either of these articles, he 
must give over and above the quantity of labour nature demands 
from him, a still large quantity to the capitalist. (Hodgskin, 1825, 
p.22)266 
In his letter to Francis Place of 28th May 1820 Hodgskin had been critical of 
David Ricardo for what he saw as Ricardo's "want of an accurate distinction 
between natural price and exchangeable value."267 
Natural price is measured by the quantity of labour necessary to 
produce any commodity: its exchangeable value, or what another 
                                            
266 By real price in this passage Hodgskin was not referring to money price as the price 
that was actually paid out by the labourer in money, but the labour that would have had 
to be undertaken by a labourer in order that that labourer would have had the where-
with-all to have acquired the relevant commodity.  The real price in this sense was an 
expression of labour embodied compared against the labour commanded.  
267 We will use the version of this letter reprinted in the English translation of Élie 
Halévyřs Thomas Hodgskin (1956).  The page numbers cited are those of this letter 
contained in this edition.  The italics are those within this rendering. 
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will give or is obliged to give for this commodity when produced, 
may or may not be equal to the quantity of labour employed in its 
production.  Mr. Ricardo has, I think, made a mistake by 
supposing these two things to be equal.  They are not, or the 
wages of labour would always be equal to the produce of labour. 
… There is therefore a great difference between real natural price 
and exchangeable value, and by not attending to this Mr. R. has 
been led into - I think - great mistakes relative to the decrease of 
profit in an improving state of economy. (Hodgskin, LP., 28th May 
1820, p.74-5) 
Hodgskin believed that Ricardo had confused the labour embodied in a 
commodity, "the quantity of labour necessary to their production" with the labour 
that can be commanded by a commodity, "the power of purchasing possessed 
by any one commodity".  However, Ricardo obviously recognised such a 
distinction as he had himself been critical of Adam Smith's work where it 
appeared "as if these were two equivalent expressions" (Ricardo, I, p.14).268  
Nevertheless to Hodgskin‘s mind, a further type of price that included these 
profits and any other charges on the workers' labour, would clarify the situation.  
Hodgskin entitled this further class of price, also denominated in terms of labour 
as social price. This social price can be seen to bear some semblance to an 
idea of the labour commanded by a commodity, whereas his natural price would 
be akin to a concept of the labour embodied within a commodity.269 
                                            
268 The reason for Hodgskinřs understanding might be found in Ricardořs chapter On 
Market and Natural Price where initially exchangeable value is associated with 
changing market prices: 
It is then the desire, which every capitalist has, of diverting his fund from 
a less to a more profitable employment, that prevents the market price of 
commodities from continuing for any length of time much above, or 
much below their natural price.  It is this competition which so adjusts 
the exchangeable value of commodities, (Ricardo, I, p.91) 
However, shortly afterwards Ricardo explained that by the "exchangeable value of 
commodities" he meant natural price rather than the adjusting market price. 
In speaking then of the exchangeable value of commodities, or the power 
of purchasing possessed by any one commodity, I mean always that 
power which it would possess, if not disturbed by any temporary or 
accidental cause, and which is its natural price. (ibid, p.92) 
One could be tempted to align Ricardořs expression of temporary or accidental 
disturbances with the issue of exogenous factors.   
269 The alignment of Hodgskinřs natural price with labour embodied, with social price 
being akin to labour commanded, is not a novel perception. For example, Ernesto 
Screpanti and Stefano Zamagni recognised the link between Hodgskinřs natural price 
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There is another description of price, to which I shall give the 
name of social, it is natural price enhanced by social regulations.  
Whatever quantity of labour may be requisite to produce any 
commodity, the labourer must always, in the present state of 
society, give a great deal more labour to acquire and possess it 
than is requisite to buy it from nature.  Natural price thus 
increased to the labourer, is Social Price. (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.220) 
However, Hodgskin's immediate concern in Popular Political Economy was not 
with social price but with natural price. He wanted to address what he perceived 
as the Ricardian theory that asserted the tendency for natural prices to increase 
with society's progress. 
Leaving, however, social price entirely out of view, I shall confine 
my present remarks to natural price; and I should not have noticed 
it, were there not a theory now prevalent, which assumes as its 
basis that natural price necessarily rises in the progress of 
society. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.221) 
Thus Hodgskin turned his attention, as we shall do in our next section, to the 
question which amounted to asking, in his terms – If natural prices have a 
tendency to fall, why was it that market prices and social prices could exhibit a 
tendency to move in the opposite direction?270  The relationship between social 
and market price was such that market price gravitated around social price, but 
this gravitational focal point could diverge from natural price.  Hodgskin‘s point 
                                                                                                                                
and labour embodied in their Outline of the History of Economic Thought (2005), and 
provided a useful explanation of the difference between natural and social prices. 
He [Hodgskin] distinguished the Ŗnatural priceŗ, defined as that 
prevailing in an economy regulated by natural law, and which can be 
expressed in terms of embodied labour, from the Ŗsocial priceŗ, defined 
as the one which prevails in real society.  In real capitalist societies 
workers do not obtain the whole produce of their labour: they can obtain 
a good only if they provide a quantity of labour which is higher than that 
required for producing it.  They buy commodities at Ŗsocialŗ prices while 
producing them at Ŗnaturalŗ values.  The Ŗsocial priceŗ is the production 
price expressed in terms of labour commanded; and it is true that in a 
capitalist economy it is always higher than expressed in embodied 
labour. (Screpanti & Zamagni, 2005, p.141)
 
270 Or perhaps one might ask why, if productivity had a tendency to improve, do real 
(rather than just nominal) market prices display a tendency (if as such they do) to 
increase?  The clumsiness of a notion of real market prices would perhaps lead us to 
look at the more conventional concept of real wages rather than real market prices. 
Thereby the question could boil down to, if productivity is improving, how can real 
wages not also show signs of improvement too?   
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that natural prices tended to fall also had to be argued against what he saw as 
the prevalent Ricardian and Malthusian directly opposed position. 
I must confess am astonished at the hasty and dogmatic manner 
in which Mr. Malthus, Mr. Ricardo, and their disciples, have 
decided, on the single principle of decreasing fertility, this most 
important, extensive, and complicated question. (Hodgskin, 
1827a. p.222) 
However before we advance to this in our next section we will conclude this one 
with a short  exposition of Hodgskin‘s ideas similar to a Smithian adding up 
notion of price that might appear less sophisticated than the Ricardian relative 
price concept which, in its opposing of wages and profits, was subsequently to 
become so favoured. 
An Adding Up Notion of Price  
E.K. Hunt recognised an important distinction between Ricardo and Hodgskin in 
that Hodgskin did not believe that prices (as paid in the market) were solely 
determined by the labour embodied in the production of a good, but rather, 
following Smith, he adhered to an adding up theory of price that effectively saw 
(exchangeable) value or market price related to what he called social price. 
Therefore, unlike Ricardo, Hodgskin did not believe that in 
contemporary capitalist society the labor embodied in the 
production of commodities determined their value.  Rather, he 
asserted, following Adam Smith, that prices were determined by 
the summation of wages, rent, and profits. (Hunt, 2002, p.169) 
Hodgskin‘s chapter on Prices did not explicitly lay out his alignment with the 
adding up theory of price but it is implied by his concept of social price as 
―natural priced enhanced by social regulations‖ to include the additional labour 
required as equivalents for rent and profits.  His letter of 28th May 1820, without 
using the term social price, better explained his adding up model of price.   
All price is paid by labour.  Now Rent is a part of the produce of 
labour taken by a person who does not labour, and, of course, if 
the labourer wishes to obtain for his own use a quantity of 
produce equal to the quantity obtained which he has shared with 
the lord, he must double, treble and in the present day must 
multiply his labour manifold to obtain it.  Rent, therefore, enhances 
price, by the whole amount of Rent. (Hodgskin, LP., 28th May 
1820, p.73) 
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Thereby Hodgskin‘s natural price was solely the amount of labour necessary to 
create a good and comprising only one factor was not subject to any adding up 
of component parts. Hodgskin‘s natural price was not Smithian in the sense that 
Smith included rent and profits as components to natural price.  
However this natural price, taken as labour embodied, became augmented by 
the rent extracted by the landlord.  This lead to the form of price Hodgskin 
called social price, which represented the labour commanded by the good, 
when the possessor of that good was enabled with the power to charge a price 
greater than the labour it embodied. For Hodgskin such power only stemmed 
from legal enactments such as primogeniture, entailment and monopolies.271  
Economic realities would otherwise have ensured that competitive forces would 
have limited market prices to reflect the embodied labour.272 
Although Hodgskin‘s letter was mainly concerned with rent he recognised that 
profits would also, if unearned in the same sense that rents were, enhance 
price and form another part of its sum. 
Profit, being in like manner a diminution to the labourer of the 
value of his produce enhances the price of everything into which it 
enters to the labourer. (ibid) 
Hodgskin recognised that it was in this way that Smith conceived of rents and 
profits as forming addition factors within the adding up concept of price.  
It is in this sense in which A. Smith says rent and profits enhance 
price, and considers the whole produce to be divided into these 
and wages or among the three classes mentioned.  No truth in the 
whole course of reason was ever more self-evident.  It is 
abundantly clear that rent and profit cannot enhance the quantity 
of labour necessary to obtain a commodity from nature, but they 
enhance its price to the labourer by the whole sum.  In proportion 
                                            
271 All such instruments were unnatural or exogenous in the sense that if they would 
have existed out of economic necessity, or natural laws, then legal laws would have 
been superfluous. 
272 Hodgskin did not make it clear if he believed that competition would wholly 
eliminate rent. It was the case that he downplayed rent as relatively inconsequential 
when compared with the ascendancy of labour to production.  He would have had to 
accept, as he favoured private rather than state or communal ownership of land, that 
some remuneration was due to the owners of land commensurate with the labour they 
expended in the service they provided in making land available for production (as 
opposed to the rent that was simply derived from the monopoly ownership of land 
resources). 
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therefore, as Rent and Profits increase, the reward of labour will 
gradually decrease; the price the labourer must pay for 
commodities will gradually increase. (ibid, p.73-4) 
In his review of Ricardo‘s collected works (28th Nov. 1846) Hodgskin 
emphasised the perspective which envisaged Smith‘s natural price as more 
realistic in actual social terms than Ricardo‘s and also conceived it in terms of 
labour necessary to create a commodity: 
Mr Ricardo is logically more accurate in ascribing, throughout, 
according to Smith‘s doctrine, ―of labour paying all price,‖ every 
variation in price ultimately to variations in quantities of labour.  
We must, however, say, that, in one sense, Smith‘s verbal 
variation from his own principle serves better to explain some 
social phenomena tha[n] Mr Ricardo‘s technical adherence to it.  
Clearly the increase of price which Smith indicated to be caused 
by rent and profit, meant the increase of labour, which the 
labourer, who originally possessed the whole commodity, when 
he, not other men, not certainly the capitalists and the landlords, 
had to pay profit and rent, or share that commodity with others. 
(Hodgskin, E., 28th Nov. 1846, p.1557)    
If we alter the terms being used we could restate Hodgskin‘s adding up concept 
of price as acknowledging that Hodgskin‘s natural price (Smith‘s prime cost) 
was not the result of a summation process.  The adding up calculation of price 
was pertinent rather to Hodgskin‘s social price (Smith‘s natural price). 
Whilst it might be conceived that one weakness of an adding up theory of price 
was that it was indeterminate, such indeterminacy was not an issue if one were 
only seeking to describe price behaviour rather then actually be able to 
determine or calculate them oneself.  Hodgskin quite plainly thought that it was 
impossible for anyone or any institution to determine prices.  His concern was 
only with description and explanation, not prescription. 
The Payers of Price 
Hodgskin emphasised that the view taken as to whether price was enhanced by 
rent and profits depended on the perspective one held of those paying the 
price.  Thereby he was critical of Ricardo. 
Mr. R. has involved this part of the subject in considerable 
confusion by supposing the buyers or the community who pay the 
prices are different from the three great classes, to wit landlord, 
capitalists and labourers, among whom he divides the produce of 
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the earth.  For all political-economical purposes however it seems 
right to consider the whole community as composed of these 
three classes, and, though Adam Smith has not uniformly adhered 
to this division, yet in all which he says on the subject of Rent and 
profits increasing prices he evidently supposes the society to be 
composed of these three classes. (Hodgskin, LP., 28th May 1820, 
p.73) 
This distinction between Ricardo and Smith as regarding the distribution 
amongst different classes was emphasised again in Hodgskin‘s Economist 
review of Ricardo: 
Substituting labourer for labour, in Smith doctrine, it is a truer 
representation of what actually occurs in society than Mr 
Ricardo‘s, which, after all, is of comparatively little importance, 
because it is limited entirely to the exchangeable variations in the 
value of commodities, and takes no notice of the exchange 
between the different classes of labourers, capitalists, and 
landowners, which it was partly Smith‘s object to explain.  
Admitting the greater verbal or logical accuracy of Mr Ricardo, it 
was obtained, we apprehend, by shutting entirely out of his 
science those important relations of the labourer to other classes, 
which Smith, by a change in his terms, really discussed. 
(Hodgskin, E., 28th Nov. 1846, p.1557)    
Clearly for Hodgskin if one supposed, as he and Ricardo apparently did, that 
natural prices were reducible to labour, then anything that devalued labour (i.e. 
necessitated more labour to acquire a good) enhanced its price. 
In fact both he [Adam Smith] and Mr. Ricardo make the real natural 
price of all things to be paid by labour, and it is therefore self-
evident that whatever diminishes the value of labour or makes a 
greater quantity necessary to obtain an equal quantity of any 
commodity enhances its price. (Hodgskin, LP., 28th May 1820, 
p.73)   
Thus in very simple terms Hodgskin can be seen to have conceived that if 
additional labour had to go into producing a good (for economically exogenous 
reasons) then productivity had been reduced.  Thus if productivity worsened the 
inverse condition, natural price socially enhanced to become social price, had 
increased.  When Hodgskin wrote about the value of labour being diminished 
he meant that natural price, as paid by labour (the social price), had increased, 
in the sense that a unit of labour could be equated to a smaller amount of a 
good or goods in general or put other ways productivity and real wages had 
fallen.  
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If we reconstruct Hodgskin‘s argument using his natural price as the inverse of 
productivity we might get a clearer idea of his position, but it will also illustrate 
some of the logomachy present with the use of divergent terminologies. 
Hodgskin was effectively claiming that social productivity resulted from the 
combined effects of labour, rent and profits.  Thus if any of the constituent 
factors increased then productivity must decrease (i.e. natural price, enhanced 
as social price, must have increased). If rent and profits were reducible to 
labour then it might, as Hodgskin claimed, be ―self-evident‖ in that if the amount 
of labour necessary in the production of a good increased, then productivity 
must have fallen and thereby social price increased. 
The Ricardian concept that an increase in profit did not enhance price (or 
reduce productivity) for Hodgskin amounted to either a claim that profit was not 
reducible to labour or the price in question was not the inverse of productivity. 
Such contradictions could, Hodgskin conceived, only be addressed from a 
position that separated the payers of price out of society as a whole so that they 
would be unaffected by changes in productivity.  This is presumably what 
Hodgskin meant when he claimed that Ricardo had been ―supposing the buyers 
or the community who pay the prices are different from the three great classes‖ 
(Hodgskin, LP., 28th May 1820, p.73). 
Hodgskin appears to have used the qualification of real for natural price when 
referring to the whole social productive activity rather than one simply isolated 
good‘s production.  Thus his real natural price took into account the labour 
embodied in the consumption goods utilised by the labourers that facilitated 
their subsequent creative activity. 
if you reflect for one moment on the real natural price of raw 
produce at present and its real natural price one or two centuries 
ago, that it is the quantity of labour now and formerly necessary to 
obtain any commodity from nature.  By improvements in 
agriculture and machinery there can be no question that less 
labour is required to produce equal quantities of corn in England 
or any land now under tillage than was required two or three 
centuries ago.  It is not only as machinery and ingenuity have 
been directly applied to agriculture that the cost of production has 
been decreased, but as its application in a thousand ways have 
diminished the cost of production of all those instruments and 
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commodities which either aid production or are consumed by the 
labourer while he is employed in the work of production.  Thus the 
improvements which enable men to make ploughs, stockings, 
cloth cheap, or to bring articles of food cheaper from a foreign 
country, enable the people engaged in the work of production to 
produce at a less cost, because what they consume while they 
are producing costs less. (ibid, p.75) 
Hodgskin reiterated this point in his discussion of agricultural prices in Popular 
Political Economy. 
It must be remembered, that those who are engaged in agriculture 
must have clothing, and many other things, as well as food and 
instruments.  If the instruments they use are made by less labour, 
it is plain that the whole quantity of labour required to produce 
corn is diminished.  It is not, however, so plain, though it is equally 
true, that if the cost of other necessaries required by the 
agriculturists is diminished, that also will lessen the cost of 
producing corn.  He must have clothing, and if he can obtain it by 
sacrificing a tenth, instead of a sixth part of his crops, more 
remains for his own use, and the labour necessary to procure his 
subsistence is diminished. If other people did not make the 
clothing, he must make it himself, and all the facilities he could 
invent for manufacturing clothing, would enable him to devote 
more time to manufacturing wheat.  It makes no difference, in a 
general point of view, that clothing is made by a different set of 
labourers; all their improvements, supplying the manufacturers of 
corn with clothing at a less cost, leave the latter more corn in 
return for their labour; or diminish to them, and to society at large, 
the natural price of that quantity of food required for subsistence. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.226) 
Hence these last passages also partly illustrate Hodgskin‘s arguments in favour 
of his affirmation, contrary to the Malthusian and Ricardian assertions, that 
natural prices, and hence social and market price in general, had a tendency to 
reduce over time, particularly in what he called real terms.  Thus, our next 
section will broaden our coverage of this point in more detail. 
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Section Two 
The Behaviour of Natural Prices 
Hodgskin's Criticism of Ricardo  
Hodgskin's criticism of Ricardo contained in his chapter on Prices dealt with the 
issue of whether natural prices had a tendency to fall or rise with society's 
progress and its associated increasing population.  Specifically, he was 
concerned that the possibility of falling natural prices appeared to have been so 
readily dismissed and that the counter assumption of rising natural prices had 
become accepted as the natural course of events. 
I must confess I am astonished at the hasty and dogmatic manner 
in which Mr. Malthus, Mr. Ricardo, and their disciples, have 
decided, on the single principle of decreasing fertility, this most 
important, extensive, and complicated question. I do not suppose 
that I shall induce the reader to come to a directly opposite 
conclusion, neither do I mean to enter fully into the question; but I 
regard the inquiry as of so much importance, that I cannot avoid 
stating some of those circumstances, which should make us at 
least hesitate in adopting a conclusion, which seems at variance 
with the general system of the universe. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.222) 
In support of this reproach Hodgskin quoted from the following passage in 
Ricardo's Principles; 
The natural tendency of profits then is to fall; for, in the progress 
of society and wealth, the additional quantity of food required is 
obtained by the sacrifice of more and more labour.  This tendency, 
this gravitation as it were of profits, is happily checked at repeated 
intervals by the improvements in machinery connected with the 
production of necessaries, as well as by the discoveries in the 
science of agriculture which enable us to relinquish a portion of 
labour before required, and therefore to lower the price of the 
prime necessary of the labourer. (Ricardo, I, p.120) 
Hodgskin understood that Ricardo's checks to rising natural price were taken as 
temporary setbacks rather than permanent reversals of the overall tendency for 
rising natural prices.  Hodgskin's understanding can be justified from various 
parts of Ricardo's work. Comments by J.S. Mill as we shall see subsequently, 
 260 
also supported Hodgskin's understanding of what might be called a Ricardian 
stance, at least as far as food production was concerned. 
But when poor lands are taken into cultivation, or when more 
capital and labour are expended on the old land, with a less return 
of produce, the effect must be permanent.  … Each man may, and 
probably will, have a less absolute quantity; but as more labourers 
are employed in proportion to the whole produce retained by the 
farmer, the value of a greater proportion of the whole produce will 
be absorbed by wages … This will necessarily be rendered 
permanent by the laws of nature, which have limited the 
productive powers of the land. (Ricardo, I, p.125-6) 
Although, then, it is probable, that under the most favourable 
circumstances, the power of production is still greater than that of 
population, it will not long continue so; for the land being limited in 
quantity, and differing in quality, there will be a decreased rate of 
production, whilst the power of population continues always the 
same. (ibid, p.98) 
Diminishing Returns in Agriculture 
Thus Hodgskin attempted to address what Mark Blaug called "Ricardo's 
dismissal of the possibility of serious influences arising from improvements in 
agricultural technique" (Blaug, 1958, p.28).  Hodgskin's position was that 
knowledge-guided labour was the most crucial factor in production and was the 
major cause of decreasing costs. 
The natural difficulty of procuring food, or natural price, depends 
so almost exclusively on increase of knowledge and division of 
labour, and consequently on an increase of people, that it seems 
to have a continual tendency to diminish.  In fact, it is admitted 
that, except as to the production of food, natural and necessary 
price does fall in the progress of society. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.223) 
To support this statement Hodgskin quoted various passages from The Wealth 
of Nations and concentrated on Adam Smith‘s acceptance of the tendency for 
the lowering of natural price. 
It is the natural effect of improvement, however, to diminish 
gradually the price of almost all manufactures. That of the 
manufacturing workmanship diminishes, perhaps, in all of them 
without exception. In consequence of better machinery, of greater 
dexterity, and of a more proper division and distribution or work, 
all of which are the natural effects of improvement, a much 
smaller quantity of labour becomes requisite for executing any 
particular piece of work; and though, in consequence of the 
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flourishing circumstances of society, the real price of labour 
should rise very considerably, yet the great diminution of the 
quantity will generally much more than compensate the greatest 
rise which can happen in the price. (Smith, WN, p.260) 273 
Corn as a Manufactured Commodity 
Hodgskin argued that corn was a manufactured commodity and as such subject 
to the same economies and diminishing costs as other man made goods.  
Corn of every kind may be considered as a manufactured 
commodity, matured certainly by the aid of natural agents, - as 
what can we mature without them? - but matured by means of a 
great deal of labour.  (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.224) 
Nor must we forget that our grain is the produce of art and 
industry; and when once matured or obtained, is a means of 
lessening the labour of all those who provide the society with food.  
The same remark holds good of cattle, which once tamed and 
domesticated, only require that man should provide them with 
subsistence.  Moreover, the mere sowing the seed, and reaping 
the harvest, are only parts of the complicated process of providing 
food.  The ground must be cleared and tilled, and the grain must 
be ground and prepared; and to perform these operations, as well 
as the operations of sowing, and reaping, and carrying home, and 
housing the grain, numberless instruments and machines are 
requisite, all of which have been invented and improved, as 
society advanced, - diminishing to an almost inconceivable 
degree, the labour necessary to procure meat or make bread 
(ibid, p.225-6).274 
                                            
273 Smith gave the example of carpentry as a possible situation where the raw materials 
- "barren timber" - might rise in price due to increased difficulty in forestry, resulting 
from the expansion of other agriculture. But even here he foresaw that other effects 
"will more than compensate" to maintain a consistent lowering of prices (Smith, WN, 
p.260).  
Ricardo also acknowledged that even if raw produce became more difficult to 
acquire when compared to manufactured goods, the labourersř consumption bundle 
could be improved: 
From manufactured commodities always falling, and raw produce 
always rising, with the progress of society, such a disproportion in their 
relative value is at length created, that in rich countries a labourer, by the 
sacrifice of a very small quantity only of his food, is able to provide 
liberally for all his other wants. (Ricardo, I, p.97) 
274 Destrutt Tracyřs Treatise on Political Economy published in English in 1817 had 
also made a similar claim that agriculture was not a special case of production: 
It is then erroneously that they have made agriculture a thing essentially 
different from all the other branches of human industry, (Tracy, 1817, 
p.21) 
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Thus Hodgskin's argument was that corn should not be understood as a 
commodity whose production was wholly dependent on the soil's fertility.  With 
the progress of society the role played by soil's decreasing innate fertility would 
become less important.  With time, further advances would generally weaken 
the relationship between the efficiency of production and land's fruitfulness. 
Hodgskin's position was that the inevitable reduction in costs would affect all 
industrious production, and that agriculture should be viewed as an industry like 
any other activity that resulted in the production of commodities by the means of 
labour and other commodities. 275    
Hodgskin's criticism should be understood in terms of his opposition to the 
stress placed on the single issue of land's decreasing fertility.  He nevertheless 
accepted that, in reality, progress in agricultural production had not been as 
effective as that in other industries.  This he believed was due to political rather 
than natural causes. 
On this all important question, the political condition of the 
agriculturist, and the manner in which land is appropriated, have 
no inconsiderable influence; in consequence of the latter, corn has 
ever been at a monopoly money-price; in consequence of the 
former, improvement has been comparatively slow in agriculture.  
The price of its produce has not, therefore, fallen in the same 
degree as the price of manufactures, with which alone it could and 
has been compared.  The price of most other manufactured 
commodities, on the contrary, has not been a monopoly price; and 
generally speaking, the manufacturers have been in a better 
political condition than the agriculturists.  (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.231) 
Knowledge and division of labour have both increased amongst 
the agriculturists, but not in the same degree as among 
manufactures.  It is only, however, by comparing the price of 
agricultural produce with the diminished price of manufactures, 
that any plausibility has been given to the statement of a natural 
                                                                                                                                
A farm is a real manufactury; … agricultural industry is a branch of 
manufacturing industry, which has no specific character which separates 
it from all the other. (ibid, p.23) 
275 Although Hodgskin pointed out that fertility related more to the amount of 
knowledge of what made land productive rather than some inherent quality; 
though we are completely ignorant of what constitutes a fertile soil, and 
that which is fertile when we know how to employ its powers, is  barren 
when we are ignorant of the laws which regulate vegetation; (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.222). 
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and necessary increase in the difficulties of procuring subsistence. 
(ibid, p.232) 
Hodgskin's Assertions Addressed 
Without mentioning Hodgskin, Edwin Cannan, in his Wealth (1914), noted that 
once it had become impossible "to ignore the historical increase of returns to 
agriculture" those in support of the premise of diminishing returns, adopted an 
amended position.  Their solution was to argue that returns were still 
diminished, in that they would have been higher but for the increasing 
population.  Cannan stated that this was "clearly untrue if applied to the whole 
history of mankind." (Cannan, 1914, p.54) 
But if the doctrine is applied, as [J.S.] Mill seems to have meant to 
apply it, only to fairly recent times, it does not appear to be 
possible either to prove or disprove it.  Mill coolly assumed that all 
the improvements which have been made would have been made 
just the same if the population had not grown. (ibid, p.55) 
That this was so can be seen from Mills comments in his Principles : 
in the case of the most important classes of commodities, food 
and materials, there is a tendency diametrically opposite to that of 
which we have been speaking [diminishing cost of production]. 
The cost of production of these commodities tends to increase. 
This is not a property inherent in the commodities themselves.  
If population were stationary, and the produce of the earth never 
needed to be augmented in quantity, there would be no cause for 
a greater cost of production.  Mankind would on the contrary, have 
the full benefit of all improvements in agriculture, or in the arts 
subsidiary to it, and there would be no difference in this respect 
between the products of agriculture and those of manufactures.  
(Mill, III, p.712) 
Thus for Mill it was an increasing population that created a condition of higher 
production costs in agriculture, as necessary to meet the increased demand. 
This contrasted with Hodgskin's notion that it was the increasing population that 
created the conditions which resulted in diminishing costs. Although it was 
apparently recognised that in non-agricultural industries "especially 
manufacturing industry," an increasing population was beneficial; 
it was supposed that division of labour lead to increasing returns 
when larger quantities of produce were raised by increasing 
numbers of workers. (Cannan, 1914, p.55) 
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Cannan perceived that the concerns of economists had been distracted with 
maintaining the integrity of the existing political economic theories and 
supporting their theory of profits.  
Thus it had to be admitted that an increase of population, while 
tending to diminish returns from agricultural industry, at the same 
time tended to increase returns from manufacturing industry, so 
that a balance had to be struck between the effect of the two 
tendencies: the returns to all kinds of industry taken together 
would only diminish when the diminution in agriculture was great 
enough to outweigh the increase in manufactures.  It seems 
difficult to believe that any one could have supposed that this was 
ordinarily the case, but the theory of profits already referred to 
required those who held it to think that a diminution of returns, at 
any rate in all industry which produces things for the labouring 
classes, was proved by the historical fall in the rate of interest, 
and the practice of identifying wages with food which prevailed in 
the earlier part of the nineteenth century led to the weight of 
agriculture being grossly overestimated.  Consequently it was held 
that increase of population tended to diminish the returns in all 
kinds of industry taken as a whole, and the gloomier writers of the 
time believed that it had actually done so. (ibid, p.56)  
The theme that we will expound in our next chapter will be Growth where we 
will look in more detail at the mechanism of endogenous growth envisaged by 
Hodgskin. However it is worth noting here that for Hodgskin it was the necessity 
caused by an increasing population, communicated by initially rising prices, that 
stimulated the technological changes that in the longer term required less 
labour for production.  This was especially so for those goods most essential for 
man‘s survival. 
Over natural price, the relation of the demand to supply, which is 
frequently said to regulate price, seems in the long run to have a 
tendency to lower it.  The ingenuity of man being necessarily first 
and chiefly directed towards supplying his more urgent wants, the 
labour employed in supplying necessaries will be most improved. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.233) 
Expressed in different terms this can be seen as seeing productivity tending to 
improve over time because supply and demand pressures lead to innovations in 
production for those areas most important to man‘s needs. Thus as we will see 
subsequently for Hodgskin it was the increase of population that rather than 
causing prices to rise, actually provided the stimulus that would lead to long 
term falling prices; 
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Thus the increase of people in this country within the last century, 
by creating a great demand for agricultural produce, has led not 
merely to extended cultivation, … but to those improved 
agricultural process to which I have alluded. The stimulus most 
generally present … is the natural but insatiable desire of 
providing for his wants or bettering his condition.  But, were 
population not to increase, there could be no additional wants to 
provide for. … but for the continual increase of people, there 
would not now be, there never would have been, a stimulus to 
invention and to the increase of knowledge. (ibid, p.85-6) 
Falling Prices 
If we construct from Hodgskin‘s political economy the hypothesis that long-term 
prices tend to fall, we may then ask how this could be confirmed.  In this we are 
fortunate in that Hodgskin was involved in the instigation of such a method.  
Whilst at The Economist as its economics‘ editor, numerous price data series 
were initiated that still continue in index form to this day.   
2005 was the 160th anniversary of ―The Economist‟s commodity-price index‖ 
which ―is probably the world‘s oldest regularly published price index‖ (The 
Economist, 12th February 2005, p.76).  The conclusion of the article to 
commemorate this anniversary recognised recent increases, but nonetheless 
concluded that ―in real terms, industrial commodity prices are a mere 30% of 
their value in 1845.‖ (ibid).276 
                                            
276 David Hackett Fischer illustrated that Commodity Prices have generally tended to 
perform in ways very similar to Wholesale and Producer Prices, and thereby not 
unrelated to Consumer Prices. (Fischer, 1996, p.181-2). 
Fischer also presented the work of Henry Phelps-Brown and Sheila Hopkins on 
ŖEnglish Ŗconsumerŗ prices since the year 1264ŗ that illustrated price inflation over this 
period had been relatively small: 
This index shows that market prices of food, drink, fuel and textiles in 
the south of England have tended to rise for more than seven hundred 
years, at an average rate of about one percent each year. (ibid, p.3) 
Thereby Hodgskinřs assertion on falling prices could be presented as accepted that 
nominal prices had risen at an average annual rate of 1%, but in real terms, as incomes 
had increased at a rate in excess of this, what he called Ŗreal pricesŗ had fallen.  Perhaps 
a more modern economical view might be to conceive that real wages had a tendency to 
increase in relative terms. Or perhaps in simplistic terms we might summarise 
Hodgskinřs position as claiming that as productivity has improved so significantly over 
the last 700 years general living standards have also improved over that period, despite 
the fact that there are now many more people alive. 
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This is undoubtedly a relatively crude test but it is remarkable in that this result 
to some extent confirmed the conclusion of Hodgskin who was instrumental in 
the instigation of this test.  Hodgskin nevertheless recognised the difficulties of 
long-term indexing due to the inherent variability of value: 
I am fully aware that we have no accurate standard for former and 
present values, and that tables of prices, extending over long 
periods, are not much to be relied upon: but when they confirm a 
theory, which seems on other grounds to be sanctioned by 
experience, we are entitled to place some confidence in them. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.228) 
Thus rather than being totally satisfactory as a strictly scientific test we might 
accept it solely as indicative of the truth of Hodgskin‘s hypothesis, which as he 
put it, enables us ―to place some confidence‖ in his concept.  In fact it is 
probably impossible to prove his theory in purely scientific terms, but we may 
have to be satisfied that his hypothesis could withstand this particular piece of 
evidence. 
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Chapter 8 
Growth 
 
Introduction 
When Hodgskin wrote about human progress and economic growth he did so at 
a time when the modern economist‘s tools we today associate with that subject 
had yet to be formulated.  Thus if we are to reconstruct Hodgskin‘s growth 
theory we would need to do so using his terms, and understanding the 
connotations and usage of them within the context of his work as a whole. 
That such a reconstruction might be necessary is in part due to the fact that 
Hodgskin did not leave us a specific piece of work devoted to the subject.  
Rather the theme of progress and growth persists throughout his writings from 
his Travels in the North of Germany (1820) through to his final articles for the 
Brighton Guardian in the late 1860.s.  Popular Political Economy (1827) does 
provide an extensive source of material as pre-eminence was given to the 
mechanisms of growth, particularly in the first half of that work. 
It would be worth again stressing the notion of progress, as we did in Chapter 
Two and then reiterating Hodgskin‘s view of progress: 
You may conceive civilisation as having gradually advanced in the 
past, but you have not got the idea of Progress until you go on to 
conceive that it is destined to advance indefinitely in the future. 
(Bury, 1920. p.7)   
the progress of society is one continual stream of improvement, 
however much at variance with it temporary aberrations may 
appear to our short-sighted view. (Hodgskin, BN., 12th March 
1862)   
For Hodgskin economic growth fuelled this progress and as such forms the 
subject matter of this chapter.  However not only was economic growth the spur 
to human progress, but within Hodgskin‘s scheme that growth was naturally 
born of man‘s social existence.  Thereby growth was inevitable when man lived, 
worked and produced in a social context, wherein the conditions of the 
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theoretical pure market economy prevailed.  It is for this reason that we argue 
that Hodgskin‘s concept of economic progress was of endogenous growth.  
Indeed we shall show that the distinction he made with the appellation of 
Natural was specifically because it was endogenous and that what he 
designated as unnatural was exogenous.  His political anarchism stemmed from 
his belief that this endogenous natural growth was necessary and sufficient as 
well as superior to any manipulation of man‘s condition in the form of attempted 
exogenous (i.e. unnatural) management of economic affairs. 
To this end we will reconstruct Hodgskin‘s notion of growth, in two stages. 
 Initially we will consider what conditions he deemed to be the constituent 
factors, determinants and indicators of growth. This will be the main 
element of our explanatory reconstruction of his notions on growth. 
 Then we will review those further situations that were not endogenous 
economic growth in the sense that Hodgskin was concerned with. 
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Section One 
A Reconstruction of Growth 
 
As we stated in the introduction to this chapter, Hodgskin did not have the 
economic analytical tools or terms of modern growth theory available to him 
when he wrote during the 19th century.  He did, however, use various features 
as constituent factors, causes and indicators, in his analysis of economic 
growth, which we will elucidate in this section: 
 Constituent factors, - Population, Output, Productivity, Natural price, 
Market price. 
 Causes – Increase in Population, Knowledge (Technology, Human 
Capital), Communication.  
 Indicators of growth – Population figures, Prices, Crime and Marriage 
statistics. 
Before we delve into these in some detail it would be as well to provide an 
overview of his growth theory. 
Overview 
Growth within Hodgskin‘s economics was a quite specific condition that resulted 
in changes to two main factors.  Firstly, population increased, and as more 
output was necessary and then provided, prices eventually fell.  Thus, 
economic growth was a condition that resulted in there being more people, and 
that increased population shared an improved standard of living, as there were 
more commodities available to be consumed consequent on those consumer 
goods being more readily available at cheaper prices.  Effectively Hodgskin‘s 
economic growth should be recognised as comprising an increase in population 
with an improvement in real wages.277 
                                            
277 Although as we shall see Hodgskin did not refer directly to the term real wages his 
reference to market prices (sometimes real prices) having fell in effect meant that 
workers conditions would improve i.e. that real wages would have increased. 
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During his time at The Economist, Hodgskin wrote extensively on the 
relationship between an increasing population and crime statistics as indicators 
of economic growth.  His basic claim was that as social welfare improved, 
people would be less likely to resort to nefarious means of acquiring goods and 
hence crime would decrease. 
Our quite concise expression of his ideas obviously needs some unpacking and 
justification, which in essence is what the remainder of this chapter will do. 
Given that the growth that Hodgskin envisaged was endogenous there was 
what might be seen as a certain amount of circularity in his reasoning as to not 
only the causes of the growth but also to what features within an economic 
society actually changed as a result of that growth.  Thus a population‘s 
enlargement was a cause of growth because its positive impact on the 
economy would eventually lead to a further increase in that economy‘s 
population as incomes improved.  
Likewise improved productivity and increased output would in due course be 
followed by positive changes to both productivity and output.  In was in this 
sense that Hodgskin‘s growth can be seen as endogenous as advances to 
population and productivity followed on internally within the hypothetical pure 
market economy and were not caused by external factors such as government 
intervention or planning.     
Part One – Constituent factors 
When discussing the constituents of growth we are referring to those factors 
that are envisaged as having undergone the changes that were effectively, in a 
combined sense, economic growth. These being: population, output, 
productivity, natural price and market price. 
Population 
For Hodgskin the study of political economy was inseparable from the issue of 
population: 
Thus an inquiry into the laws which regulate the production of 
wealth, is an inquiry into the laws which regulate the increase or 
the decrease of the people, and by their increase or decrease we 
judge of national prosperity. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.33) 
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Population needs to be understood as one of the economic features that had a 
dual position within Hodgskin‘s scheme of endogenous economic growth.  
Firstly the size of a population was a factor that underwent change as a result of 
economic progress, but secondly the increase of population was also conceived 
of as a cause of further economic growth. 
Thus when Hodgskin wrote on the use of machinery he made the link between 
what was for him effectively economic growth and a subsequent increase in 
population; 
By their use, food and clothing are obtained with less labour; and 
the whole quantity of labour not being diminished, more food and 
clothing may be produced.  If there be more food and clothing 
there will also be more people, increased demand, or extended 
markets, and further division of labour. (ibid, p.128-9) 
Output 
If a population increased in numbers but its mode and level of production 
remained unchanged, the result would be a reduced amount of produced goods 
per citizen. This would create a less than satisfactory position for the majority of 
that population.  
Hodgskin recognised that if there were more people demanding goods but the 
same amount of goods then the market prices of those goods would increase.  
These rising prices were the information that provided the producers with the 
message that they could increase their production to meet the new increased 
levels of demand.  
Thus in the initial stage population rose as a result of increased output but was 
not the cause of an immediate increase in subsequent output.  As such market 
prices would increase, given effective demand, to indicate to the producers 
those goods that it was necessary (i.e. more profitable) to produce in greater 
numbers. These improved prices encouraged the producers to increase their 
production activity and thereby output increased. As the level of output 
increased competition and demand put pressure on prices to fall.  Hodgskin‘s 
contention can be seen illustrated in his comments regarding corn prices falling 
following the impact of an increase of population and improved modes of 
production being felt. 
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Such an increase is the immediate stimulus to his exertions, and 
the cause of an increase in his ingenuity; which, in the long run, 
tends invariably to supply us with agricultural produce by less 
labour, and thus to lower price. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.234) 
Such a scenario could take place without any changes in the mode of 
production only as long as there were no limits to the availability of raw 
materials or other factors of production.  
Productivity 
However, it might be unwise to assume that the raw materials of production 
would be continually available in the same degree when there was the need to 
produce an increased level of output. If we consider a good for which one or all 
of its constituent raw materials were limited, but for which an increased 
production level was necessitated, then another mode of production would be 
required that would facilitate an increased output. 278  This might initially require 
more labour in its production but with subsequent improvements in technology, 
eventually less labour would be needed.   
Over natural price, the relation of the demand to the supply, which 
is frequently said to regulate price, seems in the long run to have 
a tendency to lower it. The ingenuity of man being necessarily first 
and chiefly directed towards supplying his more urgent wants, the 
labour employed in supplying necessaries will be most improved. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.233) 
Effectively more output would be produced by relatively less labour – i.e. 
productivity levels would have increased, and its inverse, what Hodgskin 
labelled natural price, would have fallen. 
                                            
278 Hodgskin seemed to have assumed that all goods could be produced in greater 
numbers if the need arose.  Presumably Hodgskin was able to recognise that there were 
certain goods that could not be produced in additional amounts due to the rarity of raw 
materials or talents required for production.   Thus Hodgskin, like Ricardo, would have 
been concerned with those goods which could be increased without effective limit, and 
have dismissed those whose production was finite as relatively insignificant. 
These commodities, however, form a very small part of the mass of 
commodities daily exchanged in the market.  By far the greatest part of 
those goods which are the objects of desire, are procured by labour; and 
may be multiplied, not in one country alone, but in many, almost without 
any assignable limit, if we are disposed to bestow the labour necessary to 
obtain them. (Ricardo, I, p.12) 
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The limitation of resources was not the only incentive to improve productivity.  
Competitive pressures could also spur the productivity advances that gave a 
producer a temporary advantage over their opponents or cancelled out 
advantages held by others.  The simple desire to improve profits, to merely wish 
to work less hard, or to have more leisure, also give rise to enhancements in 
productivity.   
Natural Price 
Our previous chapter detailed Hodgskin‘s concept of natural price hence we will 
here concentrate on natural price‘s role within Hodgskin‘s scheme of growth. 
The opinion that the natural price of food lessens rather than 
increases in the progress of society, seems borne out by facts. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.226) 
If, as we previously construed, productivity is represented by the ratio of output 
to labour, then its reciprocal would be the ratio of labour to output, or in 
Hodgskin‘s terminology – the natural price.  Thereby as productivity increased 
or improved the natural price must necessarily fall. 
Hodgskin, as we have seen, argued that natural price had a tendency to fall 
over time as output was increased, as he saw it, in direct conflict with the then 
common view that productivity tended to fall as more output was required.279 
a theory now prevalent, which assumes as its basis that natural 
price necessarily rises in the progress of society. (ibid, p.221) 
In the short term, Hodgskin did not deny that natural prices might increase as 
the initial consequence of an augmented population necessitated an increased 
level of output to sustain it.  However, the extra costs incurred as natural price 
increased were the stimulus to the creativity that improved man‘s productivity 
thus lowering, in the longer term, natural prices. Effectively, from Hodgskin‘s 
perception, the increased difficulties in producing greater output were just the 
prelude to technological advancements that would have enduring effects by 
diminishing natural price.  
                                            
279 Charles Babbage in his On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (1832), in 
his chapter Of Prices noted that prices had appeared to have been falling and that this 
fact was generally not acknowledged by theoretical economists: 
Political economists have been reproached with too small use of facts, 
and too large an employment of theory. (Babbage, 1832, p.156) 
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Hodgskin also pointed out that if modern man was actually less productive than 
his forebears it would reflect a perverse view of man‘s social progress.  In his 
review of George Rickards‘ Population and Capital (1854) Hodgskin noted the 
waning adherence to this particular Ricardian proposition and the general anti-
Malthusian temperament of early Victorian Britain.280 We reproduce a lengthy 
section of this review as it also illustrated Hodgskin‘s perspective on the 
development of his opponents‘ doctrines. 
The whole of his observation on ―Population,‖ on Mr. Malthus‘s 
doctrines, and the Ricardo theory of rent, constituting nine-tenths 
of his book, are a refutation of errors once very widely spread, 
adopted, as we see in the case of Lord Jeffrey, by the leading 
minds of society, embodied in legislation, and believed by many 
persons with a fervour quite religious. Mr. Rickards shares what 
we may now call the popular doctrine, and is anti-Malthusian.  He 
is, of course, equally opposed to Ricardo‘s doctrine of rent which 
grew from the Malthusian population doctrine, and was based on 
the opinion that labour became less productive as society 
advanced, and that civilised man was a less efficient instrument of 
production than the savage.  Singularly enough, the whole of the 
Malthusian theory of population and the Ricardo theory of rent 
were founded on the condition of the United States and of 
England, both which countries are striking examples of wealth 
increasing faster than population.  (Hodgskin, E., 18th Nov. 1854, 
p.1269) 
Thus Hodgskin maintained his confidence, that he accused Malthus and 
Ricardo of having lacked, that necessity was the stimulus to improvements in 
productivity. He perceived that his position was supported by man‘s apparent 
progress. 
Not that we deny, or any body can deny, that the limitation to the 
progress of population is the means of subsistence, and that the 
continual pressure of the active principle on this barrier to 
progress is always the means of making manifest all the evils of 
society, and of exciting exertion to lessen or remove them; but to 
go with Mr Malthus and Mr Ricardo a step further, and say that the 
barrier is ever becoming more formidable and the progress is 
always in a diminishing ratio, is flatly and emphatically 
contradicted by the history of society all over the world, and 
especially in England and the United States. (ibid) 
                                            
280 George K. Rickards was the recently appointed Chair of Political Economy at 
Oxford University. 
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Thus Hodgskin justified his confidence in what he saw as the evidence of 
progressive growth in the United States and England. 
Market price 
As we have seen above and in our previous chapter for Hodgskin 
exchangeable value or the money actually paid for goods must also diminish, in 
real terms, if the benefits of economic growth were actually to be felt by the 
populace as a whole.281 In a later section of this chapter we will consider the 
situation where market price does not fall even when natural price had declined, 
but here we shall illustrate Hodgskin‘s conviction that in the long term market 
price will effectively follow the same trend that natural price did, and fall. 
Hodgskin‘s chapter on Prices took Adam Smith‘s figures for the price of wheat 
since 1202 at Windsor and extended them to 1823 in order to illustrate his 
premise that over this period money (i.e. market) prices, as well as natural 
prices, had fallen in real or relative terms, apart from the period of the 
Napoleonic wars.  
The average price of wheat in the thirteenth century, was higher 
than the average price at any other subsequent period, except for 
the period between 1792 and the present time; and for the 
extraordinary rise of price during this latter period, from which 
alone Mr Ricardo and his disciples appear to have formed their 
opinion, it is easy to account without having recourse to the 
supposition that the difficulty of obtaining food naturally and 
necessarily increases in the progress of society. … It is plain from 
the table, and from the price at which, but for social regulations, 
wheat would now be sold in our markets … that the price of wheat 
has a natural tendency to fall, rather than rise in the progress of 
society. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.230) 
                                            
281 By the use of the expression Ŗreal termsŗ applicable to money prices Hodgskin 
meant to counter-distinguish them to money prices in simply nominal terms.  
Hodgskinřs real money prices thereby equate to the more modern expression of real or 
relative market prices.  That such a clarification is necessary results from the 
inexactitude of Hodgskin terminology where he used the term money price as the price 
paid in the market, and his use of the expression real for relative.  In general the 
relativity of his money or market price related to the amount of labour expended as a 
proportion of the labourersř whole working effort, or pertinent to their overall income. 
Another mode that might bring better comprehension of Hodgskinřs concept would 
be to understand his discussion of falling market or money prices as equivalent to an 
expression of a rise in real wages. 
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Hodgskin also related the current international market prices of grain to 
population densities statistics: 
This view is confirmed also, I think, by what we know of other 
countries.  In the returns, for example, recently made by his 
Majesty‘s consuls abroad, which have been printed by order of the 
House of Commons, it is stated that the price of grain was higher 
in 1825, and generally is higher in Spain and Portugal, than in 
France, in England, and in Holland, and higher in France than in 
Holland.  In Spain the number of inhabitants to each square mile 
is 55, in Portugal 90, while in France the number is 143, and in 
Holland 212.  Spain and Portugal, therefore, are less densely 
peopled than France and France is not so crowded as Holland.  
As it is well known that these returns coincide with the general 
state of the market in these countries, we have in them a 
corroborative proof, that the price of grain does not naturally and 
necessarily rise as a people are multiplied. (ibid, p.231) 
Hodgskin (and others such as J.S. Mill and Quincey) conceived natural price as 
the minimum (floor) that money or market price could be limited to.  Supply and 
demand issues could cause variations away from this base, if demand was 
such as to put upwards pressure on this minimum.  The implication being that 
competitive forces would tend to force money or market price down towards a 
minimal level, which if conceived of as a decreasing natural price, would 
likewise be lessening.   
Over natural price, the relation of demand to the supply, which is 
frequently said to regulate price, seems in the long run to have a 
tendency to lower it. (ibid, p.233) 
Over money or nominal price, the relation of the demand to the 
supply has a very powerful but varying influence, … Money, as 
well as all the commodities of which it measures the value, are 
subject to variations in their natural price; and most commodities, 
including money, are unequally affected by social regulations.  
The money price of all commodities is consequently influenced by 
numerous circumstances; and it is by no means an easy task, as 
many people suppose, to detect the real cause of those variations 
in price which are of daily occurrence. (ibid, p.234-5) 
Those situations where money and natural prices moved in opposing directions, 
i.e. when market price rose despite falling natural prices will be discussed in a 
later section of this chapter. 
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That the direction of changes to market price coincided with that of natural price 
was a conceptual notion held by Hodgskin that related to his faith in an 
unfettered economy‘s power to eventually overcome exogenous short-term 
deviations from the conditions of the hypothetical pure market economy. Thus if 
market prices were held in abatement so that their changes did not follow the 
same path as natural prices, it was inevitable that in the long run the situation 
would rectify itself so that the natural condition would again come to dominate. 
A point worthy of note from Fischer‘s The Great Wave; Price Revolutions and 
the Rhythm of History (1996) with regards to Hodgskin is what Fischer referred 
to as the ―equilibrium of the Victorian Era‖: 
It coincided almost exactly with the life of Queen Victoria herself 
(1819-1901), and was closely linked to the cultural values that she 
represented.  Its character was most clearly evident in Great 
Britain.  Prices in that nation fell sharply from 1813 to the early 
1820s, then fluctuated within a fixed range for more than fifty 
years.  They fell again during the depression of 1873, and 
stabilized once more until nearly the end of the nineteenth 
century.  There was no sustained inflation from 1820 to 1896. 
(Fischer, 1996, p.156) 282 
Hence the period during which Hodgskin wrote was without any significant rises 
in nominal market prices.  It has been questioned whether there were actually 
any improvements to living standards during this period, which amounts to 
questioning whether real wage rose during this period. 
Peter Kirby‘s paper The Standard of Living Debate and the Industrial Revolution 
(1997) pointed out the difficulties inherent in trying to ascertain an accurate 
picture of living standards during the 19th century, and the differences of opinion 
on the issue.  Nevertheless he concluded that; 
Most historians now agree that real wages remained steady over 
the period 1750 to 1815-20, but rose substantially up to 1850.  
Much of this increase resulted from falling prices, rather than 
rising wages. (Kirby, 1997, p.3) 
                                            
282 Thus as Ricardořs notions of price have been criticised as being overly influenced 
by the economic conditions during the period leading up to the time he wrote, 
Hodgskinřs optimism might be open to criticism for being partly the consequence of the 
economic history of the era during which he wrote his works.     
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Hodgskin did not have the benefit of an historical perspective over this period 
but as we shall subsequently see, investigated the issue in depth whilst writing 
for the Economist.  Kirby‘s view that the improvements in real wages resulted 
from falling prices rather than increased nominal wages might go some way to 
explain Hodgskin‘s perspective that concentrated on prices rather than the real 
wages that that might nowadays gain attention.  
Part Two – Causes of Growth 
By the causes we are referring to those forces that actively resulted in the 
constituent factors undergoing the changes that we have identified as growth. 
These being population, knowledge (as evidenced by technology) or what might 
be called human capital, as well as human communication. 
Increasing Population 
Hodgskin, like some of his contemporaries, saw a nation‘s wealth bound to its 
population size.  Although for Hodgskin it was not so much that a nation‘s 
wealth was its population, but that the increase of population was the stimulus 
to improving wealth, i.e. economic growth.283 
Should I hereafter satisfy the reader that the increase of 
population is the chief natural circumstance which promotes the 
increase of knowledge, and which extends division of labour; thus 
augmenting productive power, not merely in the simple ratio of the 
increase in the number of labourers, but in the compound ratio of 
this increase multiplied by the effects of knowledge, and division 
of labour, whatever they may be, he will then perceive, that every 
improvement, which, like the introduction of potatoes into 
husbandry, augments the means of subsistence, is a cause, by 
increasing the number of people, of multiplying to an astonishing 
                                            
283 It was not the absolute population of an economy that was significant, the density of 
its population was crucial as a densely peopled society was envisaged by Hodgskin as 
tending to have larger rates of increase than sparsely spread populations. 
In a manner similar to that we discussed regarding the difference between the source 
and the cause of wealth, it could be expressed that the size of the populace was the 
source of growth whereas the increase of the population was the cause. 
The issue of population density had been recognised well before Hodgskin by such 
writers as Petty and Martyn; 
Population was also a factor considered by William Petty (1623Ŕ87) and 
Henry Martyn both of whom stressed the importance of a high population 
density in facilitating trade and cooperation by reducing transport and 
communications costs of various kinds. (Prendergast, 2009, p.2) 
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degree the productive power of our species. (Hodgskin, 1827a, 
p.59n) 
It had often been the view, particularly in the 18th century, that the wealth of a 
nation was the size of its population. Keith Tribe in Continental Political 
Economy from the Physiocrats to the Marginal Revolution recognised that the 
Physiocrats had tended to forward the view that population resulted from wealth 
rather than it being its cause. 
Quesnay persuaded Mirabeau that a large population was not the 
cause, but the effect, of wealth, and that the proper object of 
analysis was therefore not population, but wealth. (Tribe, 2003, 
p.159)  
Hodgskin differed with both the views that a nation‘s wealth was its population 
as well as that which saw the population as the result of its wealth.  Hodgskin 
quite clearly equated a nation‘s increasing population causally to its wealth. 
As was not unusual at the beginning of the 19th century, following Malthus‘s 
famous Essay on Population (1803), the issue of population and the 
ramifications of its rate of increase were of major concern within Hodgskin‘s 
writings particularly his economic work. On one side of the debate was the anti-
Malthusian position that an increasing population could be accommodated 
because of man‘s perfectibility, i.e. social progress was possible. The 
Malthusian stance was that man‘s population and progress would be bound 
within certain parameters because of limited physical resources. 
Hodgskin saw himself in the anti-Malthusian camp.  This can be seen in his 
efforts, in January 1820, to publish an article in the Edinburgh Review, to 
coincide with Godwin‘s belated reply to Malthus.  Halévy explained that as the 
Edinburgh Review was a Whig paper, Hodgskin was doomed to failure and all 
that remains of these early efforts are letters to Francis Place (Jan. 20th and 
May 30th 1820) discussing his frustrations and his hopes that Place would 
forward his paper to Godwin (Halévy, 1956, p.59-60).  The later of these letters 
contained a summary of Hodgskin‘s intended article (On the Moral influence of 
the Increase in the number of Mankind) which was reproduced in full in Halévy‘s  
book (ibid, p.60-62). 
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This summary contained what can be seen as displaying ―in a short and 
succinct form, all Hodgskin‘s anti-Malthusianism‖ (Halévy, 1956, p.60).   It also 
provided an early example of his concern with Malthus‘s logical inconsistencies, 
for example he noted that: 
Mr. Malthus admits that as population has increased in Britain, for 
example, famine, pestilence, and all the evils which he says thin a 
population have become less. (Hodgskin, LP., 30th May 1820, 
p.61) 
Thus if population increases represented the ―constant tendency to increase 
beyond the means of subsistence‖ (Malthus, 1803, p.3) how was it that what 
Malthus saw as the positive checks to population growth actually appeared to 
be lessening?   
Hodgskin‘s final point in his summary contained what can be seen as a 
statement of his view on population‘s influence upon economic growth that was 
to colour his subsequent writings on the subject. 
Conclusion.  An increase of population promotes industry, 
ingenuity, and knowledge, consequently also the means of 
producing food. The power of the populating principle may 
therefore be looked on as the great stimulus to exertion and as 
the great means of promoting the happiness of the individual and 
of the Species, (ibid, p.62) 
This was to be a theme repeated throughout his writings in the succeeding 
decades: 
As mankind has multiplied, and as time has flowed on, knowledge 
has been extended, and the arts improved.  Agriculture sharing 
the general fate, has also been improved, and is continually 
improving; so that a less and less quantity of land gradually 
suffices for the maintenance of individuals.  The same process, 
then, after the introduction of agriculture, goes on as before, and 
the same principle is found continually to operate, it being 
dependant on the increase of mankind. (Hodgskin, 1832, p.66)284 
As mouths, which means wants, are multiplied, so are hands, 
talents, and powers, and exactly in that proportion facilities for 
extending division of labour and easily supplying the wants of all. 
(Hodgskin, 1842, p.11) 
                                            
284 Hodgskinřs use of the term dependant was correct for his time: as dependant was 
defined as Ŗin the power of anotherŗ whereas dependent was Ŗhanging downŗ 
(Walkerřs, 1861, p.142). 
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as men have been multiplied, industry has become productive in 
the compound ratio of their numbers and their skill. (Hodgskin, E., 
18th Nov. 1854, p.1269) 
The increase in necessary knowledge, we may be sure, then, is 
provided for by the increase of population as certainly as the 
beginning of all necessary knowledge. (Hodgskin, BG., 22nd Jan. 
1862, p.2)  
Thus from 1820 through to the 1860.s we have Hodgskin‘s repeated assertion 
that an increasing population of necessity increases in knowledge and technical 
ability, as a direct consequence of that proliferation of humanity.   
An article from The Economist entitled Population in France (25th April 1857), 
not known as one of Hodgskin‘s but loaded at least with his influence, 
interestingly illustrated both the perceived linkage between population increases 
and prosperity, as well as J.S. Mill‘s evident dissent from such a view. 
By ourselves and others who recognise the fact of the slow 
increase of the population it was argued against Mr Mill, that the 
continued increase in population was the real test of national 
prosperity; and that the presumed increase of capital occasioned 
by an increase of thrift and not followed by an increase of 
population was a worthless delusion.  Wherever the population 
continues to increase, there a comparative abundance and an 
increasing quantity of food must be in existence; and a great 
improvement must take place in the condition of many, wherever 
there is a continual increase in the number of all.  Unless there be 
such an increase, there is no proof of progress; and where there 
is no progress there is no prosperity.  Mr Mill‘s approval of 
population being reduced by thrift to the stationary condition, to 
which it was obviously doomed by the want of freedom, found no 
favour with the liberal public here, then much taken up with the 
advantages of free trade; (The Economist, 25th April 1857, 
p.447)285 
Nevertheless a review of Richard Jones‘ Literary Remains (1859) published a 
little while after Hodgskin‘s departure from The Economist presented a far more 
favourable take on Malthus‘s theory and also showed the extend to which 
                                            
285 According to Halévy and Stack, Hodgskinřs last known contribution to The 
Economist was the very week after this article, on 2
nd
 May 1857 (Halévy, 1956, p.188 
and Stack, 1998, p.223).  The style and use of words, as well as its subject matter and 
views expressed within this article suggest to us that although previously unrecognised 
as such, this article, in all probability, was written by Thomas Hodgskin although with 
the passing of time this is beyond absolute proof and must remain conjecture. 
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Hodgskin‘s influence had waned in the short intermittent period of just two 
years. 
First, in regard to subsistence, it is necessary to bear in mind a 
point wholly neglected by Mr Jones, that, except in a very early 
stage of cultivation, land will not – capital and knowledge 
remaining stationary – yield double produce to double labour.  If 
therefore, the population increase more rapidly than the growth of 
knowledge and of capital enables the directors of labour to 
increase its effectiveness, it is clear that its means of subsistence 
will be diminished. (The Economist, 18th June 1859, p.676.)286 
Hodgskin‘s view was far more dynamic than this later static view in The 
Economist.  Hodgskin would probably not have argued against the recognition 
that without changes to knowledge, technology, and other means of production, 
increased amounts of direct labour would not produce directly proportionate 
increases of output.287  The dynamics of Hodgskin‘s vision was that an increase 
of population would necessarily lead to a change of the circumstances of 
production as knowledge and technology would inevitably change.  If the 
population was not static, mankind‘s level of knowledge could not remain 
unaffected.  A dynamic population gave rise to dynamic changes in knowledge 
and hence technology.  
As he drew the Conclusion to his Popular Political Economy towards its end he 
had reiterated the distinctiveness of his positive attitude. 
I have taken a different view from theirs, and cannot help believing 
that we shall always find in the increase of knowledge and 
extended division of labour, – the natural and necessary 
consequences of an increase of population, – a compensation, or 
even more than a compensation, for the decreasing fertility in 
soils, which is said by Political Economists and Statesmen, to add 
to the difficulty of procuring subsistence as mankind multiply. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.267) 
Knowledge 
In The Wealth of Nations there are numberless scattered remarks, 
which show that Dr. Smith was aware of the influence of 
                                            
286 From the emphasis this article placed on the importance of capital its author can be 
quite plainly distanced from Hodgskinřs position that envisage knowledge guided 
labour as the over-riding consideration. 
287 The banality of such a statement is perhaps akin to claiming that two men with one 
hammer cannot bang in twice as many nails as one man with one hammer. 
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knowledge in adding to productive power; yet he has not 
dedicated any part of his book expressly to this subject. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.53) 
Thus consequent upon Smith‘s perceived omission much of Popular Political 
Economy was devoted to the issues relating to the acquisition and application 
of knowledge in production.  Of particular import to our reconstruction of his 
theory of growth was Chapter II – Influence of Observation and Knowledge. 
Here Hodgskin expressed an almost mechanical link between the growth of 
population and improvements to knowledge, that lead to improved productivity 
and increased output in turn resulting in increased population; which 
accentuates the endogenous nature of his growth theory. 
He began with a statement of the clear importance of observation and 
knowledge to man‘s survival: 
It is obvious, that till some knowledge has been obtained of the 
laws which govern the material world, it must be difficult to 
preserve existence, and impossible to augment wealth.  Men must 
have observed the habitudes of plants, and the qualities of 
different soils, before they could successfully have cultivated the 
ground. (ibid, p.54) 
He also quickly established the relationship between improved knowledge and 
the subsequent need to employ less labour in producing goods. 
To say nothing of those improved means invented within the last 
fifty years, for procuring, smelting, and forging iron: the results of 
our progress in chemical knowledge, which have diminished to a 
great extent the labour necessary to make all agricultural 
instruments, of which iron is one of the materials; … that 
improvements in arts, apparently the most remote from each 
other, tend materially to lighten labour in both: (ibid, p.56) 
Thereby Hodgskin conceived that technological improvements instigated by 
superior knowledge lowered natural price. 
The source of better knowledge lay, for Hodgskin, in sustained observation and 
experimentation rather than chance inventions or inspirations. As such he was 
critical of what he saw as J.B. Say‘s over-emphasis on apparently accidental 
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discoveries, when discussing the impact of changes to the method of fallowing 
in agriculture;288 
M. Say is wrong, perhaps, in ascribing this improvement to a 
chance conception.  It was the result of continued observation; 
and its advantages had to be shown by repeated experiments 
before it was adopted (ibid, p.57) 289 
Thus Hodgskin pointed out that the use of foreign sourced plants was likewise 
the result of observation rather than a simple piece of ―good-luck‖ or 
inspiration.290 
Before any person could think of removing a root like the potatoe, 
from one country to another … he must have known, or 
conjectured from what he had previously learned, that the root, or 
the seed, would keep so long as to permit its transport: and he 
must have ascertained some of its properties, and have formed 
hopes from similarity of climate or soil, that it would flourish in his 
own country; and he must have been aware of some utility or 
agreeableness in adding a foreign vegetable to the thousands that 
teem from almost every soil, before the thought of importing it 
from a remote corner of the globe could have been rationally 
entertained. (ibid, p.61) 
This chapter contained many such examples of how changes in technology, 
inventions and general improvements to knowledge derived from observation 
and the understanding made by the populace. His next chapter sought the 
Natural Laws which Regulate the Progress of Society in Knowledge.   
Here Hodgskin started by stressing that knowledge and inventions paved the 
way for the further division of labour rather than being its result, as he claimed 
―Dr. Smith and his followers‖ had apparently proposed. 
Inventions always precede division of labour, and extend it, both 
by introducing new arts and by making commodities at a less cost. 
(ibid, p.80) 291 
                                            
288 Hodgskin thereby explained the improved levels of knowledge endogenously rather 
than Sayřs exogenous explanation.  
289 Hodgskin cited a passage of Sayřs from his Notes to Storchřs Cours d’Economie, 
Vol. i. p.167. 
290 It would appear that the notion that ideas and inventions often get used for purposes 
other than those they were originally intended for, was not attended to by Hodgskin.  
Nevertheless it might be argued that it was only by their use and observation of their 
uses that additional innovative uses could be envisaged. Thus if there was a larger 
population there could be more observation and hence more uses discovered.  
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Knowledge also increased over time not only as the size of the population 
increased, but also as it learnt from and added to the understanding of previous 
generations; 
One generation is wiser and possesses more knowledge than the 
generation which preceded it.  This is not merely from being later 
in the world.  Time is a mere personification, and adds nothing to 
wisdom.  The last generation is wiser than the generation which 
preceded it, because it adds, where language is in use, and 
particularly where writing and printing are known, all its own 
observations to the knowledge of the generation which went 
before.  There are more eyes to see, more hands to practise, and 
more minds to treasure up and record observations and practices,  
As the world grows older, and as men increase and multiply, there 
                                                                                                                                
291 Hodgskinřs claim was that in Adam Smithřs position the division of labour lead to 
technological developments. Hodgskinřs own view, that the division of labour followed 
on from technological advancement, can be seen in such passages as: 
I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those machines 
by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been 
originally owing to the division of labour.  Men are much more likely to 
discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the 
whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object, than 
when it is dissipated among a great variety of things.  But in 
consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every manřs 
attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simply 
object. (Smith, WN., I.i.9) 
 Whilst Hodgskin to some extent accepted Smithřs observations, he thought that 
some of his subsequent statements were inconsistent with ŖSmithřs own principlesŗ :- 
The question at issue between Dr. Smith and his followers and myself, 
is, whether a knowledge of the material world, and inventions in the arts, 
including the invention of machines, are, or are not, originally owing to 
the division of labour. I maintain they are not. I admit, that a progress in 
knowledge, and division of labour, mutually promote each other ; that 
observation, introducing new practices, leads to extended division of 
labour ; and extended division of labour, allowing those, whose principal 
business it is to make observations, to confine their attention to some 
small part of the material world, enables them, and of course enables 
society at large, more speedily to become acquainted with it : but I 
contend, that observation must have preceded division of labour, and 
some progress must have been made in a knowledge of the external 
world, before men could have thought of devoting themselves to 
different employments. Undoubtedly they had learned to make bows and 
arrows, to catch animals and fish, to cultivate the ground and weave 
cloth, before some of them dedicated themselves exclusively to making 
these instruments, to hunting, fishing, agriculture, and weaving. I take 
this to be strictly consistent with Dr. Smith's own principles; for had men 
laid themselves out for particular employments, before those 
employments were invented, it would prove that division of labour was 
the fore-planned result of human wisdom to lighten labour, which he 
expressly denies. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.79) 
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is a constant, natural, and necessary tendency to an increase in 
their knowledge, and consequently in their productive power. 
(Hodgskin, 1827a, p.94-5) 
Thereby Hodgskin was reiterating the general Whig progressive attitude 
towards the advance of knowledge, which came to be typical of subsequent 
Victorian Britain.292   
Hodgskin as a pre-Smithian Growth Theorist  
Despite his apparent Whig affiliation, Hodgskin‘s notions on growth, 
concentrating as they did on knowledge, innovation and technological change, 
should be seen as the continuance of ideas on progress that were prominent 
before the Wealth of Nations. As we have seen, he argued against Smith, and 
later Classical economists in general, and could be understood to be 
perpetuating pre-Smithian concepts. 
The distinction between Smith and his predecessors can be seen illustrated in 
Anthony Brewer‘s paper Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the Concept of 
Economic Growth (1999).  This paper contrasted the prominence placed on 
capital‘s role by the two authors of its title; 
Where the Wealth of Nations differs from Ferguson‘s Essay is in 
the central role it accords to savings and capital accumulation as 
the primary determinant of growth.  An increasing division of labor 
is the primary source of growth in output and income per head, but 
                                            
292 Indeed, Hodgskin seems to have been echoing the general Whig attitude that we can 
see, for example, in Sidney Smithřs review of Benthams The Book of Fallacies (1824) 
for the Edinburgh Review.  Although this review referred to experience, it was in terms 
similar to Hodgskinřs observations, when discussing the Ŗfallacyŗ of the superior 
wisdom of previous generations.  
Those who come first (our ancestors) are the young people, and have the 
least experience.  We have added to their experience the experience of 
many centuries; and, therefore, as far as experience goes, are wiser, and 
more capable of forming an opinion than they were.  The real feeling 
should be, not, can we be so presumptuous as to put our opinions in 
opposition to those of our ancestors? but can such young, ignorant, 
inexperienced persons as our ancestors necessarily were, be expected to 
have understood a subject as well as those who have seen so much more, 
lived so much longer, and enjoyed the experiences of so many centuries. 
(Smith, 1824, p.34) 
This can be seen in opposition to the view held by Hodgskinřs some time opponent 
Charles Babbage in his Reflections on the Decline of Science in England (1830) that 
bemoaned the current level of knowledge as inferior to previous times, although this 
work concentrated mostly on the way science was taught, particularly at university 
level.  
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an increased division of labor requires investment (WN, 276-77.  
Increases in total output almost always require investment, and 
hence saving (343), while savings are automatically invested by all 
but the pathological misers (338). (Brewer, 1999, p.249)  
Subsequently, after the Wealth of Nations, Smith‘s focus on capital was to 
become the orthodoxy of political economy, even if it were challenged by a few, 
such as Hodgskin.293 
It is absent from Ferguson‘s Essay, as it is from the works of Hume 
and other writers of the time, with the single exception of Turgot 
(Brewer, 1995).  After the publication of the Wealth of Nations it 
came to dominate thinking about growth, at least until very 
recently. (ibid, p.250)294 
Accordingly both Ferguson and Smith saw growth as inevitable, albeit for 
different reasons: 
Although both Ferguson and Smith thought that continued growth 
was normal in developed ―commercial‖ societies, they stressed 
different reasons for it.  Where Ferguson put the emphasis on the 
development of the ―arts‖ and of knowledge, that is technical 
change, Smith instead emphasized capital accumulation. (ibid, 
p.252) 
In a similar vein Cosimo Perrotta‘s paper, The Preclassical Theory of 
Development (1997), looked at changes in economic thought brought about 
with the Wealth of Nations as related to the shifting concerns of the time. 
One could object that the Enlightenment approach to the 
problems of development was due solely to the fact that labor was 
at that time still the most important factor of production. With 
industrialization, the viewpoint changed because the growth of 
                                            
293 In Accumulation of knowledge and accumulation of capital in early ‘theories’ of 
growth and development, Renee Prendergast portrayed Hodgskin together with John 
Rae and Bentham as explicit critics of Smithřs focus that positioned capital as the main 
driving force to economic growth. She saw Smithřs innovation as a paradigm shift that 
downplayed the role of knowledge in favour of capital (Prendergast, 2009). 
294 John Gray, in his Essential Principles of the Wealth of Nations (1797), had seen 
Smithřs error not so much in his adherence to one particular writer but to French 
Economists as a whole (Gray, 1797, p.4-5). Gray also challenged Smithřs apparent 
demotion of the importance of factors of production other than capital; 
The principle and most essential cause of the prosperity of a state is the 
ingenuity and labour of its inhabitants exercised upon the fertility of its 
soil.  All other causes of the prosperity of a state, united are not 
equivalent to this; (Gray, 1797, p.4) 
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fixed capital became the main element in development. (Perrotta, 
1997, p.316) 295 
From this standpoint Hodgskin‘s economics held to pre-Smithian Enlightenment 
concepts rather than those more prevalent within early 19th century 
industrialising Britain. Thus we should not be surprised that Hodgskin, with his 
emphasis on economics as the science of labour, and his deprecation of 
capital, should have produced a concept of growth that highlighted knowledge, 
technology and innovation, in terms of human capital rather than material or 
financial capital. 
Thereby Hodgskin‘s attack on capital in Labour Defended can be seen 
conjoined with his deliberations on knowledge in Popular Political Economy.  
The first work attempted to debunk the role of capital in promoting production 
and economic growth, whereas the second book explained what he saw as the 
real active driving force to economic growth, if it were not capital. 
Communication 
Although the increase in knowledge was the main contributory factor towards 
economic growth, Hodgskin recognised that efficient and improved 
communications also encouraged economic growth and the improvements to 
knowledge.  The facility of enhanced human communication not only enabled 
knowledge to be shared, but also acted in a manner similar to creating a 
population of more concentrated proportions: 
No one doubts that the rapid communication which may now be 
had from every part of this country to every other part, contribute 
both to the increase of knowledge and of wealth. … Numbers of 
minds are instantly set to work even by a hint; and every 
discovery is instantly appreciated, and almost instantaneously 
improved. The chances of improvement, it is plain, are great in 
proportion as the persons are multiplied whose attention is 
devoted to any particular subject.  It appears to me, therefore, that 
an increase in the number of persons produces the same effect as 
                                            
295 Perrotta also summarised pre-Smithian concepts in terms that could be aligned with 
what we have seen promulgated by Hodgskin, at least as they related to the social cost 
of labour being reduced by higher productivity. 
The increase in consumption and wages allows a higher level of skill; 
this in turn increases productivity, and therefore lowers the social cost of 
labour while increasing the production of wealth. (Perrotta, 1997, p.316) 
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communication; for the latter only operates by bringing numbers to 
think on the same subject. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.93-4)  
Thus Hodgskin also saw freedom of communication as an essential factor in a 
society‘s economic growth.  A free press was thereby particularly important, as 
he saw evidenced in Britain‘s greater economic growth when compared to other 
states, which also illustrated the negative impact of censorship. 
In that European country, however, which of late has made the 
most rapid progress in wealth, the people have been the freest to 
inquire.  The press, and with that the mind, has been less 
shackled in Britain than in any other country of Europe.  This 
probably is the sole source of her superior opulence.  Every part 
of knowledge is intimately and closely connected with every other, 
and men cannot be impeded or restrained from inquiring into one 
branch without their progress being ultimately checked in every 
other. (ibid, p.98) 
Such expressions of opinion go someway to explain Hodgskin‘s dedication to 
journalism that was evident from the beginning of his writing career and was to 
stay with him for the rest of his life:296  
It is, however, apparent, that most of our prosperity is more owing 
to our free press than to our parliament, and, composed as that of 
Hannover is, it never can be a cause of prosperity to that country. 
(Hodgskin, 1820, v.I, p.463-4) 
Without a free press, therefore, even virtue and utility remain 
concealed and lose much of their efficacy because nobody is 
encouraged to imitate them. (ibid, v.II, p.238) 
Man uses words to make known his wants to his fellow man.  
There might by possibility be some rude barter were there no 
spoken language, but there could be no extensive buying and 
selling, no division of labour, no society, in the true sense of that 
                                            
296
 Such an expression can also be found in an article for the Edinburgh Monthly 
Review for March 1821: 
We need not say how much we revere the genuine freedom of the press 
as the fountain of intellectual light, and the source of all that is great 
among mankind.  It is by means of this instrument that nations grow and 
prosper in all that is essentially worth the care of rational beings, … It is 
by union and reciprocal communication that the soul of man grows to 
that maturity for which it was designed by it Creator Ŕ (EMR, March 
1821, p.366) 
Although this article may well have been one of Hodgskinřs there is only the one 
paragraph that these lines are from that appears  particularly Hodgskinite which means 
that there is insufficient material to assign this item as definitely one of Hodgskin. 
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term.  The use of language, therefore, is indispensable to social 
existence, and it alone links man to man, and links all society in 
one common bond. (Hodgskin, 1842, p.83) 
Communication is, in fact, the soul of society. (Hodgskin, BG., 17th 
April 1867, p.2). 
Material Factors 
In line with his concentration on the humanistic aspects of economics there was 
little in Hodgskin‘s writing pertaining to material influences upon growth. He also 
downplayed the importance of the personal talents of individuals, when 
compared to the overwhelming influence of society: 
It is plain that every individual, be his singularities and his 
intellectual powers what they may, has his character, his 
sentiments, his thoughts, his passions, – yea, even his intellect 
itself, – fashioned by the time at which he lives, and by the society 
of which he is a member; so that any thing which is peculiar to 
himself forms but the smallest part of the whole man.  Whatever 
may be his natural endowments, and some philosophers have 
doubted if there be originally any difference among men, every 
man is chiefly indebted for whatever he possesses of knowledge, 
of skill, of inventive power, to the knowledge and skill of other 
men, either living or dead.  The influence of society over every 
individual mind, is paramount to all other things. (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.87)    
Hodgskin was critical of those who, to his mind, recognised population as a 
human issue, but then turned to non-human material conditions to determine 
events; 
But these philosophers did not confine their researches to the law 
of population, to human nature and its attributes, to the instinct of 
love and its effects, to industry, skill, and knowledge, – they did 
not confine themselves to man; but, immediately after referring to 
a certain law under which the human species is continued and 
spread over the earth, they left man the single object they began 
to investigate – took little or no notice of the effects of that law in 
increasing knowledge and giving skill, and passed to some certain 
qualities in a monopolized soil, which they called fertility, and from 
that shaped out laws for the progress of man in society. 
(Hodgskin, E., 18th Nov. 1854, p.1269) 
With similar arguments to those he had used to dismiss material conditions 
from the science of political economy in general, he discharged the effects of 
soil from the population question; 
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The soil has, and its qualities have, no more to do with the 
question of the law of population and the means of subsistence – 
determined by industry – than the atmosphere or the water or any 
other portion of the globe. Man can no more live without a certain 
quantity of air and a certain quantity of water than a certain portion 
of food generally obtained from the soil.  In fact he can live in the 
ocean and on fish, but there he must have air and fresh water. 
(ibid) 
Not that he refused to recognise that soil had practical implications, but for him 
these were not sufficient to be so all encompassing as to negate all other 
considerations; 
But the limitation of the soil – the appropriation and monopoly of it 
– have always supplied the practical and immediate barrier to 
progress; and so these philosophers left man and his attributes, 
which comprise all the phenomena to be considered, to talk about 
fertility of soil, and deduce laws of progress from some qualities of 
it in its monopolised condition. (ibid, p.1270)297 
Thus man can be faced with immediate difficulties but the story of his progress 
related to how mankind overcame those difficulties, rather than how those 
problems came to dominate his existence. The use of knowledge and its 
communication were, in Hodgskin‘s eyes, therefore the prime concerns, not 
only to man‘s progress but to a study of such growth.  
                                            
297 The private ownership of land was not the issue for Hodgskin, but the legal mode of 
ownership that encumbered it with legislation such as primogeniture and entailment. 
Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted contained his main arguments 
against the legal mode of appropriation as contradicting what he saw as the natural or 
economically endogenous form of ownership. 
Hodgskinřs review of Herbert Spencerřs Social Statics (1851) provides an important 
insight into Hodgskinřs view as to the ownership of land. 
The right of individuals is not each to use the land, according to the 
authorřs own doctrines, but each to use his own faculties; and if in the 
progress of society great numbers of persons can subsist without using 
the land to satisfy their wants Ŕ if experience has taught us that a much 
greater number of human beings can subsist and have their wants 
satisfied by the land becoming property than otherwise Ŕ if it be also a 
fact that more faculties are called into play, such as those of the men 
engaged in all the trades not connected with the land, then it follows, on 
the authorřs own principles, that the land should be appropriated, in 
order to promote the exercise of faculties and engender greater 
happiness. … We are afraid that the author is led, by just indignation at 
the abuse of the right of property in land which has taken place 
throughout Europe, to conclude erroneously against the use of such a 
right.  (Hodgskin, E., 8
th
 Feb. 1851, p.151) 
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His review of Charles Knight‘s Knowledge is Power provided a useful exemplar 
of Hodgskin‘s overall attitude to those factors that had bearing upon economic 
growth and the relationship with material objects. 
It is intended to show that in the production of wealth knowledge is 
power; and the motto chosen from Bacon is – ―The empire of man 
over material things has its only foundation in the sciences and 
the arts.‖  It does not require any argument to show, as arts 
change and improve from age to age, though they have material 
to work on, and as science is continually augmenting, that empire 
of man over material things is wholly intellectual.  It arises from 
the senses observing external objects and the mind guiding the 
hands. The foundation of the empire being immaterial, the empire 
itself has now no known or conceivable bounds, and thus the well-
accredited principle, knowledge is power, brings clearly before us 
a vista of progressive improvements for society, with an horizon 
for ever receding as man advances. (Hodgskin, E., 30th Dec. 
1854, p.1454)  
Methodological Matters 
Given that the focus of this thesis is Hodgskin‘s concept of economic progress 
we will not enter into an extensive discussion of the general technical and 
methodological issues of both population analysis and growth theory.  
Nevertheless, it should be evident that Hodgskin was at odds with many of his 
contemporaries‘ thinking on these issues. 
In general it has been recognised that following technological change a 
population‘s condition would be improved, which in turn would lead to changes 
in both its death and birth rates; i.e. there were more people being born and 
they tended to live longer.  Whilst it cannot be doubted that Hodgskin 
recognised that changes occurred with Crude Birth Rate (CBR) and Crude 
Death Rate (CDR) statistics, he was evidently not satisfied with what had been 
said to be the initial impetus that caused such changes. 
If population changed due to technical innovation one might query, as he did, 
where such developments originated. Thus rather than having technological 
change as an exogenous factor, he sought an answer endogenously.  From this 
perspective one could envisage technical change as being made by individuals, 
but those individuals were in society and shaped by that society. 
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Hodgskin conceived that an answer could be found within mankind‘s social and 
economic existence rather than exogenous factors such as governmental 
management and planning.  For him to accept that society changed because of 
technical advances, just left unanswered the question as to why there was such 
innovation.  Even if it were assumed that technology changed because of 
improvements in human knowledge the issue would be why did human 
knowledge advance?  
Thereby, Hodgskin found an answer that saw technological change occurring 
because of the very nature or character of society.  Society was a dynamic and 
evolving arena not just a static passive canvas on which exogenous effects 
came to play out their effects. The alternative, perhaps, saw society as a static 
and otherwise unchanging phenomena.  In the Whig spirit, and partly in-line 
with Victorian vibrancy, Hodgskin saw society not from a conservative 
perspective of steadfast consistency, but from a deep-seated view of dynamic 
social evolution.   
Part Three - Indicators of Growth 
The modern array of statistics and associated analytical tools were unavailable 
to Thomas Hodgskin, but nevertheless he was evidently keen to support his 
theory of economic growth with the available data of the time.298  Thus, in the 
first decade of Victorian Britain Hodgskin‘s articles for The Economist contained 
much analysis of some of the statistical information that was available.  The first 
two indicators of growth were relatively obvious, namely population numbers 
and prices. 
In addition to these Hodgskin also concerned himself with crime statistics given 
that one of his assertions was that as prosperity grew there would be fewer 
criminal acts against property, as dire need and relative poverty diminished. 
Indeed most of his known articles for The Economist were on the subject of 
crime. Hodgskin, to a lesser degree, also used marriage statistics to forward his 
arguments, contending that as economic growth improved living standards 
more people would be willing and able to afford to be married. 
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 Remembering of course that in Popular Political Economy Hodgskin had noted that 
the purpose of his representation of growth within his theoretical pure market economy 
was to relate that to the real world so that a perception might be created as to the effects 
of non-economic (i.e. exogenous) factors. 
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Thus we turn our attention in the last part of this section to review Hodgskin‘s 
presentation of those indicators of economic growth. 
Population and Pauperism 
Simple rises in the number of people was probably not a very illuminating or 
strong case to put forward in support of growth in the sense that Hodgskin 
meant as economic progress.  Thus he sought some association between the 
population increase and their condition. To this end he availed himself of the 
statistics on pauperism that were on hand. 
An example of such an exposition can be seen in his article of 24th May 1851 
entitled Pauperism and Free Trade which was typical of his work in this area. 
This article began with almost gleeful irony that despite the introduction of free-
trade and with an increasing population, there was a reduction in public 
expenditure according to Poor Law Board statistics; 
Another half-yearly return of the most satisfactory description from 
the Poor Law Board! When is the ruin of the country to begin to 
exhibit fruits? How often have we heard from leading 
Protectionists in Parliament that they would stake the whole 
question at issue on the effects of the modern policy on the 
labouring population?  Pauperism was to be the index.  Well, for 
three years every return has been an improvement on the one 
preceding. (Hodgskin, E., 24th May 1851, p.558) 
So whilst this particular article was concerned with the issue of the impact of 
free trade upon the labouring class it still showed that the national rate ―of the 
expenditure in relief of the poor‖ had undergone ―another reduction of 8 per 
cent.‖ (ibid).  Thus it was an example, for Hodgskin, of what occurred in the 
economy when restrictive policies were abandoned so that natural growth could 
flourish.  In this case the state of the population would improve (i.e. less 
pauperism) despite its increase in size.299 
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 Although it might be noted that the amount of money spent by the Poor Law Boards 
might have simply decreased because they just gave out less rather then because less 
was necessary, Hodgskin was addressing those who he noted had claimed that 
ŖPauperism was to be the indexŗ. He was addressing the detractors from the more 
economically liberal policies, with the measure they had themselves cited.  The claim 
had been that free-trade would lead to the Poor Law Board having to pay out more and 
Hodgskin pointed out that this was not the case.   
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That population was increasing in the first half of the nineteenth century was 
widely acknowledged.  For example, G.R. Porter‘s The Progress of the Nation 
(1847) gave figures that indicated that the population increased at about 14% 
every ten years in the period from 1801 through to 1841: 
1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 
Pop. 
(M) 
Pop. 
(M) 
% rise Pop. 
(M) 
% rise Pop. 
(M) 
% rise Pop. 
(M) 
% rise 
10.94 12.60 15.11 14.39 14.12 16.54 14.91 18.72 13.18 
Table 1. Population figures for Great Britain from Porter, 1847, p.8  
These figures showed the population had risen from just under 11 million to 
nearly 18¾ million, a 71% increase in just 40 years. Indeed by the time of the 
1851 census the population had risen to 20.94 million – a near doubling of the 
population within 50 years. 300 
Thus the first criterion of an increased population was beyond question, but it 
remained to be argued whether that enlarged population were in a better 
condition than that of earlier times, and hence the figures on pauperism were 
useful – ―Pauperism was to be the index‖ 
Prices 
As we have already discussed Hodgskin‘s opinion was that in the long term 
prices, both natural and market, tended to decrease in relative, rather than 
simple nominal, terms.  We have also illustrated the attempts to validate this 
claim with the establishment of The Economist‘s price index from 1845.   
                                            
300 Porterřs Progress of the Nation was an authoritative work that went through many 
editions as a literary notice in The Economist acknowledged: 
The reputation of Mr Porterřs work is so firmly and deservedly 
established, and it is so well and widely known, that it is only necessary 
to say the present edition brings down most of its statements to the end 
of 1849. The work has lost none of its clearness, and its utility is 
increased. (The Economist, 1
st
 March 1851, p.235) 
This relatively short notice is not known as one of Hodgskinřs, but does bear much 
of his style and does immediately follow his review of James Holeřs Lectures on Social 
Science and the Organisation of Labour.  There were presumably numerous such short 
notices and commentaries in The Economist that can only ever be conjectured on as to 
their authorship. 
 296 
Thus in very crude terms prices from 1845 to 2005 fell to 30% of their original 
figure whilst population from 1841 to 2001 rose by 180% or put another way the 
1841 population was only 35% of the modern number.301  As we have shown 
Hodgskin did accept the limitation of statistics and all the vagaries incumbent on 
the technicalities of the formulation of such temporally diverse data.   
Thus in a limited vein Hodgskin‘s notions stand up to some scrutiny such that 
his view can not be summarily dismissed out of hand.302  Hodgskin also used 
other data to illustrate his hypothesis as we shall now discuss in his 
consideration of crime statistics. 
Crime Statistics 
Much of Hodgskin‘s writing for The Economist concerned crime and crime 
statistics.303   By way of example we will concentrate on his article aptly given a 
title that left no doubt as to his association between population and crime –
Increase of Population and Decrease of Criminality – published on 13th Sept. 
1851. 
This article opened with the recognition that figures available from the 1851 
census had shown that the population had increased since the 1841 census (by 
12%) and that there had been a marked shift of the population from rural to 
town dwelling. He also ridiculed John Stuart Mill and McCulloch for their 
apparently fearful attitude towards population growth and what they had 
perceived of as associated dangers. 
                                            
301 (www.statistics.gov.uk) Population in 1841 for Great Britain taken as 20.94m and 
2001 as 58.79m . 
302 The apparent decline of price levels in the early 19th Century can be seen in several 
other contemporary sources that furnish support to Hodgskinřs analysis of diminishing 
prices. For example:- 
 G.R. Porterřs Progress of the Nation Ŕ 1836, 1838, 1848, 1851 
 Thomas Tookeřs A History of Prices Ŕ 1838, 1848, 1857 
 Thomas Tookeřs An Inquiry into the Currency Principle; the connection of the 
Currency with Prices, and the Expediency of a Separation of issue from Banking 
(1844) 
 Thomas Tookeřs Thoughts and Details on the High and Low Prices of the last thirty 
years (1823 & 1824) 
 Charles Babbageřs  On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (1832)   
303 Of the 98 articles (excluding reviews) known to have been written by Hodgskin in 
The Economist, at least 48 seem, by their titles at least, to have been related to issues of 
crime (Stack, 1998, p.220-3). 
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Hodgskin went on to expound his notion that the increasing population, being 
even more concentrated in cities and towns, did not cause the sort of 
catastrophes that some had feared:  
When civilisation has always gone hand-in-hand with increasing 
people, and fled with every declining and dying-out race, it seems 
extraordinary that theorists should ever have imagined that an 
increase of people was a source of danger, and must be guarded 
against.  To have decreed that man shall multiply, and have 
accompanied the multiplication with evils and wrongs still more 
multiplied, does nor recommend a system so expounded to our 
respect; and, independently of experience, the theory would seem 
to be prima facie false, and even absurd. We know, too, that 
coincident with the growth of our towns, an immense variety of 
physical improvements have come into existence. (Hodgskin, E., 
13th Sept. 1851, p.1010) 
Hodgskin noted that even though ―the rate of mortality has been lessened‖, it 
was ―desirable to bring more evidence‖ to bear.  As such he looked to the 
annual criminal returns. 
The criminal returns, in conjunction with the increase of 
population, seem to supply such evidence. (ibid) 
Thus he presented the facts initially at national level, albeit in summary form; 
There has been in the last ten years a great increase of people, 
and there has been a great decrease in commitments.  The 
population of England and Wales has augmented in ten years 
1,968,341 and the commitments have decreased between 1841 
and 1851, 947; or taking the total of the first five years and the 
total of the last five years, the commitments in the last five years, 
the comparison was 139,505 to 138,918, showing a decided 
decrease in commitments in the last five years, not withstanding 
the increase of the people. (ibid) 
Using comparisons from the five counties with the largest increases of 
population, with those five with the smallest increases, he calculated that the 
five largest increased populations (between 18% and 26%) had far greater 
reduction in criminal commitments than those five counties with the least rise in 
population (between –0.7% and 4%). The county with the largest increase in 
population (Durham) had conversely a relatively large increase in commitments 
from 215 per year up to 358, which was obviously a large percentage increase 
although relatively small in absolute terms.  As Hodgskin pointed out the 
conviction rate in Durham was still only 0.7 per 1,000 inhabitants, whereas the 
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county with the least increase (actually a decrease of 0.7%) Wiltshire, had a 
conviction rate of 1.6 per 1,000.  However, even allowing for the oddity of 
Durham, the overall figures for the two groups of counties, showed larger 
decreases in criminality in the most populated counties, which also tended to 
have the largest increases.304 
we believe that the comparison of the population tables and the 
criminal tables together justifies the conclusion, that criminality is 
not in general so great in well-peopled districts and in the districts 
in which the population increases the fastest, as in the districts 
where the population is the thinnest and increases the slowest. 
(ibid, p.1011)     
Hodgskin was well aware that the apparent improved behaviour, evidenced by 
less criminality, might have been the result of humanity‘s closer proximity rather 
than due to an improved economic situation. Indeed Hodgskin himself had 
recognised in his review of Joseph Fletcher‘s Summary of the Moral Statistics 
of England and Wales (22nd September 1849) that the reduction of criminality 
associated with an increased population might well be due to sociological or 
psychological causes rather than solely economic reasons. 
The increase of people carries with it a decrease in criminality.  It 
brings each individual more and more under check – more and 
more annihilates obstinate self-will – more and more multiplies the 
motives for action derived from others, and diminishes those 
derived from isolate self – more and more absorbs, if we may so 
speak, the individual in the mass, and makes him conform to the 
wishes and desires of others. (Hodgskin, E., 22nd Sept. 1849, 
p.1060) 
However this improved social behaviour, induced by having to live together in 
closer confines, was of benefit to mankind, and, for Hodgskin, meant that 
greater prosperity would follow. 
Thus the progress of population being the cause of all civilisation, 
becomes the test for making manifest the causes that injure the 
welfare of man: (ibid) 
Thus an increased population did not advance knowledge, technology and 
wealth solely via economic want and necessity but also through the increased 
                                            
304 Hodgskin perceived that the areas with the largest absolute populations tended to 
have the largest economic growth and hence higher rates of population increases.  In his 
hypothetical pure market economy there would necessarily be a connection between the 
size of population and the rate of economic growth and population increase.    
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social pressures and needs resultant from living in more concentrated proximity. 
Hence criminal statistics could be indicative of improved social conditions that 
on one hand indicated that there had been progress in terms of wealth and 
welfare, and on the other hand, provided an enhanced environment from which 
knowledge and technology would be better developed. 
Marriage Statistics 
In his article Marriages and Abundance (26th May 1849) Hodgskin provided 
summary evidence to link the number of marriages with the improving economic 
conditions, particularly in years of good harvests.  He also argued that people 
generally only married having made some necessary provisions. 
few marriages take place without the parties possessing some 
property, and a probable means of providing for themselves and 
their offspring. (Hodgskin, E., 26th May 1849, p.574) 
Thus the marriage statistics could also provide a good indicator of economic 
prosperity and growth. 
The increase, or the decrease, in the number of marriages is thus 
one index to the increase of the capital of the country. From them 
spring all the labourers who create capital; and being only 
contracted as the rule when some capital or means of creating it is 
prepared, their increase is equally an indication of the growing 
power of the state and the well-being of individuals. (ibid) 
Being, in this way more dependent on the growth of wealth, than crime 
statistics, which could be affected by sociological issues, marriage statistics 
were viewed by Hodgskin as a valuable tool in his arguments in The Economist 
in favour of his theorising of population and economic growth.  
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Section Two 
Other Economic Changes 
Further economic conditions, other than the natural growth that Hodgskin 
perceived stemmed from population changes, shall be considered in this 
section, i.e.; 
 Changes in technology that did not originate from the improvements in 
knowledge associated with an increasing population in the hypothetical 
pure market economy.  These would thus equate to positive exogenous 
change. 
 Changes in the conditions of production unrelated to permanent changes 
in technology or human knowledge. Thus such changes would generally 
be of a temporary or seasonal nature. 
 Changes instigated upon the economic system by government 
intervention, that were from Hodgskin‘s perspective negative exogenous 
change. 
Exogenous Technological Change 
Changes in technology unconnected to increases in population or other 
endogenous factors within the pure market economy could be seen to represent 
exogenous growth.  Examples of these would be the importation of a new 
technology or a perfectly random technological discovery. If a new mode of 
production arose from causes unrelated to improvements in society‘s 
knowledge then that would be exogenous.305   In such a situation the changes 
in technology themselves might well provide a stimulus to an increase of 
population if that new technology actually impacted on costs so as to lower both 
natural and market prices. 
                                            
305 Such a change might be one imposed upon an economy arising from political, 
cultural, ethical or religious interests.  In these cases the alteration might be seen as 
artificial or un-natural, but only in the sense of being exogenous to the restrictions of a 
hypothetical pure market economy.  In the wider sense of society as a whole they would 
probably be artificial in the sense of man-made but not necessarily un-natural. 
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This situation was not one that Hodgskin appears to have considered in any 
detail.306  
Hodgskin did not deny that exogenous changes could take place that had 
positive affects on economic growth.  However, his concentration was directed 
towards a consideration of systemic or endogenously stimulated growth. Given 
his view that political economy was a science concerned with labour and its 
use, it should not be a surprise that he looked towards what could be done 
internally, rather then rely on events outside that science.  
Temporary Change 
When there was no technological advance but productivity was still improved 
then this could represent an improving economic situation for society.  An 
increase in output without any actual change in labour or its use, would 
necessarily be due to reasons outside of Hodgskin‘s hypothetical pure market 
economy and external to his discipline of political economy, and thereby 
represent exogenous growth.   
Land in the broadest sense, can become more productive outside of the 
influence of human action or knowledge. Such changes would in general have 
to be seen as climatic.  An example of this latter effect would be improved corn 
or wine production as a result of an advantageous environmental situation. 
                                            
306 Notwithstanding this, an exception, in the case he described of money when seen as 
simply a commodity, could with some latitude be seen as illustrative of such a situation 
of exogenous change.  The discovery of gold and silver in America that had lowered the 
natural price of these precious metals when compared with other commodities, meant 
that they fell in relative exchangeable value: 
The consequence of that discovery [of America which lowered the value 
of the precious metals throughout Europe] was to supply us with gold 
and silver, particularly the latter, by means of less labour than was 
necessary to obtain them from the mines of Europe. Accordingly, gold 
and silver in a few years fell so much in value, that the period of the 
discovery of America has become a remarkable era in the history of 
political economy, as well as in the more extensive history of mankind. 
After that period it became necessary throughout Europe, to give more 
than three times as much silver as was before given for corn. (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.187) 
Although this quote did not directly relate to growth issues it does provide an 
example of economic consequences resulting from non-economic sources.  The 
accident of American gold and silver deposits did not directly arise from what could be 
seen as endogenous factors within the hypothetical pure market economy. 
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Thus with favourable weather conditions output might be increased so as to 
cause a fall in prices and lead to an increased population.307  However, in this 
scenario, the mode of production would remain the same, having no need to 
change given the fortuitous increase of output, until such time as the increased 
population was not sustainable at the new levels of output.  At such point price 
might rise and, according to Hodgskin‘s notions, necessity would stimulate 
humanity to find further output increases, using knowledge to improve 
productivity. 
Thus, initially at least, there could be the appearance of economic growth, 
except for a change in technology. This form of fortuitous growth would not be 
permanent in the long term and remain subject to the environmental conditions, 
and thereby was not really sustainable growth. 
The impact of temporary climate changes can also be seen in the short term 
seasonal effects on society.  Thus, as Hodgskin recognised, marriages tended 
to be more numerous in the post harvest periods of the year; quoting from the 
Registrar General‘s reports he noted that; 
The details of the increase and decrease of marriages are as 
instructive as the general statement. ―The fewest people marry in 
the first quarter of the year, and the most in the last, which follows 
harvest and includes Christmas.‖ (Hodgskin, E., 26th May 1848, 
p.574) 
The impact of good harvests was still a major influence when Hodgskin was 
writing for The Economist in the mid 19th century. So much so that he estimated 
that its influence was greater than the impact of government intervention and 
enactments on the economy and people‘s welfare. 
We cannot overlook the fact – indeed, it is the strong part of the 
free trade case at present – that the seasons have more influence 
than legislation on the well-being of the community, (ibid, p.573) 
                                            
307 Other environmental, but non-climatic changes might, for example, be the 
eradication of a disease or a pest, form a cause completely independent of human 
action. Where pests or diseases are eradicated by man this would be seen as a change in 
human technology which in turn could simply be endogenous (in Hodgskinřs sense).  
Consideration could also be given to the fact that diseases or pestilence can be the result 
of manřs actions, either directly or indirectly. Pollution resulting from intensified 
industrial production could be endogenous, whereas other situations such as wars that 
had environmental consequences could be viewed as exogenous.  
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Notwithstanding this recognition Hodgskin did write far more copiously on the 
issue of government intervention in the economy presumably because that was 
at least within human control, whereas the weather was not.308 
Governmental Intervention 
For Hodgskin governmental interference in the economy took various forms that 
can be classified into three main types; 
 Restrictions that affected market size.  These included measures that 
artificially limited the population or such actions that constrained the 
available markets (i.e. consumers), such as protectionism. 
 Limitations that affected prices; such as taxes, tariffs, and tithes, which 
maintained prices higher than competition would normally have brought 
them down to. 
 Legal property rights, which facilitated the appropriation of the outputs of 
production to agents other than those that created them.  This effectively 
meant that non-labourers or idle-capitalists, in the sense we have 
already discussed, were allocated property created by others, without 
actually labouring in any form themselves. 
Within Hodgskin‘s ―anarchism‖ any government action always amounted to a 
burden for those that did labour, as legal laws in general acted in ways contrary 
to the pure market economy.  To Hodgskin‘s mind there was never a law which 
sought to promote that which would have occurred anyway, as there would not 
be a need to enforce what would nonetheless have happened.  A legal law was 
necessary to enforce a condition that would not have happened but for that 
                                            
308 Although there was an article (apparently by Hodgskin) in The Chemist that 
appeared to discuss the problem of climatic conditions akin to Global Warming. This 
piece noted the general increase of temperatures with an associated increase in rainfall.  
The common theory of the time seems to have been that these climatic changes were 
due to industrialisation, particularly the release of heat from the Earthřs core resultant 
from all the mining activities that went with that industrialisation.  Hodgskin seems to 
have ridiculed the idea that human impact on the environment was a major concern with 
immediate catastrophic implications: 
Timid people, indeed, among whom we do not reckon ourselves … 
imagine, from the calamitous state of the elements, that something more 
terrible is now to befall the human race than it ever before suffered; and 
that the unhappy beings of this generation are destined to be both 
drowned and burnt. (Hodgskin, C., 10
th
 April 1824, p.80) 
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enforcement, thus all legal laws were exogenous to the pure market economic 
system. 309 
But as law is in fact only a general name for the will of the law-
maker, being, the expression of his desire to have wealth, and 
retain power and dominion, it is clear that in making laws for the 
appropriation of property, he will not, consistently with nature, give 
to every one what he produces. This object always has been, and, 
now is, so to dispose of the annual produce as will best tend to 
preserve his power. (Hodgskin, 1832, p.47) 
Accordingly laws were there to enable the powerful to remain dominant, 
because they would have lost that power without such laws.  Those with 
inherent power did not need laws to maintain what would be sustained in any 
case.310   
The preservation of the power of the unjust appropriators has 
been called social order, and mankind have believed the 
assertion. To maintain their dominion is the object and aim of all 
human legislation. The great mass of the two hundred and odd 
statutes, which, up to a recent period, inflicted death on our 
people, had no other object than to enforce obedience to an 
unjust scheme of appropriation. That government is a great evil, 
that laws to model and uphold it, imposing restraints on thought 
and commerce, on the press and locomotion, that taxes to pay its 
expenses, kings and judges to administer it, and armies and 
hangmen to carry their blood-stained decrees into execution – that 
Aristocracies dazzling us with the display of gaudy magnificence, 
and hierarchies imposing on our senses by more solemn 
delusions--both intended to cheat us into admiration of their tinsel 
shew to which substantial happiness is sacrificed ; that gaols and 
gibbets, and tread-mills, the instruments of legislative wrath, and 
the signs of its dominion, that they all inflict sharp pain in their first 
operation, and spread misery through society, is universally 
admitted; that I have convinced you of the unholiness of their 
origin, or their inability to answer the end proposed, I cannot 
assert; but I must express my sincere conviction, that the 
apparent necessity for maintaining them is altogether a 
consequence of our artificial and unjust right of property. 
(Hodgskin, 1832, p156-7) 
                                            
309 A position we have seen acknowledged by Anton Menger in his Right to the Product 
of Labour (1886). 
310 A point that Hodgskin stressed not only in his articles for The Economist and The 
Brighton Guardian, but specifically in The Natural and Artificial Right of Property 
Contrasted (1832). Hodgskin was unable to find time to produce the work he had often 
envisaged Ŕ The Absurdity of Law Illustrated Ŕ due to the constraints and pressing 
demands of his life.     
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It might be argued that exogenous government action could be justified in order 
to correct external influences or maintain economic order against other 
exogenous influences.  Or, in other words, government interference was not 
actually meddling but intervention to keep the economy on its natural course.  
Against such a position Hodgskin argued that although we might identify that 
nature followed its own course, what route that natural course should or would 
take was unknowable. Thus the study of a future that has yet to come to pass, 
that facilitated the writing of laws to amend that unknowable future, was a 
fruitless effort. 
A philosopher, indeed, might say, inquire into what?  Into the past 
condition of society? Legislators would not surely make laws for 
that.  Into the future condition of society?  There are no means for 
conducting the inquiry with success. The progress of the past may 
cast its shadow before, so that you may have a rough notion that 
society is to go on increasing in people, in wealth, and in 
knowledge, as it has increased in past time; but what shape that 
increase is to take, how rapid is to be the progress, and what are 
to be the new relations, both among individuals and among 
nations, it will call into existence – what new trades, what new 
arts, may arise – what new habits, manners, customs, and 
opinions, will be formed – what is the precise outline society will 
assume, with all the fillings-in of the picture to the most minute 
touches; – all these things, to which laws ought to be adapted, 
cannot possibly be known: and inquiry into them, with a view of 
making laws to accord with them, must necessarily make the 
whole business of legislation appear in its true character to 
mankind – a mockery of their interests, and a fraud on their 
understandings. Will legislators inquire, then, into the present?  It 
is a line without breadth – the negation both of the past and the 
future – one of which passes into the other, while you are talking 
of inquiring and before you can make your laws to catch it. 
(Hodgskin, 1832, p.11)311 
                                            
311 The specific study of the future, as future history was for some the object of all 
intellectual inquiry. To illustrate this Hodgskin had noted Dugald Stewartřs Elements of 
the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1, page 251, 2
nd
 ed.) which referred to Ŗan 
enlightened anticipation of the future history of mankindŗ (Hodgskin, 1832, p.4). 
Perhaps in opposition to his own sometime title of ŖThe Cockney Philosopherŗ 
Hodgskin referred to those of this persuasion as the Westminster philosophers 
(Hodgskin, BG., 19
th
 June 1867, p.2). As we saw in our chapter on Nature, John Stuart 
Mill in his System of Logic (1843), was also to use the term future history: 
we may hereafter succeed not only in looking forward into the future 
history of the human race, but in determining what means may be used 
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This lengthy passage is also worth quoting for illustrating Hodgskin‘s attitude 
not only to a beneficial future, but also his stance on the futility of legislation. 
Detrimental Consequences 
The worst impact of government actions that had a bearing on growth were 
those that affected the continued increase in a population; such as market 
restrictions and measures that increased prices.  From Hodgskin‘s perspective 
an increasing population not only gave rise to more needs, but was thereby the 
source of the observations that produced the knowledge that improved 
technology.  A decreasing or static population would stunt economic growth by 
cutting off these two inspirations to growth.  
A decreasing overall population would eventually also decrease the size of the 
labouring workforce available, leading to a decline in output and living 
standards. 
On the other hand, when nations cease to increase in numbers, 
when they begin to decay, we may be quite sure the power of the 
natural principle of population is so great, that in them the mass of 
the people cannot easily obtain the means of subsistence. 
Individual poverty, a scanty population, its slow growth, or national 
decay, also accompany one another. (Hodgskin, 1827a, p.12) 
Limits to markets could also result in society‘s producers being subdued if they 
cannot export or envelop more consumers.  In turn this weakened the impetus 
to produce cheaper goods via enhanced production methods and slowed 
economic growth.  
Governmental actions also interfered with the pricing mechanism, which, as 
Hodgskin had recognised in Popular Political Economy, was an effective way to 
provide both producers and consumers with market information.  Hodgskin 
anticipated some of the arguments that were to follow in economics about the 
social co-ordinating mechanisms.  In this debate he was firmly in that camp that 
recognised the impossibility of any one agency, be it the government or other 
body, determining what society should produce to meet its needs and 
capacities. Again this was in part due to his mistrust of authority but also down 
to his view, as expressed in the passage above, regarding the impossibility of 
                                                                                                                                
and to what extent, to accelerate the natural progress in so far as it is 
beneficial; (Mill, VIII, p.929) 
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knowing the future, particularly in knowing what could be produced and what 
was actually needed and, perhaps more importantly, wanted. 
Those actions that interfered with the pricing mechanism tended to enhance 
what Hodgskin called social price.312  With market price tending to relate to 
social price – ―Unfortunately, all commerce is so much regulated by legislation, 
that all money [market] price at present represents social price;‖ (Hodgskin, 
1827a, p.232)  – government intervention would affect market prices and 
impede their tendency to equate closer to natural prices. 
In line with his general attitude to governments and laws, Hodgskin was very 
much occupied with the right of property, particularly, as we have discussed 
previously, the legal right of property and that economic right of property 
associated with the ideas of ―each to his own‖ and ―the fruit of one‘s labours‖.  
This obviously found its most forthright outlet in Natural and Artificial Right of 
Property Contrasted (1832).   
The legal right of property, as we have previously illustrated and as recognised 
by Anton Menger and others, failed to ensure that the producers (labourers in 
the widest sense) gained property rights over the whole of their produce. As we 
have already seen Menger had realised that laws, ―being the outcome of quite 
other than economic conceptions‖, were generally opposed to the economically 
ideal (Menger, 1886, p.2). 
Thus as we have discussed previously, by not attributing society‘s output solely 
to those who produced it, social price was enhanced above natural price with all 
the implications we have already shown. 
Business Cycles 
Hodgskin‘s ideas on the nature of business cycles were thinly scattered through 
his writings. An early example can be found in a letter published on 12th Feb. 
1826 in the Trades‟ Newspaper - Effects of Repealing the Corn Laws. These 
early conjectures were conceived around the idea that capitalists, being over-
                                            
312 There were, of course, measures that could affect natural prices by necessitating the 
use of more labour in production that would otherwise have been the case in a freely 
competitive market. There were also a myriad ways in which government restriction 
also directly and indirectly distorted production so as to effectively hinder natural 
pricesř inevitable fall.  Or put another way hindered the inevitable improvements to 
productivity. 
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stimulated by government actions and encouragements, periodically overtraded 
or inappropriately invested.  This over-stimulation resulted from non-economic 
or political circumstances; i.e. it was exogenous in character. 
This can be seen in Hodgskin‘s letter which defended bankers but laid the 
blame with the government for the depression that followed the short-lived 
boom of late 1825. 
A more efficient and certain cause can be found in … the 
speculation of the capitalist and the master manufacturer, which 
were founded in the hopes of advantages that have never been 
realised … I attribute [this] … to the speeches and writings of the 
ministerial part of the Government, … they have flattered the 
cupidite and stimulated the enterprise of our manufacturers and 
merchants, by talking of the increased market they were to find for 
their commodities.  The latter eagerly hastened to supply the 
imaginary market. … These speculations turned out not profitable 
– they became bankrupt, and distress among the workmen … has 
been the consequence. (Hodgskin, TN., 12th Feb. 1826) 
In Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted the subject of business 
cycles was broached again with reference to the legal right of property and the 
businessmen‘s unreliable expectations. 
When we look at the commercial history of our country, and see 
the false hopes of our merchants and manufacturers leading to 
periodical commercial convulsions, we are compelled to conclude, 
that they have not the same source as the regular and 
harmonious external world. … Starts of national prosperity, 
followed by bankruptcy and ruin, have the same source then as 
fraud and forgery. To our legal right of property we are indebted 
for those gleams of false wealth and real panic, which, within the 
last fifty years, have so frequently shook, to its centre, the whole 
trading world. (Hodgskin, 1832, p.155-6) 
Hodgskin‘s interest does not appear resurrected again until his review of 
McCulloch‘s Treatise on the Circumstances which Determine the Rate of 
Wages that showed that he conceived that the cyclical booms could involve an 
increase in consumption without an appropriate increase in capital: 
It has always been the argument, of the Economist, that in those 
years [1842-46] capital was much misapplied and wasted; and 
hence the revulsion of 1847-8.  There was something else, 
therefore, besides the quantity of capital which determined the 
employment and the wages of labour between 1842 and 1846, 
and that something every person knows, was a delusive and false 
 309 
hope in capitalists, or those who could obtain credit, which gave a 
wonderful extension to employment without any corresponding 
increase in capital.  The quantity of capital was the ultimate test, 
indeed, of the validity of credit; it proved the credit to have been 
fallacious – the hopes to have been a delusion;  but in the 
meantime the people were employed, the wages paid and 
consumed; (Hodgskin, E., 27th Dec. 1851, p.1440) 
The Economist‘s position was generally that the ―delusive and false hope in 
capitalists‖ stemmed from the government‘s exaggerated assertions and 
exogenous support regarding the expansion of railways, as such this 
interference had economically negative consequences.  
Whilst it would be unrealistic to assert that Hodgskin possessed anything like a 
fully worked out theory of business cycles, the above passages illustrate that he 
was well aware of the problem. However, rather than lay the blame on changes 
to population or simple bad luck, he sought an economic answer primarily with 
government actions as the root cause of the difficulties. 
The problems associated with business cycles were caused by factors outside 
the ―regular and harmonious‖ conditions of an unfettered market, which would 
otherwise have progressed or grown in a manner favourable to mankind‘s 
economic needs.  As such these outside influences were exogenous to the 
economic ideal of a pure market economy. 
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Chapter 9 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Our concluding remarks initially provide a summary of the points made in this 
thesis; followed by a more detailed synopsis of Hodgskin‘s position on 
economic growth.  We will also address some of the apparent contradictions 
within Hodgskin‘s work. 
Summation  
We have represented various aspects within Hodgskin‘s work, which we briefly 
summarise here: 
 We illustrated Hodgskin‘s perspective that saw political economy as a 
science concerned with the production of wealth by labour. 
 Labour amounted to any purposive human action that supported the 
labourers‘ subsistence.  Labour could be remunerated by wages, 
salaries, commission or profits. 
 We demonstrated the distinction between labour as the cause and the 
source of wealth; such that labour was the efficient cause of wealth but 
not necessarily its sole source.  
 The claim that the labourer should receive the whole product of labour 
was demonstrated to mean that the labourer had a property claim in that 
portion of the whole product they had actively contributed to create – 
labour should receive the whole of what it produced. 
 The term natural as applied within the science of political economy, when 
pertinent to a hypothetical pure market economy, was reconstructed to 
equate to the expression endogenous.  
 The term artificial when used in the sense as described above, was 
reconstructed to equate to the expression exogenous.  
 Hodgskin‘s Natural Price was presented as essentially the inverse of 
productivity. 
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 Social prices amounted to natural prices enhanced due to the 
interference of exogenous factors with pure market economy 
mechanisms. 
 Competitive forces were seen by Hodgskin, as creating an environment 
in which market prices would effectively decrease in relative terms. This 
can be seen as akin to recognising the augmentation of real wages. 
 Hodgskin‘s notions on value were interpreted such that he is distanced 
from the usual concept of a labour theory of value.  We accept that he 
held a labour theory of property as well as a labour theory of the notion 
of value, but not a full-blown objective labour theory of value with value 
directly determined or measurable in labour terms.  
 We also presented Hodgskin‘s growth theory as one based on the 
endogenous factors of population and knowledge that necessarily 
increased as a result of man‘s social existence. 
 For Hodgskin, economic progress or growth was evident in an increasing 
population under improved economic conditions, as signified by 
proportionately larger increases in both output and living standards (as 
illustrated by decreasing prices). 
 Endogenous growth was consistent with increasing productivity; thereby 
natural prices fall.  Endogenous growth was evident in the tendency for 
natural, social and market prices to fall and gravitate towards each other. 
 Exogenously stimulated developments might have some characteristics 
similar to endogenous growth, but without the tendency for the various 
forms of price to gravitate together. 
 For Hodgskin exogenous factors such as governmental actions and laws 
were likely to ensure that the difference between natural and social 
prices (and hence market prices) increased rather than narrowed, over 
time. 
Growth 
When Hodgskin wrote his economic works the terms exogenous and 
endogenous had yet to find a place within economic phraseology.  Indeed the 
words did not even appear in the 1861 edition of the Walker‟s Dictionary. 
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Within Hodgskin‘s economic scheme we should equate what he saw as natural 
to our more modern expression of endogenous, especially in the sense that 
what is natural is that which a system is endowed with.  
In distinction to this the artificial is that which was essentially exogenous to the 
economic system.  A social economic system of production was not of 
necessity encumbered with government or legal laws, as these were artificial 
embellishments.  Hodgskin‘s view was that laws and governments were 
subsequent to human economic activity. This contrasted with the prevalent view 
that economic activity could only occur in conditions created by governments 
and their legal systems. Religious tithes were also artificial in this sense.   
When Hodgskin considered natural price he was effectively discussing a price 
determined purely by factors endogenous to a social pure market economic 
system of production.  In contrast to this his social price reflected factors 
external to such a system, or prices affected by economically external issues, 
i.e. exogenous. 
The same distinction can be drawn with his ideas on growth.  In the normal 
course of events, Hodgskin argued, the socio-economic conditions lead to a 
growth of population in improved circumstances.  This growth would have been 
endogenous or in the language of the time natural. 
Given that the workings of such a market system were in general necessary 
and sufficient to enhanced prosperity (economic growth), that which was 
exogenous would generally be detrimental or at least superfluous.  Thus that 
which was not natural, i.e. exogenous to such a pure market economy, was 
deemed as artificial (or unnatural), and considered as unnecessary or harmful.  
It would appear that this was the perspective that coloured Hodgskin‘s 
economic prognosis and can be seen exhibited particularly in his promotion and 
defence of free trade in The Economist.   
It is also evident from much of his writing that although he viewed what we 
would nowadays refer to as the market as the best available economic system, 
he was not blind to some of its short term failings.  His Effects of Repealing the 
Corn Laws (12th February 1826) provided an excellent example of this but also 
showed his commitment to long term issues and interests. The same piece also 
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illustrated that his concerns were not restricted to the local or national, but 
extended internationally throughout the whole human social economy. 
Contradictions 
The exposition and reconstruction we have made can prove useful in shedding 
light upon some apparent contradictions within Hodgskin work.  
The ostensible contradiction between his position in support of free-market 
economies and his criticism of capital would only be inconsistent if he promoted 
the free-market whilst at the same time wishing to completely abandon all forms 
of capital and capitalism.  His criticisms seem rather to have been directed at 
the mismanagement of capital, which he saw arose from that inaccurate 
economic analysis which valued the importance of capital too highly, and 
downplayed labour‘s role. 
He never denied that capital was important nor rebuffed the services performed 
by capitalists.  His argument was rather with the attitude that saw capital 
independently creative of wealth separate from any human action or 
involvement.  Left to itself capital would not perform any useful role, but would 
waste and decay.  Nevertheless legal society tended to reward those who did 
no work, purely on the basis of their legal ownership of wealth. For Hodgskin 
this was exploitative not only of the labourers, but of human society as a whole. 
From our insights into his notions of growth one can conclude that he envisaged 
that humanity would prosper without legal intervention, but such intervention 
was necessary only to maintain the power of those with property who no longer 
wished to work (or labour) in order to receive a reward. For Hodgskin capital 
was a necessary factor within production but its impact diminished in the long 
term, whilst its reward – compounded interest – increased.  Such increases 
were in the long-term not only unsustainable but detrimental to the potential rate 
of progress, i.e. economic growth.  
With a correct view of capital and labour the rewards of production would reside 
with those that were actively creative of output rather than concentrated on 
those who just owned or had power over the means of production – as 
encapsulated in the concept of an idle capitalist. 
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In Hodgskin‘s view of the Natural there would be economic growth, and man‘s 
current efforts, rather than his past, would be rewarded.  However the 
apparatus of state and power intervened and, in the relatively short term at 
least, disturbed man‘s normal progress.  Thus Hodgskin was a free-marketeer 
of the most liberal persuasion, who only baulked at modern capitalism as it was 
distracted from its true unhindered path by politically misguided and self-
interested parties. 
It is also in this vein that we need to understand Hodgskin‘s apparently 
contradictory attitude to trade unionism.  When capital was disproportionately 
rewarded trade unions could redress the balance back towards the interests of 
those that creatively produced, rather than the idle capitalists.  Utilised 
inappropriately capital could impede labour‘s productivity; hence these themes 
surfaced in Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital (1825).  However as 
the power of trade unions increased Hodgskin conceived that they went beyond 
this expediency with eventual detrimental effects upon the economy, as they 
impeded capital‘s economical efficiency. 
So again understanding the natural and artificial distinction in a manner akin to 
the endogenous and exogenous concepts provides some useful insights. We 
could perhaps say that when trade unions acted in an endogenous manner, in 
the sense of behaving in line with economic and social laws of the hypothetical 
pure market economy, they would do no harm and actually could counter 
exogenous affects. After all, as Hodgskin pointed out in Labour Defended, it is 
perfectly understandable for workers to combine in social union, as labourers 
are, like humanity in general, social creatures. 
Nevertheless, a point can arise when trade unions behaved in a manner 
contrary to economic laws or necessity; they then became akin to an 
exogenous effect on the economic system.  Such exogenous behaviour might 
well be the pursuit of political ends, such as socialism or communism, in 
comparison to the purely economical and social ends that could be conceived 
of as endogenous. 
Hopefully, these points also lead the way to understanding our final 
contradiction of Hodgskin‘s use of the term social price with somewhat negative 
connotations, and his perception of economics as a social science and man as 
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a necessarily social creature; as such social price become equivalent to an 
exogenous price. 
Consonance  
Thus the apparent dissonance that Hodgskin‘s economics initially presented 
tends to fade when we reconstruct his work and become more aware of the 
intricacies, resolve logomachy, and benefit, with hindsight, from understanding 
that his perspective on human progress has proved in many instances useful, 
not least his emphasis on human ability and knowledge as regards economic 
growth.   
Indeed, both Anthony Brewer and Cosimo Perrotta drew attention to the 
relevancy of pre-Smithian concepts, such as we find fundamental to Hodgskin‘s 
ideas on progress, to a modern understanding of growth. 
To point out that Ferguson‘s approach to economic growth 
differed from Smith‘s is not to say that it was inferior.  As a piece 
of economic analysis, it is far less developed – indeed, it can 
hardly be called economic theory at all.  It provided, as it was 
meant to do, a background to his discussions of social 
development and was not intended as a contribution to 
economics.  Even so, Ferguson‘s emphasis on product and 
process innovation is in many ways more in line with modern 
thinking about economic growth than is Smith‘s single-minded 
emphasis on capital accumulation, (Brewer, 1999, p.253) 
But today we are witnessing the decline of traditional 
industrialization as the driving force in development, and the 
growing importance for productivity and development, of human 
capital (that is to say the very factor to which the Enlightenment 
thinkers attached such value). We can therefore conclude that 
eighteenth-century development theory can explain the real 
evolution of the western economy over the last three centuries 
better than the later theories of development. (Perrotta, 1997, 
p.317) 
It is in this vein that Hodgskin‘s ideas of growth should be valued with regards 
to a modern understanding of growth theory. 
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